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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Insurance and the Commissioner
On November 29, 1977, the North Carolina Rate Bureau, I on behalf of its
member companies and the North Carolina Reinsurance Facility,2 filed with
the Commissioner of Insurance a proposed rate increase for automobile insur-
ance including bodily injury and property damage liability, medical payments,
and physical damage insurance for nonfleet private passenger automobiles.3
In 1978 the Rate Bureau made an additional filing proposing territorial rate
differentials for automobile insurance4 and revised premium rates for home-
owners insurance and workmens' compensation insurance.
The Commissioner disapproved these filings in their entirety. Four cases
appealing this disapproval were decided by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in 1980.5 Pursuant to G.S. 58-9.6(b), 6 the court declared the decision of
the Commissioner null and void, finding that "it is apparent that the multiple
errors committed by the Commissioner in the proceedings and order before us
are of such magnitude as to make remand futile.' 7
1. Scope of Review of Commissioner's Orders
The North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (NCAPA) provides
that review of a final agency decision may be sought under the act unless "ade-
quate procedure for judicial review is provided by some other statute, in which
case the review shall be sought under such statute." 8 The supreme court held
1. The North Carolina Rate Bureau is established by chapter 58, article 12B of the North
Carolina General Statutes, and all companies writing "essentiar' lines of insurance (certain res-
idential fire and property insurance, automobile theft and physical damage insurance, automobile
liability and allied lines, and workmen's compensation and employers' liability insurance) are
required to be members. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 6, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1119
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-124.17(1), -124.18 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The Bureau promul-
gates rules to which all members must adhere, and it is responsible for making rate filings. Writ-
ers of nonessential lines may become members of the Bureau as well but are not required to join.
See generally Surey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1977-Insurance, 56 N.C.L. Rav.843, 1088-92 (1978).
2. The North Carolina Reinsurance Facility was created by chapter 28, article 25A of the
North Carolina General Statutes as a reinsurance pool for high risk drivers whom insurers do not
wish to insure individually. All insurance companies licensed to write motor vehicle insurance in
the state are required to participate in the Facility. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 20, 1977 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1119 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.34(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The
same statute provides procedures to make the Facility self-sustaining and provides that the Facil-
ity shall make neither a profit nor a loss. The Facility is required to accept any risk ceded to it by
its members.
3. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 392, 269
S.E.2d 547, 557 (1980).
4. See notes 56-62 and accompanying text infra.
5. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 485, 269 S.E.2d 602
(1980); State exrel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 474, 269 S.E.2d 595
(1980); State ex rel. Comn'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 538
(1980); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547(1980).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.6(b) (1975).
7. 300 N.C. at 459, 269 S.E.2d at 594.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978).
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that a statute provides adequate procedure for review only if it requires a
scope of review equal to that under Chapter 150A, article 4 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes.9 In light of "subtle differences" between G.S. 150A-51
and G.S. 58-9.6(b), 10 the review statute specifically applicable to insurance
ratemaking cases, the court found G.S. 150A-51 controlling except to the ex-
tent that the chapter 58 provision expands the judicial function." Since other
portions of the chapter 58 provision previously had been found inadequate
and thus subordinate to the NCAPA, 12 the court here perceived its decision as
a step toward achieving some uniformity in judicial review of administrative
decisions. 13
2. Commissioner's Authority to Require Audits of Ratemaking Data
The supreme court held that, viewing the statutes inpar mater/a, it is
within the Commissioner's statutory authority to require that data be audited
in order for him to deem it reliable and credible.14 The court recognized the
general North Carolina rule that in the regulation of insurance rates the Com-
missioner has only the authority given him by statute,15 but the court inter-
preted the rule broadly. Indeed, the court thought it beyond doubt that "our
Legislature intended for the Commissioner of Insurance to promulgate such
reasonable rules and regulations as he deems necessary to discharge the func-
tions of his office .... ,,16 The opinion cited with approval decisions by the
United States Supreme Court that held that even though a power asserted by
an agency is novel or unprecedented it is not necessarily unauthorized unless
statutory authority clearly indicates the contrary.' 7
9. 300 N.C. at 395, 269 S.E.2d at 559.
10. One such difference is that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-51 (1978) provides that an agency
decision can be reversed whenever a substantial right may have been prejudiced, while N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-9.6 (1975) allows reversal when such rights have been prejudiced.
11. 300 N.C. at 395, 269 S.E.2d at 559.
12. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619, 240 S.E.2d 460 (1977).
13. 300 N.C. at 395, 269 S.E.2d at 559. See Daye, North Carolina's NewAdministrative Proce.
dure Act: An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C.L. REv. 833, 899-900 (1975).
Professor Daye recommends repeal of all judicial-review provisions in individual statutes to
alleviate the lack of uniformity. Daye is concerned that this lack of uniformity could be com-
pounded by decisions holding only part of a specific review provision inadequate, thus applying
the NCAPA to matters arising under that portion while applying the specific provision to other
matters. Id. at 899 n.306.
The supreme court's decision attempts to meet the expressed concern by making the NCAPA
provision controlling on ratemaking cases as well as other insurance cases. The decision does not
result in complete uniformity, however, since the specific statute will apparently still apply to the
extent that it broadens the judicial review afforded under the NCAPA. This result does nothing to
alleviate the need Daye correctly recognized for members of the bar to become familiar with each
agency's individual review provisions since lawyers must still determine whether such provisions
add to the NCAPA scope of review. Id. at 899.
14. 300 N.C. at 400, 269 S.E.2d at 562.
15. Id. at 398-99, 269 S.E.2d at 560-61 (citing State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina
Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 471, 234 S.E.2d 720 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v.
North Carolina Auto. Rate Administration Office, 287 N.C. 192, 214 S.E.2d 98 (1975)).
16. 300 N.C. at 400, 269 S.E.2d at 562.
17. Id. at 400-01, 269 S.E.2d at 562-63 (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950) (power not necessarily unauthorized) and Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968) (statutory authority to the contrary)).
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The North Carolina court's view is consistent with the modem tendency
to be liberal in granting discretion to administrative agencies in carrying out
their statutory purposes.' 8 It is also consistent with the primary reason for
establishing administrative agencies-to reduce what would otherwise be an
overwhelming burden on the legislature to administer laws in highly complex
and technical areas.
While the Commissioner's discretion is broad, however, it is not unfet-
tered. Though the court held that the requirement that data be audited is
within the Commissioner's authority, it also held that such a rule cannot be
made during a contested case but only pursuant to the rulemaking provisions
of the NCAPA. The Commissioner argued that his determination was re-
lieved from the NCAPA requirements by statutory exclusions applicable to
"[s]tatements of policy or interpretations that are made in the decision of a
contested case" and to "[i]nterpretative rules and general statements of policy
of the agency." 19 The court disagreed, finding the Commissioner's require-
ment to be a legislative rule, rather than a mere interpretation, and thus sub-
ject to the rulemaking provisions.20 Unlike policy or interpretive statements,
the Commissioner's rule set up new substantive requirements with sanctions
for failure to comply. 2 '
The court, in interpreting the legislative intent behind G.S. 150A-10,
ruled that the ad hoe adjudication technique should be used only when its
advantages clearly outweigh possible deleterious public consequences result-
ing from retroactive application of a rule adopted without public hearing.22 In
this case the court found none of the factors that justify rulemaking in adjudi-
cation. These factors are present, according to the United States Supreme
Court, when a problem arises in the case which the administrative agency
could not reasonably foresee, or when the agency has not had sufficient experi-
ence with a particular problem to have made a hard and fast rule, or when the
problem is so specialized and varying that it is impossible to deal with under a
general rule.23
On the other side of the scale, the court found numerous factors mitigat-
ing against the ad hoc rulemaking in this situation. These factors include the
extent of the change that the new requirement would make in long-established
procedure. In addition, no investigation had been made into the cost of such a
18. See I AM. JUR. 2dAdministrative Law § 118 (1962). But see 300 N.C. at 414, 269 S.E.2d
at 570. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-9 provides in part:
It is the intent of this Article to establish basic minimum procedural requirements for the
adoption, amendment, or repeal of administrative rules. Except for emergency rules
.. , the provisions. . . are applicable to the exercise of any rulemaking authority...
No rule. . . is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with this Article.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-10 (1978).
20. 300 N.C. at 412, 269 S.E.2d at 568.
21. Id. The court again cites Professor Daye's article, supra note 13, at 852-53, for a defini-
tion of legislative rules. See also I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 175 (1965).
22. 300 N.C. at 415-16, 269 S.E.2d at 570-71. The rule was adopted from 1 F. COOPER, supra
note 21, at 181-82.
23. SEC v. Cheneny Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
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requirement, which undoubtedly would be borne ultimately by consumers, or
the feasibility of the rule in logistical terms.24 The court also criticized the
vagueness of the Commissioner's ad hoc rule and declared the Commissioner's
actions arbitrary and capricious. 25 The court's decision indicates a policy
favoring rulemaking over ad hoc adjudication except in cases in which the
latter is clearly necessary to the effective accomplishment of the agency's func-
tions.26
3. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility27
The same case presented the first substantial challenge to the Reinsurance
Facility.28 The challenge by the Commissioner was prompted by the Rate
Bureau's proposal that the rates for risks ceded to the Reinsurance Facility be
ten percent higher than the proposed rates for voluntarily insured risks. 29
The applicable statutory provision states that "[a]U rates shall be on an
actuarially sound basis" and that "there shall be a strong presumption that the
rates and premiums for the business of the Facility are neither unreasonable
nor excessive."'30 The court held that even though the record was replete with
evidence indicating that the proposed differential was actuarially sound, the
24. 300 N.C. at 419, 269 S.E.2d at 572.
25. Id. at 420, 269 S.E.2d at 573.
26. Id. The court's finding that the Commissioner's rule was arbitrary and capricious was
made pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.6(b)(6) (1975) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51(6)
(1978).
See I F. COOPER, supra note 21, at 181-82. The court also cites several cases in accord with
this general position. 300 N.C. at 416-17, 269 S.E.2d at 571. See generally NLRB v. E & B
Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961); NLRB v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952).
In this same case the court again stressed the importance of public hearings and indepth study
of new agency rules when it branded the Commissioner's adoption of a new formula for under-
writing profit as "arbitrary and capricious." 300 N.C. at 451, 269 S.E.2d at 590. The court stated
that although the formula had been used in another state, it was still arbitrary and capricious to
"blindly" adopt a novel approach without careful study of the appropriateness of the formula for
North Carolina. Id. at 451-53, 269 S.E.2d at 590-91.
The court also held the proposed formula impermissible as a matter of law because it takes
into account income on invested capital, see notes 42-55 and accompanying text infra, and be-
cause the formula uses a hypothetical "risk free" rate of return. Id. at 450, 269 S.E.2d at 589. The
court held that the legislature could not have intended a requirement that underwriting profit be
computed on the latter hypothetical basis since G.S. 58-79.1 (1975) specifically requires casualty
insurance companies to invest in one or more of ten different types of investments including first
mortgage bonds, ground rents, certain stocks, and real estate. 300 N.C. at 450, 269 S.E.2d at 589.
Clearly these are not risk-free investments.
Finally, the court's desire for public hearings and input into ratemaking decisions was
stressed again in the second case decided on the same day. See State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v.
North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 538 (1980). The court interpreted N.C.GEN. STAT. § 150A-23(d) (1978) to mean that the Commissioner may allow anyone to intervene in
an agency hearing at his complete discretion. 300 N.C. at 468, 269 S.E.2d at 543. In addition, the
court held that the Commissioner properly could authorize citizen groups to hold hearings
throughout the state on proposed rate changes since ratemaking is so important to all the citizens
of the state. Id., 269 S.E.2d at 543-44.
27. See note 2 supra.
28. 300 N.C. at 424, 269 S.E.2d at 575.
29. Id. at 422-23, 269 S.E.2d at 574.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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Commissioner ignored that evidence and that his findings were unsupported
by substantial evidence. 3' Furthermore, the court held that the legislature
must have intended that Facility rates be higher than those for voluntarily
retained risks.32 Such a result is clearly required if the Facility is to follow the
legislative mandate to accept all ceded applicants despite their driving records,
to fix rates on an actuarially sound basis, and to operate in a manner that
produces neither a profit nor a loss. 33
The court gave short shrift to the Commissioner's other attacks on the
Facility. The Commissioner found unfair rate discrimination in the absence
of objective criteria for deciding which risks would be ceded to the Facility.34
The finding, however, was unenforceable because the statute allows a com-
pany to cede any risk it does not wish to retain.35 In addition, the insurance
industry is not likely to abuse the privilege since the only way it can profit
from a customer is by not ceding the risk.36
The Commissioner also concluded that the rate proposal was improper
because any increase in the number of ceded risks would result in a total rate
increase of more than six percent, in violation of G.S. 58-124.26. 37 While this
conclusion is mathematically correct the court concluded that it was erroneous
as a matter of law.38 Obviously, if additional cessions to the Facility consti-
tuted rate increases, the statutory provision allowing unlimited cessions to the
Facility could itself operate to cause an impermissible rate increase, as could a
number of other premium variations caused by factors such as the territory in
which the car is principally garaged. 39
Finally, the court ended its discussion by calling for establishment of
guidelines by the legislature or the Commissioner on the meaning of "unfair
rate discrimination."4 Since the court, as well as the legal profession and the
industry, has been unable to determine what the legislature wants to encom-
pass within this requirement, it is to be hoped that the General Assembly or
the agency will respond with sufficiently clear guidelines to ensure proper im-
plementation of its policies. 4 1
31. 300 N.C. at 431, 269 S.E.2d at 579.
32. Id. at 434, 269 S.E.2d at 580-81.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 422-23, 269 S.E.2d at 574. The Commissioner's power to declare an unfairly dis-
criminatory rate ineffective was contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977)
(amended 1979).
35. 300 N.C. at 434, 269 S.E.2d at 581. The applicable statutory provision is N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-248.35 (1975). The court noted that no constitutional challenge to the statute was
raised. 300 N.C. at 435, 269 S.E.2d at 581.
36. 300 N.C. at 435, 269 S.E.2d at 581.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.26 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979).
38. 300 N.C. at 436, 269 S.E.2d at 581.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 437, 269 S.E.2d at 582.
41. Some of the Commissioner's worries about unfair discrimination between ceded risks and
voluntary risks were alleviated by the 1979 Legislature's amendment to the statute passed after the
filing at issue was made. Law of May 29, 1979, ch. 676, §§ 1-2, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 721
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). As amended, G.S. 58-248.33(1)
defines a "clean risk" as any owner of a private, nonfleet automobile if the owner and each li-
! 1981] 1021
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4. Income on Invested Capital
The Commissioner further challenged the rate filings on the ground that
income on invested capital was not taken into account in the ratemaking
formula.42 The North Carolina Court of Appeals had recently decided that
investment income may be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a
filing.4 3 However, that case concerned only invested income from unearned
premium and loss reserves. The supreme court concluded that investment in-
come from unearned premium and loss reserves may properly be considered,
but income from invested capital may not.44
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily upon language in
previous North Carolina cases. The court, in In re North Carolina Automobile
Rate Administrative Office,4 5 recognized that the industry view, and at that
time the Commissioner's view as well, was that profit should not be based on
invested capital since the required capital assets of an insurance company are
not held for working capital but as reserves to guarantee its ability to pay off
all liabilities. 46
A second rationale that the court found persuasive is that insurance com-
panies, since they do not require costly equipment or large capital investments,
cannot properly determine rates by reference to the capital invested and the
value of their property. "[Piroper profit levels for insurance companies may be
more appropriately ascertained by taking a percentage of their premiums than
by specifying a certain rate of return on their capital investment.' '47 Finally,
the court found this rule on invested capital consistent with the rule in the
majority of jurisdictions.48
The statute in effect when the challenged rate filing was made did not
refer to consideration of investment income on either unearned premium and
loss reserves or on invested capital.49 The statute was amended and now pro-
vides for consideration of "investment income earned or realized by insurers
from their unearned premium, loss, and loss expense reserve funds generated
from business within this State."50 Thus, the statute was amended to provide
for consideration of unearned premiums and loss reserves; however, it still
censed driver in his household have two years of driving experience and if none of them has had
any chargeable accident or conviction for a moving violation during the three year period prior to
applying for insurance. The statute provides that rates charged "clean risks" ceded to the Facility
may not exceed rates charged "clean risks" who are not reinsured by the Facility.
42. 300 N.C. at 440, 269 S.E.2d at 584.
43. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 40 N.C. App. 85, 252 S.E.2d
811 (1979).
44. 300 N.C. at 441, 269 S.E.2d at 584.
45. 278 N.C. 302, 180 S.E.2d 155 (1971).
46. Id. at 315, 180 S.E.2d at 164.
47. 300 N.C. at 443-44,269 S.E.2d at 585-86. Seealso State exrel. Comm'r oflns, v. State ex
rel. Att'y General, 19 N.C. App. 263, 268, 198 S.E.2d 575, 579, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 252, 200
S.E.2d 659 (1973).
48. 300 N.C. at 444, 269 S.E.2d at 586. See 2 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§ 21:38 (2d ed. 1959).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (amended 1979).
50. Id. § 58-124.19(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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says nothing about income from invested capital. In light of the holding in In
re North Carolina Automobile Rate Administrative Office against consideration
of such income, 51 a strong inference arises that the legislature is in accord.
The case raised one final issue that, though quickly disposed of by the
court, is still important. When the legislature passed the statute implementing
the file and use system, the Commissioner was given the affirmative duty to act
if he wishes to challenge a proposed rate change.52 The Rate Bureau argued
that it necessarily follows that the burden of proof in ratemaking cases has
been shifted to the Commissioner. 53 The court, however, held that such a
drastic change in the law cannot be implied without specific language by the
legislature indicating intent to make such a change. 54 In addition, the court
noted that such a change was included in the proposed statute but was deleted
before the final version was passed, thus indicating an intent to leave the bur-
den of proof on the Rate Bureau.:55
5. Territorial Rate Differentials
In the second case decided by the supreme court on the same day, the
court upheld the Rate Bureau's proposal to use territorial rate differentials.56
The proposed rates were statistically calculated in each line of coverage on the
basis of the loss experience of each territory in one of three levels; (1) five
percent below the statewide base rate; (2) five percent above the statewide base
rate; and (3) the indicated statewide base rate.57
The Commissioner argued that the use of territorial rate differentials
would violate G.S. 58-30.4's limitation on classification and subclassification
plans.58 As the court points out, however, the statute makes no mention of the
51. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
52. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 7, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1119 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 58-124.20 to -124.22 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (amended 1979)). Under the file and use
system the insurer or Rate Bureau is required only to file the new rates and accompanying data
with the Commissioner. The rates take effect automatically without prior approval of the Com-
missioner. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.20(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). If the Commissioner wishes to
challenge the rates he must hold a hearing. If he finds that the rates fail to comply with statutory
requirements he can declare them ineffective. Id. § 58-124.21(a). This decision is subject to ap-
peal pending which insurers may continue to use the new rates if the purportedly excessive
amounts are placed in an escrow account. Id. § 58-124.22(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (amended 1979).
This sytem replaced the North Carolina requirement of prior approval for all new rate filings. 300
N.C. at 454, 269 S.E.2d at 591.
53. 300 N.C. at 454, 269 S.E.2d at 591.
54. Id.
55. Id., 269 S.E.2d at 592.
56. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 473, 269
S.E.2d 538, 546 (1980). Data on premiums and losses throughout the state are collected using a
territorial approach. Each insured vehicle is assigned to a territory according to the place where it
is principally garaged. All premiums and losses with respect to the vehicle are reported in its
assigned territory. This territorial rate system is commonly used throughout the country. Id. at
471, 269 S.E.2d at 545.
57. Id, 269 S.E.2d at 546.
58. Id. at 471-72, 269 S.E.2d at 546. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30.4 (Cum. Supp. 1979)(amended 1979) provides for four basic classifications: (1) pleasure use only; (2) pleasure use
except driving to and from work; (3) business use; and (4) farm use. The statute further mandates
that the Rate Bureau set up subclassifications reflecting statistical driving experience and exposure
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establishment of territories; and it was clear to the court that territories are not
encompassed within the term "classifications."'5 9 The court derived this con-
clusion from another insurance statute which lists "territories" separately from
"classifications."'60 In addition, the court had previously held that the statute's
purpose was to abolish any use of age or sex as rating factors.61 The court
found "absolutely no intent" on the part of the legislature in the cited statute
or elsewhere to prohibit the consideration of territories in ratemaking.62
Perhaps the most important aspect of the supreme court's decisions in
these cases, aside from the specific holdings, is a clear message to the Commis-
sioner that the court intends to protect fully the file and use system. The court
is prohibiting the Commissioner from springing new requirements on the in-
surance industry after its filings have already been made. The Commissioner
is required, whenever possible, to use the formal rulemaking procedures, thus
putting the industry on notice of any changes in policy.
Had the court held otherwise the Commissioner could impose insuffera-
ble delays on the Rate Bureau by challenging every rate filing with some new
requirement which the Bureau could not possibly have anticipated. In addi-
tion, the direction to use the rulemaking procedures should foster a more care-
ful study of proposed changes and more public input than would hastily
adopted changes serving merely to frustrate filings already made.
B. Utilities Regulation
North Carolina courts reviewed several ratemaking decisions by the
North Carolina Utilities Commission in 1980. In State ex rel Utilities Com-
mission v. CF Industries, Inc. (CFI)63 a natural gas retailer had overcollected
approximately $625,000 under the curtailment tracking rate (CTR)64 allowed
by the North Carolina Utilities Commission for the year ending October 31,
1977. Instead of ordering a full refund, the commission allowed the retailer to
offset that amount by the amount of undercollection under the previous year's
CTR, some $518,000.65 The North Carolina Supreme Court held in CFI that
such an offset did not constitute retroactive ratemaking and therefore was per-
of insured drivers in each of the four main classifications except that no subclassification may be
based directly or indirectly on age or sex.
59. 300 N.C. at 472, 269 S.E.2d at 546.
60. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.25 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides that "[r]ates, rating sys-
tems, territories, classifications and policy forms lawfully in use on September 1, 1977, may con-
tinue to be used thereafter, notwithstanding any provision of this Article."
61. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administrative Office, 294
N.C. 60, 64, 241 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1978); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate
Administrative Office, 293 N.C. 365, 368, 239 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1977).
62. 300 N.C. at 472, 269 S.E.2d at 546.
63. 299 N.C. 504, 263 S.E.2d 559 (1980).
64. The CTR is a variable surcharge, imposed on the basis of projected volumes of gas avail-
able for the year, designed to guarantee to the retailer a certain absolute amount (Base Period
Margin) of revenue over the cost of fuel regardless of the volume available to be sold. At the end
of the year the retailer 'trues up" the CTR and refunds any overcollections or recoups any un-
dercollections. Id. at 505-06; 263 S.E.2d at 560-61.
65. Id. at 506, 263 S.E.2d at 561.
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missible.66 The court acknowledged the general rule that a utility may not
increase a fixed general rate for current customers in order to recover a previ-
ous deficit,67 but found that the CTR is not a fixed general rate; rather, the
CTR is by nature an estimated rate that is corrected in light of actual experi-
ence through the trueing up process. 68 The court reasoned, therefore, that
since a utility could be forced to refund any overcollections above the guaran-
teed base, it must be allowed to recoup any undercollections. 69
In State ex rel Utilities Commission v. Bird Oil Co. 70 the court of appeals
struck down a dedicated rate provision that allowed common carriers to offer a
special low rate for any tanker truck "dedicated" to the intrastate use of a
single customer for at least 100 hours per week for at least twenty consecutive
weeks. The court found the provision unreasonably discriminatory71 against
small oil jobbers in violation of G.S. 62-140(a)72 and G.S. 62-259,73 because
only large oil companies have 100 hours of transport demand per week to
occupy the dedicated tankers.74 The court rejected appellees' contention that
the lower rate for dedicated service was reasonable because cost-justified,75
thus bringing North Carolina in line with the federal approach under the In-
terstate Commerce Commission.76
In State ex rel Utilities Commission v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.
(VEPCO) 7 7 the court of appeals held that in an expedited rate adjustment
proceeding provided by G.S. 62-134(e),78 the North Carolina Utilities Coin-
66. Id. at 509, 263 S.E.2d at 562-63.
67. Id. at 507, 263 S.E.2d at 562. See, e.g., State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C.
451, 232 S.E.2d 184 (1977); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. City of Durham, 282 N.C. 308, 193
S.E.2d 95 (1972).
68. 299 N.C. at 508-09, 263 S.E.2d at 562. See note 64supra for comments on the trueing-up
process.
69. Id. at 509, 263 S.E.2d at 563. The court failed to explain adequately why there should be
a distinction betwen general ratemaking and CTR ratemaking with respect to collection of deficits
from prior years. Clearly, if a utility must refund any excesses, it should be allowed to recoup any
deficitsfrom theyearjust ended. This case, however, concerns the rolling forward of a deficit from
an earlier year. Moreover, this deficit was caused by the utility's own erroneous calculation of the
Base Period Margin (BPM), not from any shortfall of revenue below the BPM as approved at the
time. Id. at 505, 263 S.E.2d at 560.
70. 47 N.C. App. 1, 266 S.E.2d 838 (1980).
71. Id. at 18, 266 S.E.2d at 847.
72. "No public utility shall, as to rates or services, make or grant any unreasonable prefer-
ence or advantage to any person or subject any person to any unreasonable prejudice or disadvan-
tage. .. ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-140(a) (Supp. 1979).
73. "lilt is declared the policy of the State of North Carolina to preserve and continue all
motor carrier transportation services now afforded this state. . . and to prevent discrimination,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices between all carri-
ers .. " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-259 (1975).
74. 47 N.C. App. at 6, 266 S.E.2d at 841.
75. Id. at 11-12, 266 S.E.2d at 843-44. Appellees argued that discounted rates would draw
more business to common carriers. The carriers' fixed costs would be spread over a larger volume.
Consequently, the unit cost for transport would decline. Id.
76. See, ag., Central & S. Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 823, 829
.(D. Del. 1967).
77. 48 N.C. App. 453, 269 S.E.2d 657 (1980).
78. [U]pon application by any public utility for permission and authority to increase its
rates and charges based solely upon the increased cost offuel. . . the Commission shall
suspend such proposed increase for a period not to exceed 90 days.... The Commis-
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mission may not consider factors such as "heat rate"7 9 and "plant availabil-
ity"80 because those factors deal with overall system efficiency, not with the
reasonableness of the price paid for fuel.8 1 The court indicated that system
efficiency could be considered in a general rate case,8 2 but not in the special
fuel cost pass-through proceeding under G.S. 62-134(e).8 3
C. State and Local Government
1. Review of State Agency Action
In Orange County v. North Carolina Department of Transportation84 the
court of appeals reversed and remanded, in part, the dismissal by the superior
court of a suit to enjoin planning and construction of the connnecting link of
Interstate 40 through Orange and Durham Counties.8 5 The complaint raised
several administrative procedure issues, including whether the state Board of
Transportation had improperly given permission for a specific route within the
approved 1-40 corridor before a final environmental impact statement (EIS)
was prepared.8 6 Plaintiffs also questioned whether the Board violated state
and federal regulations by denying a hearing to local landowners8 7 and by
providing inadequate procedures for the public corridor hearings. 88 Plaintiffs
further contended that the Board of Transportation's enabling statute8 9 was an
sion shall promptly investigate applications filed pursuant to provisions of this subsec-
tion and shall hold a public hearing within 30 days.. .and shall base its order upon the
record adduced at the hearing.... A proceeding under this subsection shall not be
considered a general rate case.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-134(e) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
79. The court defined "heat rate" as "the ratio between the amount of heat, expressed in
BTU's, required to produce a kilowatt-hour of electricity.... [Thus,] the lower the heat rate, the
more efficient is the conversion of fuel into electricity." 48 N.C. App. at 460-61, 269 S.E.2d at 661-
62.
80. "Plant availability" refers to the relationship between the amount of electricity actually
generated from a given plant and the theoretical maximum capacity of that plant. Id. at 460, 269
S.E.2d at 661-62.
81. Id. at 462, 269 S.E.2d at 662.
82. Standards for a general rate case are provided by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (1975 &
Supp. 1979).
83. 48 N.C. App. at 462, 269 S.E.2d at 662.
84. 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 94 (1980).
85. The court held that mandamus and an injunction are interchangeable remedies. Id. at
384-85, 265 S.E.2d at 912-13. Accordingly, just as in the case of mandamus, if plaintiffs prove
their case, the injunction will be effective against the individual defendants so long as they remain
in their official capacities. Id. at 386, 265 S.E.2d at 913.
86. The complaint further alleged that the draft EIS relied upon by the Board was materially
misleading in that it listed, as "alternatives" to the approved I-B route, two routes which were to
be constructed regardless of the decision on 1-B. The court remanded this factual issue to the trinl
court. Id. at 383, 265 S.E.2d at 911-12.
87. 19 N.C.A.C. 2A.0501 (1980), promulgated by the North Carolina Department of Trans-
portation and in effect at the time of the denial of a hearing, provided that "[a]ny person having
business with the Board of Transportation shall be heard by the Board" (emphasis added). The
word "shall" has since been changed to "may." See note 97 infra.
88. At 23 C.F.R. §§ 790.5-.7 (1980), procedures for public hearinp at both the corridor and
design stages of a federally aided highway project are provided. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the
Board of Transportation gave inadequate notice of the corridor hearing in violation of 23 C.F.R.
§ 790.7(a).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-44.1 (Supp. 1979) requires the Department of Transportation to
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unconstitutionally broad delegation of legislative authority to an administra-
tive body.
The court dealt first with the reviewability of the administrative action
under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (NCAPA).90 G.S.
150A-43 delineates four prerequisites to judical review: (1) an aggrieved per-
son, (2) a final agency decision, (3) a contested case, and (4) exhaustion of
administrative remedies. 9 1
The court found all plaintiffs to be "aggrieved" under the statute because
each had a direct or personal stake in the placement of the highway.92 The
court also ruled that the plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers to challenge the
unauthorized expenditure of public funds for the highway because they had a
sufficient geographical nexus to the proposed route.93 It is established prece-
dent that a taxpayer has no standing to challenge public expenditures that
affect members of the general public in an equal fashion.94 Citing its opinion
in Texft Industries, Inc. v. Fayetteville,95 however, the court held that taxpayers
in and around the proposed route could show a direct and peculiar injury,
thereby giving them standing as "aggrieved" persons.96
The Board of Transportation contended that its actions to date were unre-
viewable because they were not final agency decisions within the meaning of
G.S. 150A-43. The court found, however, that the Board's denial of plaintiffs'
request for a hearing in violation of its own regulations97 did constitute a final
"develop and maintain a statewide system of roads and highways commensurate with the needs of
the state as a whole .. " The court found that statutes such as G.S. 136-45 (Supp. 1979) (gen-
eral guidelines for state highway system), G.S. 136-42.1 (Supp. 1979) (preservation of cultural and
historic landmarks), and the North Carolina Environmental Policy Act, G.S. 113A-1 through -10
(1978 & Supp. 1979), when read together, provide adequate standards to govern administrative
discretion; the delegation was therefore constitutional. See Adams v. North Carolina Dept. of
Natural and Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978), for a discussion of the
nondelegation doctrine in North Carolina.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 through -64 (1978 & Supp. 1979). See generally Daye, North
Carolina'r NewAdministrative Procedure Act: An InterpretiveAnalysis, 53 N.C.L. Rv. 833 (1975).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
92. Orange County's planning scheme stood to be affected by the 1-40 placement; the individ-
ual plaintiffs stood to lose their land through eminent domain; and the nonprofit corporation,
Sensible Highways and Protected Environments (SHAPE), was composed of residents living in or
near the proposed route. 46 N.C. App. at 360-61, 265 S.E.2d at 899.
93. Id. at 361, 265 S.E.2d at 899. Here, plaintiffs claimed the expenditure was unauthorized
because the required procedures were not followed. Each individual plaintiff had the requisite
geographical nexus. See note 92 supra.
94. Green v. Eure, 27 N.C. App. 605, 608, 220 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1975), cert. denied 289 N.C.
297, 222 S.E.2d 696 (1976).
95. 44 N.C. App. 268, 270, 261 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1979). For a discussion of taxpayer standing in
the federal context, see Note, Taxpayer Standing in the Wake of.Fast v. Cohen, 81 DIcK. L. REv.
495 (1977). See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 556 (1972); Annot., 17 A.L.R. Fed. 33 § 8 (1973).
96. 46 N.C. App. at 361, 265 S.E.2d at 899. See also City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661,
671 (9th Cir. 1975).
97. The regulation in effect when the denial was made provided that "[a]ny person having
business with the Board of Transportation shall be heard by the Board." 19 N.C.A.C. 2A.0501
(1980) (emphasis added).
On July 1, 1978 this regulation was superceded by a provision that the Board "may hear any
person or persons on any transportation matter." 19A N.C.A.C. IA.0302(1) (1981) (emphasis ad-
ded). The court in Orange County indicated in dictum that the new regulation is valid because
there is no statutory or constitutional requirement that the Board hear any citizen on a particular
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agency decision.
On the other hand, the court held that the Board's decisions relating to
notice, public hearings, and the sufficiency of the EIS under federal regula-
tions98 were not sufficiently final to allow judicial review unless federal loca-
tion approval had been sought and obtained.99 Only at that point in the
planning of a federally-aided highway project is the commitment to a particu-
lar route definite enough to ensure that judicial intervention will not lead to
piecemeal litigation.100 The court remanded the case for a determination of
whether federal location approval had been obtained since the complaint was
filed. 10' Nevertheless, the court proceeded to decide the case as if location
approval had been obtained.
The denial of the individual hearing guaranteed by the Board's regula-
tions was clearly a final decision because it immediately and completely closed
off plaintiffs' opportunity to be heard. Presumably no further internal review
of that denial was available. On the other hand, the alleged improprieties in
the EIS procedures could be challenged effectively after federal location ap-
proval was obtained. The court believed it should not intervene until the Fed-
eral Highway Administration had had a chance to review the EIS for legal
sufficiency and content. 10 2 Perhaps, like the exhaustion-of-remedies require-
ment, this approach to the finality requirement is designed to allow an admin-
istrative hierarchy to correct its own mistakes before a court steps in.
The court rejected the Board of Transportation's argument that this pro-
ceeding was not a "contested case" and therefore was unreviewable. As de-
fined by the NCAPA, a "'[c]ontested case' means any agency proceeding...
wherein the legal rights. . . of a party are required by law to be determined
by an agency after an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing." 103 Normally,
an adjudicatory hearing is required only in the condemnation proceeding that
follows the location proceedings. In North Carolina, however, all administra-
tive actions must meet the requirements of the North Carolina Environmental
Policy Act (NCEPA).1 4 Administrative regulations promulgated under the
NCEPA do provide for appeal of an environmental determination to a hear-
transportation matter. 46 N.C. App. at 382, 265 S.E.2d at 911. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-62 (1974 &
Supp. 1979) does at least give citizens a right to comment on any highway proposal by presenting
a petition to the local county commission for transmission to the Board of Transportation.
98. 23 C.F.R. §§ 771.1 through .22 (1979) (environmental impact statements); 23 C.F.R.
§§ 790.1 through .11 (1979) (public hearings concerning highway projects).
99. 46 N.C. App. at 372-73, 265 S.E.2d at 905-06. See 23 C.F.R. § 790.9 (1979) (requirements
for location and design approval).
100. 46 N.C. App. at 372-73, 265 S.E.2d at 905-06. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club 427 U.S. 390,
406 n.15 (1976) (appeal ripe when agency action sufficiently mature to assure that judicial review
will not cause undue disruption and lead to piecemeal adjudication).
101. 46 N.C. App. at 387, 265 S.E.2d at 914. In the event the case proved ripe on remand, the
court said in dictum that with respect to a federally-aided highway project, the state may select a
route before preparing the final EIS because federal regulations require that procedure. Id. at
383, 265 S.E.2d at 911.
102. See 23 C.F.R. § 771.14(b) (1979).
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (1978).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-4(I), -6 (1978).
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ing officer appointed by the Governor.105 The court reasoned, therefore, that
the law did require a hearing and that the present dispute constituted a con-
tested case. 10 6
Although the NCAPA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies as
a prerequisite to judicial review, the court of appeals in Orange County held
that plaintiffs' failure to use a petitioning procedure provided by administra-
tive regulations did not bar judicial review under G.S. 150A-43. The court
noted that the regulations had not been published and properly indexed as
required by the NCAPA. 10 7 Consequently, there was no practical way for a
party to discover what remedies were available under the regulations.108 The
court reasoned that despite the general rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse, a party could not, consistent with due process, be held responsible for
exhausting remedies contained in regulations that are "effectively hidden in
the catacombs of the state bureaucracy."' 10 9
This holding by the court of appeals was an apparent admonition to the
state to comply with G.S. 150A-63. In January 1981 the North Carolina Ad-
ministrative Code was published.' 10 Consequently, it is now less likely that
lack of notice of available remedies will again provide an excuse for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Finally, the court rejected the state's contention that sovereign immunity
barred the suit because the Board of Transportation's discretionary power to
locate highways is unreviewable under G.S. 136-59."'1 Instead, the court held
that the Board's duty to provide certain procedures was ministerial; therefore,
105. 1 N.C.A.C. 25.0106 (1981).
106. 46 N.C. App. at 374-75, 265 S.E.2d at 906-07. The court conspicuously failed to address
directly the question whether the hearing required by the NCAPA regulations could legitimatelybe considered adjudicatory.
In Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979), the North Carolina Supreme Court
cited Daye, supra note 90, at 868-72 for the proposition that "contested case" as used in the
NCAPA has two elements: (I) an agency proceeding; (2) that determined the rights of a party.
296 N.C. at 424-25, 251 S.E.2d at 850. Professor Daye's analysis was based, however, on an earlier
version of the statute which defined "contested case" as "any agency proceeding, by whatever
name called, wherein the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are to be determined."
Daye, supra note 90, at 869. In 1975 the General Assembly amended the statute to its present
form. Law of May 14, 1976, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. c. 983, 61, 62. The supreme court's
definition of "contested case" in Lloyd therefore should not be considered a license to disregard
the new statutory language relating to an adjudicatory hearing.
107. G.S. 150A-63 requires the Attorney General to organize, index, and publish as soon as
possible after Feb. 1, 1976, a compilation of all administrative rules. A complete compilation was
finally published in January, 1981, well after this case arose. As of February 1981, however, there
was still no master index of regulations by corresponding statutory authority. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150A-63 (1978).
108. 46 N.C. App. at 377, 265 S.E.2d at 908. See generally Bell, Administrative Law: The
Proposed North Carolina Statutesfor Registration and Publication of State Administrative Regula-
tions, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 309 (1972). Cf. Powers v. Owen, 419 P.2d 277 (Okla. Crim. 1966)
(although ignorance of the law is no excuse for crimnal conduct, due process may bar prosecution
if the law is essentially unascertainable absent extensive and costly legal research).
109. 46 N.C. App. at 377, 265 S.E.2d at 908.
110. See note 108 supra.
111. "No action shall be maintained in any of the courts of this State against the Board of
Transportation to determine the location of any State highways or portion thereof, by any person,
corporation, or municipal corporation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-59 (1981).
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any alleged breach of that duty was subject to judicial review.1 12
2. Municipal Corporations
Actions by various North Carolina municipalities were scrutinized by the
appellate courts in 1980. In Cauble v. City ofAsheville,"13 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that proceeds from the payment of city parking tickets
constituted criminal fines; therefore, those proceeds must be given to the
county for the support of public schools pursuant to article IX, section 7 of the
North Carolina Constitution.1 14 The majority reasoned that although viola-
,tion of a city ordinance is normally a civil infraction, G.S. 14-4 had automati-
cally turned such civil violations into criminal misdemeanors.' 5 The court
believed that it made no difference that these tickets are paid voluntarily and
without criminal prosecution; it is the nature of the offense, not the method of
enforcement, that determines whether the proceeds are criminal fines or civil
penalties.116
Justice Exum, joined by Justice Britt, dissented, arguing that unless the
parking violation was enforced through a criminal prosecution, the proceeds
could not constitute criminal fines. 17 In essence, Justice Exum contended that
the same act may constitute both a civil violation and a criminal act. If the
city chooses to enforce its rule through a civil proceeding, the proceeds are
civil penalties and need not be given to the county for public education, he
concluded."18
In Hawks v. Town of Valdese1 9 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that a town may not annex, through an involuntary annexation proceeding,120
an area which abuts solely on a previously annexed satellite area. 21 Specifi-
112. 46 N.C. App. at 378, 265 S.E.2d at 908-09.
113. 301 N.C. 340, 271 S.E.2d 258 (1980).
114. "TIThe clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the sev-
eral counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State, shall belong to.. . the several coun-
ties, and shall be. . . used exclusively for maintaining free public schools." N.C. CONsT. art. IX,
§ 7.
115. 301 N.C. at 342-43, 271 S.E.2d at 259-60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-4 (1976) provides that
"[if any person shall violate an ordinance of a county, city, or town, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than fifty dollars ($50.00), or imprisoned for not more
than thirty days." Cf. Board of Educ. v. Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 36 S.E. 158 (1900) (G.S. 14-4,
making violation of ordinance a criminal offense, viewed as necessary to facilitate administration
and enforcement of proper police government in a municipality).
116. 301 N.C. at 344, 271 S.E.2d at 260. See State v. Rumfelt, 241 N.C. 375, 85 S.E.2d 398
(1955) (criminal fine appropriate in criminal prosecution for violation of parking ordinance); State
v. Addington, 143 N.C. 683, 57 S.E. 398 (1907) (in civil bastardy proceeding, criminal punish-
ments may not be inflicted under guise of civil penalties).
117. 301 N.C. at 347, 271 S.E.2d at 262.
118. Id. at 347-48, 271 S.E.2d at 262. The dissent noted that theAdding/on and Rumfel cases
cited by the majority involved instances in which individuals had been found guilty in criminal
prosecutions. Id. at 347, 271 S.E.2d at 262. See note 116 supra.
The court in Henderson also limited its definition of fines to those funds the city "has col-
lected upon prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws of the state." 126 N.C. at 692, 36 S.E.
at 159 (emphasis added).
119. 299 N.C. 1, 261 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-33 through -56 (1976 and Supp. 1979).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.1 (1976) allows annexation of a noncontiguous satellite area,
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cally, the court construed G.S. 160A-36(b)(1) 122 to require that the area an-
nexed be contiguous to the primary corporate boundary, not to a satellite
corporate boundary. 123
The court also held that a satellite may not be included in the area to be
annexed for the purpose of computing the aggregate external boundaries of
that area under G.S. 160A-36(b)(2). 124 In this case, one proposed annexation
area extended from the primary corporate limit and wrapped around the east-
ern, northern, and western sides of an existing satellite. Under the court's rul-
ing, the long perimeter of the tentacle must be measured rather than the short
cut across the southern boundary of the satellite. 125 Thus, the town was not
able to meet the requirement in G.S. 160A-36(b)(2) that "one-eighth of the
aggregate external boundaries of the area to be annexed coincide with the mu-
nicipal boundary of Valdese."'126
3. Permits and Licenses
In In re Broad and Gales Creek Community Association 127 the North Car-
olina Supreme Court held that in denying a dredging permit under G.S. 113-
229(e)(2), 128 the Department of Natural Resources and Community Develop-
ment properly considered the effects on riparian neighbors of a planned boat
ramp as well as the effects of the dredging process itself.129 The court believed
that limiting the inquiry to the immediate effects of the dredging would under-
cut the department's ability to achieve the legislative purposes of preserving
estuarine resources and promoting the public welfare. 130
In Porsh Builders, Inc. v. CiQy of Winston-Salem 13 ' the North Carolina
provided the area meets certain criteria and provided all landowners in the area sign a petition
requesting annexation.
122. "The total area to be annexed must meet the following standards: (1) It must be adjacent
or contiguous to the municipality's boundaries at the time the annexation proceeding is begun."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36(b)(1) (1976).
123. 299 N.C. at 10-12, 261 S.E.2d at 96-97. A satellite area automatically comes within the
primary corporate limit when the town annexes the area up to the satellite. N.C. GEN. STAT.
160A-58.6 (1976).
124. 299 N.C. at 15, 261 S.E.2d at 98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36(b)(2) (1976) provides that
"the total area to be annexed must meet the following standards:. . .(2) At least one eighth of the
aggregate external boundaries of the area must coincide with the municipal boundary."
125. 299 N.C. at 14-15, 261 S.E.2d at 98-99. In a different context, the court indicated that a
satellite may not be included in the area to be annexed because inclusion would skew the sixty-
ercent urban development requirement for proposed annexation under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-
6(c) (1976). Id. at 7-8, 261 S.E.2d at 94-95.
126. 299 N.C. at 15, 261 S.E.2d at 98.
127. 300 N.C. 267, 266 S.E.2d 645 (1980).
128. "The Department [of Natural Resources and Community Development] may deny an
application for a dredge or fill permit upon finding:. . .(2) that there will be significant adverse
effect on the value and enjoyment of the property of any riparian owners." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 113-229(e)(2) (Supp. 1979).
129. 300 N.C. at 281-82, 266 S.E.2d at 655-56.
130. Id. Justice Exum dissented, reasoning that the department was barred from considering
the ultimate use for which the dredging was requested. Id. at 284-86, 266 S.E.2d at 656-58. The
Coastal Resources Commission did not have the authority or expertise to act as a "super zoning
commission." Id. at 285, 266 S.E.2d at 657.
131. 47 N.C. App. 661, 267 S.E.2d 697 (1980).
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Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of G.S. 160A-514(d). 132 In that case
two developers had submitted bids to buy a parcel of land owned by the Win-
ston-Salem Redevelopment Commission. Each bidder's development proposal
met the city zoning requirements and the requirements of the Crystal Towers
Community Development Plan (CTCDP). After deciding that the proposal of
the lower bidder was more consistent with the purposes of the CTCDP, the
Board of Aldermen accepted that bid.133
In a two-to-one decision' 34 the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court and held that the applicable statute, G.S. 160A-514(d),135 re-
quires the city to accept the highest bid if that bid meets the applicable zoning
and development plan requirements and if the bidder is financially able to
carry through with his proposal.136
D. Workers' Compensation Law
1. Byssinosis Cases
Byssinosis, or "brown lung," has become an important and controversial
part of North Carolina's Worker's Compensation Act.137 Recent develop-
ments in the area will have far-reaching effects on the direction that brown
lung compensation will take. In 1980 the courts struggled with determining
whether to apportion compensation between byssinosis and nonwork-related
diseases, and the legislature dealt with byssinosis compensation by passing a
statute that allows coverage for byssinosis claims regardless of the date of the
last injurious exposure. 138
The original statute dealing with occupational diseases covered by
worker's compensation was passed in 1935 and consisted of a specific list of
diseases that would be considered work-related and therefore compensable.' 39
The list, in what was then G.S. 97-53(13), included "infection or inflamation of
the skin or eyes or other external contact surfaces . . . due to irritating oils,
cutting compounds, chemical dust, liquids, fumes, gases, or vapors."' 140 Byssi-
nosis was not specifically covered by this relatively general section nor was it
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-514(d) (1976).
133. 47 N.C. App. at 662, 267 S.E.2d at 698.
134. Judge Martin dissented without opinion. Id. at 664, 267 S.E.2d at 699.
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-514(d) (1976) provides that
no sale of any property by the commission or agreement relating thereto shall be effected
except after advertisement, bids and award as hereinafter set out. The commission shall,
by public notice,. . . invite proposals and shall make available all pertinent information
to any persons interested in undertaking a purchase of property. . . . 4fter receipt of all
bids the sale shall be made to the highest responsible bidder. All bids may be rejected.
All sales shall be subject to the approval of the governing body of the municipality.
(Emphasis added.)
136. 47 N.C. App. at 663-64, 267 S.E.2d at 698-99.
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 through -122 (1979).
138. Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1305, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 217.
139. Law of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, 1935 N.C. Pub. Laws 130.
140. Id. § l(b)(13) (emphasis added).
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one of the diseases that were specifically listed.141 In 1963 the legislature
sought to broaden the coverage of occupational diseases by adding the lan-
guage "any other internal or external organ or organs of the body."'14 2 Byssi-
nosis arguably was compensable under this amendment if sufficient proof of
causation could be produced, but the statute was applicable only to claims for
which the last injurious exposure took place after the 1963 effective date. 143
This section of the act was amended even further in 1971,144 when cover-
age was expanded to include virtually any work-related disease. The amended
act covered any disease "proven to be due to causes and conditions which are
characteristic of. . . a particular trade. . . but excluding all ordinary diseases
of life to which the general public is equally exposed."' 4 The North Carolina
Supreme Court's interpretation of this amendment,146 in combination with the
1963 statute, arguably allowed compensation for most brown lung claims.
The court first considered the statutory language in Booker v. Duke Medi-
cal Center,147 which involved a claim for death benefits under the Worker's
Compensation Act. The decedent had been disabled by serum hepatitis prior
to 1971 but had not died until 1974. The court held that since the dependents'
claim for death benefits could not arise until the employee's death, this case
was one arising on or after July 1, 1971; therefore the 1971 amendment was
applicable. 148 In Wood v. JP. Stevens & Co. ,149 a claim for disability due to
byssinosis, the court ruled that it would be possible for a claim to arise after
1971 even though the last injurious exposure had occurred in 1958. Plaintiff
alleged that she had not become completely disabled until 1975; if this were
true, the court concluded, then her claim did not originate until 1975.150 Such
a finding would be important because the statute in force in 1958,151 unlike the
one in force in 1975,152 did not specifically allow compensation for byssinosis.
Until this year there were still claims that could not be covered because of
a gap left open by the 1963 and the 1971 amendments. Often the employee has
been disabled for some time before he discovers that he has byssinosis. In
141. Diseases listed specifically were certain types of poisoning, asbestosis, silicosis, bursitis,
and blisters due to use of tools or appliances. Id. § 1(b). Whether a court might find byssinosis
covered by the pre-1963 act is not clear.
142. Law of June 18, 1963, ch. 965, § 1, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 1224.
143. Id.
144. Law of June 14, 1971, ch. 547, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 477.
145. Id. § 1. The amendment was to be applicable to cases originating on or after July 1,
1971. Id. § 3.
146. See Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979); Wood v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979). See text accompanying notes 147-49 infra.
147. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
148. Id. at 466-67, 256 S.E.2d at 195.
149. 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d. 692 (1979).
150. Id. at 651, 256 S.E.2d at 701-02.
151. The 1958 version of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13), with regard to breathing disorders,
contains the language found in the original Workman's Compensation Act, Law of March 26,
1935, ch. 123, § l(b)(13), 1935 N.C. Pub. Laws 131, as amended by Law of June 12, 1957, ch. 1396,
§ 6, 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws 1590:
152. The 1975 version of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) contains the language found in Law of
June 14, 1971, ch. 547, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 477.
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Taylor v. JF. Stevens & Co. ,153 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
byssinosis claimant has two years from the date of diagnosis to bring a work-
ers' compensation claim. The court also held that the date of correct diagnosis
would have no effect on which statute would be applicable; rather, the applica-
bility of the 1963 or 1971 versions of G.S. 97-53(13) would depend on when
the claimant was first disabled.154 Thus, a sitatuion could arise in which the
last injurious exposure took place before 1963, the disability occurred prior to
1971, and the claim would not be asserted until 1981. This situation would not
be covered by the 1963 amendment because the last injurious exposure oc-
curred prior to 1963, and the 1971 amendment would not apply because the
disability occurred prior to 1971. The legislature, seeking to fill this gap,
passed the 1980 act providing compensation for byssinosis if adequate causa-
tion is proved, regardless of the date of.the last injurious exposure. Thus, if
the court found byssinosis not compensable by the pre-1963 statute, recovery
would be allowed even though no statute was applicable at the time of disable-
ment.
The retroactive effect of the new statute raises two constitutional ques-
tions. 155 The North Carolina Supreme Court has labeled a statute impermissi-
bly retroactive "only when it interferes with rights which had vested or
liabilities which had accrued prior to its passage,"' 56 or when the statute im-
153. 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E.2d 144 (1980). Plaintiff in this case had experienced difficulty in
breathing since 1939 and finally quit working in the textile mill in 1963. She was not diagnosed as
suffering from byssinosis until 1975 at which time she filed her claim. The holding allowed her to
file her claim two years after the date of discovery rather than one year from the last exposure.
The court construed G.S. 97-58(b) & (c) inparimateria. G.S. 97-58(b) states that the time within
which notice must be given to the employer shall begin when the employee has been advised by
competent medical authority that he has an occupational disease. Section 97-58(c) states that the
right to compensation shall be barred unless the claim is filed within twoyears after death, disabil-
ity, or disablement. The court found that it would render the statute ridiculous if the employee
could give the employer notice of injury after discovery, but would at the same time be barred
from filing a claim on that injury. 300 N.C. at 102, 265 S.E.2d at 148-89.
154. Id. at 102-03, 265 S.E.2d at 149. The supreme court had previously held that "[aln em-
ployee has no right to claim compensation in occupational disease cases until the disablement
occurs .... [Aipplying the law in effect at the time of the disablement to a claim arising from
that disablement does not involve a retroactive application of the law." Wood v. J.P. Stevens &
Co., 297 N.C. at 650, 256 S.E.2d at 701.
155. The pertinent sections of the constitutions are:
U.S. CONsT. art I, § 10: "No State shall. . . pass any Bill of Attainder... or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of. . . prop-
erty, without due process of law."
N.C. CON T. art. I, § 16: "No law taxing retrospectively sales, purchases, or other
acts previously done shall be enacted." [Similar to provisions of N.C. CONST. of 1868,
art. I, § 17 (superseded 1970).]
N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19:1 "No person shall be. . . disseized of his freehold, liberties,
or privileges. . . or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the
law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. . . ." [Sim-
ilar to provisions of N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 17 (superseded 1970).]
156. Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. at 650, 256 S.E.2d at 701. Seegenerally 16A C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 417 (1956) for discussion of the rule that retrospective laws are generally




pairs obligations of contracts.157 There appear to be no impairment-of-con-
tract problems because the North Carolina Supreme Court has clearly stated
that the proper question for analysis in a worker's compensation case is not
"whether the amendment affects some imagined obligation of contract but
rather whether it interferes with vested rights and liabilities."'15 8
This statute, if construed to be retroactive, will create a right for the em-
ployee and a liability for the employer where none existed before. It will allow
an employee to make a claim for byssinosis even though at the time the disa-
bility occurred he would have had no claim. It is unclear from the North
Carolina cases, however, whether this constitutes interference with vested
property rights in the employer.159 Claims under the new amendment could
be considered a taking of the employer's property without due process because
the employer had no statutory notice, prior to the disablement creating liabil-
ity, that byssinosis claims arising from exposure prior to 1963, and disable-
ment prior to 1971, were compensable. 160
157. Piedmont Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Guilford County, 221 N.C. 308, 311,20 S.E.2d 332,
334 (1942). The court further noted that "[a] statute is not rendered unconstitutionally retroactive
merely because it operates on facts which were in existence prior to its enactment." Booker v.
Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. at 467, 256 S.E.2d at 466.
158. Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. at 650, 256 S.E.2d at 701. The court noted that "the
relationship between a covered employer and employee is clearly not contractual in the usual
sense of that term." Id. at 648, 256 S.E.2d at 700. "The liability of the employer under our
Workmen's Compensation Act arises not from the individual employment contract but from the
Act itself." Id. at 649, 265 S.E.2d at 700.
Some states have invalidated legislative enactments increasing workers' compensation pay-
ments as impermissible alterations of a substantial term of an existing contract between the em-
ployee and employer. See, eg., Mitchell v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 206 F. Supp.
489 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768, 443 P.2d 314 (1968); Noffsker v. K. Barnett
& Sons, 72 N.M. 471, 384 P.2d 1022 (1963); Loveless v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r,
155 W.Va. 264, 184 S.E.2d 127 (1971).
159. Only one case could be found that held a statute unconstitutional because it created a
new cause of action retroactively, and in that case there was also a contract that would have been
impaired. Bank of Pinehurst v. Derby, 218 N.C. 653, 12 S.E.2d 260 (1940). In Leak v. Gray, 107
N.C. 468, 12 S.E. 312 (1890), the court stated that "[w]hen the effect of a law is to divest the vested
right of property, except for the use of the public, and then only after providing for payment of its
value, it will be declared void." Id at 478, 12 S.E.2d at 314.
Other states have split on the divestment theory in retroactive workers' compensation amend-
ment cases. See, e.g., Price v. All Am. Eng'r Co., 320 A.2d 336 (Del. 1974) (suggesting that if the
statute did divest vested property rights, it was nonetheless permissible as a valid exercise of the
state's police power); Cooper v. Wicomico County, Dept. of Pub. Works, 278 Md. App. 596, 366
A.2d 55 (1976) (remanding without affirming or reversing a circuit court's invalidation of supple-
mental allowances as impermissibly divesting vested rights).
The United States Supreme Court held the Massachusetts workers' compensation scheme to
be a valid exercise of legislative power in Boston & Maine RtR. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234 (1932).
Earlier, the Court had ruled that states, in the exercise of their police power, may affect contracts
and modify property rights without violating either the impairment of contracts bar in article I,
section 10 or the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia
Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372 (1919). Moreover, the Court held that the Constitution does not
forbid the creation of new rights or the abolition of old ones in order to attain permissible legisla-
tive objectives. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
160. Several state courts have upheld, against due process challenges, retroactive increases in
workers' compensation payments. See, e.g., Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 377 Mich. 140, 139 N.W.2d
714 (1966) (reclassification of injuries that occurred prior to effective date of statute, resulting in
increased benefits payable after the effective date); Hahti v. Fosterling, 357 Mich. 578, 99 N.W.2d
490 (1959) (amendment requiring employer to pay additional medical benefits on account of in-
jury occurring prior to effective date of the amendment); Schmidt v. Wolf Contracting Co., 269
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Even if the 1980 amendment is found to be constititutional there will still
be obstacles for byssinosis claimants. Since byssinosis has been recognized
fairly recently, in both the medical and legal communities,' 6 ' proof of causa-
tion remains a problem. It is not enough merely to show that the claimant has
a pulmonary disease and was once exposed to cotton dust.' 62 The court of
A.D. 201, 55 N.Y.S.2d, af'dper curiam, 295 N.Y. 748, 65 N.E.2d 568 (1946) (under state statute
increasing maximum compensation benefits for injuries occurring prior to effective date of statute,
compensation was to be paid only for periods after the effective date).
The United States Supreme Court has upheld federal statutes providing benefits to coal min-
ers, rejecting due process attacks. In National Independent Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Brennan, 372
F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C.), afTdmem., 419 U.S. 955 (1974), the Court upheld that portion of the Black
Lung Benefits Act which required payment of benefits for disability or death occurring prior to the
Act's effective date; the lower court had held that the Act did not violate the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), coal operators claimed that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment was violated by the amended Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1972), in that the operators were required to
compensate former employees who had ended employment before passage of the Act and their
survivors, creating unexpected liability for past, completed acts which were legal at the time. The
following comments of the Court may be particularly instructive:
[Tihis Court long ago upheld against due process attack the competence of Congress to
allocate the interlocking economic rights and duties of employers and employees upon
workmen's compensation principles. . . regardless of contravening arrangements be-
tween employer and employee.
428 U.S. at 15.
[O]ur cases are clear that readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely be-
cause it upsets otherwise settled expectations .... This is true even though the effect of
the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts.
Id. at 16.
The retrospective aspects of legislation. . . must meet the test of due process.
Id. at 17.
We find, however, that the imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in
the past is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities
to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal
consumers.
Id. at 18.
In sum, the Due Process Clause poses no bar to requiring an operator to provide
compensation for a former employee's death or disability due to pneumoconiosis arising
out of employment in the mines, even if the former employee terminated his employ-
ment in the industry before the Act was passed.
Id. at 19-20.
Usery was cited in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1977), in which
the Court observed that the "Due Process Clause generally does not prohibit retrospective civil
legislation, unless the consequences are particularly 'harsh and oppressive."' (Citation omitted.)
161. The symptomatic history usually associated with byssinosis is: Grade one-half: Sensa-
tion of tightness and difficulty of breathing which may be associated with a cough. The symptoms
appear on the first day of returning to work after a period away from the mill but decrease with
continued exposure. Grade one: Symptoms may be present on more than one day after returning
to work. Grade two: Symptoms are present throughout the work week, with evidence of lung
dysfunctions. Grade three: Failure to improve even after being away from work with symptoms
of tightness, shortness of breath, often accompanied by cough and sputum production. Moore v.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 47 N.C. App. 744, 751, 269 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1980). In Wood v. J.P. Stevens &
Co. the court observed that the development and causes of brown lung "are still the subject of
scientific debate" (citing Bouhuys, Schoenberg, Beck & Schilling, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung
Disease in a Cotton Mill Community, in 5 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATiOR-
NEY 607 (Serv. vol. 1978); 5A LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND AP-
PLIED SPECIALITIES § 33.59a (1972 & Supp. 1979); Dickie & Chosy, Some Important Occupational
Dieases, in 3 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ArroRNzEY 729 (Serv. vol. 1975)).
162. "[B]yssinosis, or brown lung disease, seldom occurs without a smoking history." lB A.
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appeals upheld a denial of compensation in two recent pulmonary disease
cases,163 finding that the claimants had not carried the burden of proof on the
issue of causation.
If the causal link is shown, the question becomes how much compensa-
tion to award. Many byssinosis claimants also suffer from diseases which
could be classified as nonwork-related. It is established doctrine that if the
work-related cause acts on a pre-existing condition to create total disability,
the employer is liable for the entire disability.16 With byssinosis, the problem
is slightly different. It involves a concurrently developing condition rather
than a pre-existing one.165
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has applied the pre-existing injury
rule but the supreme court has indicated that it will take a different tack. In
LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 41.64(b), 7-432 (1980). "[P]roofofindustrial causa-
tion in occupational disease-smoking cases has two components-the legal and the medical." Id.
at § 41.64(c), 7-435.
To establish legal causation, the claimant must show that the employment contributed to the
disease in the sense of "arising out of employment," and that the disease is occupational rather
than an ordinary disease of life. Most courts adopt the view that a worker's preexisting disease or
other predisposition does not prevent compensability; the employer takes the employee as he finds
him; hence the employment condition need only be a contributing cause rather than the sole or
dominant cause to establish compensability. Moreover, the disease can be shown to be occupa-
tional by showing that the nature of the employment or the quantity of exposure was different
from ordinary life experiences. When legal cause is shown, the claimant must also show medical
causation, which means that the employment exposure contributed to the disease as a matter of
medical fact. Id. at 7-435 through 7-439.
163. Brown v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 49 N.C. App. 118, 270 S.E.2d 602 (1980); Moore v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 47 N.C. App. 744, 269 S.E.2d 159 (1980). In Brown, claimant did not contend on
appeal that he had byssinosis; rather he contended "that the whole record does show that he had a
pulmonary disease which was due to causes and conditions which are peculiar to his employ-
men...... " 49 N.C. App. at 120, 270 S.E.2d at 604. The court held that the hearing commis-
sioner's finding of fact-that the lung disease was not caused by cotton dust and lint-was
sufficient to support a denial of compensability. Id.
In Moore the court upheld the Industrial Commission's finding that exposure to cotton dust
and lint did not cause plaintiff's disease. The court noted that medical testimony indicated that
plaintiff's breathing problems were not symptomatic of byssinosis. The medical expert stated that
it was possible, rather than probable, that plaintiffs disease was caused by occupational exposure.
47 N.C. App. at 751-52, 269 S.E.2d at 164.
164. See, eg., Little v. Anson County Schools Food Serv., 295 N.C. 527, 531-32, 246 S.E.2d
743, 746 (1978).
165. According to Larson, most courts "hold that when distinctive employment hazards act
upon. . . preexisting conditions to produce a disabling disease, the result is an occupational dis-
ease." IB A. LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 41.63, 7-418 (1980). Moreover,
[t]he line between occupational disease and aggravation of preexisting disease or
weakness has become blurred. The ultimate working rule that seems to emerge is simply
that a disability which would be held to arise out of the employment under the tests of
increased risk and aggravation of a preexisting condition will be treated as an occupa-
tional disease.
Id. at 7-423.
Furthermore, since the 1970s courts have begun to deal with "dual causation" cases, Le., "any
occupational disease causation problem in which a personal element, such as smoking, combines
with an employment element, such as inhalation of. . . textile fibres. . . to produce lung cancer,
emphysema, bronchitis, and the like." Id. at § 41.64(a), 7-424 & 7-425. No clear trend has been
established; "variations in outcome have turned on all sorts of variations in the relative strengths
of the personal and employment contributions, or in other facts, or in the statutes themselves." Id.
at 7-425.
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Walston v. Burlington Industries,166 the appeals court found the pre-existing
disease rule to be applicable. 167 This case is different from the typical byssi-
nosis claim because plaintiff claimed that the occupational conditions aggra-
vated his nonwork-related diseases. Plaintiff apparently tried to invoke the
pre-existing disease rule by claiming an occupational disease per se, thereby
avoiding the problem of concurrent development. The Industrial Commission
denied compensation since it concluded that he did not have an occupational
disease. The court of appeals held that the record had shown that (1) environ-
mental factors that characterized plaintiffs place of employment were also
substantial factors in causing his diseases, and (2) by virtue of his employment
plaintiff was "exposed to such irritants in greater quantities than persons
otherwise employed."' 168 The court remanded the case to the Commission to
inquire as to the extent to which plaintiffs intervening occupational exposure
had contributed to the onset of his resulting disabling disease. 169
In Morrison v. Burlington Industries,170 the court of appeals held that the
disability should not be apportioned between work-related and nonwork-re-
lated causes. Once the causal link was shown between the disability and the
occupation, the employer was to be liable for the total disability. The supreme
court reversed the court in Morrison 171 and held that the record did not con-
tain sufficient evidence for review, remanding to the Industrial Commission
for further testimony.172 The court enumerated three factors that the evidence
must show in order for the court to determine if the commission's findings
were supported by the evidence: (1) the percentage, if any, of plaintiff's dis-
ablement that results from an occupational disease, (2) the percentage of
plaintiff's disablement that results from diseases unrelated to plaintiffs occu-
pation but accelerated or aggravated by plaintiffs occupational disease, and
(3) the percentage of plaintiffs disablement that results from diseases or infir-
mities unrelated to plaintiffs occupation which were not accelerated or aggra-
vated by plaintiffs occupational diseases.' 73
The court did not state whether it would follow the pre-existing injury
doctrine as did the court of appeals, but the remand itself implies that it will
not. Rather, it appears that the court will apportion. The court would not
need the information it requested on remand if it were going to follow the
court of appeals. The court's request for the percentage of disability unrelated
to the occupational disease strongly suggests that the court wishes to apportion
166. 49 N.C. App. 301, 271 S.E.2d 516 (1980).
167. Id. at 310, 271 S.E.2d at 521-22. The court noted that the majority ofjurisdictions that
had addressed the issue held that when work hazards acted upon a pre-existing condition to pro-
duce a disabling disease, then the disability was due to an occupational disease Id.
168. 49 N.C. App. at 309, 271 S.E.2d at 521.
169. Id. at 311, 271 S.E.2d at 522.
170. 47 N.C. App. 50, 266 S.E.2d 741 (1980). In this case plaintiff had been found to be totally
disabled. The Industrial Commission accepted expert testimony which showed that only fifty to
sixty percent of the disability was due to byssinosis.
171. 301 N.C. 226, 271 S.E.2d 364 (1980).
172. Id. at 231-32, 271 S.E.2d at 368.
173. Id., 271 S.E.2d at 367.
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between work-related and nonwork-related causes. Such an approach would
seem to be a considerable departure from the general rule that apportionment
does not apply "in any case in which the prior condition was not a disability in
the compensation sense." 174 Especially with cases of byssinosis, in which
smoking may combine with industrial exposure, the worker's personal afflic-
tion alone may not render him even partially disabled; yet, in conjunction with
the employment exposure, the conditions yield byssinosis disability. If the
worker were not in the textile mill, he might not be considered disabled at all.
Consequently, it would seem that dual causation analysis,175 rather than the
pre-existing condition rule176 or an apportionment approach, would be appro-
priate. Moreover, should the supreme court choose to expand the apportion-
ment approach, it must be careful not to jeopardize the pre-existing condition
rule. Whatever path the supreme court chooses, the decision is important
since it will enable the Industrial Commission finally to begin processing these
claims, many of which are being litigated.
2. Employer's Failure to Provide Medical Care
In Schofield v. Great Atlantic & Pacoc Tea Co. 177 the supreme court inter-
preted G.S. 97-25 of the Workers' Compensation Act. G.S. 97-25 covers the
medical treatment that must be provided by an employer to an injured em-
ployee. Plaintiff suffered a knee injury in 1972, for which his employer pro-
vided medical treatment until 1974. At that time the employer advised plaintiff
that treatment would no longer be provided, but plaintiff challenged the find-
ing before the Industrial Commission. In 1976 the Industrial Commission de-
cided that the employer was liable for necessary treatment after the 1974
termination date. Prior to notification of the Commission's decision, plaintiffs
knee injury worsened and he was forced to seek emergency treatment for an
infection when he was 150 miles away from defendant's physicians. This
treatment continued for seventeen months even though the infection was
under control after six months, without notification to the Commission that
plaintiff had employed his own physician. 17 8 Under G.S. 97-25,179 an em-
ployee may go to a physician of his own choosing in an emergency only if the
employer has failed to provide medical care, or, if the Commission has ap-
proved his choice in the absence of an emergency. The Industrial Commission
awarded plaintiff the medical expenses for the entire seventeen months 80 de-
spite the end of the emergency treatment after six months.
174. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMcSN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 59.20, 10-273 (1980). "To be appor-
tionable, then, an impairment must have been independently producing some degree of disability
before the accident, and must be continuing to operate as a source of disability after the accident."
Ad. at 10-285. Moreover, if the prior condition is latent, and it is operated on by the industrial
injury to precipitate disability, the entire disability is compensable. Id. at 10-270.
175. See causation analysis at note 162 supra.
176. See notes 164, 165 and accompanying text supra.
177. 299 N.C. 582, 264 S.E.2d 56 (1980).
178. Id. at 584-85, 264 S.E.2d at 58-59.
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1979).
180. 299 N.C. at 585, 264 S.E.2d at 59.
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The North Carolina Supreme Court found two issues to be important: (1)
whether it was the employer's failure to provide medical care that led plaintiff
to seek his own physician; and (2) whether medical expenses not attributable
to the actual emergency should be awarded. The court defined failure, as used
in G.S. 97-25, to mean inability to provide medical care as well as a willful
refusal;' 81 thus an emergency on a weekend at a distance from home consti-
tuted inability to provide services.182 Even if there had not been a medical
emergency, defendant's notification to plaintiff in 1974 that services would no
longer be provided amounted to a wilfull "failure to provide" medical serv-
ices.' 83 The court went on to hold that in the absence of an emergency, the
employee who wishes to select his own physician must request the approval of
the Industrial Commission within a reasonable time.' 84 What constitutes a
reasonable time will be a question of fact for the Commission. The court re-
manded the case to the Commission for a decision on when plaintiff should
have notified the Commission and to award expenses on that basis. 85
E. Unemployment Compensation
Several 1980 cases involved construction of G.S. 96-14,186 which deals
with situations that result in denial of unemployment benefits. The North Car-
olina Court of Appeals construed "voluntary" as used in G.S. 96-14(1) and
held in In re Werner 187 that a resignation pursuant to a demand from a super-
visor would not be considered a voluntary separation. 188 In In re Clark 18 9 the
court found, under the same statutory provision, that a resignation based on
valid ethical grounds would not be considered voluntary separation. In Clark
a social worker refused to begin custody proceedings to remove children from
certain families after promising those families that the children would not be
removed permanently if each family agreed to a temporary removal. She re-
signed her position with the Department of Social Services because she be-
lieved that she was being required to violate the ethical stndards of her
profession. 190
The court was called upon to define misconduct as used in G.S. 96-14(2),
181. Id. at 589, 264 S.E.2d at 61.
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1979)).
184. Id. at 593, 264 S.E.2d at 63.
185. Id. at 596, 264 S.E.2d at 65.
186. "An individual shall be disqualified.., if.. . such individual is.. . unemployed be-
cause he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 96-14(1) (1981).
187. 44 N.C. App. 723, 263 S.E.2d 4 (1980). The court also held that the failure of the em-
ployee to seek redress under the employer's grievance procedure would not render the separation
voluntary. Since the General Assembly had not sought this effect expressly, the court would not
read it into the statute. Id. at 728, 263 S.E.2d at 7.
188. Delaware's interpretation of a similar statute was relied upon since it was an issue of lirst
impression in North Carolina. See Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Appeal Bd., 325 A.2d 374
(Super. Ct. Del. 1974).
189. 47 N.C. App. 163, 266 S.E.2d 854 (1980).
190. Id., 266 S.E.2d at 855.
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which disqualifies an individual from receiving unemployment benefits if he
was discharged due to misconduct in connection with his work. In In re Can-
trelI' 9 1 a truckdriver refused to make a trip for personal reasons even though
it was his turn under the rotation system. The court upheld the Employment
Security Commission's determination that this was misconduct under the ap-
plicable statute; thus the claimant was not entitled to compensation. The key
factors in the determination of misconduct were (1) the reasonableness of the
employer's request, and (2) the reasonableness of the employee's refusal in
light of available alternatives.1 92 These two questions apparently are to be
considered in the context of the particular facts of the case. A refusal to make
the drive "for either racial or unidentified personal reasons. . . was not rea-
sonable or justified." 193
In Jones v. Department of Human Resources 194 plaintiff was discharged,
without warning, for unsatisfactory job performance. The State Personnel
Commission found that he had not received proper notice and ordered re-
employment, but did not award compensation for pecuniary loss.19 5 The state
argued that the State Personnel Commission had complete discretion over the
remedies it granted. The court of appeals rejected this argument as a contra-
vention of the spirit of the State Personnel Act. The court believed that the
mandatory language of the statute, 196 as well as its remedial purpose, indi-
cated that the remedies authorized were not discretionary; the court noted that
the remedy ordered by the commission failed to return an employee to the
condition he would have been in had the wrongful discharge not taken
place.' 97 The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed and upheld the
commission but limited its discretion.1 98 It held that when the claim for
wrongful discharge is based merely on lack of notice and the record shows that
job performance was unsatisfactory, it is within the commission's discretion
not to award back pay.1 99 The dispositive reasoning was that the failure to
give warnings had not been the cause of the dismissal and that plaintiff's rein-
statement would be sufficient to protect his due process rights. 20° To grant
191. 44 N.C. App. 718, 263 S.E.2d 1 (1980).
192. Id. at 722, 263 S.E.2d at 3.
193. Id. at 723, 263 S.E.2d at 4.
194. 44 N.C. App. 116, 260 S.E.2d 654 (1980). Jesse Jones had been discharged from his
position as a janitor at the Governor Morehead School due to unsatisfactory job performance.
His employer had not given him the required notice prior to his discharge; therefore the discharge
was wrongful. Id. at 121-24, 260 S.E.2d at 656-58.
195. Id. at 120, 260 S.E.2d at 657.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35 (Cum. Supp. 1980): "No permanent employee... shall be
discharged... except for just cause."
197. 44 N.C. App. at 124, 260 S.E.2d at 660.
198. Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 300 N.C. 687, 268 S.E.2d 500 (1980).
199. Id. at 692-93, 268 S.E.2d at 503-04.
200. Id. at 693, 268 S.E.2d at 504.
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back pay to the claimant in a situation such as this would constitute a windfall
to him.20 1
CLYDE LOWELL BALL, JR.
DAWN ELIZABETH GANTr
MELISSA A. MAGEE-BREMER
201. Id. The court relied on Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), to support this rationale. In
that case procedural due process requirements were not met because there was no hearing before
dismissaL The United States Supreme Court held that, absent proof of actual injury, only nomi-
nal damages could be awarded since the failure to accord due process had not been the cause of
the suspensions. The Court based its holding on the finding that the suspension would have taken
place even if the hearing had been held so there was no actual injury. Id. at 260. The North
Carolina Supreme Court's reliance on this case in Jones seems to be misplaced. The purpose of
notice requirements in a situation in which the employee's job performance is unsatisfactory is to
give him a chance to improve. If the employee improves he may not be dismissed. Thus, the state
in Jones, unlike Carey, could not have proved that Jones would have been dismissed even if his
due process rights had been met because there was the possibility of improved performance.
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II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
4. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In Byrd v. Hodges I the court of appeals held that in a civil action in which
punitive damages are sought the defendant may refuse to answer the plaintiffs
complaint, asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, without such re-
fusal to answer being deemed an admission under rule 8(d).2
The underlying action in Byrd was for damages for alienation of affection
and criminal conversation. Plaintiff Byrd alleged seven separate instances of
sexual intercourse between defendant Hodges and plaintiffs wife.3 Such a
course of conduct, if true, would be a misdemeanor under North Carolina
criminal law.4 Plaintiff sought $100,000 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages.5
Defendant was deposed prior to the issuance of the complaint, but re-
fused to answer any questions on the ground that his answers might tend to
incriminate him. Plaintiff then filed a complaint; defendant, in his answer,
refused to reply to plaintiffs allegations, again invoking the privilege against
self-incrimination. The superior court "treated as admitted" the unanswered
allegations of the complaint, and judgment was entered for plaintiff except for
the amount of damages.6
The court of appeals, noting that rule 8(d) supports the superior court's
holding, identified the issue as "whether a defendant who has been sued for
punitive damages may assert his privilege against self-incrimination by refus-
ing to plead without suffering the stricture of Rule 8(d)."'7
The court also noted that the case of4llred v. Graves8 had established that
the privilege against self-incrimination attached to testimony in a civil pro-
ceeding in which punitive damages were sought. Finding that the privilege
against self-incrimination, preserved both in the state and national constitu-
tions,9 is "basic to our law," the Byrd court saw "no reason why a party should
be required to incriminate himself by pleading if he is not required to do so by
1. 44 N.C. App. 509, 261 S.E.2d 269 (1980).
2. Id. at 510, 261 S.E.2d at 270. N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(d): "Averments in a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when
not denied in the responsive pleading."
3. Id. at 509, 261 S.E.2d at 269-70.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1969): "If any man and woman, not being married to each
other, shall lewdly and lasciviously associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor ... punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00), imprison-
ment for not more than six months, or both."
The courts have interpreted this statute to apply only to "habitual intercourse," as opposed to
"single or nonhabitual intercourse." State v. Kleiman, 241 N.C. 277, 279-80, 85 S.E.2d 148, 151
(1954); State v. Robinson, 9 N.C. App. 433, 176 S.E.2d 253 (1970).
5. 44 N.C. App. at 509, 261 S.E.2d at 270.
6. Id.
7. 44 N.C. App. at 510, 261 S.E.2d at 270.
8. 261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E.2d 186 (1964).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 23.
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deposition in a civil action."'10
In response to plaintiff's argument that defendant could enter a general
denial to the complaint without waiving his privilege, the court replied that "a
defendant and his attorney may not be able in good conscience to deny an
allegation." 11 To require an answer would force defendant either to admit
that which he was privileged not to admit, or knowingly to file a false plead-
ing.12 "Rule 8(d) must yield to the constitutional right of the defendant not to
incriminate himself.''13
The decision of the superior court was reversed and the case remanded
for a hearing on the use of the self-incrimination plea. "If the court should
find that the defendant's answers would tend to incriminate him, it shall enter
an order that the allegations to which the defendant does not plead are
deemed denied."' 14
That the privilege against self-incrimination should apply to the defend-
ant's pleadings appears correct. The Allred court found that the privilege
"may be exercised by a witness in any proceeding,"'15 and "also applies in civil
actions and proceedings, as, for example, with reference to an answer in chan-
cery." 6 The majority rule among those state courts that have faced the issue
appears to be "that a defendant cannot be required by his answer to a pleading
to state facts which will tend to [inlcriminate him, since the answer may be
read in evidence as an admission upon the trial."'17 Although Allred, having
established the right to invoke the privilege in a proceeding in which punitive
damages are sought, adequately supports the Byrd holding, Byrd could be
based on another ground. Even if no punitive damages had been sought, de-
fendant Hodges should have been allowed to invoke the privilege' 8 because
the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, if true, would make defendant guilty of
a crime under North Carolina law. 19
The more difficult question in Byrd, however, was not whether the privi-
10. 44 N.C. App. at 510, 261 S.E.2d at 270.
11. Id.
12. Id. Though not referred to in the court's opinion, N.C.R. Civ. P. 11 imposes a good faith
requirement on an attorney who signs a pleading.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 510-11, 261 S.E.2d at 270.
15. 261 N.C. at 35, 134 S.E.2d at 190 (emphasis added); accord, McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266
U.S. 34 (1924).
16. 261 N.C. at 35, 134 S.E.2d at 190 (emphasis added) (quoting 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 433, at
246 (1957)).
17. Amana Soe'y v. Seizer, 250 Iowa 380, 384, 94 N.W.2d 337, 339 (1959); see Annot., 52
A.L.R. 143 (1928).
18. "[A] witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give
testimony which will tend to incriminate him." 261 N.C. at 34, 134 S.E.2d at 189.
The request for punitive damages, while, on these facts, not determinative with respect to the
availability of the privilege, is, however, relevant to the consequences which flow from its use. See
text accompanying note 29 infra.
19. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. The application of the privilege to civil actions
seeking punitive damages was critical inAllred because in that case, defendants had already been
tried on criminal charges and "all criminal charges... in respect to the facts alleged in the
complaint had been finally disposed of." 261 N.C. at 40, 134 S.E.2d at 193.
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lege attached, but what consequences might flow from its exercise. There is a
split of authority on this issue, represented by the cases of Amana Society v.
Seizer20 and DeAntonlo v. Solomon. 21 In Amana Society the Iowa Supreme
Court allowed defendant to claim the privilege in his answer,2 2 but held that
"defendant's failure to deny [the allegation of the complaint] should be
deemed an admission thereof." 3 The court justified its holding on the ground
that "it is proper in a civil case to draw an inference of the. . . misconduct
with which a litigant is charged from his refusal to testify upon the ground of
self-incrimination." 24 While defendant was not required to answer the com-
plaint by reason of his privilege, he could not "assert such. . . privilege as a
ground * * * for escaping the consequences of his failure to answer. * * * In
other words, he cannot escape the civil consequences of his default in answer-
ing the allegations of his adversary." 25
In Bauer v. Stern Financing Co. ,26 a case involving the effect of claiming
the privilege on a request for summary judgment, the court treated the exercise
of the privilege as an admission and justified the result in this manner:
Such a result is not designed to punish plaintiff for his refusal to
answer. It is simply a recognition of the provisions of rule 237 that
the absence of a genuine issue of fact-from whatever cause-justi-
fies in appropriate cases the entry of summary judgment. The reason
for such absence is incidental; the fact of the absence is determina-
tive.
When plaintiff says he is being punished for exercising his right
to remain silent, he is overlooking the real matter before us: that his
silence, justifiable or not, prevents a justiciable issue from arising on
the question involved.27
If one takes the Amana Society approach the textual requirements of rule
8(d) will be determinative: failure to answer, for whatever reason, is then
deemed an admission. To paraphrase Bauer, the reason for such failure is
incidental; the fact of the failure is determinative.
BothAmana Society and Bauer dealt with civil actions in which there was
no claim for punitive damages.28 Byrd, however, was an action for both com-
pensatory and punitive damages, and thus falls within the ambit of Allred.
Allred indicated that actions seeking punitive damages are to be treated, for
purposes of applying the privilege, as "quasi-criminal" in nature, therefore the
20. 250 Iowa 380, 94 N.W.2d 337 (1959).
21. 42 F.R.D. 320 (D. Mass. 1967).
22. 250 Iowa at 384, 94 N.W.2d at 340.
23. Id. at 387, 94 N.W.2d at 341.
24. Id. at 388, 94 N.W.2d at 342; accord, Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); c. State
v. Garrett, 44 N.C. 357 (1853) (defendant not required to answer disparaging question, but refusal
to answer could be considered by jury).
25. 250 Iowa at 389, 94 N.W.2d at 342 (quoting Annot., 52 A.L.R. 143, 148-49 (1928)) (em-
phasis added).
26. 169 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970).
27. Id. at 854. The court cited Amana Society in support of its holding.
28. Id.
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privilege attaches just as it does in criminal cases.29 Following this logic, the
Amana Society doctrine should not apply on the Byrd facts because the result
would be analogous to an automatic finding of guilt in a criminal proceeding,
a result which may not follow simply from the invocation of the privilege?30
The alternative reasoning to Amana Society is presented in De4ntonlo .
Solomon,31 a case consistent in its holding with Byrd. The federal district
court held that
[t]he court must regard the defendant's assertion of his privilege
against self-incrimination in defense against various allegations in
the complaint as having the effect of a denial of such allegations and
therefore considers a material issue of fact to exist as to those allega-
tions. Although Rule 8(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that averments
in a complaint are admitted when not denied, the defendant's right to
assert his privilege against self-incrimination would be considerably
watered down if his failure to explicitly deny averments might result
in a summary judgment against him.3 2
DeAntonio was based on the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Spevack v. Klein33 and Garrity v. New Jersey.3 4 These two cases held
that, when "sanctions" imposed on the assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination "water down" the privilege, such sanctions are not to be al-
lowed.35 The most recent Supreme Court formulation of this rule is Le/7owitz
v. Cunningham,36 in which Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
stated as
settle[d] that government cannot penalize assertion of the constitu-
tional privilege against compelled self-incrimination by imposing
sanctions to compel testimony which has not been immunized. It is
true. . . that our earlier cases were concerned with penalties having
a substantial economic impact. But the touchstone of the Fifth
Amendment is compulsion, and direct economic sanctions and im-
prisonment are not the only penalties capable of forcing the self-in-
crimination which the Amendment forbids.37
De.ntonjo assumes that applying rule 8(d) to invocations of the privilege
against self-incrimination imposes a sanction on the use of the privilege. This
is in contrast to Amana Society, in which no such penalty was found.38 The
Dentonio approach is more sound, for requiring defendant to forfeit his case
29. 261 N.C. at 38, 134 S.E.2d at 192. The Allred court specifically noted that, criminal
charges against defendants having been settled, the privilege would not apply if plaintiff "relin-
quish[ed] all claim to punish defendants by punitive damages." Id. at 39-40, 134 S.E.2d at 193.
30. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1956); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 426-28 (1965).
31. 42 F.R.D. 320 (D. Mass., 1967).
32. Id. at 322.
33. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
34. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
35. 42 F.R.D. at 322. See Spevack, 385 U.S. at 514; Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
36. 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
37. Id. at 806.
38. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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in order to preserve his right against self-incrimination is arguably exactly the
type of "direct economic sanction" to which Chief Justice Burger referred.
The court of appeals in Byrd may have agreed with the Dentonio posi-
tion; the same remedies were provided by both courts.39 Since the Byrd court
failed in its short opinion to make clear whether its result was based solely on
the presence of a claim for punitive damages, however, it left the door open to
a future application of the Amana Society rationale. 4° A literal reading of the
opinion appears to leave room for Amana Society,41 but the underlying ration-
ale, insofar as it can be perceived, might indicate a broader basis of the opin-
ion.42
Though the Arana Society rationale appears to remain available,43 the
Delntonio rationale seems more in keeping with Leokowitz and with the
broader reasoning in Allred, which called for a "liberal construction" of the
constitution, "especially with respect to those provisions which were designed
to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizens in regard to both persons
and property."44
B. Jury Trials
In Frissell v. Frissell,45 the court of appeals clarified the circumstances
under which a party waives the right to a jury trial. The court reaffirmed that
a party may waive the right to jury trial, which is guaranteed by Article I,
Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution,46 by failing to appear at trial.47
The court was forced to expressly overrule inconsistent language in Heidler v.
Heidler,48 which had been decided only a year earlier under similar facts.49
However, Heidler involved an ineffective waiver of the jury trial right under
rules 38(d) and 39(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,50 which provide for
consensual withdrawal of demands for jury trials. The Heidler court did not
consider waiver of the right other than under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, Frissell makes clear that the rules do not exclusively determine waiver
of the right to a jury trial and that failure to appear at trial may constitute such
39. Compare 44 N.C. App. at 511, 261 S.E.2d at 270 with 42 F.R.D. at 322.
40. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
41. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
43. The Supreme Court has not directly decided the question, and it denied certiorari in the
Bauer case, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970).
44. 261 N.C. at 38, 134 S.E.2d at 192.
45. 47 N.C. App. 149, 266 S.E.2d 866 (1980).
46. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
47. 47 N.C. App. at 153, 266 S.E.2d at 868.
48. 42 N.C. App. 481, 256 S.E.2d 833 (1979).
49. 47 N.C. App. at 153, 266 S.E.2d at 868. Heidler involved a defendant who requested a
jury trial. At trial, plaintiff failed to appear and defendant waived her right to the jury trial.
However, plaintiff did not consent to the withdrawal of the jury trial demand as required by N.C.
R. Civ. P. 38(d). The court held that rule 38(a) does not provide that failure to appear at trial
constitutes consent to the withdrawal of the jury trial demand. 42 N.C. App. at 486, 256 S.E.2d at
835.




The court of appeals also held in 1980 that an agreement by the parties
that a verdict of a stated majority of the jurors should be taken as the verdict
of the jury may be made at any time under rule 48 of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.52
C Jurisdiction53
The North Carolina court of appeals decided several cases involving ju-
risdictional issues in 1980. In Webb v. James54 the court of appeals held that
when defendants entered into negotiations with plaintiffs for a continuance of
the action, they made an "appearance" 5 5 within the meaning of rule 55(b)(2) 56
and, therefore, a default judgment entered by the clerk was void.57
In Williams v. Williams58 counsel for defendant participated in a pretrial
conference in the trial judge's office, and the issue arose whether this was a
general appearance which would lead to a waiver of any objections to lack of
personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that, although it was a close
case, the subject matter of the conference59 was sufficiently directed toward a
"purpose in the cause" to constitute a general appearance under G.S. 1-75.7.60
In McGinnis v. McGinnis6' the court of appeals held that even though the
appellant had filed a timely appeal the trial court was not divested ofjurisdic-
51. 47 N.C. App. at 152-53, 266 S.E.2d at 868.
52. United States Indus., Inc. v. Tharpe, 47 N.C. App. 754, 765, 268 S.E.2d 824, 831 (1980).
In Tharpe, a personal injury and wrongful death action, defendant agreed, during the deliberation
of the jury, to accept a verdict of nine or more of the jurors. Id. at 764, 268 S.E.2d at 831. The
verdict was 11 to 1, but defendant argued on appeal that the agreement must be made prior to the
start of the jury deliberations. Although defendant could have demanded a unanimous verdict,
his agreement to accept a lesser verdict, even when made during the jury deliberations, was held to
be binding upon him. Id. at 765, 268 S.E.2d at 831.
53. In Questor Corp. v. DuBose, 46 N.C. App. 612, 265 S.E.2d 501, cert. denied, 300 N.C.
375, 267 S.E.2d 678 (1980), an action to declare void a sheriffs deed for failure to pay cash at an
execution sale (the execution price was set off by creditors' judgment in violation of G.S. § 1-
339.47), the court held that the action was not an action to void the deed, but an attempt to attack
collaterally the execution sale. Since such an attack may be brought only by motion in the cause
or on appeal within 10 days of the entry of the clerk's order, the court had no jurisdiction of the
matter, and the action should have been dismissed.
54. 46 N.C. App. 551, 265 S.E.2d 642 (1980).
55. Negotiations between parties after the action has been filed have been held to constitute
an appearance. See, eg., Taylor v. Triangle Porsche-Audi, Inc., 27 N.C. App. 711, 220 S.E.2d 806
(1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 619, 223 S.E.2d 396 (1976). An appearance may also arise by impli-
cation when the defendant takes some step in the proceedings beneficial to himself or detrimental
to the plaintiff. Roland v. W & L Motor Lines, 32 N.C. App. 288, 231 S.E.2d 685 (1977).
56. N.C.R. Crv. P. 55(b)(2).
57. Id. When an appearance has been made, a default judgment can only be entered by a
judge with three days written notice to the defendant prior to the hearing on the motion.
58. 46 N.C. App. 787, 266 S.E.2d 25 (1980). The defendant in this child custody case was not
served with a summons, but N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979) confers personaljurisdiction over any defendant who has made a general appearance in the action. 46 N.C. App.
at 788, 266 S.E.2d at 27.
59. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the validity of an order restraining defend-
ant from removing the child from the jurisdiction. 46 N.C. App. at 787, 266 S.E.2d at 26.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
61. 44 N.C. App. 381, 261 S.E.2d 491 (1980).
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tion62 because appellant failed to perfect his appeal within the eighty-eight
days before judgment was rendered. This failure to perfect appeal was tanta-
mount to an abandonment, to which the general rule of divestiture does not
apply.63
In Harding v. Harding64 the court of appeals held that in contempt pro-
ceedings for disobedience of a court order the defense of invalidity of the or-
der for want of subject matter jurisdiction of the issuing court could be raised,
even though the deadline for appeal from the order had passed.65
D. Service of Process66
In Hassell v. Wilson67 the supreme court ruled that a deputy sheriffs fail-
ure to indicate on a return of service the place the papers were left and when
the service was made according to the provisions of rule 4(j)(1)a., 68 made the
return "insufficient on its face to show valid service."'69
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, owned a house and lot subject to a deed of
62. The general rule in North Carolina is that an appeal takes the case out of the jurisdiction
of the trial court. See Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183, 197, 217 S.E.2d 532, 541 (1975).
63. 44 N.C. App. at 385-87, 261 S.E.2d at 494-95. In the instant case, appellant neither ten-
dered a proposed record on appeal within 30 days pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 11(c), nor did he
seek an extension of time in which to settle the record pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 27(c). Id. at
386, 261 S.E.2d at 494-95.
64. 46 N.C. App. 62, 264 S.E.2d 131 (1980).
65. Id. at 64, 264 S.E.2d at 132. The court treats the case as one of first impression in North
Carolina and adopts the general rule, as set forth in 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contempt § 42 (1964). In fact,
the question was decided in North Carolina in Patterson v. Patterson, 230 N.C. 481, 53 S.E.2d 658
(1949); and again as recently as Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Local 61, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 11 N.C.. App. 159, 180 S.E.2d 461, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 601 (1971).
66. In In re Rogers, 44 N.C. App. 713, 262 S.E.2d 312 (1980), an appeal from civil
commitment proceedings, the court of appeals held that a copy of the proposed record on appeal
should have been served on the special advocate who represented the State at the civil
commitment hearing rather than on the Attorney General, despite the language of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122-58.9 (Cum. Supp. 1979) that the "Attorney General shall represent the petitioner on
appeal." The appointed special advocate had represented the State at the civil commitment
hearing "and was qualified to determine for the State if the proposed record on appeal was
accurate." 44 N.C. App. at 717, 262 S.E.2d at 314. This made him the "attorney of record" for the
purposes of N.C.R. APP. P. 26. The court also stated that the clerk of the superior court of
Granville County had no authority to make a determination of proper service of the record under
N.C.R. APP. P. 11. Id. at 716, 262 S.E.2d at 313. Finally, the court noted that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 122-58.7(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979) had been amended to make staff attorneys from the Attorney
General's office who represent the State at commitment hearings in the future the opposing
counsels of record for the purposes of rule 26. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 915, § 13, 1979 N.C. Sess.
Laws, Ist Sess. 1260, 1262.
In Quattrone v. Rochester, 46 N.C. App. 799, 266 S.E.2d 40 (1980), the court held that failure
to file the affidavit of compliance required under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979),
which provides for service of process on the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, until 14 days after
service of the summons on the Commissioner and after the hearing on defendant's motion to
dismiss, did not invalidate the service when all the requirements of G.S. 1-105 were complied with
for service on a nonresident defendant. The court stated that the filing of the affidavit "merely
perfects the record and furnishes proof of compliance with G.S. 1-105 for the guidance of the
courts"-it does not affect the completeness of the service. 46 N.C. App. at 802, 266 S.E.2d at 42.
67. 301 N.C. 307, 272 S.E.2d 77 (1980).
68. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1)a.
69. 301 N.C. at 315, 272 S.E.2d at 82.
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trust held by a savings and loan association, 70 and sought to set aside an order
of foreclosure and the trustee's deed. The ensuing circumstances are best ex-
pressed by the court:
Plaintiff husband was employed away from home... and en-
trusted his wife with the duty and necessary funds to make the re-
quired payments on the loan. This she failed to do. She also failed
to tell her husband she was not making the payments. Foreclosure
proceedings were begun against the home. When [the] deputy sheriff
served notice of the foreclosure hearing on [wife], she hid the papers
under a mattress, never delivered them to her husband, and never
told him about them. [Wife] did attend the hearing before the clerk
• . . but said nothing about it to her husband. Pursuant to the fore-
closure order issued after the hearing . . . the foreclosure sale was
held .... [The property was conveyed to defendants] for the price
of $6,300. [Husband] first learned of these developments [after the
sale] when his sister and brother found the papers and brought them
to him. Plaintiffs purchased their home in 1971 for $7,900 and made
extensive additions and renovations. Apparently they are willing to
reimburse defendants for the $6,300 [and] have deposited this
amount with the clerk.7 1
Noting that this independent action could be allowed to attack the fore-
closure proceedings only if the "defect in the service of process appear[ed] on
the face of the return itself,"' 72 the court pointed out the requirement that
plaintiff-husband be "served with notice of the foreclosure hearing in accord-
ance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 73 Personal service was not at-
tempted, but substituted service under rule 4(j)(1)a was.7 4 This rule
invalidates service that is not made at "a place which constitutes the dwelling
of both the person to be served and the person with whom the papers are
left."'75 When service is challenged, G.S. 1-75.10 provides for proof of service
"by the officer's certificate thereof, showing place, time and manner of serv-
ice.,"76
In the officer's return of service,7 7 the blank space on the form for indicat-
70. At the time payments were stopped, plaintiffs owed $5,035.62 plus interest to the associa-
tion. Id. at 309, 272 S.E.2d at 79.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 312, 272 S.E.2d at 80.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 312, 272 S.E.2d at 81. See N.C.R_ Civ. P. 4(j)(l)a.: "[B]y leaving copies thereof at
the defendant's dwelling house or usualplace fabode with someperson of suitable age and discre-
tion then residing therein;.. ." (emphasis added).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.10(l)(a) (1969) (emphasis added).
77. I certify that this Order of Service was received on the 15th day of September, 1977
and together with the copy of the Notice of Hearing was served as follows: on Tex. R.
HasselL
On the 16 day of Sept., 1977 at the following place:
(Address where copy delivered or left)
By: X leaving copies with Phronia Loy Hassell who is a person of suitable age and
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ing the place of service was not filled in.78 The court reasoned that "[p]lace is
a prerequisite to valid substituted service under rule 4(j)(1)a; and place must
be stated in the return under G.S. 1-75.10. Therefore the return was insuffi-
cient on its face to show valid service."'7
9
The court distinguished Guthrie v. Ray,80 in which the supreme court held
"that a similar return of service substantially complied with Rule 4(j)(1)a,"81
because the return showed the address where service was made---the same ad-
dress given for defendant in the summons. 82
Earlier cases, including State v. Moore,83 had concluded that "if the re-
turn merely recites that it was 'served' without detailing the manner of service
it is sufficient to show proper service."84 These cases, however, concerned per-
sonal service, not substituted service, and were decided prior to the enactment
of rule 4(j)(1)a and G.S. 1-75.10. 85 In addition, the statute supporting the de-
cisions in those cases was repealed at the same time G.S. 1-75.10 was en-
acted.8 6
Because the statute authorizing substituted service is "in derogation of the
common law," it is to be "strictly construed, and must be followed with partic-
ularity;' 87 the Hassell court concluded that an "affirmative" showing of "due
service" was necessary.88 The court went on, however, to point out that while
"the defect . . . is sufficient to permit the foreclosure proceedings to be at-
tacked in an independent action, it is not. . . necessarily fatal to the foreclo-
sure proceedings."'89 The return may be amended, if the court allows, and the
amendment given retroactive effect.90 Whether amendment should be al-
lowed "rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge," and leave to
amend must be "warranted by the facts, circumstances and the ends of jus-
tice." 91 The question was remanded to the trial court.92
In Kahan v. Longiotti93 the court of appeals held that
discretion and who resides in the designated recipient's dwelling house or usual place of
abode.
301 N.C. at 310, 272 S.E.2d at 79.
78. Id. at 313, 272 S.E.2d at 81.
79. Id. at 315, 272 S.E.2d at 82.
80. 293 N.C. 67, 235 S.E.2d 146 (1977).
81. 301 N.C. at 313, 272 S.E.2d at 81.
82. Id. The court noted, however, that "[t]he better practice [was] to state explicitly in [the]
return of service that the place where the summons was left was the dwelling house or usual place
of abode of both the named defendant and 'the person. . .' to whom [the summons was deliv-
ered]." Id. (quoting Guthrie, 293 N.C. at 70, 235 S.E.2d at 148).
83. 230 N.C. 648, 55 S.E.2d 177 (1949).
84. 301 N.C. at 313, 272 S.E.2d at 81.
85. Id. at 314, 272 S.E.2d at 81-82.
86. Id. at 314 n.4, 272 S.E.2d at 82 n.4.
87. Id. at 314, 272 S.E.2d at 82.
88. Id. at 315, 272 S.E.2d at 82.
89. Id. at 315, 272 S.E.2d at 82-83.
90. Id. at 315-16, 272 S.E.2d at 83.
91. Id. at 316, 272 S.E.2d at 83.
92. Id. at 316-17, 272 S.E.2d at 83.
93. 45 N.C. App. 367, 263 S.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 675 (1980).
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an intervenor party who is granted permission to intervene pursuant
to Rule 24(b)(2)94 is not required to then issue [sic] a summons and
complaint pursuant to Rule 495 but that the service pursuant to Rule
596 of the motion to intervene accompanied with the complaint is
sufficient service upon the party against whom relief is sought or de-
nied in the intervenor's pleading and is sufficient to acquire jurisdic-
tion over the party if all other requisites for jurisdiction over the
party are met.97
In Kahan plaintiff-intervenor, a corporation, was allowed to intervene in
an action on a partnership of joint venture accounting as an assignee of the
original plaintiff, which status entitled it to an accounting.98 Defendant was
properly served with the intervenor's complaint and the motion to intervene.
Defendant opposed the motion to intervene because no summons was ever
issued to the defendant in connection with plaintiff-intervenor's suit. This op-
position was futile and defendant was given thirty days in which to respond to
intervenor's complaint. 99
The trial court found that plaintiff-intervenor's compliance with rule 5100
was sufficient notice to defendant and a rule 4101 summons was not re-
quired. 102 The court of appeals noted that rule 24(c) requires that "[a] person
desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon all parties affected
thereby."' 0 3 Unlike the original federal rule, the North Carolina version of
24(c) does not expressly provide that the motion to intervene shall be served
"as provided in Rule 5."104 The court found, however, that rule 5 service "is
the better procedure."'10 5
Defendant had relied on In re Indiana Transportation Co. 106 and Ruck v.
Spray Cotton Mills10 7 as requiring that an intervenor "issue summons and
serve the complaint pursuant to Rule 4."108 The court of appeals dist-
inguished Indiana Transportation as a situation in which "defendant was no
longer subject to process in the jurisdiction"'1 9 and as treating the 373 wrong-
94. N.C.R. Crv. P. 24(b)(2).
95. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4.
96. N.C.R. CIv. P. 5.
97. 45 N.C. App. at 372, 263 S.E.2d at 348.
98. Id. at 368, 263 S.E.2d at 346.
99. Id. at 369, 263 S.E.2d at 346-47.
100. N.C.R. Civ. P. 5 requires that pleadings and motions subsequent to the original com-
plaint "shall be served upon each of the parties," N.C.R Civ. P. 5(a), "in the manner provided for
service and return of process in Rule 4,' N.C.R Civ. P. 5(b).
101. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(a): "Upon the filing of the complaint, summons shall be issued forth-
with."
102. 45 N.C. App. at 370, 263 S.E.2d at 347.
103. N.C.R. Civ. P. 24(c).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(c).
105. "[A]nd certainly in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure."
45 N.C. App. at 372, 263 S.E.2d at 348.
106. 244 U.S. 456 (1917).
107. 120 F. Supp. 944 (M.D.N.C. 1954).
108. 45 N.C. App. at 374, 263 S.E.2d'at 349.
109. Id. In the instant case, defendant did not contest personal jurisdiction. Id.
1052 [Vol. 59
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1
ful death actions as "separate", whereas in Kahan "the same basic facts...
are alleged by both plaintiff and plaintiff intervenor and the same rules of
partnership law are applicable."' 110 Additionally, the court pointed out that it
is questionable whether the Indiana Transportation rule "survived the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules."' I Ruck was distinguished as dealing with an at-
tempt at intervention in an "independent proceeding,"' 1 2 whereas Kahan
dealt with "a claim on common questions of fact and law."' " 3
Plaintiff-intervenor had not commenced an action under rule 3,114 but
had entered an already extant action. Defendant had "ample time" in which
to answer the new complaint, and issuance of a new summons under the cir-
cumstances would have been "superfluous."' s
The court of appeals also held in 1980 that delivery of a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint to a defendant's place of business rather than to his resi-
dence does not comply with rule 4(j)(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and
is not sufficient service of process to confer jurisdiction over the defendant.16
E. Statutes of Limitations 117
The case of First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin18 dealt with the
applicability of the one-year statute of limitations "[flor a deficiency judgment
on any ... promissory note. . . after the foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of
110. Id. at 374, 263 S.E.2d at 350.
111. Id. See Berman v. Herrick, 30 F.R.D. 9, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1962); 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 24.20 (2d ed. 1980); 7A C. Wmir-rr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL § 1919 (1972).
112. In Ruck the original action was for the payment of dividends; in Kahan intervenors
brought an action for collection of attorney's fees. 45 N.C. App. at 375, 263 S.E.2d at 350.
113. Id.
114. N.C.R. Civ. P. 3.
115. 45 N.C. App. at 376, 263 S.E.2d at 351.
116. Hall v. Lassiter, 44 N.C. App. 23, 25, 260 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1980). The Hall court refused
to extend Wiles v. Welpamel Constr. Co., 295 N.C. 81, 243 S.E.2d 756 (1978), to apply to cases in
which manner of service of the summons does not comply precisely with rule 4. Despite broad
language in Miles about actual notice curing defects in service of process, the opinion was thus
limited to cases involving formal defects in the summons or complaint. 44 N.C. App. at 25, 260
S.E.2d at 157. Miles involved a summons which was directed to a corporation's registered agent
rather than to the corporate defendant itself, as required by N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(b). 295 N.C. at 85,
243 S.E.2d at 758.
117. In Citizens Ass'n v. City of Washington, 45 N.C. App. 7,262 S.E.2d 343, cert. denied, 300
N.C. 195, 269 S.E.2d 622 (1980), applying G.S. 159-62 to a contest of referendum results, the court
held that the statutory time limit for bringing claims was computed from the first publication of
the results, and that a second publication of the corrected results did not operate to extend the
original time limit.
In Central Syss., Inc. v. General Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 48 N.C. App. 198, 268
S.E.2d 822 (1980), Judge Webb ruled that although plaintiff had taken a voluntary dismissal
under N.C.R. Civ. P. 41, and had not served defendant with process within the statutory limit of
90 days after the preceding endorsement, the action was not barred but was simply discontinued
pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(e), and could be revived by suing out an alias or pluries summons or
by obtaining an extension from the clerk of the time in which to serve process. 48 N.C. App. at
201, 268 S.E.2d at 823. Defendants had claimed that the one-year statute of limitations for
reinstituting an action after taking a voluntary dismissal had run.
118. 44 N.C. App. 261, 261 S.E.2d 145 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 741, 267 S.E.2d 661
(1980).
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trust on real estate securing such... note"' 19 to a maker of the note who is
not a mortgagor of the property.120 The court of appeals held that "only a
party with an interest in the mortgaged property may assert [the one-year stat-
ute of limitations] as a bar to an action for a deficiency judgment."' 2 1
In this question of first impression the court noted a split among jurisdic-
tions' 22 and found support for its holding in legislative intent. The present
statute, first enacted in 1933,123 "was obviously intended to restrict the per-
sonal liability of debtors upon the foreclosure of property during the depres-
sion." 124 Another statute 125 enacted in 1933 allowed an assertion that the
purchase price was below fair market value as a defense to an action for a
deficiency by a mortgagee who had purchased the property.126 The defense
was made available only to a "maker of any such obligation whoseproperly
[had] been sopurchased.'"127 From this the court concluded that the legislature
intended to extend protection only to those with "a property interest in the
mortgaged property," and not to "other parties liable on the underlying
debt.",128
The court also noted that under the terms of the note each maker was
liable for the entire debt. If plaintiff had brought this action prior to foreclo-
sure, defendant would have been fully liable and without recourse to the stat-
ute of limitations. Defendants, having suffered no loss as a result of the
foreclosure on property in which they held no interest, should not be able to
assert the abbreviated limitations period "merely because the plaintiff elected
to foreclose on the mortgaged property first."'129 Finally, the court noted that
its holding was "consistent with the general rule that a statute of limitations
should not be applied to cases not clearly within its provisions.' ' 30
In Stutts v. Duke Power Co. 131 the court of appeals distinguished two
complaints based on defendant's allegedly libelous statements made at the
time it discharged plaintiff from employment. The first complaint was based
on the denial by-the Employment Security Commission of plaintiffs unem-
ployment benefits because of defendant's statement on the discharge slip that
plaintiff was "discharged for misconduct" and for "a dishonest act."' 132 The
second claim was based on the impairment of plaintiffs reputation and his
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(6) (1969).
120. 44 N.C. App. at 262-63, 261 S.E.2d at 147.
121. Id. at 264, 261 S.E.2d at 148.
122. Id. at 263, 261 S.E.2d at 147.
123. Law of May 15, 1933, ch. 529, § 1, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 880 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-54(6) (1969)).
124. 44 N.C. App. at 263, 261 S.E.2d at 147.
125. Law of April 18, 1933, ch. 275, § 3, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 402 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (1976)).
126. 44 N.C. App. at 263, 261 S.E.2d at 148.
127. Id. at 263-64, 261 S.E.2d at 148.
128. Id. at 264, 261 S.E.2d at 148.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 47 N.C. App. 76, 266 S.E.2d 861 (1980).
132. Id. at 79, 266 S.E.2d at 864.
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ability to obtain other employment as a result of defendant's including in
plaintiffs employment record that he was discharged for a dishonest act, and
repeating that charge through its employees and agents to plaintiffs fellow
workers and to prospective employers. 133
Although the two complaints "stemmed" from the same discharge, the
court held they were not based on the same claim. 134 Thus the latter action,
which was commenced after the statute of limitations had run, could not be
saved under rule 41(a)(1) by relating it back to the date of the filing of the
former complaint, which was voluntarily dismissed under rule 41 within one
year of the filing of the second complaint. 135
In Burcl v. North Carolina Baptist Hospital, Inc. ,136 the court of appeals
held that plaintiffs wrongful death action was barred because she had not
qualified as administratrix in North Carolina within the statutory two year
period, 137 and the amendment to her complaint did not relate back to the
original action that was dismissed because the plaintiff was a foreign adminis-
tratrix.
Plaintiff argued that she acted in good faith, that defendant had not been
prejudiced by the amendment, and that in a case such as this, the statute of
limitations should not be strictly construed to deny a hearing of the action on
its merits.138 The court of appeals' adherance to an unbending interpretation
of the statute of limitations seems unwarranted by the facts of Burcl or by the
policies behind the statute.
In Danielson v. Cummings139 the supreme court was faced with the ques-
tion of when the statute of limitations begins to run after the taking of a volun-
tary dismissal: from the time notice is given in open court of intent to take a
dismissal or from the time written notice of dismissal is filed with the clerk.
The court held that the statute began to run from the time of oral notice
in open court because
133. Id. at 80-81, 266 S.E.2d at 864.
134. Id. at 79, 266 S.E.2d at 864.
135. Id. at 81, 266 S.E.2d at 864. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) provides that if an action is brouht
within the statute of limitations and is then voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, a new action
based on the same claim can be commenced within one year of the dismissal.
The Stuffs court also stated that the actionable words must be alleged in the complaint " 'sub-
stantially' in haec verba, or with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine whether
the statement was defamatory." 47 N.C. App. at 84, 266 S.E.2d at 866. The court found that the
plaintiffs complaint met the standard as required. Id.
136. 47 N.C. App. 127, 266 S.E.2d 726, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 86, 273 S.E.2d 444 (1980). Plain-
tiff was the administratrix of decedent's estate in Virginia and brought a wrongful death action in
North Carolina pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (1976). The original action could not
be maintained because an administrator of another state may not bring suit in North Carolina, but
plaintiff was qualified as an ancillary administratrix in North Carolina.
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53(4) (1979).
138. But see Merchants Distrib. v. Hutchinson, 16 N.C. App. 655, 193 S.E.2d 436 (1972).
139. 300 N.C. 175,265 S.E.2d 161 (1980). Danielson was a personal injury case. On February
1, 1977, plaintiffs counsel gave notice in open court of his intention to take a voluntary dismissal,
but he did not file written notice until April 25, 1977. Defendant then pled the statute of limita-
tions, arguing that it had been one year and 14 days since plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal in
open court. The applicable statute of limitations was one year. Plaintiff contended that the statute
begins to run from the time written notice is filed.
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when parties confront each other face-to-face in a properly convened
session of court where a written record is kept of all proceedings,
there is no necessity to file a paper writing in order to take notice of a
voluntary dismissal. In such a case, oral notice of dismissal is clearly
adequate, and fully satisfies the "filing" requirements of rule41(a)(1).1 40
F Res Judicata141
The plaintiff in Thompson v. Northwestern Security Life Insurance Co. 142
had previously brought an action against defendant in her capacity as admin-
istratrix of the estate of her husband, whose life had been insured by a policy
issued by defendant. 143 That action had been dismissed for failure to prose-
cute.144 In the instant action plaintiff again served defendant, this time in her
individual capacity as beneficiary under the policy.'45 The trial court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim on grounds of res judicata.' 46
The court of appeals, noting that a judgment on the merits bars relitiga-
tion of issues in a subsequent action by "parties or their privies" to the first
action, 147 nevertheless found that the "insufficient identity of parties"'148
caused by the change in capacity in which plaintiff sued prevented a res judi-
cata bar to the suit. 149 Lack of identity of parties was predicated on plaintiffs
entitlement to payment under the policy only "in her individual capacity as the
wife and beneficiary of the insured," and not in her capacity as administratrix
in the prior action.' 50
This result is difficult to reconcile with King v. Grindstajl 5 and Thomp-
son v. Lassiter.'52 In Grindstaff the court found that when the sole benefi-
140. Id. at 179, 265 S.E.2d at 163. N.C.R. Cry. P. 41(a)(1) provides that "any claim ... may
be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (I) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before plaintiff rests his case." See also Wood v. Wood, 297 N.C. 1, 252 S.E.2d 799 (1979).
Another case concerning voluntary dismissals was Swygert v. Swygert, 46 N.C. App. 173, 264
S.E.2d 902 (1980), in which it was held that when the defendant has filed a counterclaim that
arises out of the same transaction alleged in the complaint, plaintiff thereby loses the right to take
a voluntary dismissal without defendant's consent. The case approved the ruling in McCarley v.
MeCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).
141. Department of Social Servs. v. Skinner, 48 N.C. App. 621, 269 S.E.2d 678 (1980), held
that a court ruling that plaintiff had no standing to sue did not have res judicata effect when no
summons had been issued in the previous action. Due to the failure of summons, the prior action
was held to be a nullity and the recital of lack of standing was of no effect.
142. 44 N.C. App. 668, 262 S.E.2d 397, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 202, 269 S.E.2d 620 (1980).
143. Id. at 671, 262 S.E.2d at 399.
144. Id. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(b): "For'failure of the plaintiff to prosecute.., a defendant
may move for dismissal of an action. . . against him. . . .Unless the court. . . otherwise speci-
fies, a dismissal under this section. . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
145. 44 N.C. App. at 671, 262 S.E.2d at 399.
146. Id.
147. 44 N.C. App. at 677, 262 S.E.2d at 403; see note 144 SUpra.
148. 44 N.C. App. at 677-78, 262 S.E.2d at 403.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 677, 262 S.E.2d at 403 (emphasis in original). The issue in either proceeding would
be the same-whether the insurance company is liable on the policy.
151. 284 N.C. 348, 200 S.E.2d 799 (1973).
152. 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957).
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ciaries under the wrongful death statute were plaintiffs in a prior action
against the same defendants based on the same issues, sufficient identity of
parties existed to make judgment on those issues conclusive, the beneficiaries
being the real parties in interest in the subsequent wrongful death action. l5 3
The court of appeals' ruling tends to indicate that an administrator, even if an
heir to the estate, is not the real party in interest of an action brought on behalf
of the estate.
Even if sufficient identity of parties is not found, principles of res judicata
may still apply, according to Lassiter, with regard to
[a] person who is not a party but who controls an action, individually
or m cooperation with others,... if he has a proprietary interest or
financial interest in the judgment or in the determination of a question
offact or a question of law with reference to the same subject matter, or
transactions.1
5 4
The result of Northwestern Security Life may indicate an unwillingness on the
part of the court of appeals to apply the Lassiter rule to situations in which the
questions were not actually litigated, or, more likely, to situations in which, as
a matter of law, there could be no recovery for the party in the capacity in
which the previous action had been brought.' 55
The court's opinion also tends to ignore the general rule that a final judg-
ment is conclusive with regard to "all material and relevant matters within the
scope of the pleadings, which the parties, in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, could and should have brought forward."'156 The court easily could
have found that plaintiff, "in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could and
should have brought forward" her individual claim and her claim as adminis-
tratrix at the same time.' 5 7
In Phillps v. Phillips158 the court of appeals held that although the separa-
tion agreement between plaintiff and defendant was not specifically raised in
an earlier action 159 between the same parties, it formed the basis of plaintiff's
right to recover and was therefore within the scope of the pleadings. Thus, the
issue of the validity of the separation agreement was res judicata in this ac-
tion. 160 The court also stated that res judicata was not a defense to breach of
153. 284 N.C. at 357-58, 200 S.E.2d at 806.
154. 246 N.C. at 39, 97 S.E.2d at 496 (emphasis in original).
155. See 44 N.C. App. at 677, 262 S.E.2d at 403.
156. Bruton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 7, 6 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1940).
157. Cf. Andrews v. Masons, 189 N.C. 697, 128 S.E. 4 (1925) (plaintiff suing on life insurance
policy both in personal capacity and as administratrix.)
158. 46 N.C. App. 558, 265 S.E.2d 441 (1980). The case involved a suit for back alimony in
which defendant pled as defenses fraud and duress in the separation agreement.
159. The earlier action ended in a consent judgment for the plaintiff. "[A] consent judgment
[as well as a judgment on trial of issues] is resjudicata as between the parties upon all matters
embraced therein." McLeod v. McLeod, 266 N.C. 144, 153, 146 S.E.2d 65, 71 (1966). For a
helpful definition of res judicata, see Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962).
160. "The plea of res adjudicata applies not only to the points upon which the court was
required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which
properly belonged to the subject in litigation." Painter v. Board of Educ., 288 N.C. 165, 173, 217
S.E.2d 650, 655 (1975).
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the agreement when the alleged breach arose subsequent to the earlier ac-
tion.161
Principles of res judicata were held to bar "litigating or relitigating issues
in an arbitration proceeding which are raised or could have been raised in the
prior action" in C & 0 Development Co. v. American Arbitration Association. 162
G. Summary Judgment
Steel Creek Development Corp. v. James163 evidenced an attempt by the
supreme court to provide guidelines as to when summary judgment should be
granted. The court stated that when the movant has carried his burden of
proof on the motion for summary judgment, his motion is entitled to be
granted unless his opponent responds by producing evidence or has an excuse
for not doing so.' 4 Assuming the opposing party has no excuse for not pro-
ducing evidence, after the movant has carried his burden he may be granted
summary judgment through either of two ways. First, the movant may show
through evidence obtained via discovery that the opponent cannot produce
enough evidence to support at least one essential element of his affirmative
defense.' 65 Second, if the opponent, in response to the movant's carrying his
burden, responds with affidavits or other evidence, the movant will thereby
obtain a forecast of his opponent's evidence that may once again reveal that
the opponent cannot support at least one essential element of his affirmative
defense.166 "Thus, a party may succeed on a summary judgment motion upon
the strength of his own evidence or upon the weakness of the opposing party's
evidence when such a forecast of that evidence can be obtained in discovery or
161. 46 N.C. App. at 563, 265 S.E.2d at 444.
162. 48 N.C. App. 548, 553, 269 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1980). This appears to be the first time in
North Carolina that res judicata has been used to bar arbitration proceedings. The question was
not directly raised by appellant, who attacked the power of the court to determine whether the
subject matter in question had been previously reduced to a binding judgment and the finding by
the trial court that the requirements for application of res judicata had been met, id at 552-53, 269
S.E.2d at 686, not whether res judicata principles were applicable to bar arbitration proceedings as
opposed to judicial proceedings. In any event, the result would appear to be a generally accepted
one. See DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 39.04 (1968).
The trial court's power to issue a stay of arbitration proceedings was justified on the grounds
that it is the province of the courts to determine "the extent of a judgment's binding effect," 48
N.C. App. at 552, 269 S.E.2d at 687.
163. 300 N.C. 631, 268 S.E.2d 205 (1980).
164. Id at 639, 268 S.E.2d at 210.
N.C.R. Ciw. P. 56(c) dictates that summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."
It is well settled that the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proof on the
motion. See Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972). In
order for the plaintiff to obtain summary judgment, he must establish that there is no genuine
issue of a material fact on any of the essential elements of his claim, and that there is no genuine
issue of a material fact as to one or more elements of the opponent's affirmative defenses, if any.
See Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 300 N.C. 631, 637-38, 268 S.E.2d 205, 209-10 (1980).
165. Cf Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 474, 251 S.E.2d 419, 424 (1979) (ele-
ments of a claim).
166. See 2 A. McINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1660.5 (2d ed.
Supp. 1970).
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in response to movant'sprimafacie showing on the motion." 167
Middleton v. Myers168 involved a tort suit for malicious prosecution in
which plaintiff claimed that defendant planted drugs in plaintiff's car and
called the police to arrest plaintiff. The defendant-movant's affidavit stated
that he informed the police in good faith. Plaintiff-opponent's affidavits
showed that defendant was a pharmacist with access to illegal drugs, that de-
fendant refused to tell the arresting officer where he received his information
that the drugs would be in the car, and, finally, that defendant fabricated testi-
mony about a conversation he overheard that implicated plaintiff in illegal
drug operations. 169
Justice Brock, writing for the majority, stated that movant's affidavit aver-
ring good faith carried his burden of proof on the motion, and that plaintiff's
counter-affidavits failed to create any factual issue of the maliciousness of de-
fendant's conduct.' 70 Both of these majority propositions are dubious at best,
especially when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff.171 Justice Exum's
forceful dissent172 correctly recognized the pitfall that this and other courts
have fallen into-sitting as a trier of fact on a motion for summary judg-
ment.173
In Bell v. Martin 174 defendant failed to file a responsive pleading, and
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the allegations in the complaint
was granted by the trial court and affirmed by one court of appeals. 75 The
supreme court reversed, holding that the proper motion was for an entry of
default under rule 55(a),176 because the granting of summary judgment pre-
cluded defendant from presenting any testimony in opposition to the motion
or defenses on the merits.177
The supreme court, in Kavanau Real Estate Trust v. Debnam,178 settled
the question left open by the court of appeals 179 whether summary judgment
for plaintiff could be entered even before defendant had filed an answer by
167. 300 N.C. at 639, 268 S.E.2d at 211.
168. 299 N.C. 42, 261 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
169. 299 N.C. at 51, 261 S.E.2d at 113-14 (Exum, J., dissenting).
170. 299 N.C. at 46, 261 S.E.2d at 110-11.
171. See, e.g., Patterson v. Reid, 10 N.C. App. 22, 178 S.E.2d 1 (1970). Additionally, any
doubt as to whether a genuine issue of fact exists must be resolved against the movant. See, e.g.,
Bentley v. Langley, 39 N.C. App. 20, 249 S.E.2d 481 (1978).
172. 299 N.C. at 50-52, 261 S.E.2d at 113-14 (Exum, J., dissenting). Justice Huskins also filed
a dissent in which Justices Copeland and Exum joined. Id at 47-50, 261 S.E.2d at 111-13 (Hus-
kins, J., dissenting).
173. Courts are not to resolve disputed issues of fact on a motion for summary judgment. See,
eg., Patterson v. Reid, 10 N.C. App. 22, 178 S.E.2d 1 (1970).
174. 299 N.C. 715, 264 S.E.2d 101 (1980).
175. 43 N.C. App. 134, 258 S.E.2d 403 (1979).
176. N.C.RI Civ. P. 55(a). See notes 182-88 and accompanying text infra.
177. 299 N.C. at 721-22, 264 S.E.2d at 105.
178. 299 N.C. 510, 263 S.E.2d 595 (1980), a§- 41 N.C. App. 256, 254 S.E.2d 638 (1979).
179. In the case of Alpine Village, Inc. v. Lomas & Netfleton Financial Corp., 27 N.C. App.
403, 219 S.E.2d 242 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 302, 222 S.E.2d 695 (1976).
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holding that under rule 56(a)180 such a judgment was proper.18 1
H Default Judgments
In Love v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 182 plaintiff obtained a judg-
ment against defendant's insured, who did not appear at the trial. However,
plaintiff's counsel did not serve Nationwide with a copy of the summons, com-
plaint, or other pleadings, and Nationwide was never notified of the action by
its insured. Plaintiff then brought suit against Nationwide to collect on its
judgment against the insured.
G.S. 20-279.21(f)(1) 183 precludes collecting from the insurer on a default
judgment against the insured, unless the insurer has been served in the default
judgment action. In a case of first impression, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that a "default judgment" under G.S. 20-279.21(f)(1) includes
"all judgments obtained where an insured person. . . has not timely filed a
responsive pleading or has otherwise made hismself subject to a Rule 55 de-
fault."1 84
The court of appeals first determined that plaintiffs decision to go to trial
and to bypass the procedure for the entry of default under rule 55 of the Rules
of Civil Prodedure did not bar her from obtaining a judgment against a nonap-
pearing defendant. 185 The court then decided that in light of the purpose of
the statute, which is to give insurers notice of actions against their insureds so
the insurers can protect their interests, when a judgment is had against a non-
appearing defendant after trial it comes within the meaning of "default judg-
ment" as that term is used in the statute.1 86 The court believed the burden
180. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(a), which provides that a motion for summary judgment may be made
"at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action."
181. The supreme court reasoned that by statute a motion for summary judgment was allowed
after 30 days from the commencement of the action, without regard to defendant's having an-
swered, see note 180 supra; that even if defendant had answered, he would not be able to rest on
his pleadings, but would still be required to file affidavits in opposition to plaintiffs motion; and
that the result reached by the court of appeals, that summary judgment was "not premature," 41
N.C. App. at 262, 254 S.E.2d at 642, was correct, 299 N.C. at 513, 263 S.E.2d at 598.
182. 45 N.C. App. 444, 263 S.E.2d 337 (1980).
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(f)(1) (Supp. 1979) provides, in part:
As to policies issued to insureds in this State under the assigned risk plan or through the
North Carolina Motor Vehicle Reinsurance Facility, a default judgment taken against
such an insured shall not be used as a basis for obtaining judgment against the insurer
unless counsel for the plaintiff has forwarded to the insurer, or to one of its agents, by
registered or certified mail with return receipt requested, or served by any other method
of service provided by law, a copy of summons, complaint, or other pleadings, filed in
the action....
Id (emphasis added).
184. Love v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 45 N.C. App. 444, 448, 263 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1980).
185. Id at 447, 263 S.E.2d at 339. The court cited Whitaker v. Whitaker, 16 N.C. App. 432,
192 S.E.2d 80 (1972), as controlling. Whitaker held that an entry of default under N.C.R. Civ. P.
55(a) is not a prerequisite to a judgment against a defendant who has not answered, but has
appeared at trial.
186. 45 N.C. App. at 448, 263 S.E.2d at 339-40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1978 &
Supp. 1979).
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placed on plaintiffs attorney to notify the insurer187 would be slight compared
to the risk of loss to the insurer if it is denied the opportunity to defend against
the action. Therefore, the failure to give the insurer notice of the action
against the insured barred the plaintiff from maintaining her action against
Nationwide to collect on the judgment.
In another case the court of appeals held that filing of an answer thirty-
seven days after being served with the complaint does not prevent the clerk
from entering a default judgment.' 88
Z Rule 60(b) Reief from Judgment
In Endsley v. Wolfe Camera Supply Corp. ,189 a case of first impression
under rule 60(b)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,190 plaintiff failed to ap-
pear in court, when his trial reconvened, due to his counsel's being delayed at
another hearing in another county on the same morning. The court of appeals
held that the counsel's delay was a sufficient ground for setting aside the judg-
ment against plaintiff on the basis of "surprise."' 191 The trial court had found
that plaintiffs attorney was unaware of the conflict at the time the plaintiffs
hearing was scheduled, and that the attorney's secretary had informed the
clerk of the court of the conflict and possible delay. 192 The trial court con-
cluded that plaintiff was "surprised" by the delay in the other proceedings and
that the judgment against plaintiff should be set aside.
The court of appeals affirmed, although it noted that the "surprise" in-
volved might be more appropriately called "mistake" or "excusable ne-
glect."' 193 In support of its affirmation, the court of appeals cited the North
Carolina Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he surprise contemplated by the
statute is some condition or situation in which a party to a cause is unexpect-
edly placed to his injury, without any fault or negligence on his own, which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."'194 Also, the court relied
187. 45 N.C. App. at 448, 263 S.E.2d at 340. Plaintifts counsel would have "to inquire into
the insurance status of the defendant" to determine if any notice is necessary. Id
188. Peebles v. Moore, 48 N.C. App. 497, 502, 269 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1980). The court held that
while the type of response to a complaint required from the defendant has been liberally con-
strued, the 30 day time limit will be strictly applied. 48 N.C. App. at 502, 269 S.E.2d at 697.
However, the court went on to hold that the superior court had abused its discretion in failing to
set aside the entry of default where the equities of the situation favored setting aside the default.
Id at 507, 269 S.E.2d at 700.
189. 44 N.C. App. 308, 261 S.E.2d 36 (1979).
190. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b) reads, in part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . .
191. 44 N.C. App. at 310, 261 S.E.2d at 38.
192. Id at 309, 261 S.E.2d at 37. The court found that the attorney was scheduled to be in
District Court in Gaston County at 9:30 a.m., one hour before the trial in the instant case was to
reconvene in Mecklenburg County. The court also found that the judge was late in arriving at the
Gaston County courthouse, thus causing the delay. Id
193. 44 N.C. App. at 312, 261 S.E.2d at 39. Although it did not seem to affect the court of
appeals, it is at least questionable whether the failure of plaintiffs attorney to keep track of his
schedule only one day in advance can be termed "excusable neglect."
194. 44 N.C. App. at 310, 261 S.E.2d at 38 (citing Townsend v. Coach Co., 231 N.C. 81, 85, 56
S.E.2d 39, 42 (1949)).
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on Greater Baton Rouge Golf Association v. Recreation and Park Commis-
sion, 195 a Fifth Circuit case with strikingly similar facts. In Golf Association
the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) 196 motion and
urged that a liberal construction be given to the rule. 197 The Endsley result
seems consistent with the remedial intent of rule 60(b) and the general policy
of preventing hardship and injustice to litigants resulting from overly technical
or narrow applications of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Laroque v. Laroque'98 the court of appeals ruled that when neither
defendant nor counsel were present at trial' 99 and had no notice of the trial
because the trial was held the day after plaintiff received defendant's answer,
defendant's rule 60(b)200 motion should have been granted for excusable ne-
glect. 201
J Appeal and Error20 ZInterocutory Appeals
Several important decisions in 1980 evidenced an attempt by the court of
appeals to resolve ambiguities in North Carolina law regarding when an inter-
195. 507 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1975). In Golf Association the attorney was aware of the conflict in
his schedule, although he had reason to believe that he could make both hearings on the same
morning. Id at 228.
196. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b).
197. 507 F.2d at 228-29.
198. 46 N.C. App. 578, 265 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 558, 270 S.E.2d 109 (1980).
Plaintiff filed her complaint on April 6 and defendant answered on May 5. Plaintiff's calendar
request for a May 9 trial was granted.
199. When defendant was not present for trial a default judgment was entered against him
pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 55.
200. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) provides for reopening a final judgment on a finding of excusable
neglect.
201. N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. 2(d) provides that when an attorney wants to schedule a case for trial
earlier than five months after the date the complaint is filed, he should give a copy of his certificate
of readiness to opposing counsel. It is implicit in this rule that a defendant not represented by
counsel (as in this case) be mailed a copy of the certificate as well. This was not done, therefore
the usual rule that a party must keep himself advised of the time and date of trial did not apply.
See generaly Craver v. Spaugh, 226 N.C. 450, 38 S.E.2d 525 (1946).
202. In Cook v. Export Leaf Tobacco Co., 47 N.C. App. 187, 266 S.E.2d 754 (1980), the court
held that partial summary judgment on the issue of indemnity for damages is not an appealable
final judgment under N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b) because there had been no determination of liability or
of damages on the underlying transaction. 47 N.C. App. at 189, 266 S.E.2d at 756. The court also
held that the partial summary judgment was not appealable under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277
(Cum. Supp. 1979) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(d) (1969) because it would not injure the
appellant if not corrected prior to the appeal from a final judgment. Id at 188, 266 S.E.2d at 755.
In C.C. Woods Constr. Co. v. Budd-Piper Roofing Co., 46 N.C. App. 634, 265 S.E.2d 506
(1980), the court held that a motion for a new trial or for a modification ofjudgment under N.C.R.
Crv. P. 59 and the court's orders denying the motions and fixing the time for service of the record
on appeal could not extend the 150 day time limit of N.C.R. App. P. 12(a) for the filing of the
record on appeal once notice of appeal from the judgment had been given. 46 N.C. App. at 636,
265 S.E.2d at 507. Where an extension of time in which to file the record is not granted by the
court and the appellant has failed to comply with the time limit, N.C.R. ApP. P. 27(c) requires
dismissal of the appeal. Id
In Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp. v. Foreman's Inc., 44 N.C. App. 126, 260 S.E.2d 661
(1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 544, 265 S.E.2d 404 (1980), the court stated that the failure of briefs
to refer to the assignments of error and to the exceptions pertinent to the questions presented on
appeal, as required by N.C.R. APP. P. 28(b)(3), was grounds for dismissal of the appeal. 44 N.C.
App. at 128, 260 S.E.2d at 663. However, the strong factual basis for the appeal in this case led the
court to exercise its discretion in the interests of justice, under rule 2 of the appellate rules, to
1062 [Vol. 59
CIVIL PR 0 CED URE 1
locutory appeal 203 may be taken. In Bailey v. Gooding2°4 the plaintiff ob-
tained an entry of default205 and defendant moved under North Carolina Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)2 06 to set aside the entry of default. The motion was
denied, plaintiffs later motion for a default judgment was granted, and the
trial judge ordered a jury trial solely on the issue of damages. Defendant
again filed a rule 60(b) motion, this time to set aside the default judgment; the
motion was granted and plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals vacated the order granting the motion, reasoning
that because a trial on damages was forthcoming the 60(b) motion was an
appeal from an interlocutory order and, therefore, should not have been
heard.20 7
The court went on to consider whether the trial judge erred by refusing to
set aside the entry of default, ruled that the trial court applied the wrong stan-
dard, and remanded for a determination whether good cause, the proper stan-
dard, had been shown.208
Judge Hedrick, in a vigorous dissent, stated that it was an improper exer-
cise of the court's discretion to review and reverse interlocutory orders. He
argued that the court should remand for trial on the issue of damages and only
then allow defendant to file his 60(b) motion.20 9
In sum, the Bailey court both disallowed the appeal and invoked its dis-
cretionary power to review the appeal. Such a paradoxical ruling does little to
clarify this confusing area of civil procedure. The court's reasoning seems to
be that when a glaring error appears on the face of the record,210 it is a matter
of judicial economy to remand and rectify the error rather than to proceed
directly to a trial on damages and then hear an appeal that will definitely
result in reversal. The Bailey reasoning seems to represent a minor movement
by the court of appeals away from the traditional North Carolina practice of
consider the appeal. Nonetheless, the opinion included a strong admonition to the bar that the
rules are mandatory for all parties before the court. Id
203. "An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not
dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and deter-
mine the entire controversy." Tridyn Indus. v. American Mutual Insurance Co., 296 N.C. 486,
488, 251 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1973) (perhaps the most frequently cited North Carolina decision in this
area). An interlocutory appeal is an appeal from an interlocutory order.
204. 45 N.C. App. 335, 263 S.E.2d 634 (1980).
205. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 55(a).
206. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides that "loin motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment. . . for [mistake, inadvertance, excusable
neglect, fraud, etc.] ..
The court also held that the proper application of a rule 60(b) motion is to a default judg-
ment, in accordance with rule 55(d), and not to the entry of default as the trial court had ruled.
Defendant should have been able to simply show "good cause" to relieve himself from the entry
of default, again pursuant to rule 55(d). The standard for setting aside an entry of default is less
strict than the standard for vacating a default judgment. See, e.g., Crotts v. Camel Pawn Shop,
Inc., 16 N.C. App. 392, 192 S.E.2d 55 (1970), cert. denied, 282 N.C. 425, 192 S.E.2d 835 (1971).
207. 45 N.C. App. at 343, 263 S.E.2d at 639-40.
208. See note 206 supra.
209. 45 N.C. App. at 346, 263 S.E.2d at 641.
210. See discussion at note 206 supra. The proper standard for setting aside an entry of de-
fault is for "good cause" shown and the trial judge applied the stricter 60(b) standard. ,
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granting appeals from interlocutory orders. 211
The court of appeals added further confusion to the area of interlocutory
appeals in Metcalf v. Palmer2 12 and Davis v. Mitchell.213 In Metca/f a default
judgment for defendant was set aside by the trial judge, in accordance with
rule 60(b)(1), by reason of neglect of plaintiffs counsel. Defendant's appeal
from the granting of the motion to set aside the default judgment was clearly
interlocutory-the order did not terminate, but rather revived, the action.
The question for the court of appeals was whether the granting of the rule
60(b) motion affected a substantial right of the defendant under G.S. 1-
277(a). 214 More precisely, the issue was whether the right to avoid a trial on
the merits is a substantial right that would permit an interlocutory appeal if it
were denied. 215
The Metcaf court, quoting Davis v. Mitchell, recognized that the
"Supreme Court and this Court have historically entertained appeals from or-
ders setting aside default judgments even though such orders are clearly inter-
locutory and only questionably may be considered as affecting a substantial
right";216 nevertheless, the court held the order to set aside the default was not
appealable. The Davis court, however, did grant an interlocutory appeal on
an order setting aside a default judgment even though it noted that "avoidance
of a rehearing or trial is not considered to be. . .a "subs/antial right.' ,,217 The
Davis court conceded that, although the federal courts and most state courts
hold that setting aside a default judgment is not ordinarily appealable, the
North Carolina courts, despite substantial criticism, 21 8 have "historically en-
tertained interlocutory appeals. '219
The Metcalf court acknowledged that its holding was "not altogether logi-
cally consistent with" the North Carolina tradition of allowing interlocutory
appeals from orders setting aside default judgments, 220 but stated that it has
"been reluctant to [grant interlocutory appeals] absent an express direction
from our Supreme Court. '221
Me/ca/f and Davis exemplify the continued uncertainty regarding the ap-
211. "Our appellate courts have... historically entertained [interlocutory] appeals. Davis v.
Mitchell, 46 N.C. App., 272, 274, 265 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1980).
212. 46 N.C. App. 622, 265 S.E.2d 484 (1980).
213. 46 N.C. App. 272, 265 S.E.2d 248 (1980).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken
from every judicial order or determination of a judge of a superior or district court ... which
affects a substantial right claimed in any action or proceeding. .....
215. Defendant did not show any detrimental reliance on the judgment so that the only sub-
stantial rights question involved the right to avoid a trial on the merits.
216. 46 N.C. App. at 625,265 S.E.2d at 485 (citing Davis v. Mitchell, 46 N.C. App. at 274, 265
S.E.2d at 250) (emphasis added).
217. 46 N.C. App. at 274, 265 S.E.2d at 250 (emphasis added).
218. See, e.g., Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978-Civil Procedure, 57
N.C.L. RFv. 827, 914-18 (1979).
219. Id See, ag., Shackleford v. Taylor, 261 N.C. 640, 135 S.E.2d 667 (1964). But see Tridyn
Indus. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (1973); Waters v. Qualified Per-
sonnel Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
220. 46 N.C. App. at 625, 265 S.E.2d at 485.
221. Id
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pealability of orders setting aside default judgments. While Davis granted the
interlocutory appeal, it stated in dictum that no substantial right is affected by
setting aside a default judgment. In the same term the Metcajf court refused
to hear the interlocutory appeal, but admitted that setting aside a default judg-
ment arguably affects a substantial right, citing Davis as authority.
In Steel Creek Development Corp. v. James222 the North Carolina
Supreme Court had an opportunity to provide much needed guidance to the
court of appeals, but failed to do so. James involved an action for trespass in
which plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction to force defendants to re-
move concrete anchors allegedly placed on plaintiffs' submerged lands. The
injunction was granted and a trial set on the issue of damages. Defendants
appealed the order granting the injunction and the supreme court allowed the
appeal, reasoning that to comply with the injunction would necessitate an im-
mediate removal of the anchors from plaintiffs land and thus a substantial
right would be affected within the meaning of G.S. 1-277(a)223 and 7A-27(d).224
Justice Copeland cited WhaleheadProperties v. Coastland Corp. 225 in sup-
port of the holding in James. In Whalehead summary judgment was granted
on defendant's counterclaim on the issue of liability and a trial was set to
determine damages, but it was also held that defendant was not entitled to
specific performance. Defendant's interlocutory appeal on the denial of spe-
cific performance was granted because to refuse to hear the appeal would have
eliminated defendant's opportunity to obtain specific performance.
Thus, James seems confined to the narrow holding that when an injunc-
tion is granted and a trial set on damages, the granting of the injunction is
appealable if the defendant would incur undue cost or inconvenience by com-
plying. The supreme court failed to offer any guidance as to when interlocu-
tory appeals should be granted in other areas.
It is difficult to comprehend the rationale behind North Carolina's allow-
ance of appeals from interlocutory orders in circumstances where no substan-
tial right is affected other than the avoidance of a trial on the merits.226 It is
certainly not judicially economical to hear appeals from grants of rule 60(b)
motions. Because it is a discretionary ruling, the number of erroneously
granted 60(b) motions is probably small; moreover, the trial on the merits is
postponed for the duration of the appeal.
One argument for granting such appeals is that the parties must go
222. 300 N.C. 631, 268 S.E.2d 205 (1980). It should be noted that James did not involve an
appeal from an order setting aside a default judgment as did Bailey, Davis, and Metcalf Rather,
defent appealed from an order granting specific performance to plaintiffs when there was a
trial forthcoming on the issue of damages.
223. See note 214 supra.
224. 300 N.C. at 636, 268 S.E.2d at 209. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(d)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979)
provides for an appeal of right "[from any interlocutory order or judgment of a superior or dis-
trict court in a civil action or proceeding which.. . [a]ffects a substantial right. . . ."
225. 299 N.C. 270, 261 S.E.2d 899 (1980).
226. But see Metcalf v. Palmer, 46 N.C. App. 622, 265 S.E.2d 484 (1980); Tridyn Ind. v. Amer-
ican Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (1973).
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through the possibly needless expense of a new trial and may rely on the
granting of the motion to their detriment, so perhaps it is more prudent and
expeditious to hear the appeal immediately. However, these factors clearly
should be taken into account by the trial judge in deciding whether or not to
grant the 60(b) motion in the first instance.
In the majority of state courts and in the federal courts the granting of a
60(b) motion is unappealable unless the trial judge certifies it as an important
question, and even then the appeal is discretionary with the appellate court.227
The basis for this antiquated practice in North Carolina seems to be purely
historical. It arose at a time when appellate judges were distrustful of trial
judges because the latter were not required to have any legal training, and
when there was a relatively small volume of litigation awaiting appeal.
Neither is the case today.
In another development in the law of appellate procedure, the court of
appeals held in Hanes v. Kennon228 that appellant's failure to adhere to the
formal requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure229 required the court
to deem abandoned the exceptions not properly set forth, thus requiring dis-
missal of the appeal.230 Appellant's error was in his failure to tie the assign-
ments of error and exceptions to the questions presented for review.231
227. See 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 401 (2d ed. 1978); 15 C. WRIOHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 586 (1976).
228. 46 N.C. App. 597, 265 S.E.2d 488 (1980).
229. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(3) states:
An argument. This shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to
each question presented together with citations of the authorities, statutes, and those
portions of the record on appeal upon which he relies. Each question shall be separately
stated. Immediately following each question shall be a reference to the assignments of
error and exceptions pertinent to the question, identified by their numbers and by the
pages of the printed record on appeal at which they appear. Exceptions in the record not
set out in appellant's brief, or m support of which no reason or argument is stated or
authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.
230. 46 N.C. App. at 600-01, 265 S.E.2d at 491. The court, however, discussed the substantive
issues presented by the appeal, and noted that they were "bound" by the findings of the trial court.
Id at 598-600, 265 S.E.2d at 490.
231. Id at 600,265 S.E.2d at 491. Plaintiff Appellants' Brief at 1-6, Hanes v. Kennon, 46 N.C.
App. 597, 265 S.E.2d 488 (1980):
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
1. Whether or not the Court allowed evidence which was inadmissible on the
grounds of irrelevancy, calling for conclusions on the part of witnesses, asking for con-
clusions of law on the part of witnesses, and asking for opinions from witnesses;
5. Whether or not the Court erred as a matter of law in allowing the defendant the
right of way provided in the Court's order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[The facts are set forth.]
ARGUMENT
The primary question to be resolved in this appeal is how much right of way was
conveyed by the deed to Defendant (R p 11) which stated, [argument is continued]
Exceptions Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 (R p 49)
The Court further erred in asking the defendant why he did not buy the property,
since any reason the defendant might have for not buying the property at the present
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K Other Cases
In Cody v. Department of Transportation23 2 the court of appeals held that
the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs suit for damage to his property
caused by blasting as to one of the defendants-DOT. The trial court rea-
soned that because DOT had a provision in its contract with the other defend-
ant, a contractor, providing that the latter shall reimburse the former for any
damages caused by the latter's blasting operations, DOT was judgment-proof
and not a necessary party to the action.
The court of appeals recognized that the plaintiff could have sued either
the contractor under a strict liability theory233 and/or DOT under an inverse
condemnation theory,234 and that contracting parties cannot by the terms of a
private agreement eliminate a statutory cause of action benefitting a citizen.235
In Duke Power Co. v. Winebarger236 the supreme court broadly inter-
time could have no visible connection to the intentions of the parties in 1958. See RED-
DING v. BRADDY, supra.
Exception No. 4 (R p 40)
Compare with Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 1-10, Terry v. Terry, 46 N.C. App. 583, 265 S.E.2d
463 (1980)):
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Did the trial Court err in concluding that plaintifs First Claim fails to state a
claim and in dismissing it upon defendant's Rule 12 (b)(6) motion?
II. Did the trial Court err in concluding that plaintifis Third Claim fails to state a
claim and in dismissing it upon defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[The facts are set forth.]
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CLAIM STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD
SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSU-
ANT TO RULE 12(b)(6).
Assignment of Error No. 1;
Exception No. I (R p 16)
Plaintiff contends his First Claim states a cause of action [the argument continues]
II. PLAINTIFFS THIRD CLAIM SUFFICIENTLY STATES A CAUSE OF AC-
TION AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR BREACH OF HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY AS
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF EDWARD McKINLEY TERRY, SR.
Assignment of Error No. 2;
Exception No. 2 (R p 16)
[Argument continues]
232. 45 N.C. App. 471, 263 S.E.2d 334, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 372, 267 S.E.2d 674 (1980). The
Department of Transportation (DOT) hired defendant contractor to perform reconstruction work.
The work necessitated blasting operations that destroyed a building on the plaintiffs property. Id
at 472, 263 S.E.2d at 334.
233. See Falls Sales Co. v. Board of Transp., 292 N.C. 437, 233 S.E.2d 569 (1977).
234. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-111 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
235. 45 N.C. App. at 473-74,263 S.E.2d at 335-36. The court cited several practical considera-
tions for its holding. First, the contractor may be insolvent and may have violated any insurance
contract that would have benefitted the plaintiff. Second, the contractor may be popular in the
community, thereby causing biased jury problems. Finally, the state is solvent and is an ideal
defendant from the plaintiffs point of view. Id at 475, 263 S.E.2d at 336.
236. 300 N.C. 57, 265 S.E.2d 227 (1980). For a further discussion of WIn'rebarger, see the
Evidence section of this Survey.
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preted rule 46(a)(1). 237 Counsel objected to questions asked of a witness when
the same questions were allowed to be asked of two previous witnesses over
strenuous objection. The objection was overruled after a discussion between
court and counsel and it was clear that continued objection would be fruit-
less.2 3
8
The supreme court held that when a line of questioning is apparent to
both the court and the parties, the statutory requirement that counsel object to
a "specified" line of questioning is satisfied. 239 The Winebarger ruling recog-
nizes the tactical disadvantages of counsel's repeatedly objecting in view of the
jury.
In Eubanks v. First Protection Life Insurance Co. 240 the court of appeals
ruled that defendant's counterclaim was actually an affirmative defense be-
cause it stated no claim for relief,241 and therefore, plaintiffs failure to reply to
defendant's "counterclaim" did not constitute an admission of the facts stated
therein. 242
In Southern National Bank v. B & E Construction Co. 243 the court of ap-
peals held that in order for a party to have requests for admissions deemed
admitted for insufficiency of the responses under rule 36 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, he must first move to have the trial court determine the sufficiency
of the responses and obtain a ruling from the court that the responses are
insufficient. 244
In Gardner v. Gardner24 the supreme court held that when the question
of proper venue had been settled judicially, a statute enacted subsequent to the
decision could not be applied retroactively to reopen the question of venue in
237. N.C.R. Civ. P. 46(a)(1) provides that "when there is (an] objection to the admission of
evidence involving a specified line of questioning, it shall be deemed that a like objection has been
taken to any subsequent admission of evidence involving the same line of question."
238. 300 N.C. at 68-69, 265 S.E.2d at 234.
239. Id at 68, 265 S.E.2d at 234.
240. 44 N.C. App. 224, 261 S.E.2d 28 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 735, 267 S.E.2d 661 (1980).
In Eubanks plaintiff brought suit to collect the proceeds of a life insurance policy on plaintif's
intestate. Defendant's "counterclaim" alleged that the intestate had misrepresented his medical
history and, therefore, defendant was not liable on the policy.
241. N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(c) provides that "[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated a defense as
a counterclaim... . the court, on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there
had been a proper designation."
242. If defendant's allegations had amounted to a counterclaim, plaintiffs failure to reply
would have constituted an admission of the facts stated therein pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(d).
243. 46 N.C. App. 736, 266 S.E.2d 1 (1980).
244. 46 N.C. App. 736, 738-39, 266 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1980). The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's treatment of requests to admit for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment when the responses given to the requests were simply "admitted" or "denied". 46 N.C. App.
at 738, 266 S.E.2d at 2. The court construed the 1975 amendments to N.C.R. Civ. P. 36, Law of
June 24, 1975, ch. 762, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1039, to require the trial court to make a
determination of the sufficiency of the answers or objections to the requests and, if it finds them
insufficient, to order the matter admitted or to order the party to file an amended answer. 46 N.C.
App. at 739, 266 S.E.2d at 2-3. The court believed this procedure would eliminate unfair surprise
to the responding party who may have discovered for the first time at trial that matters which he
intended to deny were, in fact, to be used as binding admissions against him. Id (citing 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2263 (1970)).
245. 300 N.C. 715, 268 S.E.2d 468 (1980).
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litigation pending at the time of enactment.246
In Synco, Inc. v. Headen24 7 the court of appeals held that under rule
53(f)(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure the referee must file a transcript of the
evidence along with his report, but this requirement may be waived by agree-
ment of the parties.248
In ITCO Corp. v. West 249 the court of appeals held that exceptions to the
homestead allotment must be filed with the clerk of the superior court of the
county in which the allotment is made.250
The second session of the 1979 General Assembly amended the General
Statutes to authorize clerks of superior court to hold persons in civil contempt
for failure to comply with an order of the court, and to give magistrates in
district court power to punish persons only for direct criminal contempt (com-
mitted within the sight or hearing of the magistrate or in immediate proximity
to the room in which the proceedings are being held).251
ROBERT FRANKLN BEARD III
JOEL LEE LULLA
JOHN FRANCIS MORRIS
246. In the lower court proceedings both a motion for dismissal on the basis of improper
venue, pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), and a motion for change of venue for convenience of
the parties, pursuant to G.S. 1-83(2), had been denied. Id at 716-17, 268 S.E.2d at 470. The first
denial was upheld on appeal. Id at 716, 268 S.E.2d at 470. The second was not appealed. Id at
717, 268 S.E.2d at 470. The statute on which the motion for change in venue in question was
based, G.S. 50-3, was enacted prior to the court of appeals' affirmation of the trial court's order
granting alimonypendente lite. 300 N.C. at 717, 268 S.E.2d at 470.
The supreme court determined that application of the statute, which would have required a
change of venue under the circumstances, would alter "the legal effect of previous rulings by the
trial court that venue [was] properly [laid]." Id at 718, 268 S.E.2d at 471.
N.C. CONST., art. 4, § 1, forbids giving effect to a legislative declaration to alter a final judg-
ment of a court. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967); Piedmont Mem. Hosp. v.
Guilford County, 221 N.C. 308, 20 S.E.2d 332 (1942). Therefore, because a final adjudication of
venue is "secure," 300 N.C. at 719, 268 S.E.2d at 471; Dellinger v. Bollinger, 242 N.C. 696, 89
S.E.2d 592 (1955); the statute "may not be given effect to alter or amend a final exercise of the
courts' rightful jurisdiction." 300 N.C. at 719, 268 S.E.2d at 471.
247. 47 N.C. App. 109, 266 S.E.2d 715 (1980).
248. The parties were unable to secure the transcript of the evidence at what they considered
to be a reasonable cost. The referee did not make any request for the transcript. The trial court
dismissed the action to review the referee's decision under N.C.R Cirv. P. 50 for failure to present
the transcript for review. The court of appeals held that it was the duty of the referee to submit a
copy of the transcript and not that of the parties to the action. 47 N.C. App. at 114, 266 S.E.2d at
718. However, if the parties had agreed to waive the transcript requirement of rule 53 and to
accept the notes of the referee for consideration at trial by the jury, they would be bound by that
agreement. Id at 115, 266 S.E.2d at 718.
249. 44 N.C. App. 185, 260 S.E.2d 443 (1979).
250. 44 N.C. App. 185, 187, 260 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1979). Plaintiff obtained judgment and exe-
cution in Wilson County, while defendant's property was located in Franklin County. The home-
stead allotment by the sheriff of Franklin County was approved by the superior court of Wilson
County, which also dismissed the defendant's exceptions. On appeal, the court held that the Wil-
son County superior court did not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the exceptions to
the allotment by the sheriff of Franklin County under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-381 (1969). 44 N.C.
App. at 187, 260 S.E.2d at 445.
251. Law of June 12, 1980, ch. 1080, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 6 (codified in N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 5A-21,-23, 7A-103,-292 (Interim Supp. 1980)).
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A. Unfair Trade Practices
In Marshall v. Miller' the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals holding that bad faith is an essential element in a private suit
for treble damages brought for violation of G.S. 75-1.1(a),2 which prohibits
unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts or practices. Plaintiffs, resi-
dents of a mobile home park owned and operated by defendant, claimed that
defendant had promised and failed to provide playgrounds, a basketball court,
a swimming pool, garbage pickup, yard care, paved and lighted streets, and
common facilities.3 The trial court ruled that defendant could be held liable if
he intended to perform his contract but lacked the ability to provide the facili-
ties that plaintiff claimed were promised.4 The court of appeals found the
instruction erroneous because it allowed the jury to find defendant liable
under G.S. 75-1.1(a) without a showing of bad faith.5
The court of appeals noted that the North Carolina Supreme Court has
directed lower courts interpreting G.S. 75-1.1(a) to look to federal decisions
interpreting the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act 6 because the language
of section five of that Act7 is identical to G.S. 75-1.1(a). The court found that
the existence of bad faith is irrelevant when the Federal Trade Commission
decides to issue a cease and desist order8 for violation of section five of the
Act.9 The court also noted that a good faith defense is not recognized when the
North Carolina Attorney General seeks injunctive relief' o under G.S. 75-14"1
for violation of G.S. 75-1.1(a). The court of appeals determined, however, that
"although good faith may be irrelevant when injunctive relief is sought by the
Attorney General. . .it should be relevant where a private party seeks treble
1. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), modifying 47 N.C. App. 530, 268 S.E.2d 97 (1980).
The supreme court's decision has attracted such widespread attention that the Board of Editors
chose to include it in the 1980 Survey along with the discussion of the 1980 court of appeals
decision.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides: "Unfair methods of competi-
tion in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are declared unlawfuL"
3. 302 N.C. at 540, 276 S.E.2d at 398.
4. 47 N.C. App. at 534, 268 S.E.2d at 99.
5. 47 N.C. App. at 542, 268 S.E.2d at 103.
6. Id. at 543, 268 S.E.2d at 103; Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262,
266 S.E.2d 610, 620 (1980); Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 308, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976).
9. 47 N.C. App. at 544, 268 S.E.2d at 104.
10. Id.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-14 (1975) provides:
If it shall become necessary to do so, the Attorney General may prosecute civil
actions in the name of the State on relation of the Attorney General to obtain a
mandatory order, including (but not limited to) permanent or temporary injunctions and
temporary restraining orders, to carry out the provisions of the Chapter, and the venue
shall be in any county as selected by the Attorney General.
COMMERCIAL LAW
damages. ' 12 When the state's attorney general seeks civil penalties under G.S.
75-15.2,13 he is required to show that defendant's activity was "specifically
prohibited by court order or knowingly violative of a statute." 14 The court of
appeals concluded that since persons are not subject to civil penalties by the
attorney general without a showing of bad faith, "treble damages should not
be assessed against a defendant (in a private suit) who acts in good faith where
he is not otherwise on notice that his conduct violates G.S. 75-1.1(a)."1 5
The supreme court concluded that the court of appeals' holding that bad
faith is an essential element in treble damage suits is inconsistent with the
higher court's ruling in Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.1 6 In
Johnson, the supreme court noted that G.S. 75-1.1(a), like section 5 of the
12. 47 N.C. App. at 544, 268 S.E.2d at 104 (emphasis original).
In stating this proposition the court cited two recent North Carolina cases, Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Smith, 44 N.C. App. 685, 262 S.E.2d 646, and United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D.N.C. 1980). In the Wachovia case, defendants filed a
counterclaim against the dealer who sold them a mobile home on the ground that the dealer's sale
of a mobile home with defects and his failure to perform certain services constituted unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in violation of G.S. 75-1.1(a). In limiting its holding to the particular
facts of the case, the court stated that "absent evidence of willful deception or bad faith, we cannot
-conclude that the existence of defects in the mobile home or [the dealer's] failure to perform the
above stated services constitutes a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 to warrant the award of treble damages
under G.S. 75-16." 44 N.C. App. at 691, 262 S.E.2d at 650. While reiterating the position that a
breach alone does not constitute a violation of G.S. 75-1.1(a), the court left open the question of
what "specific actions, if any which do not constitute fraud, would nonetheless be a violation of
G.S. 75-1.1." 44 N.C. App. at 691, 262 S.E.2d at 650. This decision, therefore, stopped short of
the rule formulated in Marshall that bad faith is an essential element for a treble damage suit
under G.S. 75-1.1(a).
In UnitedRoasters the judge held that "intentional wrongdoing"was an essential element of a
G.S. 75-1.1(a) violation in a treble damage suit. The court held that "given the fact that section
75-16 is punitive in nature, the requirement of a jury finding of intentional wrongdoing to consti-
tute a violation of the statute is consistent with the position of the courts of North Carolina gener-
ally concerning punitive damages." 485 F. Supp. at 1059. The district court's result was affirmed
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1981). The district court's holding
appears to be in conflict with the recent decision in Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App.
229, 259 S.E.2d 1 (1979), in which the court of appeals stated that G.S. 75-16 has remedial and
private enforcement objectives as well as punitive objectives. The bad faith requirement in United
Roasters, therefore, would prevent the attainment of these other objectives. Finally, the district
court held that although previous decisions allowing treble damages involved intentional torts, it
does not necessarily follow that such intent is an essential element for a G.S. 75-16 cause of action.
The Fourth Circuit Court noted that the supreme court decision in Marshall may severely under-
cut the district court's position on this issue. 649 F.2d at 991.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15.2 (Curn. Supp. 1979) provides:
In any suit instituted by the Attorney General, in which the defendant is found to
have violated G.S. 75-1.1 and the acts or practices which constituted the violation were,
when committed, specifically prohibited by a court order or knowingly violative of a
statute, the court may, in its discretion, impose a civil penalty of five thousand dollars
($5,000) against the defendant for each violation. In determining the amount of the civil
penalty, the court shall consider all relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to,
the extent of the harm caused by the conduct constituting a violation, the nature and
persistence of such conduct, the length of time over which the conduct occurred, the
assets, liabilities, and net worth of the person, whether corporate or individual, and any
corrective action taken by the defendant. Any penalty so assessed shall be paid to the
General Fund of the State of North Carolina.
14. Id.
15. 47 N.C. App. at 544, 268 S.E.2d at 104.
16. 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980) (cited in Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at
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FTC Act, "contemplates two distinct grounds for relief': unfair grounds and
deceptive grounds. 17 In adopting the standards used in the federal courts to
determine whether an act is unfair or deceptive, the court never discussed the
presence or absence of good faith on the part of the defendant. 18 The court
stated that a practice is unfair if "it offends established public policy as well as
when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substan-
tially injurious to consumers."'19 It is deceptive if "it has the capacity or ten-
dency to deceive." 20 Each of these tests indicates that it is the effect of the act
or statement upon the consumer, not the defendant's intent, that determines
whether the statute has been violated.2 1
In reaching its decision in Marshall, the court of appeals analogized G.S.
75-16,22 which allows private suits for treble damages for violations of G.S.
75-1.1(a), to G.S. 75-15.2, which authorizes the attorney general to sue for civil
penalties for violation of G.S. 75-1.1(a). The court never explicitly defined
"bad faith," although it indicated it was equating "bad faith" with actual
knowledge that one's conduct is unfair or deceptive. Under G.S. 75-15.2, the
court said, "a defendant against whom a mandatory order is issued is thereaf-
ter on notice that a civil penalty may be imposed," and one who "knowingly"
violates the statue "needs no such notice."'23 Thus, if bad faith is an essential
element for a G.S. 75-1.1(a) violation, plaintiff would have to prove defend-
ant's bad intent with evidence that the defendant had received specific notice
that his conduct was illegal unless the practice was so outrageous that bad
faith could be inferred from the practice alone. A defense of good faith, then,
would defeat a claim.
It is not clear, however, that the legislature intended "good faith" to be a
defense under G.S. 75-15.2 or 75-16 since under the FTC Act "good faith" is
never a defense for a civil penalty suit for violation of a cease and desist or-
der.24
Unlike the FTC Act, the North Carolina legislation, through G.S. 75-16,
allows a private party to bring suit and collect treble damages for a violation
of the unfair and deceptive trade practice prohibition. The supreme court
17. Id. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
18. Amicus Curiae Brief for State of North Carolina, at 2.
19. 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry& Hutchin-
son Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972); Spiegel Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 540 F.2d 287, 293
(7th Cir. 1976)).
20. 300 N.C. at 265, 266 S.E.2d at 622 (citations omitted).
21. Amicus Curiae Brief for State of North Carolina, at 3.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation
shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other
person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person,
firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done,
and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
23. 47 N.C. App. at 544, 268 S.E.2d at 104.




found this private right of action provided in G.S. 75-16 to be more closely
analogous to that given by section 4 of the Clayton Act25 which gives a federal
cause of action for treble damages to "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
The dual enforcement scheme of G.S. 75-1.1(a) is similar to that of the federal
antitrust laws which allow both public and private suits. When G.S. 75-16 is
used in conjunction with G.S. 75-1.1(a) it becomes a hybrid statute in that its
substantive provisions are identical to section five of the FTC Act while its
enforcement scheme is similar to section four of the Clayton Act.
Although the FTC Act does not confer a private right of action,26 the
Commission can bring suit in federal district court for civil penalties, the max-
imum of which is $10,000 per violation.2 7 In all FTC suits for civil penalties,
notice of some kind beyond the broad prohibition against unfair or deceptive
trade practices is an essential element for a section five violation.28 The con-
gressional determination that specific notice is required for an FTC Act viola-
tion before civil penalties are assessed against a defendant is rational in light
of the purpose of the Federal Trade Commission. As an administrative agency
charged with enforcing the FTC Act,29 it is sensible for the agency to spend its
resources seeking voluntary compliance with the act by giving specific notice.
Such a strategy is less vexatious to business interests than the threat of imme-
diate suit and more efficient for the Commission. Civil penalties, unlike treble
25. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (cited in Marshall, 302 N.C. at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 398).
26. 1 S. KANWiT, supra note 24, § 1.07, at 1-22 to -23.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1976) provides in part:
Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Commission
after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the
United States a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation ...
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (1976) provides in part:
The Commission may commence a civil action to recover a civil penalty in a district
court of the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation which violates
any rule under this chapter respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . with
actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances
that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule.
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (1976) provides in part:
If the Commission determines. . . that any act or practice is unfair or deceptive,
and issues a final cease and desist order with respect to such act or practice, then the
Commission may commence a civil action to obtain a civil penalty in a district court of
the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation which engages in such
act or practice-
(1) after such cease and desist order becomes final (whether or not such person,
partnership, or corporation was subject to such cease and desist order), and
(2) with actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is
unlawful ....
28. Notice under 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) is provided by the issuance of the cease and desist order.
Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) notice is provided by publication of the FTC rule with the added
provision that the defendant have actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied that such act is
unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by the rule. Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) notice is given
with issuance of the cease and desist order with the added stipulation that the defendant have
actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited. This provision
is used to collect penalties from defendants who were not the original targets of the cease and
desist order.
29. See generall, 1 S. KA.wrr, supra note 21, § 1.02, at 1-3 to -6.
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damages sought in private suits, are imposed only to force compliance with the
law,30 not to compensate victims for injuries sustained. Additionally the
agency, unlike a private party, is designed to provide specific notice through its
rule-making power 3' and authority to issue cease and desist orders32 without
resort to the courts. It is clear that the reasons that support giving specific
notice in the FTC situation do not operate where a private party is seeking
compensation for a violation of G.S. 75-1.1(a).
The rationale supporting the imposition of treble damages in antitrust
cases was stated succinctly by Professors Areeda and Turner:33
The treble damage remedy serves, of course, to compensate private
persons for their injuries. Trebling those damages punishes the de-
fendant for his violation. . . . Such awards generate a powerful
financial incentive for injured persons to detect, disclose, attack, and
end violations of the antitrust laws. Private enforcement thus in-
creases the likelihood that a violator will be found out, greatly en-
larges the penalties and thereby helps discourage illegal conduct.
The statutory scheme thus supplements public enforcement, which is
inevitably selective and not always likely to concern itself with local,
episodic, or less than flagrant violations.34
If bad faith were considered an essential element of a cause of action under
G.S. 75-1.1(a), the victim of an unfair or deceptive trade practice would be left
without means of recovery unless the defendant had specific notice that his
action violated the law or unless the conduct in question was egregious enough
to infer bad faith. This requirement might discourage private plaintiffs from
paying the costs of civil suit when the claim may be defeated by a good faith
defense and will diminish the deterrent effect of treble damage suits. It would
be particularly significant in North Carolina because there is no agency com-
parable to the FTC to enforce this statute.
Requiring a showing of bad faith before liability is imposed would, how-
ever, ensure that blameless defendants cannot be punished by imposition of
treble damages. Since treble damages are similar to criminal sanctions be-
cause they are intended to punish the wrongdoer,35 courts might be reluctant
to find a violation absent a finding of bad faith.36 This could disrupt the de-
velopment of trade practice law because courts might distort the law to avoid
imposing treble damages on defendants who had no notice that their actions
violated the law.37
Although a defense of good faith protects a blameless defendant from
imposition of treble damages, this protection could be afforded in ways that do
30. Id. § 10.05, at 10-15.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1976).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976).
33. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRusT LAW (1978).
34. Id. 331b, at 149-150 (footnotes omitted).
35. See id at 149.




not defeat policies underlying the treble damage sanction. One alternative is
making treble damages discretionary and awarding only compensatory dam-
ages in certain situations. While the language of section four of the Clayton
Act (and G.S. 75-16) seems to leave little room for judicial discretion, Areeda
and Turner point out that:
[I]t is by no means clear that unqualified statutory language cannot
be interpreted to contain implied qualifications (1) in infrequent situ-
ations not within the contemplation of those who wrote the statute
and (2) where qualification would best serve both the fundamental
purposes of the statute and the ends of justice.38
Such a judicial move, however, is open to charges of unwarranted intervention
since it can be argued that the legislature has already determined that treble
damages are mandatory. Discretionary treble damages would also weaken a
plaintiff's incentive to bring suit, thus diminishing the impact of the enforce-
ment scheme.
A second alternative is using a Rule of Reason similar to that used in
antitrust cases. The Rule of Reason evaluates the activity "in the light of stat-
utory purposes, knowledge of the world, and the insights of economic analy-
sis. ' ' 39 In applying a similar analysis to trade practice cases, a court would
determine whether a practice -is unfair or deceptive by viewing the conduct
"against the background of all of the relevant facts"'' ° and "against the back-
ground of actual human experience."' With the foregoing analysis, the court
may be able to prevent the imposition of treble damage sanctions when they
are inappropriate by looking at the practice in the context of its surroundings
to determine if it violates G.S. 75-1.1(a). It can be argued, however, that this
suggestion will not remedy the situation, but rather will disrupt the develop-
ment of trade practice law through distorted applications.
The court of appeals' holding in Marshall that bad faith is an essential
element in a private suit for violation of G.S. 75-1.1(a) was rational in light of
the court of appeals' concern with the possibility that blameless defendants
may be subjected to treble damage sanctions. Unfortunately, in its analysis
the court of appeals failed to take into consideration the compensatory and
enforcement objectives of the statute. The supreme court's failure to uphold
the court of appeals' requirement of a showing of bad faith in G.S. 75-1.1(a)
treble damage suits raises a different series of issues. The line between the
Johnson standard of "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or sub-
stantially injurious" and the "bad faith" standard struck down by the supreme
court in Marshall is not entirely clear. The language of the Marshall opinion
does not distinguish adequately the application of G.S. 75-1.1(a) to transac-
tions between consumers and businessmen from the application of the statute
to arm's length dealings between businessmen. After the supreme court deci-
38. Id. 331b3, at 151.
39. Id. I 314b, at 47.
40. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 401, 248 S.E.2d 739, 744
(1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).
41. Id. at 400, 248 S.E.2d at 744.
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sion doing away with the "lack of bad faith" defense, it is at least arguable that
the breach of a valid contract between two commerical concerns might lead to
a chapter 75 treble damages award to the nonbreaching party. Presumably,
however, the court could remove such breaches from the treble damage sanc-
tion in either of two ways. The court could apply a Rule of Reason analysis to
determine that a breach of contract between two commercial concerns is not
deceptive or "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers," and thus does not violate G.S. 75-1.1(a). In the alter-
native, the court could determine that the legislature did not intend to include
these contract breaches under G.S. 75-1.1(a) and that to exclude these actions
from the statutory prohibition would not defeat the purpose of the statute or
the ends ofjustice. Under either analysis the damaged party still would have a
cause of action under contract law. It is all too evident that the supreme court
opinion in Marshall has left many issues undecided and that further judicial
or legislative clarification of this area is badly needed.
B. Un!form Commercial Code
In Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc. ,42 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals considered the applicability of G.S. 25-1-207 to the common problem of
the "payment in full" or "conditional" check. Plaintiff in Brown, upon termi-
nation of his employment as a salesman for defendant, disputed the amount of
commission defendant owed him.43 Defendant mailed plaintiff a check with a
notation in the lower left hand corner "account in full."44 Several days later
plaintiff wrote to defendant indicating that the check did not settle the amount
in full and that he would strike the notation and deposit the check. 45 After
depositing the check with the "account in full" language deleted, plaintiff sued
defendant upon his refusal to pay the balance of his commissions.46 The trial
court granted summary judgment for defendant on the grounds that the check
represented an accord and satisfaction.47
Prior to North Carolina's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,48
the facts of the case would unequivocally constitute an accord and satisfaction
under North Carolina law, and would thereby extinguish plaintiffs claim.4 9
Under the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction, when a debtor
tenders a conditional check to a creditor, the creditor is deemed to accept the
conditions if he accepts the check. Such acceptance results in an accord and
satisfaction regardless of the creditor's objections.50 At issue in Brown was
42. 44 N.C. App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980).
43. Id. at 454-55, 261 S.E.2d at 267 (1980).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 455, 261 S.E.2d at 267.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Law of May 26, 1965, ch. 700, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws. 768 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 25-1-101 to 25-10-106) (effective July 1, 1967).
49. See Phillips v. Phillips Constr. Co., 261 N.C. 767, 136 S.E.2d 48 (1964); Moore v. Green,
237 N.C. 614, 75 S.E.2d 649 (1953); Rosser v. Bynum & Snipes, 168 N.C. 340, 84 S.E. 393 (1915).
50. An accord and satisfaction is an agreed upon method of discharging an obligor's duty
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whether G.S. 25-1-207, part of the Uniform Commercial Code, provides a
creditor in receipt of a conditional check with a means of keeping the check
without accepting its conditions. G.S. 25-1-207 provides as follows:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or
promises performance... in a manner demanded or offered by the
other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such
words as "without prejudice," "under protest" or the like are suffi-
cient.51
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals held that G.S. 25-1-207 did not
apply to the conditional check, and thus plaintifi's acceptance of defendant's
conditioned check represented an accord and satisfaction.5 2
Certain commentators have argued that the language of U.C.C. section 1-
207 allows a creditor to accept a conditional check and reserve his rights to
further claim simply by striking any notation of condition and substituting
"under protest" or "deposited without prejudice" along with his indorse-
ment.53 At least one state supreme court has accepted this argument.5 4 The
under an existing contract. Though not entirely clear, the underlying theory of this doctrine seems
to be that the offer of partial or conditional performance of the obligor's duties and the subsequent
acceptance of the offer constitutes a new contract as to the completion of the original contract. In
the full-payment check situation, when the debt is unliquidated and in dispute, the full-payment
check is seen as an offer to compromise. If the creditor accepts the check, he has entered into a
binding agreement despite the fact that he may have marked through the notation or added his
own reservation clause. Arguably, the creditor who accepts a full-payment check in this fashion
has manifested an intention to reject the compromise, but the courts have routinely denied this
argument on the theory that the acceptance and depositing of the check outweigh any other mani-
festations of the creditor's intent. See generally Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfactibn: Section 1-
207 of the Uniform Commerical Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1978).
It should be noted that when the debt is liquidated, undisputed, and due, consideration is a
necessary condition to an accord and satisfaction. Because the doctrine of accord and satisfaction
was formulated to facilitate compromise, in situations where there was nothing to compromise, the
common law would not impute discharge of indebtedness unless consideration was exchanged.
Id. at 52. Recently the North Carolina Court of Appeals adhered to this principle in FCX, Inc. v.
Ocean Oil Co., 46 N.C. App. 755, 266 S.E.2d 388 (1980). In FCX plaintiff sold petroleum to the
corporate defendant on credit. A dispute arose as to the amount defendant owed plaintiff. The
parties subsequently agreed the total account amounted to $38,322.49. Defendant then tendered a
check for $26,377.49 marked "payment in full" Plaintiff retained the check but refused to cash it.
Plaintiff sued for the balance and defendant claimed accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed
and held that the account agreed upon by the parties represented the book value of the account,
but did not reflect possible set-offs defendant claimed against plaintiff. Because the agreed figure
did not represent the totality of the transactions between the parties, the court held that a jury
question existed as to whether the debt was liquidated or in dispute. Id. at 758, 266 S.E.2d at 390.
Moreover, the court maintained that if the parties were found by the jury to be in dispute, the
partial payment check, if accepted by plaintiff, constituted an accord and satisfaction. Id. at 759,
266 S.E.2d at 390. On the other hand, if the debt were found to be liquidated, the partial payment
check could not constitute an accord and satisfaction without additional consideration. Id.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-207 (1965).
52. 44 N.C. App. at 458. Relying on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-802, the court held that the
Code applied to these circumstances despite the fact that the case involved an employment con-
tract. Under 3-802, if a check is given in payment and the underlying obligor is discharged on the
check, he is also discharged on the underlying claim. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-802(l)(b).
53. See J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERs, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 544-47 (2d ed. 1980);
Hawkland, The Effect of U.C C. § 1-207 on the Doctrine ofAccord and Satisfaction by Conditional
Check, 74 CoM. LJ. 329 (1969); But see McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Some Implicationsfor Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 824-28 (1978); Rosen-
thal, supra note 50.
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court of appeals maintained, however, that a close reading of the provision
would not support its application to the full payment check situation.55 The
court noted that the language of the statute refers to circumstances where a
party assents to "'performance in a manner demanded or offered by'" the
other party.56 Because plaintiff struck the noted condition and informed de-
fendant that he would not accept the check as full payment, the court argued
that he did not assent to performance in a manner offered by defendant. Thus,
G.S. § 25-1-207 did not apply.5 7
To buttress this conclusion the court proceeded to examine the Official
Comments to U.C.C. section 1-207 and suggested that the drafters of the Uni-
form Commercial Code probably did not intend U.C.C. section 1-207 to ad-
dress accord and satisfaction circumstances.58 Rather, the court argued, the
Official Comment suggests that the provision was drafted to allow a party to
continue performance of a contract despite a potential dispute. The provision
could then be relied on as a defense to charges that continued performance
constituted a waiver of the continuing parties rights under the contract. Be-
cause plaintiff had terminated his contract with defendant, the court found
that the facts of Brown were not within the scope of U.C.C. section 1-207 as
delineated by the Official Comment.59
The decision in Brown is sound. The full-payment check represents a
shortcut to compromise in the area of debtor-creditor disputes. Because of its
long-accepted utility, this aspect of common law accord and satisfaction
should not be subject to revision based on belated and weak references to the
Uniform Commercial Code. Moreover, as the court of appeals demonstrated,
this particular use of U.C.C. section 1-207 can be accomplished only by dis-
torting the provision beyond areas it was designed to cover. Finally, if the
statute could be applied to full-payment checks and creditors were allowed to
reserve their rights by counter-notation, then settlement of these disputes
could be accomplished only through more complicated negotiation or by liti-
gation. A policy that fosters complication in commercial transactions violates
the avowed spirit of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the court was correct
54. Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976). In Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Caro-
lina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969), the North Carolina Court of Appeals denied an
accord and satisfaction in a conditional check case on the grounds that the debt was liquidated
and no consideration had been exchanged. The court noted, in dictum, that U.C.C. § 1-207 might
be applicable and would lead to the same result. The South Dakota Supreme Court cited Ballie
as support for their decision in Scholl. 247 N.W.2d at 492. In Brown, however, the court of
appeals, though mentioning Balie, denied its relevance to Brown because in Brown the debt was
unliquidated. 44 N.C. App. at 458, 261 S.E.2d at 269.
55. 44 N.C. App. at 457, 261 S.E.2d at 268.
56. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-207 (1965)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 457-58, 266 S.E.2d at 268-69. One scholar has suggested that the drafters of the
U.C.C. wrote a provision specifically designed to deal with the full payment check but that upon
further consideration the provision was dropped. See Rosenthal, supra note 50, at 59-60.
59. 44 N.C. App. at 457-58, 266 S.E.2d at 268. The court also noted that where the Code was
intended to change the common law, the drafters generally mentioned it in the Official Comments.




in avoiding this interpretation.60
C Contracts
In Oroweat Employees Credit Union v. Stroupe6l plaintiff, a lending insti-
tution, financed the purchase of a car by defendant Stroupe from defendant
Smith Chevrolet Company. The check drawn on plaintiff was payable jointly
to defendants, and a statement on the back of the check specified that endorse-
ment would acknowledge payment in full and guarantee legal title to the car to
plaintiff.62 Both defendants endorsed the check and it was deposited, but title
to the car was transferred to Stroupe rather than to plaintiff.63 Stroupe subse-
quently defaulted on the loan and the credit union brought action against both
Stroupe and Smith Chevrolet.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, recognizing the case as one of first
impression 64 and relying on decisions in other jurisdictions, 65 maintained that
the case was simply a matter of contract law.66 The court held that upon en-
dorsement defendants created a contractual guaranty that title to the car
would be transferred to the credit union.67 Defendants were held to be co-
guarantors in the contract.68 The court reasoned that the language on the
check constituted an offer, endorsement an acceptance, and the transfer of title
to the credit union against the payment to the defendants an exchange of con-
sideration.69
While the court acknowledge defendant's contention that G.S. 20-5770
prohibited transfer of title to the credit union, it dismissed the defense of im-
possibility due to legislative enactment. 71 The court suggested that because of
the statute defendant Smith should not have accepted the check, but that upon
acceptance defendant could not subsequently repudiate its conditions.72 In
conclusion the court held that because Smith Chevrolet and Stroupe were co-
guarantors on the indorsement, they could be sued jointly or severally on prin-
ciples of guaranty, and if Smith Chevrolet was held liable it could proceed
60. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-102. In Barber v. White, 46 N.C. App. 110, 264 S.E.2d 385
(1980), the court of appeals cited Brown and reiterated its holding that the Uniform Commercial
Code will not prevent an accord and satisfaction in a full payment check case.
61. 48 N.C. App. 338, 269 S.E.2d 211 (1980).
62. Id. at 339, 269 S.E.2d at 212.
63. Id. at 339, 269 S.E.2d at 213.
64. Id. at 343, 269 S.E.2d at 215.
65. Id. at 343, 269 S.E.2d at 214 (citing Federal Employees Credit Union v. Capital Automo-
bile Co., 124 Ga. App. 144, 183 S.E.2d 39 (1971); United Virginia Bank v. Dick Herriman Ford,
Inc., 215 Va. 373, 210 S.E.2d 158 (1974)).
66. 48 N.C. App. at 343, 269 S.E.2d at 214.
67. Id. at 345, 269 S.E.2d at 216.
68. Id. at 346, 269 S.E.2d at 216.
69. Id. at 343, 269 S.E.2d at 214-15.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-57 requires that title to an automobile be placed only in the name
of the "owner". N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(26) excludes a chattelmortgagee who is not in posses-
sion of the chattel from the definition of "owner" under the statute.
71. 48 N.C. App. at 344, 269 S.E.2d at 215.
72. Id.
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against Stroupe for indemnity.73
The North Carolina Court of Appeals considered the standards for com-
pliance with notice provisions in insurance policies in Great American Insur-
ance Co. v. C G. Tate Construction Co.74 In Great American the defendant
construction company's employee, while driving a bulldozer, allegedly caused
an automobile to collide with a tanker truck.75 The president of the defendant
corporation was apprised of the accident but was told that his employees were
not involved; consequently he did not notify the plaintiff insurance company
with whom the corporation held a general liability policy.76 When another
party to the collision notified Great American of its intention to sue the defend-
ant, the insurance company informed the defendant that it would not cover
the defendant's liability because of defendant's failure to give notice of the
accident "as soon as practicable" under the terms of the policy.77 The trial
court granted declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff as to its non-liability
because of defendant's failure to give notice of the accident.
The court of appeals noted that although North Carolina courts had not
addressed the issue, a number ofjurisdictions had held that "as soon as practi-
cable" meant within a reasonable time.78 Whether notice was filed within a
reasonable time depends on the facts of each particular case. More impor-
tantly, the court held that an insurer must show that it was prejudiced by a
delay of notice before it can deny its obligations under the policy.79 The court
pointed to the unequal bargaining strength of the insurer and the insured; the
party seeking insurance does not have a choice as to the notice provision of an
insurance policy.80 Because the notice provision is designed to provide the
insurer with an opportunity to investigate the claim and gather evidence for a
potential defense, the court reasoned that unless failure to give notice reduced
this opportunity the insurer was not prejudiced and should not be able to
dodge its duties to the insured.8' The court concluded that while the defend-
ant may have failed to give notice of the accident within a reasonable time,
whether the insurance company had been prejudiced by the delay was not
decided at the trial level. The court remanded the case accordingly.8 2
73. Id. at 345-46, 269 S.E.2d at 216. The court explained that co-guarantors are "'each liable
for an equal proportionate share of the principal obligation, as between themselver,' . . [but]
'where one guarantor receives property or other security which constitutes a means of indemnity
for ... loss, it inures to the benefit of all co-guarantors.'" Id. at 346, 269 S.E.2d at 216 (quoting
38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 128 (1968); 38 CJ.S. Guarany § 114 (1943) (emphasis supplied by the
court)). Because Stroupe had possession of the automobile (a means of indemnity), Smith would
have an action for the price of the automobile against Stroupe.
74. 46 N.C. App. 427, 265 S.E.2d 467 (1980).
75. Id. at 429, 265 S.E.2d at 469.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 430, 265 S.E.2d at 470.
78. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milam, 438 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.W.Va. 1977);
Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Oliver, 115 N.H. 141, 335 A.2d 666 (1975).
79. 46 N.C. App. at 436, 265 S.E.2d at 473.
80. Id. See general 8 J. APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4731 (1962, Cum.
Supp. 1973 & Supp. 1979).
81. 46 N.C. App. at 436, 265 S.E.2d at 473.




The formation of a limited partnership for the purpose of real estate in-
vestment and development is a common business practice. Because real estate
development is a highly uncertain enterprise, in which anything can go wrong,
the wise investor must pay close attention to his investment. But in a construc-
tion venture, a limited partner who has neither the skill nor the time to oversee
a construction project will usually rely on the managerial skills of his general
partner to complete the project according to plans. In Browning v. Maurice B.
Levien & Co.83 the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered a case in
which complete inattention by the limited partners in a construction financing
limiting partnership resulted in disaster.
In Browning, the plaintiffs were limited partners in a partnership formed
to finance and build an apartment complex. 84 There were two general part-
ners, a general contracting company and its principal stockholder and chief
executive officer.85 Each of the limited partners signed statements acknowl-
edging that he had been advised of the risks of the venture, that he was in the
fifty per-cent tax bracket, and that he had access to all necessary documents to
form a judgment on the merits of the transaction.8 6 The limited partnership
arranged a construction loan with a New York bank.87 As is common in con-
struction financing, the bank hired an architect to inspect the construction site
and certify progress payments to the general contractor.8 8 The partnership did
not require the general contractor to file a performance bond.8 9 In July 1973,
the architect certified that the project was 85.5 percent complete; the bank at
that time had paid the corresponding amount of the loan to the general con-
tractor.90 In August 1973, the general contractor defaulted and, because the
partnership failed to obtain further financing, the bank foreclosed. 91 The two
general partners declared bankruptcy.92 The plaintiffs filed an action against
the architect on their own behalf and, in the alternative, derivatively on behalf
of the partnership.93 The plaintiffs alleged that the architect was negligent in
court of appeals considered another case in which the insurer denied liability because of the in-
sured's failure to follow insurance policy procedures. In Brandon the insured plaintiff filed a
proof-of-loss form with the defendant insurer after his residence burned. The insurance company
alleged that the file was incomplete, refused to accept it, and on these grounds denied that proof of
loss had been filed. The court of appeals rejected the trial court's decision to submit the issue to
the jury and held that where uncontroverted evidence showed that the plaintiff had filed a timely
proof of loss form, the insurance company could not, in its sole discretion, declare that an incom-
plete filing was a failure to file under the policy. Id.
83. 44 N.C. App. 701, 262 S.E.2d 355 (1980).




88. Id. For a broad view of construction financing, see generally G. OsBomR, G. NELSoN &
D. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 702-799 (1979).




93. 44 N.C. App. at 705-06, 262 S.E.2d at 358. The question of the right of the limited part-
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certifying uncomplete work by the contractor and that the architect's negli-
gence resulted in a $900,000 loss to the plaintiffs. The defendant offered the
defense of contributory negligence based on the fact that the plaintiffs had
failed to require a performance bond of the general contractor. The jury
found that the defendant had been negligent and the plaintiffs contributorily
negligent and awarded the plaintiff one dollar in damages. 94 In ordering a
new trial the court of appeals held that contributory negligence was a proper
issue for the jury under the facts of the case, but returned the case to trial court
because of erroneous jury instructions. 95
In holding that the plaintiffs could be properly charged with contributory
negligence, the court pointed to the "business acumen" of the limited partners
as constituting the standard of care.96 The court maintained that the failure of
the limited partners to require a performance bond created a jury question as
to whether such failure would be accepted by a reasonable businessman of
comparable experience, and whether the ommission was a proximate cause of
the plaintiffs' damages.97 Although the court allowed contributory negligence
as a jury question, it ordered a new trial because the trial court, in its instruc-
tions to the jury, directed the jury to the plaintiffs' opportunity to inspect the
project and records and their failure to learn of the overcertification until after
the general contractor had defaulted. 98 The court of appeals contended there
was no evidence that inspection of the partnership records would reveal the
overcertification, so that, this ommission by the limited partners could not be
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages. 99
The court of appeals treated two other potentially difficult issues summa-
rily. First, addressing the question of the limited partners' standing to sue on
behalf of the partnership, 10 the court maintained that the injury involved ran
directly to the limited partners' interests rather than to the partnership; hence
there was no necessity for a derivative action.10' The court denied that the
limited partners' right to participate in proceeedings concerning "dissolution
and winding up" under G.S. 59-10102 invested the limited partners with a right
to a derivative action.103 Second, under North Carolina statutory and case
ners to sue the architect notwithstanding lack of privity arose, but the court pointed out it had
settled that question in Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App, 661, 255
S.E.2d 580 (1979). "An architect... is liable for damages proximately caused by his negligence
to anyone who can be reasonably foreseen as relying on that architect's performing his services in
a reasonable manner." 44 N.C. App. at 704-05, 262 S.E.2d at 358.






100. Some courts have held that limited partners lack standing to enforce claims arising out of
obligations that accrue directly to the partnership. See Note, Procedures and Remedies in Limited
Partners' Suitsfor Breach of the General Partner's Fiduciary Duty, 90 HARV. L. REV. 763 (1977);
see also Note, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1463 (1965).
101. 44 N.C. App. at 704, 262 S.E.2d at 357.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-10 (1975).
103. 44 N.C. App. at 704, 262 S.E.2d at 357.
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law, the knowledge of general partners can be imputed to limited partners.104
Thus it could be argued that the limited partners in Browning, through the
general partners, had knowledge of, and acquiesced to, the negligent overcer-
tification by the defendant architect. The court, however, held-without ex-
planation-that the general partner's knowledge of the overcertification did
not bar the limited partners from suing the architect.10 5
The Browning decision is essentially incorrect. In real estate development
contracts a performance bond is simply insurance that the general contractor
will perform his obligations under the contract. A performance bond is guar-
anteed mitigation of potential losses. But the lack of a performance bond can-
not be the cause of actual injury.106 In Browning, whether the plaintiffs
provided for recovery from potential injury is irrelevant in determining
whether the architect's negligence injured the plaintiffs. The injury in the case
is an economic loss due to a wrongful disbursement of loan proceeds. The
issue is whether the architect's negligence caused the wrongful disbursement.
The limited partners' failure to secure a performance bond had no causal rela-
tionship to the architect's actions. It did not contribute to the plaintiffs in-
jury.10 7 Therefore the limited partners' omission, no matter how careless, is
not evidence of contributory negligence. The Browning court, in effect, im-
posed a duty to insure upon the limited partners. In so doing the court con-
fused care in protecting oneself from injury with care in providing for recovery
from injury. The latter is not a recognized duty in American tort law.
The Browning opinion not only mishandles basic elements of tort law but
also may cause unnecessary confusion in North Carolina limited partnership
law as well. Under G.S. 59-7108 a limited partner who "takes part in the con-
trol of the business" may become liable to creditors as a general partner.
There is some controversy as to how actively a limited partner may participate
in the business before he crosses the line and becomes liable as a general part-
ner.109 Browning imposes a duty on limited partners to make what is arguably
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-42 (1975) provides that except in case of fraud, notice to any part-
ner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and knowledge of any partner who could have
communicated such knowledge to another partner, is imputed as notice to, or knowledge of, the
partnership. In Howard y. Hamilton, 28 N.C. App. 670, 222 S.E.2d 913 (1976), the court of ap-
peals held that knowledge of a lien on certain property by a general partner was imputed to the
limited partners.
105. 44 N.C. App. at 706, 262 S.E.2d at 359.
106. "Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to con-
form for his own protection." W. PROSSER, HAN BOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS 416-17 (4th ed.
1971) (emphasis added).
107. This point can be illustrated by imagining that the limited partners had required a per-
formance bond. In that case the surety would have been obligated to pay or complete construc-
tion. At that point the surety would have been subrogated to the plaintiffs claim against the
architect (ignoring indemnity agreements). The injury to the plaintiff would have been unchanged
by the acquisition of the performance bond. The architect ultimately would be liable because of
his injury to the plaintiff.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-7 (1975).
109. See Abrams, Imposing Liabilityfor "Control" Under Section 7 of the Uniform Partnership
Act, 28 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 785 (1978); Feld, The "Control" Testfor LimitedPartners, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1471 (1969).
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a managerial decision. One may assume that the court did not intend to force
limited partners in real estate partnerships into a position of full liability. But
the court has held that in at least one instance limited partners must actively
participate in the management of the partnership. Whether limited partners
have other duties to participate actively in the partnership is unclear. In the
future, determining the line between the duty to act under Browning and the
consequences of limited partner's action under G.S. 59-7 may be a source of
trouble for attorneys attempting to provide sound advice to their clients.
E. Express Warranty
In Richard W. Gooper Agency, Inc. v. Irwin Yacht and Marine Corp. ,I1O
defendant's express warranty purported to limit damages to the cost of re-
placement and repair of defects in materials and workmanship. 11 Plaintiff
offered evidence only of the difference between the value of the defective
goods as accepted and the value of goods as warranted.112 The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to avoid a directed
verdict because plaintiffs initial proof of breach of the express warranty would
entitle him to at least nominal damages." 3 The court also reasoned that proof
of the difference in value, at least in respect to a new good, would contribute to
a determination of the cost of repair and replacement. 14
Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 115 involved the dichotomy be-
tween limitation of warranties and limitation of remedies under the Uniform
Commercial Code.' 16 Many consumer goods are provided with a limited re-
pair warranty." 7 These warranties usually contain a narrow express war-
ranty, a disclaimer of all other implied and express warranties, an exclusive
remedy, and a specific exclusion of liability for consequential damages.1 18 In
Williams the manufacturer provided a limited warranty to repair the good but
failed to make the remedy exclusive. 19 The court emphasized the distinction
between a limitation of the manufacturer's warranty obligation under G.S. 25-
2-316120 and a limitation of the remedy available to the purchaser upon
110. 46 N.C. App. 248, 264 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
111. Id. at 253, 264 S.E.2d at 771.
112. Id. at 252, 264 S.E.2d at 771. Since plaintiff was also proceeding under the theory that
there was an implied warranty of merchantibility (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314), plaintiff was
proving the general measure of damages under the U.C.C. (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-714(2)-
difference in values).
113. 46 N.C. App. at 253, 264 S.E.2d at 771.
114. Id. The court based its reasoning on the reverse application of the legal theory that the
cost of repairs has a logical tendency to illuminate the issue of difference in value. See Simrel v.
Meeler, 238 N.C. 668, 78 S.E.2d 766 (1953).
115. 48 N.C. App. 308, 269 S.E.2d 184 (1980).
116. Id. at 314-16, 269 S.E.2d at 188-89.
117. Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C. L.
Rav. 835, 840-41 (1977).
118. Id. at 841.
119. 48 N.C. App. at 315, 269 S.E.2d at 188-89 (except for excluding consequential damages).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-316 (1965).
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breach of that obligation under G.S. 25-2-719.121 The manufacturer's failure
expressly to limit its remedy made the remedies available to the purchaser
cumulative' 22 under G.S. 25-2-719(l)(b).' 23 In limiting remedies for breach of
warranty, the manufacturer may avoid this pitfall by skillfully drafting war-
ranty clauses specifically making both the warranty obligation and the remedy
exclusive.
In Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc. ,124 the court of appeals grappled with several
other warranty issues. After purchasing a truck from the defendant, 125 plain-
tiff returned it to defendant's service department many times during the first
seven months of ownership for repairs of numerous defects and failures. 126
When defendant failed to correct the problems plaintiff took the truck to an-
other dealer.127 When the warranty coverage ran out the truck still had a
persistent oil leak and suffered a loss of power on inclines.128
Plaintiff filed suit for breach of express warranty and for consequential
damages.1 29 A directed verdict was granted to defendants Ford Motor Com-
pany and Green Ford, Inc.130 The court of appeals vacated the judgments.1 31
The court construed the warranty to limit the manufacturer's and seller's
obligation to the repair and replacement of defective parts132 but held that
plaintiff was not required to identify the specific parts or workmanship that
were defective.1 33 Plaintiffs recognition of the problems was sufficient to pro-
vide an inference of a defective part and thus invoked the warranty obliga-
tion.134 Therefore, once plaintiff determined that the automobile was
defective, he was entitled to return it to the dealer for correction. 135 This deci-
sion is based on the inability of the normal automobile purchaser to isolate a
defective part.
The court also recognized that a failure to make repairs within a reason-
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-719 (1965).
122. 48 N.C. App. at 315-16, 269 S.E.2d at 189. Thus the purchaser had the remedies avail-
able under the U.C.C. in addition to the replacement and repair warranty provided by the manu-
facturer.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. 25-2-719(l)(b) provides that "resort to a remedy as provided is optional
unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy."
124. 47 N.C. App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 919 (1980).
125. Id. at 508, 267 S.E.2d at 922.
126. Id. at 509, 267 S.E.2d at 923.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 507, 267 S.E.2d at 921-922. Plaintiff also requested a temporary restraining order
against Ford Motor Credit Co. to prevent it from taking possession of the truck pending final
determination of the case. Ford Motor Credit Co. alleged a counterclaim for the amount due to it
under the installment contract. The trial court granted them a directed verdict on this issue. The
court of appeals vacated this judgment, remanding for determination by the jury, the issue of how
many monthly installments plaintiff had paid.
130. Id. at 507-508, 267 S.E.2d at 922.
131. Id. at 510, 267 S.E.2d at 923.
132. Id. at 512, 267 S.E.2d at 924.
133. Id. at 512-13, 267 S.E.2d at 924-25.
134. Id. at 513, 267 S.E.2d at 925.
135. Id. at 512-13, 267 S.E.2d at 924-25 (quoting Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301, 307, 310 P.2d
923, 927-28 (1957)).
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able time was sufficient to breach the warranty and provide a cause of action
against the warrantor. 136 In doing so, the court adopted the rule of a number
of other jurisdictions. 137
Relying on Lilley v. Manning Motor Co.138 defendants argued that by
taking the truck to another dealer, plaintiff prevented defendants from carry-
ing out the terms of the warranty. 139 The court rejected the argument, dist-
inguishing Lilley on its facts.' 40 The Court read Lilley to hold only that when
there is no evidence that the dealer is unable to make the repairs a refusal to
permit the dealer to comply with the warranty absolved the dealer of liabil-
ity. 141 In Stuts there was evidence of unsatisfactory repairs to justify seeking
another dealer.
For guidance in the new trial, the court discussed the appropriate meas-
ure of damages to apply in the case. Following other jurisdictions, the court
determined that when a defect is not repaired in a reasonable period of time,
the limited remedy "fail[s] of its essential purpose" under G.S. 25-2-719(2) 142
and that the purchaser may then recover other remedies provided for under
the Uniform Commercial Code. 143 Thus the Court tied the breach of war-
ranty standard and the failure of remedy determination into one test. Under
limited repair warranties, the plaintiff may now prove that the warrantor has
failed to repair the defect in a reasonable length of time or has refused to
repair the defect. The plaintiff has then proved breach of the warranty obliga-
tion and failure of the limited remedy and thus has negated the limited war-
ranty.
F. Close Corporations
In Snyder v. Freeman 144 the supreme court significantly altered tradi-
tional rules of corporate governance by holding that a contract executed by all
shareholders of a close corporation, in their individual capacities only, may
nevertheless bind the corporation, if the shareholders so intend.145 Ordinarily,
a corporation is bound by acts of its shareholders only when they act under
136. 47 N.C. App. at 513, 267 S.E.2d at 925.
137. The court cited Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301,310 P.2d 923 (1957); Givan v. Mack Truck,
Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 47 N.C. App. at 513, 267 S.E.2d at 925; and Cannon v.
Pulliam Motor Co., 230 S.C. 131, 94 S.E.2d 397 (1956).
138. 262 N.C. 468, 137 S.E.2d 847 (1964).
139. 47 N.C. App. at 513, 267 S.E.2d at 925.
140. 262 N.C. 468, 137 S.E.2d 847 (1964).
141. 47 N.C. App. at 513, 267 S.E.2d at 925.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. 25-2-719(2): "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited rem-
edy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this chapter."
143. 47 N.C. App. at 514-15, 267 S.E.2d at 925-26. The Court goes on to hold that the meas-
ure of damages in this case should be the difference between the fair market value of the truck had
it been as warranted and the fair market value of the truck the plaintiff accepted plus the increased
value of repairs and replacements. Id. at 515, 267 S.E.2d at 926.
144. 300 N.C. 204, 266 S.E.2d 593 (1980).
145. Id. at 210, 266 S.E.2d at 597-98. The court alternatively held that the corporation could
be bound by the shareholders' agreement under the principle of ratification, since the corporate
entity had itself accepted benefits from the agreement and thus may have intended to adopt it.
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authority conferred by the board of directors at a duly constituted meeting. 146
The court reasoned, however, that when the shareholders waive formalities
established for their benefit, there is no need for the judiciary to insist on such
formalities. 14 7 Although the holding circumvents the traditionally exclusive
role of the board of directors in managing the everyday affairs of the corpora-
tion, 14 8 the result is consistent with realities of the close corporation. Requir-
ing all shareholders as parties to the agreement ensures that all beneficially






146. Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473, 478, 85 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1955),
af'don rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956).
147. 300 N.C. at 210, 266 S.E.2d at 598 (citing Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Crosland-Cullen
Co., 234 F.2d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1956)); H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 126, at 296 (rev. ed.
1946).




In Burke County Public Schools Board ofEducation v. Shaver Partnership
the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a contract between a North
Carolina board of education and an Indiana architect for the design of a
North Carolina school building did not involve "commerce" within the mean-
ing of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 The court therefore denied de-
fendant's demand for arbitration under the FAA. 3 In reaching its decision,
the court equated interstate commerce, as required for application of the FAA,
with the "actual physical interstate shipment of goods."'4 This interpretation
was based in part on the United States Supreme Court case of Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co..5
Prima Paint held that a consulting agreement between a Maryland corpo-
ration and a New Jersey corporation involved interstate commerce within the
meaning of the FAA. The rationalization for this decision was the close con-
nection of the consulting agreement with the interstate transfer and continued
operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesale business. 6 Although
Prima Paint expressly held that application of the FAA was not limited to
"contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods,' 7 the court
in Burke County interpreted the Prima Paint decision to require some involve-
ment or relation between the transaction and the actual physical interstate
shipment of goods.8
Defendant in Burke argued that there was sufficient interstate involve-
ment in the contract to meet FAA requirements. Its contention was based on
such factors as defendant's employment of out-of-state personnel, defendant's
use of out-of-state facilities, plaintiff's payments to defendant at out-of-state
offices, and defendant's specification of materials manufactured by out-of-
1. 46 N.C. App. 573, 265 S.E.2d 481 (1980).
2. Section I of the Federal Arbitration Act defines "commerce" as "commerce among the
several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation .. " 9 U.S.C. § 1
(1976).
Section 2 of the Act provides that the FAA is to govern the arbitrability of a contract that
evidences a "transaction involving commerce." Id § 2. If the FAA is applicable to a contract,
federal arbitration rules supersede conflicting state law even if there is a choice of law clause in the
contract. 46 N.C. App. at 574, 265 S.E.2d at 481.
3. 46 N.C. App. at 578, 265 S.E.2d at 483. The contractual dispute that was the subject of
the suit concerned alleged design defects in the roof of the school building. Id at 574, 265 S.E.2d
at 481.
4. Id at 576, 265 S.E.2d at 482.
5. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
6. Id at 401. The court stated that "[t]here could not be a clearer case of a contract evidenc-
ing a transaction in interstate commerce." Id
7. Id at 401 n.7. In making this determination the Court looked to legislative intent, A
House Report on the Act stated that "[t]he control over interstate commerce [one of the bases for
the legislation] reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods but also contracts
relating to commerce." Id at 401-02 n.7 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. I
(1924)).
8. 46 N.C. App., at 576, 265 S.E.2d at 482.
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state suppliers.9 The court rejected defendant's argument, stating that "it is
evident that the essence of the contract was for the defendant to provide archi-
tectural services to plaintiff for the construction of two high schools."' 0 It re-
garded the contract's interstate involvement as incidental to the contract and,
therefore, insufficient to establish interstate commerce within the meaning of
the FAA.II
The decision in Burke is consistent with the 1979 North Carolina Court of
Appeals decision in Bryant-Durham Electric Co. v. Durham County Hospital
Corp. 12 In Bryant-Durham the court of appeals refused to extend application
of the FAA to a North Carolina construction contract merely because some of
the materials used by plaintiff to perform the contract were shipped in inter-
state commerce. The court again referred to the "subject of the contract" anal-
ysis, stating that "[a]s we interpret this section [9 U.S.C. § 2] the transaction
which is the subject of the contract must be a transaction in interstate com-
merce."' 3 Construction of the Durham County Hospital was considered the
"subject of the contract;" consequently, the FAA was deemed inapplicable.' 4
The Burke County and Bryant-Durham decisions limit application of the
Federal Arbitration Act to those contracts in which the subject or essence of
the contract concerns actual physical interstate shipment of goods. Other
transactions are governed by the North Carolina Arbitration Act.' 5 As a re-
sult, contracting parties wishing to ensure arbitration of disputes would be
well-advised to write arbitration clauses that are valid under state as well as
federal law.' 6
B. First Amendment
In Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State17 the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the exemption of some but not all
religious groups from the Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act' s violated the
9. Id at 576-78, 265 S.E.2d at 483.
10. Id at 578, 265 S.E.2d at 483.
11. Id
12. 42 N.C. App. 351, 256 S.E.2d 529 (1979).
13. Id at 356, 256 S.E.2d at 532.
14. Id The analysis in Burke County and Bryant-Durham Electric conflicts with an earlier
holding of the Federal District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in Warren Bros.
Co. v. Community Bldg. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C. 1974). In Warren the construction of
an apartment complex in North Carolina was held clearly to involve interstate commerce within
the meaning of the FAA. This was because the defendant contractor brought Georgia personnel
in to work on the project, construction materials were shipped from South Carolina and Georgia,
and the joint sureties on plaintiff's bond were California and New York companies. Id at 664-65.
15. In Bryant-Durham Electric the court reasoned that holding the FAA applicable to any
contract involving shipment of materials in interstate commerce would substantially limit use of
state arbitration laws. The opinion states that "if this is the proper interpretation of the Federal
Arbitration Act there would be little need for the State to have adopted an arbitration act." 42
N.C. App. at 356, 256 S.E.2d at 532.
16. The current North Carolina Arbitration Act is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to
.20 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
17. 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.7(a)(1) (1978).
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establishment clause of the first amendment.' 9 In order to protect the public
from fraudulent charitable solicitation, the legislature passed a licensing stat-
ute requiring charitable organizations to disclose the intended purpose and the
actual use of the funds they collected within the state.20 Although the Act
exempted religious groups, the Act qualified that exemption by denying its
benefits to religious groups that derived their financial support "primarily
from contributions solicited from persons other than [their] own members."'2 '
The plaintiffs, nonprofit religious organizations, objected to the regulatory
scheme because it interfered with conduct required by their religions, the solic-
itation of money for God.22 The court of appeals affirmed a permanent in-
junction barring application of the Act to their organizations, 23 and the state
appealed.
The first amendment guarantee of religious freedom has two clauses, an
"establishment" clause and a "free exercise" clause.24 The first clause con-
cerns government benefits to religion in two general contexts: the extension of
government aid to religion 25 and the extension of religious activities to gov-
ernment.26 The second clause concerns government burdens upon religion,
distinguishing between freedom to believe, an absolute right, and freedom to
act, a right that the government may regulate in the pursuit of legislative pur-
poses unrelaited to religion.27 The clauses overlap, creating a conflict of com-
peting values; for example, the free exercise clause may require the exemption
of a religion from a regulatory scheme, but the exemption may prefer that
religion in violation of the establishment clause.28 Nevertheless, the two
clauses embrace the unifying principle of neutrality: the government may not
use religion as a basis for controlling a benefit or for imposing a burden.29
The four judge majority opinion declined to analyze the case in terms of
the free exercise clause, a surprising result given the factual similarity of this
19. 299 N.C. at 405, 263 S.E.2d at 729. The court also held that the qualified exemption
violated similar provisions of the state constitution. Id at 405-06, 263 S.E.2d at 729-30 (citing
N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, §§ 13, 19 (1970)). However, the court relied mainly on United States
Supreme Court cases interpreting the United States Constitution. Id at 406 n.l, 263 S.E.2d at 730
n.l.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.18(4)-(5) (1978).
21. Id § 108-75.7(a)(1).
22. 299 N.C. at 412, 263 S.E.2d at 734.
23. Id at 404-05, 263 S.E.2d at 729.
24. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ..").
25. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (financial aid to parochial schools);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for church property).
26. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public
schools).
27. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Jehovah's Witness solicited funds
without a permit).
28. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish ignored state compulsory
school attendance law).
29. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CMi. L. REv. 1, 96 (1961).
The North Carolina Supreme Court expressly recognized this "neutrality" concept in Heritage
Village Church, 299 N.C. at 406, 263 S.E.2d at 730.
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case and the usual free exercise case.30 Instead, the court adopted a three-
prong test of establishment clause neutrality-first, the statute must have a
"secular legislative purpose;" second, its effect must be primary, neither ad-
vancing nor inhibiting religion; and third, the statute must not create an "ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion." 3 1 Designed to protect the
public from fraudulent charitable solicitation, the Act possessed a valid secu-
lar purpose.32 However, the primary effect of the Act advanced orthodox reli-
gions by exempting them from regulation and inhibited evangelical religions
by subjecting them to regulation.33 Although orthodox religions rely upon
their congregational members' generosity, while evangelical religions rely
upon the general public's generosity, both types of religion collected funds as
expressions of religious faith.34 Consequently, any attempt to use the secular
purpose of the statute to justify the qualified exemption's disparate treatment
of religions created a religions test that belied the allegation of a neutral ef-
fect.35 Having decided that the second prong of the test required either the
exemption of all religions or the exemption of none, the court turned to the
third prong-entanglement. The regulatory statute involves the government
in the intended purposes and actual uses of the solicited funds. It would also
permit any person to inject the government into any religious dispute.36
Therefore, the court held that all religions deserved the protection of the ex-
emption in order to promote the separation of church and state.37
The three-judge dissenting opinion vigorously objected to the decision.
The dissenters first attacked the effect argument, contending that the majority
misunderstood the establishment clause. They denied the existence of a non-
neutral religious test,38 and insisted that the Act's secular purpose required the
regulation of soliciting religions and that the Act's accommodation of the free
exercise clause required the exemption of nonsoliciting religions.3 9
30. In such cases, the claimant argues that a government regulation based on a state interest
unrelated to religion interferes with (insists upon) conduct required by (forbidden by) his religious
beliefs. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S 296
(1940). In Heritage Village Church the religious groups claimed that the state statute regulating
public charitable solicitation burdened the solicitation of God's money. Nevertheless, the state
supreme court declined to consider this free exercise issue, noting only that such an inquiry would
probably require the state to adopt less restrictive means to achieve its compelling interest. 299
N.C. at 408 n.3, 263 S.E.2d at 731 n.3.
31. 299 N.C. at 407-08, 263 S.E.2d at 731 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971)). Lemon consolidated the approaches used in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963) ("purpose" and "effect ) and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) ("entangle-
ment").
32. 299 N.C. at 408, 263 S.E.2d at 731.
33. Id at 411, 263 S.E.2d at 733.
34. Id at 412, 263 S.E.2d at 734.
35. Id The opinion cited a recent federal district court decision that made this argument,
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978). 299 N.C. at 413-14, 263 S.E.2d
at 734-35.
36. 299 N.C. at 415, 263 S.E.2d at 735. The Act enables the state to investigate any organiza-
tion "upon the complaint of any person." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.22(b) (1978).
37. 299 N.C. at 416, 263 S.E.2d at 736.
38. Id at 416-17, 263 S.E.2d at 736 (Huskins, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 417-22, 263 S.E.2d at 737-39 (Huskins, J., dissenting).
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The dissenters also attacked the majority's entanglement argument. In
the mainstream entanglement case, excessive regulation resulted when the
state extended benefits to religion.40 However, in the principal case, excessive
regulation resulted when the state imposed burdens on religion.4t Conse-
quently, the majority actually raised a free exercise issue.42 The dissenters
disposed of this issue by recognizing that the bulk of the statute's provisions
enjoyed a necessary relation to a compelling state interest.43
Despite this strong counterattack, the majority opinion still possesses con-
siderable force. The establishment clause will not condone a qualified exemp-
tion to regulation based upon a religious test,44 and the free exercise clause
will not permit regulation of religious conduct based on such a test.45 The
decision stands on firm constitutional ground.
In State ex rel Gilchrist v. Hurley46 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
rejected constitutional challenges to a North Carolina statute that permitted
the state to abate a house of prostitution as a public nuisance.47 Following
numerous arrests of masseuses for soliciting prostitution, plaintiff-district at-
torney obtained a temporary restraining order, pursuant to the statute, against
defendant-massage parlor.48 Subsequently, the trial court permanently en-
joined defendant from maintaining the parlor, and defendant appealed.49
The appellate court refused to find the statute's reference to "prostitution"
unconstitutionally vague because the public nuisance statute cross-referenced
a criminal prostitution statute that adequately defined the term50 and because
prostitution on its face included "the offering or receiving of the body, in re-
turn for a fee, for acts of vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio, cunni-
lingus, masturbation, or physical contact with a person's genitals, pubic area,
buttocks, or breasts."' 51 The court also rejected defendant's "taking" challenge
based on the state's exemption from the statutory bond requirement, an ex-
emption that would allegedly permit the state to arbitrarily deprive individuals
40. See notes 25 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
41. The "benefit" accorded by exemption from the Act resulted in no regulation by the state.
299 N.C. at 424, 263 S.E.2d at 741 (Huskins, J., dissenting).
42. id at 425, 263 S.E.2d at 741 (Huskins, J., dissenting).
43. Id at 426-30, 263 S.E.2d at 741-44 (Huskins, J., dissenting).
44. Id at 412, 263 S.E.2d at 734 (Exum, J., majority opinion).
45. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940) (secular "regulation. . . of solicita-
tion, which does not involve any religious test ... is not open to any constitutional objection" (em-
phasis supplied)).
46. 48 N.C. App. 433, 269 S.E.2d 646 (1980), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 881, 274 S.E.2d 233
(1981).
47. The statute provides that the use of any building for the purpose of prostitution consti-
tutes a nuisance, that the state may commence an action to abate such nuisance without posting
bond, and that the state may obtain a temporary restraining order without notice. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 19-1, -2.1, -2.3 (1978).
48. 48 N.C. App. at 436-38, 269 S.E.2d at 649-50.
49. Id at 439, 269 S.E.2d at 650.
50. Id at 442-43, 269 S.E.2d at 652. Prostitution means "the offering or receiving of the body
for sexual intercourse for hire." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203 (1969).
51. 48 N.C. App. at 443, 269 S.E.2d at 653. Although the opinion purports to deal with
defendant's overbreadth claim as well, the court's definition nevertheless sweeps up such constitu-
tionally innocuous behavior as a doctor's examination.
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of property, because the state's initiation of the nuisance action depended on
the pursuit of the public welfare as opposed to the pursuit of private con-
cerns.52 Similarly, the court rejected a "taking" challenge based on the issu-
ance of a temporary restraining order without notice, because the statute
authorized the preservation rather than the destruction of property, estab-
lished the right to an immediate hearing, and incorporated the procedural lim-
itations imposed by the statute governing temporary restraining orders.53
Finally, the court rejected defendant's first amendment claim and held that the
United States Constitution did not protect association for purposes of prostitu-
tion.54
C. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection55
In Texfi Industries, Inc. v. City of Fayettevile56 the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of G.S. 160A-24 to -30,57 which
sets forth the North Carolina procedure of annexation by referendum. Plain-
tiff corporation attacked the lawfulness of the statute on two grounds: first, the
notice by publication provisions in G.S. 160A-24 were inadequate to safeguard
plaintiff's right to due process of law;58 and second, the referendum procedure
gave residents but not corporations a right to vote in a referendum on annexa-
tion and thus denied plaintiff equal protection.59
52. Id at 444-45, 269 S.E.2d at 653.
53. Id at 446-47, 269 S.E.2d at 653-55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, Rule 65(b) (1969), controls
the issuance of temporary restraining orders without notice.
54. 48 N.C. App. at 449, 269 S.E.2d at 656.
55. In Maines v. City of Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 265 S.E.2d 155 (1980), the supreme court
denied the due process and equal protection claims of a Greensboro fireman discharged for
violation of a city ordinance that required city employees living inside the city at the time of the
adoption of the ordinance to continue to reside within the city. Because a North Carolina
employment contract does not create a property interest, the United States Constitution does not
guarantee the employee a right to a pretermination hearing; consequently, plaintiff's challenge to
the adequacy of a hearing which he did in fact receive failed. Id at 133, 265 S.E.2d at 160.
The court also rejected plaintifts equal protection challenge based on the city manager's
exemption of certain city employees who moved their residences outside the city after the effective
date of the ordinance because those exemptions applied to employees who had financially
committed themselves to such a move prior to that date. Id at 132-33, 265 S.E.2d at 159-60.
56. 301 N.C. 1, 269 S.E.2d 142 (1980).
57. N.C. GEM. STAT. §§ 160A-24 to -30 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
58. G.S. 160A-24 provides for annexation by the governing body of the municipality as fol-
lows:
After public notice has been given by publication once a week for four successive weeks
in a newspaper in the county with a general circulation in the municipality.., thus
notifying the owner or owners of the property located in such a territory that a session of
the municipal legislative body will meet for the purposes of considering the annexation
of such territory to the municipality ....
Id § 160A-24 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
59. G.S. 160A-25 allows qualified voters residing in the affected area to file a petition at a
public hearing requesting a referendum on the question of annexation. The petition must be
signed by at least 15% of the qualified voters residing in the affected area. After the petition is
filed, the governing body of the municipality is required to submit the annexation question to a
vote of the qualified resident voters. Qualified resident voters are those who "actively participated
in the last gubernatorial election." Id § 160A-25 (1976). In this case there were no natural per-
sons residing in the affected area. There were, therefore, no residents qualified to vote in a refer-
endum under G.S. 160A-25. 301 N.C. at 7, 269 S.E.2d at 147.
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The public notice procedure used in this instance by the City of Fayette-
ville complied with statutory requirements. 60 The statutory notice procedure
itself was held constitutionally valid as being "reasonably calculated, under all
of the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the ac-
tion."' 61 The court rejected plaintiffs argument that the city should have been
required to mail personal notice of the pendency of annexation to each real
property owner in the affected area. Since the publication procedure had been
found constitutionally adequate, the court felt it was without authority to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the legislature.62 In addition, plaintiff was with-
out standing to raise the issue since it owned no real property in the area.63
The crux of plaintiffs constitutional attack on the annexation procedure
was its equal protection argument. G.S. 160A-25 permits "qualified resident
voters" to submit a petition at a public hearing requesting a referendum on the
issue of annexation. Only qualified resident voters are then allowed to vote in
the referendum. 64 Corporations are not considered qualified resident voters,65
and therefore are not permitted to petition for, or vote in, a referendum pro-
ceeding.
The court, acknowledging that corporations are entitled to assert equal
protection claims,66 used the traditional two-tiered equal protection analysis to
determine the validity of the annexation statute.67 The supreme court held
that a corporation is not a suspect class for purposes of applying a strict scru-
tiny test. It stated that "[w]e are unable to conclude that corporations have
been saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to make it appropriate to make such fictitious entities mem-
bers of a suspect class." 68 The court also refused to apply strict scrutiny based
on denial of a fundamental right.69 The fundamental rights of corporations
are limited to those constitutional guarantees that are not "purely personal" or
unavailable to corporations for some other reason depending on the "nature,
history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision .... ,,7o The
corporate right to vote was not deemed fundamental due to the nature of the
60. The city published a notice in the Fayetteville Observer once a week for four consecutive
weeks. The notice described the area proposed for annexation and set forth the date, hour, and
place of public hearing. The hearing was held as scheduled and no opposition to the proposed
annexation was voiced. 301 N.C. at 2, 269 S.E.2d at 144.
61. Id at 9, 269 S.E.2d at 148. The court cited the due process test of Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
62. 301 N.C. at 10, 269 S.E.2d at 148.
63. Id Texfi Industries was a Delaware corporation that leased real property under an
agreement that required it to pay all real property taxes on the leased premises. Id at 2, 269
S.E.2d at 144.
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-25 (1976). See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
65. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
66. 301 N.C. at 12, 269 S.E.2d at 150.
67. Id at 10, 269 S.E.2d at 149.
68. Id at 12, 269 S.E.2d at 149.
69. Id
70. Id at 13, 269 S.E.2d at 150 (citing First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.14
(1978)). First National Bank stated further. "Certain 'purely personal' guarantees. . . are un-
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corporate entity.71 Corporations were regarded as artificial entities designed
for the purpose of managing economic resources. The court reasoned that
corporations, by their nature, do not share in the concerns of the general vot-
ing public.72
The practical difficulties in allowing corporate suffrage also influenced the
court's decision. The court feared that the possibility of diversification of a
single corporation into many affiliates and subdivisions would allow a multi-
plication of corporate voting power, to the detriment of natural persons.73
After rejecting the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection, the court
applied a rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the statute.74
G.S. 160A-25 was held to bear a rational relation to the legitimate governmen-
tal purpose of insuring the integrity of the right to vote.75 Such practical
problems as the variety of interests represented by a single corporation, the
possibility of corporate location in a number of jurisdictions, and the possibil-
ity of multiplication of corporate subsidiaries were deemed sufficiently incom-
patible with the integrity of the franchise to justify denial of corporate
suffrage.76
Justice Exum, dissenting, argued that the legislature did not intend use of
the referendum procedure of annexation in a case when no qualified resident
voters resided in the affected area.77 He viewed the history of the annexation
statutes, as well as the statutes themselves, as evidence of an intent to permit
annexation only by the will of qualified voters in the area, or when the area
itself had become sufficiently urbanized to permit annexation under G.S.
160A-30 or 160A-45. 78 In this case, the city was not required to prove that the
affected area met urbanization standards because it was proceeding by way of
referendum.
Justice Carlton joined in Justice Exum's dissent. Additionally, he dis-
agreed with the majority's equal protection argument. He saw no incompati-
available to corporations and other organizations because the 'historic function' of the particular
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals." 435 U.S. at 779 n.14.
71. 301 N.C. at 13, 269 S.E.2d at 150. In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that the voting rights of natural persons
were fundamental. The Court stated that "any alleged infringement on the right to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized." I at 626 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562
(1964)). See Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979), which held that state laws that
have the effect of denying certain classes the right to vote must have compelling justification.
72. 301 N.C. at 13, 269 S.E.2d at 150.
73. Id
74. Id In Rexham Corp. v. Town of Pineville, 26 N.C. App. 349, 216 S.E.2d 445 (1975), the
North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the rational basis test in holding that the annexation
procedure of G.S. 160A-33 to -44 does not violate equal protection. The statute allows town-
initiated annexation for towns with a population of less than 5,000. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33
to -44 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979). In Plenmner v. Matthewson, 281 N.C. 722, 190 S.E.2d 204
(1972), the supreme court stated that the manner of annexation rests entirely in the discretion of
the legislature. As a result, an annexation ordinance authorizing annexation without the consent
of inhabitants of the affected area was held valid.
75. 301 N.C. at 13-14, 269 S.E.2d at 150.
76. Id, 269 S.E.2d at 150-51.
77. Id at 14-17, 269 S.E.2d at 151 (Exam, J., dissenting).
78. Id, 269 S.E.2d at 151-52 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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bility between allowing a corporate right to vote and protecting the integrity of
the voting franchise.79 He further stated that "[d]enial of the right to vote
should not be predicated upon the fear of potential abuse. Such abuse can be
prevented by appropriate legislation."80
Texfi permits municipalities to circumvent checks on annexation deci-
sions by following referendum procedures in areas where there are no quali-
fied resident voters. It also denies corporate residents the right to affect the
decision to annex even though they own real property in the area.81 Despite
judicial recognition of the constitutional rights of corporations,8 2 these rights
are not deemed coextensive with those of natural persons.8 3 It is thus within
the discretion of the court to decide whether a particular right is available to
corporations by applying the "purely personal" and "historic function" tests of
First National Bank v. Bellotti.8 4
In Hohn v. State 5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld G.S. 1-
17(b) 86 against a claim that it was violative of equal protection. Plaintiff in
Hohn alleged that he had been the victim of various acts of medical malprac-
tice as a four-year-old child. Plaintiff filed suit to recover for these injuries
when he was twenty years old and the action was dismissed as barred by the
statute of limitations. G.S. 1-17(b) provides that an action on behalf of a mi-
nor for malpractice shall be brought within three years unless this time limit
expired before the minor reaches the age of nineteen, in which case the action
may be commenced before the minor reaches the age of nineteen.8 7 Plaintiff
contended that G.S. 1-17(b) created an arbitrary classification by limiting the
time a minor has to bring a malpractice action to less than the time allowed a
minor for other tort claims, which is normally three years after reaching the
age of eighteen. The court rejected this claim, noting that no suspect class or
fundamental right was involved. Rather, the statute was permissibly based on
the "substantial distinction between persons who have malpractice claims and
those with other types of tort claims."88 The court did not elaborate upon the
basis for this distinction other than stating that any claim that G.S. 1-17(b) was
enacted for the benefit of insurance companies must be directed to the legisla-
ture.89
79. Id at 17, 269 S.E.2d at 152 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
80. Id (Carlton, J., dissenting).
81. This factor was not present in this case. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
82. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
83. Corporations have been denied certain constitutional rights such as the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-86 (1911), and the right
to privacy, California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-67 (1974).
84. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
85. 48 N.C. App. 624, 269 S.E.2d 307 (1980).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17(b) (Cure. Supp. 1979).
87. Id




D. Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process
1. Civil Contempt and Right to Counsel
The United States Supreme Court held inArgersinger v. Hamlin9" that no
defendant may be imprisoned, for even the most petty infraction of the law,
without the benefit of counsel at his trial. Argersinger, the Court's ultimate
expression of the indigent defendant's sixth amendment right to appointed
counsel, sets forth an absolute rule of entitlement in criminal cases. Beyond
the reach of the Argersinger rule, however, is a variety of civil cases in which
imprisonment is possible, but the indigent's entitlement to counsel is much less
clear. These include civil contempt for nonpayment of child support. Accord-
ing to the North Carolina Supreme Court's recent ruling in Jolly v. Wright,9 1
an indigent defendant without the assistance of counsel for his defense may be
held in civil contempt and imprisoned for nonsupport.
In 1976, defendant in Jolly signed a voluntary agreement to pay child
support. The agreement was approved by a district court judge and enforcea-
ble as a court order.92 In 1979, the Wake County Child Support Enforcement
Agency filed a motion in the Superior Court of Wake County alleging that
defendant was $650 in arrears, and the court ordered defendant to appear and
show cause why he should not be held in civil contempt and committed to jail.
On the day of the hearing, a local legal aid attorney made a limited appear-
ance for defendant, alleging that he was indigent and requesting that counsel
be appointed for indigent defendants in all civil contempt cases for nonpay-
ment of child support. The motion was denied. Further action on the con-
tempt charge was stayed pending appeal of the motion, and the North
Carolina Supreme Court, allowing a motion to bypass the court of appeals,
took the case for initial appellate review.
93
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling and held that there is
no absolute statutory or constitutional entitlement to appointed counsel for
indigent defendants in civil contempt cases for nonsupport. The court first
addressed defendant's claim that G.S. 7A-451(a)(1), 94 which provides for the
appointment of counsel in "any case" in which imprisonment is likely to be
adjudged, must apply to civil contempt for nonsupport-a case in which im-
prisonment is likely. The court rejected this claim, finding that the legislative
intent of G.S. 7A-451(a)(1) was to reflect "the scope of entitlement to court-
appointed counsel in sixth amendment cases in light of current constitutional
doctrine,"95 rather than to lay down a broad rule of entitlement to counsel in
90. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
91. 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
92. Id at 83, 265 S.E.2d at 137. The agreement is enforceabile pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 110-132 (Supp. 1979).
93. 300 N.C. at 84, 265 S.E.2d at 137-38.
94. G.S. 7A-451(a)(1) states in pertinent part: "(a) An indigent person is entitled to services
of counsel in the following actions and proceedings: (1) Any case in which imprisonment, or a
fine of five hundred dollars ($500), or more, is likely to be adjudged. ... N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-451(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
95. 300 N.C. at 87, 265 S.E.2d at 140.
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all cases involving imprisonment. That construction of the statute was sup-
ported very convincingly by a review of the revisions of the statute since it was
enacted, with each revision corresponding to a change in the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment.96 Thus, G.S. 7A-45 1 (a)(1) provides for appointment of counsel only in
criminal cases to which the sixth amendment applies, and not in civil cases.97
The court then turned to the most important issue in the case-whether
an indigent defendant in civil contempt nonsupport proceedings has a consti-
tutional98 right to counsel under the sixth amendment 99 or the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1°° The court dispensed with the sixth
amendment claim to entitlement by finding that civil contempt for nonsupport
is not sufficiently criminal in nature for the sixth amendment to apply. In
North Carolina, the court held, civil contempt for nonsupport is unquestiona-
bly a civil offense. The purpose of civil contempt proceedings is to compel
compliance with a court order, rather than to punish; thus, imprisonment is
imposed only after a determination that defendant is capable of complying
with the support order-and may be lifted as soon as he does comply.' 0 ' Fur-
thermore, North Carolina's new statutory definition of civil contempt'0 2
makes it clear that civil contempt is not a form of punishment. 10 3 Thus, it
follows that the sixth amendment's criminal guarantees are inapplicable to
96. Seeid at 86-90, 265 S.E.2d at 139-41. As originally enacted in 1969, G.S. 7A-451(a)(1)
provided: "(a) An indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in the following actions and
proceedings: (1) Any felony case, and any misdemeanor case for which the authorized punish-
ment exceeds six months imprisonment ... " (corresponding to the requirements of Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). The statute was amended to its present form, see note 94 msora,
in 1973 to reflect the new sixth amendment doctrine of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 25. 300
N.C. at 86-87, 269 S.E.2d at 139-40. North Carolina legislation incorporating sixth amendment
rulings of the Supreme Court goes back to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 300 N.C. at 87-
88 n.l, 269 S.E.2d at 140 n.l.
97. 300 N.C. at 90, 269 S.E.2d at 141. See note 113 infra.
98. The provisions of the North Carolina and United States constitutions are identical for the
purpose of this analysis. 300 N.C. at 92 n.2, 269 S.E.2d at 142 n.2.
99. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states: "IN]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...
101. 300 N.C. at 92, 269 S.E.2d at 142.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21 to -25 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
103. Id § 5A-21, Official Commentary, states in part: "This section is based on the Commis-
sion's recognition that civil contempt should be solely a matter of forcing the contemnor to comply
with a court order and, unlike criminal contempt, is not a form of punishment."
While Jolly's conclusion that civil contempt for nonsupport is not a criminal offense is cer-
tainly correct, see text at notes 122-26 infra, it is worth noting that several North Carolina deci-
sions prior to the enactment of G.S. 5A-21 took a somewhat different view of the nature of civil
contempt. See, e.g., Blue Jeans Corp. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 275 N.C. 503, 169
S.E.2d 867 (1969), where the court noted that "[i]n this State a contempt proceeding has been
described as suigeneris, criminal in nature, which may be resorted to in civil or criminal actions."
(citations omitted). Id at 508, 169 S.E.2d at 870. See also United Artists Records v. Eastern Tape
Corp., 18 N.C. App. 183, 186-87, 196 S.E.2d 598, 601, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 666, 197 S.E.2d 880
(1973):
A contempt proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is sul generi, and criminal in
nature.... Although the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is often un-
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civil contempt nonsupport proceedings. 1°4 If there is a right to counsel in
these cases, then its source is the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.105
Joly's due process analysis is based on Gagnon v. Scarpelli,'0 6 a United
States Supreme Court case dealing with the right to counsel in probation revo-
cation hearings, which like civil contempt are civil proceedings that may result
in imprisonment. Joly draws from Gagnon two elements that are essential to
Joll's result: (1) the conclusion that due process does not require automatic
appointment of counsel in all civil cases in which imprisonment is possible
because the Argersinger rule that imprisonment triggers an absolute right to
counsel is exclusively a sixth amendment principle, whose application to the
due process analysis was "authoritatively rejected by the Court in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli;"'10 7 and (2) a rule of law for determining whether due process re-
quires automatic appointment of counsel, or whether it may be satisifed on a
case-by-case approach in a particular kind of civil case where imprisonment is
possible:
According to Gagnon, whether due process requires an automatic or
case-by-case approach to appointment of counsel depends on the
type of proceedings under consideration. If the proceedings are in-
formal in nature and if the legal and factual issues generally raised at
such proceedings are not complex, then Gagnon suggests that the
minimum requirements of due process may be satisfied by evaluating
the necessity of counsel on a case-by-case basis.'0 8
Applying the Gagnon test to the case at hand, the court found that civil con-
tempt proceedings for nonsupport generally are informal in nature and do not
present complex issues, 109 so a case-by-case approach to appointment of coun-
sel is permissible. Accordingly, the court held that "due process requires ap-
pointment of counsel for indigents in nonsupport civil contempt proceedings
only in those cases where assistance of counsel is necessary for an adequate
presentation of the merits, or to otherwise ensure fundamental fairness.""10
clear, the primary purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is "to punish as for con-
tempt"....
Thus, it may be seen that contempt in North Carolina is treated as an offense
against "the majesty of the law," [and] is essentially criminal in nature ....
104. 300 N.C. at 92, 269 S.E. at 142.
105. Id
106. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
107. 300 N.C. at 91, 269 S.E.2d at 141. See also note 15 infra.
108. Id at 91-92, 269 S.E.2d at 142.
109. Id at 93, 269 S.E.2d at 143. The court stated:
In general, the legal and factual issues in such proceedings are neither numerous nor
complex. Defendant's obligation to pay child support has been previously adjudicated.
The existence and present effectiveness of the court order obligating defendant to pay
child support can be determined by reference to court records. . . . Inquiries as to
whether the purpose of the order may still be served by compliance, defendant's ability
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If a right to counsel exists in civil contempt cases when imprisonment is
possible, it must be grounded in either the sixth amendment or the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Beyond that departure point, the case
law is contradictory and vague as to whether either of those grounds for ap-
pointment of counsel applies to civil contempt for nonsupport. Under the
sixth amendment the scope of entitlement to counsel is clear-counsel will
automatically be appointed in criminal cases when there is any possibility that
defendant will be imprisoned.11 The difficulty is whether civil contempt for
nonsupport is sufficiently "criminal" in nature for the sixth amendment to ap-
ply. Under the fourteenth amendment the problems are reversed-imprison-
ment is certainly a deprivation of liberty so that procedural due process must
be observed, but it is unclear whether "due process of law" includes the ap-
pointment of counsel.
In Gideon v. Wainwright 1 12 the United States Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment mandates appointment of counsel for indigents in state fel-
ony prosecutions. That ruling was expanded in Argersinger v. Hamlin, where
the Supreme Court set forth an absolute rule of entitlement to counsel in all
cases where imprisonment is possible. Argersinger is an interpretation of the
requirements of the sixth amendment, however, and the sixth amendment is
by its own terms limited to criminal prosecutions. 13 Thus, if civil contempt
for nonsupport is to come under the Argersinger rule, it must qualify as a
criminal proceeding under the sixth amendment.
State courts have split on this question. The supreme courts of New
Hampshire1 4 and Michigan'1 5 both refused to apply Argersinger to civil con-
tempt for nonsupport, in light of the coercive, non-punitive nature of the im-
prisonment. Other state courts, however, have reached the contrary result. In
Tetro v. Tetro116 the Supreme Court of Washington eschewed the
civil/criminal distinction entirely and held that the Argersinger rule compels
111. More precisely, defendant is entitled to counsel when he is actually going to be impris-
oned as a result of the proceeding, under the most recent clarification of the Argersinger rule.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
112. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
113. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions .... "). The Supreme Court in
Argersinger stated that "It]he Sixth Amendment ... provides specified standards for 'all criminal
prosecutions'...." 407 U.S. at 27. The Court concluded:
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial.
That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with which we agree. It said in
Stevenson v. Holman, 254 Ore. 94, 102, 458 P.2d 414, 418:
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied the
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This holding is applicable
to all criminal prosecutions.
Id at 37-38.
114. Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 322 A.2d 1 (1974).
115. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 249 N.W.2d 88 (1976). Both Sword and Duval reached
the same result as Jolly, and on precisely the same analysis; their reasoning so mirrors Jolly's that
any discussion of them here would be redundant. Both are cited in Joly. 300 N.C. at 92, 269
S.E.2d at 143.
116. 86 Wash. 2d 252, 544 P.2d 17 (1975).
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the automatic appointment of counsel in civil contempt nonsupport cases. Al-
though it recognized that nonsupport hearings are not technically criminal tri-
als, the court reasoned that "insofar as the right to counsel is concerned, the
label put on proceedings is less important than the threat of imprisonment
they entail. It was this threat that the court in Argersinger v. Hamlin. . . held
was determinative of the existence of the right to counsel in criminal cases."' 17
Thus, the Washington court would apply theArgersinger rule to all cases, civil
or criminal, when the possibility of imprisonment exists. 118 Similarly, New
York has adopted a per se rule of appointment in civil contempt nonsupport
cases in reliance on Argersinger, although its highest court has never ruled on
the issue. 119 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the only federal
appeals court that has reached this precise issue, held in Henkel v. Brad-
shaw120 that Argersinger's per se rule applies to civil contempt for nonsupport.
Indeed, a salient feature of nearly a11121 of the cases that have adopted a per se
rule of appointment is their reliance on Argersinger.
Is civil contempt for nonsupport sufficiently criminal for the sixth amend-
ment to apply? The leading case on the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt in the United States is Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co. 122
There the United States Supreme Court held that it is not the nature of the
underlying suit, but the reason why the contempt sanction is imposed, which
determines the nature of the contempt:
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose
that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it
is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit
of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is
punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court. 123
That distinction may not be particularly sharp in many cases. The Gompers
court itself recognized that even when imprisonment is imposed with the sole
117. Id at 254-55, 544 P.2d at 19.
118. Id "[When a judicial proceeding may result in the defendant being physically incarcer-
ated, counsel is required regardless of whether the trial is otherwise 'criminal' in nature. The grim
reality of a threatened jail sentence overshadows the technical distinctions between 'criminal,'
'quasi-criminal,' and 'civil' violations... Id
119. Rudd v. Rudd, 45 A.D.2d 22, 356 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1974); People v. Jackson, 74 Misc. 2d
797, 346 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
120. 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973). In Henkel the court held that, although under Argersinger
defendant could not be imprisoned unless counsel was appointed, he had alleged no "irreparable
injury" sufficient to warrant injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. III 1979).
121. There are exceptions. n Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974), the Supreme
Court of Alaska held that due process of law-apart from any sixth amendment grounds-man-
dates the automatic appointment of counsel for indigents in civil contempt nonsupport proceed-
ings because "[t]he potential deprivation of liberty is nonsupport contempt proceedings is as
serious a matter as the restraint of liberty possible in criminal. . . proceedings." Id at 539. It
should be noted that the decision was partly based on the right to jury trials in nonsupport pro-
ceedings in Alaska, previously recognized in Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1971).
Pennsylvania also follows a per se rule of apportionment in civil contempt nonsupport ac-
tions, although its highest court has never reached the issue. The opinion is extremely circum-
spect, saying only that due process of law includes appointment of counsel in these cases, without
citing any authority. Commonwealth v. Hendrick, 220 Pa. Super. 225, 283 A.2d 722 (1971).
122. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
123. Id at 441.
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intent to coerce defendant into complying with a court order, defendant is
incidentally punished as well. 124 Nevertheless, the Gompers distinction has
been widely accepted 125 and is workable when it is possible to ascertain the
dominant purpose of the imprisonment, as will usually be the case. In civil
contempt for nonsupport, at least, the distinction is fairly clear. The purpose
of imprisonment there is not to punish the defendant for his failure to pay
child support in the past, but to coerce him into paying it now. The defendant
cannot be imprisoned unless he possesses the means to comply with the court
order, and if he complies he is released immediately. 126 Theoretically at least,
a defendant faced with civil contempt for nonsupport can purge himself of the
contempt by paying his support obligation, and thus avoid a prison stay alto-
gether. The imprisonment is purely a threat to coerce compliance, and not a
punitive measure. And thus civil contempt for nonsupport unquestionably is a
civil offense, to which the procedural guarantees of the sixth amendment have
no application.
This is not to suggest that the courts relying on Argersinger were guilty of
oversight. As the Tetro opinion suggests, they were aware of the civil/criminal
dichotomy but felt that the reality of a prison sentence at the end of a civil
action justified the extension of Argersinger outside the purely criminal
area.127 Thus, their decisions were grounded more in policy than in an accu-
rate interpretation of Argersinger. The New York Appellate Division's opin-
ion in People ex rel Amendola v. Jackson 128 makes this point clear:
The. . . attempt to [classify] procedural due process into criminal
and civil divisions may well result in the negation of any semblance
of due process in a given case. . . . The protection of that right rises
above every consideration and is, in this court's opinion, its chief
charge.
It is a peculiar sophistry that commands attention to the distinc-
tion between civil and criminal proceedings when, at the end of ei-
ther, the commitment to a jail cell looms before the accused. The
124. Id at 443.
It is true that either form of imprisonment also has an incidental effect. For if the case is
civil and the punishment is purely remedial, there is also a vindication of the court's
authority. On the other hand, if the proceeding is for criminal contempt and the impris-
onment is solely punitive, to vindicate the authority of the law, the complainant may also
derive some incidental benefit from the fact that such punishment tends to prevent a
repetition of the disobedience.
Id. See also Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 956 (1931).
"I venture to say that every 'civil' contempt whose contumacy is carried to the point at which the
contemnor may be committed is a 'criminal' contempt as well . I..." .d at 961. In the context of
civil contempt for nonsupport that is certainly true. Defendant must be in arrears on his support
payments to be held in civil contempt; yet, if he is in arrears, he has violated the court order
obligating him to pay support, and thus is chargeable with criminal contempt under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 5A-ll(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
125. See Moscovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 780, 786
n.25 (1943).
126. 300 N.C. at 92, 269 S.E.2d at 142. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(a) (Cum. Supp.
1979).
127. See notes 116-18 and accompanying text supra.
128. 74 Misc. 2d 797, 346 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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loss of liberty is equivalent regardless of the manner provided for its
execution and despite the forum in which it is mandated. 129
The civil/criminal distinction is, however, more than a matter of labels
and sophistry. The sixth amendment rule that imprisonment compels auto-
matic appointment of counsel, while relevant and even persuasive when ap-
plied to defining the scope of the right to counsel in civil cases, 130 is irrelevant
to the preliminary inquiry of finding a constitutional source for that right. To
apply sixth amendment guarantees to a civil case, simply because the fact of
imprisonment makes it desirable to have such guarantees, is little more than
wishful thinking. Precedent compels the conclusion that Jolly's is the more
correct approach, and Argersinger cannot be direct authority for the appoint-
ment of counsel in civil contempt cases. The right to counsel in those cases
must be grounded in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Due process of law is a flexible and elusive concept, and there is no par-
ticular set of procedures that must be observed in all cases.' 3 The Supreme
Court has determined exactly what process is due in a particular type of hear-
ing by balancing the grievousness of the loss to the individual against the
state's interest in inflicting that loss. 132 The most definitive statement of the
Court's modem balancing approach is found in Mathews v. Eldridge,l33 in
which the Court said:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dic-
tates of due process generally requires the consideration of three dis-
tinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
financial and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 134
In those rare civil cases in which imprisonment of defendant is possible, the
129. Id at 800-01, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
130. The applicability of Argersinger and other sixth amendment cases to a fourteenth amend-
ment analysis of the right to counsel in civil contempt cases is discussed at text accompanying
notes 161-63 infra.
131. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this
Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 442 (1960) ("[Due process] is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its
content varies according to specific factual contexts.").
132. Although this balancing analysis was originally used in connection with deprivation of
property cases, see, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin); Cafeteria Workers Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (right to employment), the Court's use of the same analysis
when liberty interests were at stake indicates that the test is equally applicable there. See, e.g.,
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
133. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews presented the question whether due pxocess requires a
hearing before the termination of disability benefits--again, a deprivation of property case. For
an indication that the same due process calculus is applicable to cases involving deprivation oif
liberty, see Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
(even assuming a foster family has a protected "liberty" interest in retaining a foster child, infor-
mal procedures before removal of the child satisfied due process under a Mathews analysis).
134. 424 U.S. at 334-35.
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balance is most strongly in defendant's favor, and due process may include the
appointment of counsel if defendant is indigent. 135 The Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of entitlement to counsel under the fourteenth amendment
in civil cases in which imprisonment is possible only twice,136 in In re Gaul 137
and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.138
In Gault the Court addressed the requirements of procedural due process
in juvenile delinquency hearings in which civil commitment may result. 139
Reasoning that the possibility of imprisonment in delinquency hearings makes
them "comparable in seriousness" to felony prosecutions, 140 the Court held
that counsel must be appointed when defendant and his parents cannot afford
retained counsel.14' Gault is some authority for the proposition that imprison-
ment triggers an automatic due process right to counsel in civil cases, just as it
does under the sixth amendment in criminal cases. But there were independ-
ent grounds, other than the loss of liberty, that mandated appointment of
counsel in Gault-the close similarity of the delinquency hearing to a criminal
prosecution, 142 together with the likelihood that a juvenile will be less capable
of presenting his own defense than an adult defendant. Gault would be slim
authority for a requirement that counsel be appointed in all civil cases in
which imprisonment is possible.
Indeed, that proposition was rejected by implication in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, the case relied upon so strongly by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in doly. Gagnon dealt with the right to counsel in probation revocation
135. The constitutional argument for counsel as a component of due process is that the right to
be heard, if it is to be effective, must include the right to be heard by counsel. That idea originated
in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where, m discussing the requirements of procedural due
process in a criminal (capital rape) case, the Court said:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre-
hend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him ...
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a
party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted
that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing and, therefore, of due process in the
constitutional sense.
Id at 68-69.
136. The Court has found a right to appointed counsel, additionally, in civil cases involving
mental commitments, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), and commitment of sex offenders,
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); both cases are irrelevant to the present analysis.
137. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
138. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
139. Defendant, fifteen-year old Gerald Gault, was accused of making an obscene phone call.
At his hearing Gault was declared "delinquent" and was committed to a reformatory until he
reached the age of twenty-one. 387 U.S. at 7-9. The maximum criminal penalty for the same
offense would have been no more than two months in jail. Id at 29.
140. "A proceeding in which the issue is whether a child will be found to be 'delinquent' and
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."
Id at 36. Note that the Court made the analogy to a felony prosecution because the right to
counsel under Gideon as interpreted at that time applied only to felony cases.
141. Id at 41.
142. Id at 36. Gault's alleged offense was a violation of a generally applicable criminal stat-
ute, which prohibited the use of obscene language in the presence of a woman. Id at 8. He was
tried in a civil rather than a criminal court only because he was under age twenty-one. Id at 29.
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hearings. Its analysis drew heavily from the court's prior decision in Morrissey
v. Brewer,143 which outlined procedural requirements for parole revocation
hearings. 144 After reviewing the Morrissey decision, 145 the Gagnon Court con-
cluded that there are no differences of constitutional import between the revo-
cation of parole and probation, 146 and that a probationer is entitled to the
same due process guarantees specified in Morrissey.147
The Court then turned to the more important question-whether defend-
ant is entitled to appointed counsel at the revocation hearing. Again drawing
from Morrissey, the Court distinguished the nature of revocation hearings
from that of criminal trials. Probation or parole revocation is rehabilitative in
nature rather than punitive.14 8 Ideally, the probation or parole officer has his
client's interests at heart and is not a prosecutor representing the state. Al-
though this unity of interests between the officer and his charge breaks down
when the officer decides to recommend revocation, "the officer is not by this
recommendation converted into a prosecutor committed to convict."149 Revo-
cation hearings, therefore, are not full-fledged adversary proceedings,'- 0 and
consequently there is less need for defendant to be represented by counsel.
While counsel will be necessary in some revocation hearings to ensure the
effectiveness of the rights guaranteed in Morrissey, due process is satisfied by
appointment of counsel in only those cases in which special circumstances
make counsel necessary for an adequate presentation of defendant's case.' 51
The Gagnon Court recognized that its holding resurrected an approach to
appointment of counsel long defunct in criminal cases and took care to justify
its use of the case-by-case approach.' 52 The fact that revocation hearings are
143. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
144. In Morrissey the Court held that a parolee is entitled to the following due process protec-
tions at a parole revocation hearing: written notice of the claimed violations; disclosure of evi-
dence against him; opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him; a "neutral
and detached" hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence it relied on
in its decision. Id at 489. The Court reached that result upon a careful balancing analysis of the
kind later outlined in Mathews v. EldridSe, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which included a lengthy discus-
sion of the parolee's conditional liberty interest. See note 153 infra.
145. 411 U.S. at 781-82.
146. Id at 782 n.3.
147. 411 U.S. at 782. See note 14 supra.
148. "mhe 'purpose [of probation or parole] is to help individuals reintegrate into society as
constructive individuals as soon as they are able. .. " Id at 783 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 477).
149. 411 U.S. at 785.
150. Gagnon expresses a concern that the introduction of counsel for defendants on a regular
basis would "alter significantly the nature of the proceeding," since the State would undoubtedly
then employ its own attorney to act as a prosecutor. The result would be a proceeding more
adversarial in nature, with perhaps more pressure on the hearing body to reincarcerate defend-
ants. Id at 787.
151. Id at 786-87.
152. Id at 788.
[D]ue process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality,
flexibility, and economy must always be sacrificed.
In so concluding, we are of course aware that the case-by-case approach to the right
to counsel in felony prosecutions adopted in Belts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), was
later rejected in favor of aperse rule in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See
alsoArgersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). We do not, however, draw from Gideon
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both less complex and less adversarial than criminal trials provided some justi-
fication.1 53 That reason alone, however, was not entirely satisfactory to the
Court because it did not "dispose altogether of the argument that under a
case-by-case approach there may be cases in which a lawyer would be useful
but in which none would be appointed because an arguable defense would be
uncovered only by a lawyer."' 154 Thus, the Court further justified its approach
by noting that a parolee or probationer is deprived only of conditional lib-
erty,155 a less grievous loss of liberty that does not entitle him to the higher
degree of due process protection provided by a per se approach to appoint-
ment of counsel:
[W]e think it is a sufficient answer that we deal here, not with the
right of an accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with the
more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee
only because he has been convicted of a crime.'
56
The Court underscored this point by citing In re Gault as a civil case in which
defendant is "differently situated from an already-convicted probationer or
parolee, and is entitled to a higher degree of protection."' 157
Thus the defendant's situation in Gagnon served to justify a case-by-case
approach to appointment of counsel. An "already convicted probationer"' 5 8
and .4rgersinger the conclusion that a case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel is
necessarily inadequate to protect constitutional rights in varying types of proceedings.
Id
153. The differences between revocation hearings and criminal trials, developed at length in
the opinion, were summarized as follows:
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor, formal rules of evidence
are in focus; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost if not
timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a presentation understandable
to untrained jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is an adversary proceed-
ing with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the
State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer with the orientation
described above; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the
members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or
parole. The need for counsel at revocation hearings derives, not from the invariable
attributes of those hearings, but rather from the peculiarities of particular cases.
411 U.S. at 789.
154. Id
155. "Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observation of special parole
restrictions." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. In Morrissey the Court examined the nature of that
conditional liberty in careful detail:
The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who
have never been convicted of any crime. . . . Subject to the conditions of his parole, he
can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other
enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him to many
restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of
confinement in prison. He may have been on parole for a number of years and may be
living a relatively normal life at the time he is faced with revocation. The parolee has
relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up
to the parole conditions.
Id at 482 (footnotes omitted).
156. 411 U.S. at 789 (footnote omitted).




stands to lose only a conditional liberty: the liberty to remain free so long as
he observes the conditions of his parole. He has previously been deprived of
the full liberty that every citizen enjoys, at a trial where his guilt was deter-
mined and sentence passed in accordance with full due process protections,
including representation by counsel. Thus, to the extent that Gagnon suggests
that "[i]f the proceedings are informal in nature and the legal and factual is-
sues generally raised at such proceedings are not complex. . the minimum
requirements of due process may be satisfied by evaluating the necessity of
counsel on a case-by-case basis,"' 59 as Jolly held, that suggestion applies only
in the context dealt with in Gagnon and Morrissey-the situation in which
defendant stands to lose something less than unconditional liberty. Whatever
the requirements of due process when the defendant's right to remain uncon-
ditionally at liberty is not at stake, certainly in cases in which that right is
threatened, due process requires a more careful analysis than the bare-bones
utilitarian approach taken in Jolly.
Something more than a simple determination of the formality and com-
plexity of the proceeding is required. Comparison of Gault and Gagnon sug-
gests that two factors should be considered in determining whether a case-by-
case or per se approach to appointment of counsel is permissible in a civil case
in which imprisonment is possible: 1) the severity of defendant's potential loss
of liberty and 2) the degree to which the civil proceeding functionally resem-
bles a criminal trial. A third factor is necessary to balance the Mathews v.
Eldridge equation: 3) the state's interest in committing the defendant to jail.
1) Defendant's loss of liberty: In civil contempt nonsupport cases a citizen
unconditionally at liberty is committed to jail. The length of his sentence is
indeterminate, and thus potentially unlimited.' 60 Argersinger and other cases
dealing with the right to counsel in criminal trials 161 express a longstanding
concern with the procedural protection of personal liberty before imprison-
ment is imposed. That concern has led to the rule that a defendant in a crimi-
nal case cannot be imprisoned for even a single day unless he was represented
by counsel at trial. There is no reason why the requirements of due process
should be any less strictly observed in a civil than in a criminal case; nor is
there any reason that the philosophy concerning imprisonment expressed in
the criminal cases should not apply as well to imprisonment in civil cases in
which defendant's loss of liberty is "equivalent regardless of the manner pro-
vided for its execution and despite the forum in which it is mandated."'162
Applying those concerns to the fourteenth amendment analysis, the fact
that a defendant unconditionally at liberty is to be imprisoned should itself
159. 300 N.C. at 91, 265 S.E.2d at 142.
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(b) (Interim Supp. 1980): "A person who is found in civil con-
tempt may be imprisoned as long as his civil contempt continues .... "
161. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
162. People ex re. Amendola v. Jackson, 74 Misc. 2d 797, 801, 346 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357 (Sup.
Ct. 1973).
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outweigh all other factors and require automatic appointment of counsel. The
Supreme Court has never ruled that such a per se rule exists in civil cases
involving imprisonment, but on the other hand the Court has never ruled that
it does not exist, notwithstanding the interpretation of Gagnon advanced by
the supreme courts of North Carolina and other states. But even barring such
an absolute rule, the defendant's loss of unconditional liberty in civil contempt
nonsupport cases is surely grievous enough to weigh heavily in the balance.163
Although the defendant is deprived of unconditional liberty, the argu-
ment can be made that this is a less grievous loss because his liberty is only
conditionally taken away. That has been the usual rationale for denying pro-
cedural due process to defendants facing imprisonment for civil contempt,
since all defendant need do to obtain his release is comply with the court order
he has violated; he "carries the keys of [his] prison in [his] own pocket."' 64 If
defendant stubbornly refuses to unlock his own cell, that is entirely his own
concern, and none of the state's; "it follows that if he does not cooperate to
attain his release he is not truly being punished, but is doing some masochistic
act which the State cannot control, and for which it is not responsible."'165
Beyond a certain semantic cleverness, the "keys in his pocket" rationale
is unjustified and obscures the underlying fact that defendant is, after all, sent
to jail.166 Moreover, unless defendant's refusal to comply is in fact due to
stubbornness, he may not have the "keys in his pocket." If he lacks the means
to comply, that will of course bar his commitment to jail;167 but the determina-
tion of his ability to pay is itself made without the procedural safeguard of
counsel.' 68 Without the assistance of counsel, it is conceivable that the de-
fendant will be unable to explain to the court's satisfaction why he is unable to
comply with the support order, despite Joly's assertion that such explanations
are "bookkeeping matters." 169
163. Jolly does add, almost as an afterthought, that "[i]t is worth noting that the potential loss
of liberty in such [parole or probation revocation hearings] cases is much more extensive than in
nonsupport civil contempt cases." 300 N.C. at 93, 265 S.E.2d at 143. In terms of length of impris.
onment, that may be true; what Jolly failed to recognize is that the imprisonment in a revocation
case is not a punishment for the parole or probation violation being adjudicated, but rather a
sentence previously imposed for the commission of a separate crime. Thus, the probationer or
parolee is deprived only of the conditional liberty he has based on the state's guarantee that that
criminal sentence will be suspended for so long as defendant honors the conditions of his parole or
probation. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-82. The civil contemnor, on the other hand, is uncondi-
tionally at liberty and faces imprisonment as a result of the conduct being adjudicated; his depri-
vation of liberty is therefore a much more grievous loss.
164. 300 N.C. at 92, 265 S.E.2d at 142 (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902)).
165. R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 59 (1963). For a criticism of this rationale, see Id
at 58-61.
166. Id at 61.
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979); see Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76
(1948).
168. See Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 120, 125
(1965).
169. 300 N.C. at 93, 265 S.E.2d at 143. See, e.g., Houle and Debose, The Nonsupport Contempt
Hearing: Constitutional and Statutory Requirements, 14 N.H.B.J. 165, 174 (1973):
A very common situation in nonsupport cases arises when the court is calculating
total support arrearages and, because of the bookkeeping of the probation department,
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2) Degree to which the nonsupport hearingfunctionaly resembles a criminal
trial: In an ordinary civil suit, the State serves as a neutral arbitrator inter-
ested only in justice between the parties. Under the present statutory scheme
for enforcement of support orders in North Carolina,170 the State has a fur-
ther, financial interest in pursuing the nonsupport action-an interest that is so
great that it is not an exaggeration to say that the State, and not the custodial
parent, is the real party in interest.
As a condition to receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), the parent receiving the aid must assign to the state her right to child
support from the father.' 71 Her acceptance of AFDC aid "creates a debt, in
the amount of public assistance paid, due and owing to the state by the respon-
sible parent,"' 172 the "responsible parent" being defendant. Moreover, the
payment of public assistance to the custodial parent creates a duty for the
county paying the funds to pursue the nonsupport action against the responsi-
ble parent, 173 and the county may by designated representative initiate such
actions in its own right if the custodial parent neglects to do so. 174
Thus, the state involvement in nonsupport actions is significant enough to
make the nonsupport action the functional equivalent of a criminal trial. As
noted, North Carolina may on its own initiative bring the action against de-
fendant, just as it would initiate a criminal prosecution. It is also required to
employ its own counsel 75 for these actions in what is essentially a
prosecutorial role. The procedural deck is therefore stacked considerably
against defendant in nonsupport actions in a way that is markedly different
from the usual civil proceedings in which the State merely arbitrates a dispute
between private parties. Here, North Carolina is not a neutral arbitrator but
an interested participant, and its powers are marshalled on the side of the
plaintiff. Perhaps in a different sort of civil case-a proceeding to determine
paternity, for example, in which only property interests are at stake-such a
procedural imbalance would be conscionable. But to allow a defendant to be
imprisoned as a result of a civil proceeding in which the State played an essen-
tially prosecutorial role, and at which defendant himself was not represented
by counsel because he could not afford it, is an affront to any conception of
"fundamental fairness."
3) The State's interest in committing defendant to jail: Balanced against
defendant's loss of liberty is the State's laudable motive for imprisoning him.
By committing defendant to jail, the State seeks to enforce his parental duty to
support his child and to prevent the custodial parent, usually the mother, from
which does not note the level of a man's earnings week by week, charges him for weeks
in which he may have had little or no income.
170. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-128 to -141 (Supp. 1979) (adopted in accordance with 42 U.S.C.
§ 654 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979), which sets forth a "[sitate plan for child support" that each state
receiving federal funds for AFDC must enact as a condition of acceptance of those funds).
171. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 110-137 (Supp. 1979).
172. Id § 110-135.
173. Id § 110-138.
174. Id § 110-130.
175. Id § 110-135.
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having to bear alone the costs of caring for the child. That the proceeds of the
nonsupport action will go into the State's coffers rather than to defendant's
children in no way diminishes the weight of the State's interest here, for the
funds will eventually go to other needy children under the AFDC program.
But automatic appointment of counsel for indigents in nonsupport actions
would by no means prevent the State from pursuing such actions; it would
only make them more expensive. 176
All factors in the due process equation weigh in favor of a per se rule of
appointment of counsel in civil contempt for nonsupport cases. Defendant in
nonsupport cases faces imprisonment that deprives him of unconditional lib-
erty, a loss that is different from the mere revocation of conditional liberty that
justified the case-by-case approach to appointment in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.
Comparison of Gault and Gagnon suggests by analogy to the sixth amendment
rule in criminal cases that a per se rule of appointment is constitutionally re-
quired in all civil cases in which imprisonment of a defendant unconditionally
at liberty is contemplated. But even in the absence of a per se rule, defend-
ant's liberty loss is sufficiently grievous to outweigh the state's interest in im-
prisoning him without benefit of counsel. That conclusion is bolstered by the
significant state involvement in nonsupport actions, which renders them the
functional equivalent of criminal trials and makes it both more desirable that
counsel be appointed and more likely that mistaken imprisonment will occur
if defendant is not represented by counsel. Due process of law, apart from any
sixth amendment considerations, mandates the automatic appointment of
counsel for all indigent defendants in civil contempt actions for nonsupport.
Certainly such a rule would impose an additional financial burden on the
State of North Carolina. But that additional burden is not irreconcilable with
the State's interest in enforcing child support agreements, and the State would
be compensated for the additional expense by the knowledge that it was not
only furthering the welfare of its needy children but doing so within the pa-
rameters of the Constitution.
176. Apparently there are no exact figures available on the number of civil contempt cases
involving potential imprisonment of indigent defendants in North Carolina. Attorneys who
briefed Jolly varied widely in their estimates of the cost of providing counsel in these cases, as
might be expected. Compare Appelant's Reply to the Amicus Brief at 9 (less than $200,000 a
year") with Amicus Curiae Brief at 17 ("undoubtedly staggering... could double the cost to the
State [currently more than $4,000,000 per year to provide counsel for indigents in criminal trials,
according to figures of the Administrative Office of the Court]").
Counsel for appellant suggested that the cost of providing counsel in nonsupport actions
might be defrayed in part by the federal government, using funds collected in those same actions.
Brief for Appellant at 25 n.7. Since the federal government currently reimburses the states for
approximately 75% of the cost of prosecuting these actions, 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979),
such an arrangement seems eminently fair. Expenditures from the fund are regulated, however,
so that an amendment to the Social Security Act would be necessary to effect the reimbursement.
See id § 657(b) (1976).
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2. Procedural Due Process
In In re Hernandez177 the court of appeals held that G.S. 122-58.18 ade-
quately protected the rights of a mentally ill person subject to an emergency
custody order. Under G.S. 122-58.18 an emergency custody order may be is-
sued if the respondent is found to be dangerous to himself or others, and if
respondent is violent and requires restraint, and delay in taking him to a quali-
fied physician for examination would likely endanger life or property." 178 Re-
spondent in Hernandez had presented himself at the military police desk at
Fort Bragg, claimed to be Jesus Christ, and stated that the Pope had sent him
to get a permit to carry a weapon. Hernandez also claimed to be an under-
cover agent and demanded an automatic weapon. Respondent was taken to
the Cumberland County Mental Health Center for examination. From the
Mental Health Center respondent was transferred to the Cumberland County
Law Enforcement Center where a deputy sheriff signed the petition and oath
for involuntary commitment required by G.S. 122-58.18. On the basis of this
petition a magistrate issued an emergency custody order confining respondent
to Dorothea Dix Hospital. Eight days later the district court conducted a hear-
ing persuant to G.S. 122-58.7.179 At the close of the hearing respondent was
committed for a period of ninety days.
On appeal, respondent challenged the district court's failure to grant a
motion to dismiss. Respondent contended that the district court's interpreta-
tion of G.S. 122-58.18 was faulty in two respects: the court failed to require
the petitioning officer to specifically state the facts supporting his belief that
respondent was violent, and the court did not require that the officer witness
any overt acts of violence before signing the commitment petition. Respon-
dent claimed that both due process and a proper interpretation of legislative
intent mandated that these requirements be met.180
The magistrate issuing the custody order is required to find by "clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence" that the facts stated in the petition are
true.'8 1 Respondent argued that this standard of proof is meaningless without
a specific statement of facts upon which a magistrate may base his decision.
Hernandez urged that due process, as well as an intelligent reading of the stat-
ute, required more of the petitioning officer than merely placing his signature
on a "pre-printed oath."' 82
The court rejected this claim without stating what minimum evidentiary
standard is required by due process. In reaching its decision the court noted
several factors that mitigated against imposition of a strict standard. The use
177. 46 N.C. App. 265, 264 S.E.2d 780 (1980).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.18 (1981).
179. Id § 122-58.7.
180. Respondent did not contend that G.S. 122-58.18 expressly set forth these requirements, in
fact respondent admitted that "on its face § 122-58.18 does not require a detailed statement of
facts showing that the Respondent is violent and requires restraint." Respondent Appellant's
Brief at 7.
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.18 (1981).
182. Respondent Appellant's Brief at 7.
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of generalized statements by petitioning law enforcement officers was justified
because most magistrates are laymen and because G.S. 122-58.18 is, by defini-
tion, only invoked in emergency situations. Under these conditions "Illegal
niceties must not be expected."' 8 3
While these factors may justify some informality in the proceedings they
do not answer the claim that the petitioning officer should state specifically the
facts upon which he bases his belief that respondent is violent. This additional
requirement would be unlikely to prevent a law enforcement officer from ef-
fectively dealing with an emergency situation and could only aid the magis-
trate in determining whether the emergency custody order should be issued.
Respondent additionally urged that due process required a mechanism
for review of the magistrate's findings. "The logical way for review to occur
would be for there to be a requirement for a specific statement of alleged facts
on the face of the petition, including the facts supporting violence and requiring
restraint, lending itself to review by the District Court Judge."' 8 4 The court of
appeals rejected this argument, noting that a district court hearing must be
provided within ten days, and that this hearing adequately protects respon-
dent's rights.1 85 The protection offered by this hearing was examined by a
federal district court in French v. Blackburn.18 6 In validating the hearing pro-
visions, the court in Blackburn emphasized that respondent was given "at least
two opportunities to be released prior to the hearing based upon medical ex-
aminations and the findings of a qualified examining physician."' 87 While
Blackburn does not justify the loose evidentiary standard accepted in Her-
nandez, the safeguards discussed by the court do lessen the potential damage
that can be done under an emergency custody proceeding.
Respondent's second contention was that, even assuming the petition
could be valid without a specific statement of facts, it should have been dis-
missed when it became clear that the petitioning officer did not have firsthand
183. 46 N.C. App. at 269, 264 S.E.2d at 782.
184. Respondent Appellants Brief at 6 (emphasis in original).
185. 46 N.C. App. at 269, 264 S.E.2d at 782. The district court hearing is required by G.S.
122-58.7. It should be noted that the hearing is held to determine if the respondent should be
involuntarily committed for the future, not to review the magistrate's initial determination. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122-58.8 (1981). Thus, the hearing does not protect against an erroneous initial
commitment, nor could it; therefore, it supports the proposition that the magistrate be presented
with detailed allegations. A magistrate dealing with specific factual claims is less likely to issue an
erroneous commitment order than one dealing with unsupported statements.
186. 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd metm., 443 U.S. 901, (1979). In Blackburn
respondent had been initially committed under G.S. 122-58.3. Respondent did not challenge the
initial commitment and the court did not deal with this part of the proceedings. Blackburn, then,
does not justify the failure to require the petitioning officer to state specific facts. The decision in
Blackburn is discussed in Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1977-Constitutional
Law, 56 N.C.L. REv. 843, 960-62 (1978).
187. 428 F. Supp. at 1355 (footnote omitted). In Hernandez respondent claimed that proceed-
ings under G.S. 122-58.18 provided less protection than proceedings under the non-emergency
provisions of G.S. 122-58.3 because respondent lost "the right afforded by N.C.G.S. § 122-58.3 et
seq. to be examined by an impartial qualified physician in his community." Respondent Appel-
lant's Brief at 6. The basis of this claim is not clear as G.S. 122-58.18 provides that respondent,
once taken into custody, "shall be examined and processed thereafter in the same manner as all
other respondents under this Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.18 (1981).
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knowledge of any acts of violence.188 The court was unwilling to accept this
requirement because "[rlarely are law enforcement officers witnesses to acts of
violence."' 89 Nor was the court willing to require that respondent have com-
mitted any overt acts of violence before a district court would be justified in
finding him "imminently dangerous" to others and order involuntary commit-
ment.190 The court reviewed the evidence in respondent's case and concluded
that his commitment was supported by "clear, cogent and convincing evi-
dence."191
While the facts in Hernandez may support respondent's commitment
under G.S. 122-58.18, it is clear that the court's reading of the statute leaves
open the possibility of abuse. Requiring that the petitioning officer state spe-
cific facts to support his petition would do much to solve this problem.
3. Fundamental Rights
The court of appeals refined the standards for involuntary sterilization
under G.S. 35-43 in In re Johnson.192 Although the court found that the order
compelling respondent's sterilization was proper, it held that the state could
not order sterilization solely on the basis of mental retardation. G.S. 35-43
provides for involuntary sterilization when "because of a physical, mental or
nervous disease or deficiency which is not likely to materially improve, the
person would probably be unable to care for a child."' 193 The evidence
presented to the jury194 in Johnson established that respondent, a twenty-three
year old female, had a Stanford Binet I.Q. of forty. Testimony by respon-
dent's foster mother and an employee of the Department of Social Services
described respondent as sexually active but unable to understand or use birth
control methods. 195
In examining the evidence on appeal the court recognized that the sterili-
zation statute, although previously determined to be constitutionally valid, 196
lacked detailed standards for determining respondent's unfitness. In supplying
these details, the court sought to protect respondent's fundamental constitu-
188. 46 N.C. App. at 270, 264 S.E.2d at 782. It was clear in Hernandez that the petitioning
officer initiated the petition under the orders of his major and did not in fact know of any violent
behavior on the part of the respondent. Record at 7-9.
189. 46 N.C. App. at 270, 264 S.E.2d at 783.
190. Id
191. Id at 271, 264 S.E.2d at 783. The "clear, cogent and convincing" standard must be met
before the district court can order continued confinement. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.8(b) (1981).
Additional facts developed at the hearing in Hernandez showed that respondent was carrying a
knife in his luggage and that he was willing to use it. 46 N.C. App. at 271, 264 S.E.2d at 783.
192. 45 N.C. App. 649, 263 S.E.2d 805, appeal dismissed, 300 N.C. 373, 267 S.E.2d 686 (1980).
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. 35-43 (1976). G.S. 35-43 also provides for sterilization when "the per-
son would be likely, unless sterilized, to procreate a child or children which probably would have
serious physical, mental, or nervous diseases or deficiencies." Id The court in Johnson did not
deal with this aspect of the statute.
194. G.S. 35-44 provides for a trial de novo in superior court after a district court hearing. Id
§ 35-44. The district court hearing is before a judge. Id § 35-43. Either party may request a jury
trial in superior court. Id N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-44 (1976).
195. 45 N.C. App. at 650-51, 263 S.E.2d at 807.
196. Id at 652, 263 S.E.2d at 808 (citing In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976)).
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tional right to procreate. 197 The State had to demonstrate a compelling inter-
est to support a sterilization order in light of the fundamental nature of
respondent's constitutional right. 198 From this framework, the court deter-
mined that the state must prove that respondent was mentally retarded or ill,
that respondent had a physical, mental or nervous disease or deficiency, that
the disease or deficiency was unlikely to improve, and that respondent would
probably be unable to care for a child. 199 The court held that the State could
not meet this burden by relying on a presumption of unfitness raised solely by
the fact of retardation. However, "[tihe burden on the petitioner to show per-
sonality defects or traits of unfitness apart from retardation increases as the
retardation ranges from severe to mild. ' '2 ° °
To meet this burden the State may introduce evidence of respondent's
morals, sexual activity, attitude toward birth control, and attitudes towards
children. This evidence is admissible in determining whether respondent is fit
to care for a child and whether her condition is likely to improve.201
The standards enunciated in Johnson should act to protect the interests of
persons subject to involuntary sterilization, clarifying a statute that otherwise
provides little guidance.
4. Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute
In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ingram20 2 the North
Carolina Supreme Court considered the effect of an unconstitutional statute,
the North Carolina Health Care Liability Reinsurance Exchange Act.20 3 Af-
ter the major health care liability insurers withdrew from the malpractice in-
surance market in 1975, the legislature passed the Act, which prohibited a
general liability insurer from writing any liability insurance in the state unless
the insurer agreed to provide medical malpractice insurance.204 The insur-
ance companies immediately challenged the Act, and the state supreme court
held that the Act violated the state constitution and the due process clause of
the United States Constitution.205 This decision impugned the validity of
medical malpractice insurance binders issued under the statute, raising the
question whether the court's determination of the statute's unconstitutional
197. 45 N.C. App. at 652, 263 S.E.2d at 808. The court cited Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) as establishing the right to procreate.
198. 45 N.C. App. at 652, 263 S.E.2d at 808.
199. Id at 653, 263 S.E.2d at 808.
200. Id at 653, 263 S.E.2d at 809. In Johnson respondent's retardation was classified as mild.
Id at 651, 263 S.E.2d at 807.
201. Id at 654, 263 S.E.2d at 809.
202. 301 N.C. 138, 271 S.E.2d 46 (1980).
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-173.34 to .51 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
204. 301 N.C. at 139-40, 271 S.E.2d at 47.
205. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976). The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the statute violated the equal protection and law of the
land clauses of the state constitution, N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19, and the due process clause of the
United States Constitution, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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status would take effect retroactively. InAmerican Insurance Co. ,206 the court
postponed this crucial question.
Plaintiff-insurance company issued a binder to defendant-medical clinic,
conditioned upon the constitutionality of the Act.20 7 The insurance company
also indicated, however, that the medical clinic enjoyed full coverage regard-
less of the wording in that condition.208 Later, the insurance company ob-
tained a temporary restraining order preventing application of the Act to the
company, pending the court's examination of the company's claim that the
statute's unconstitutionality made the binder void when issued.209 After the
supreme court declared the Act unconstitutional,2 10 but before the trial court
considered the effect of that decision on the binder, third parties sued the med-
ical clinic for malpractice arising from acts committed while the clinic was
insured under the binder. The insurance company denied coverage based on
its previous contention that a binder issued under an unconstitutional statute
lacked validity.211
The supreme court refused to accept the insurance company's argument,
rejecting the absolute retroactivity rule favored by the United States Supreme
Court in Norton v. Shelby County212 and recognized by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in a series of similar cases.213 Instead, the court adopted the
good faith reliance approach to retroactivity presented by the United States
Supreme Court in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,214 an
approach later expanded by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Roberson v.
Penland215 when it ruled that the unconstitutionality of a statute provides no
defense to an action based on liability created by a relationship voluntarily
assumed pursuant to that statute.216 Under this approach, the insurance com-
pany voluntarily assumed the contractual relationship of insurer.217 By stat-
ing that the medical clinic enjoyed full coverage, the insurance company lost
the benefit of the condition to the binder.218 Consequently, the company
agreed to insure the medical clinic regardless of the constitutionality of the
Act.
The court carefully noted that American Insurance Co. did not decide the
retroactivity of the decision that declared the Reinsurance Exchange Act un-
constitutional. Regardless of the answer to that question, the court would
206. 301 N.C. at 153, 271 S.E.2d at 54.
207. Id at 140-42, 271 S.E.2d at 47-48.
208. Id at 142-43, 271 S.E.2d at 48-49.
209. Id at 144, 271 S.E.2d at 50.
210. See note 205 and accompanying text supra.
211. 301 N.C. at 144-45, 271 S.E.2d at 49-50.
212. 118 U.S. 425 (1886).
213. See 301 N.C. at 147, 271 S.E.2d at 51.
214. 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940) ("an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified").
215. 260 N.C. 502, 133 S.E.2d 206 (1963).
216. Id at 505-06, 133 S.E.2d at 208.
217. 301 N.C. at 150, 271 S.E.2d at 53.
218. Id at 150-52, 271 S.E.2d at 53-54.
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guarantee the validity of any insurance binders voluntarily written under the
Act, as opposed to those binders written involuntarily under coercion of the
unconstitutional statute.219 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged an impor-
tant exception to a possible subsequent determination of retroactivity.
E. North Carolina Constitution
1. Abortion Funding
In Stam v. State220 plaintiff sought a declaration that the action of the
State of North Carolina and the Wake County Department of Social Services
in paying for medically unnecessary abortions 221 violates State statutory and
constitutional law. Plaintiff made the following allegations: 1) that a live
human fetus is a "person" within the protection of article I, sections 1 and 19
of the North Carolina Constitution; 2) that State funding of medically unnec-
essary abortions violates article V, section 5 of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion; and 3) that the county's appropriation and expenditure of State and
county funds for medically unnecessary abortions is "ultra vires" any power
given to the county by any State statute.222
The North Carolina Court of Appeals had affirmed the decision of the
Wake Superior Court granting summary judgment for the defendants on all
three issues.2m On appeal, the supreme court adopted the court of appeals'
decision and reasoning on the first two of plaintiffs allegations, namely, that
the implicated State action complies with article I, sections 1 and 19 and arti-
cle V, section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution. It reversed on the third
issue.224
The court of appeals had looked to the probable intent of the drafters of
the State constitution and to United States Supreme Court interpretations of
similar equal protection and due process language in the United States Consti-
tution in order to determine whether a fetus should be included within the
constitutional definition of "person." 5 The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals analyzed common and statutory law existing at the time the North Caro-
219. Id at 153, 271 S.E.2d at 54.
220. 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981).
221. The State Abortion Fund, which provides state funds for abortions for indigents, was
created by the North Carolina General Assembly, and is administered according to rules promul-
gated by the Social Services Commission. Money from the Fund is used to provide indigent
women with abortions during the first twenty weeks of pregnancy. See Brief for Appellee, Stain v.
State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980).
222. 302 N.C. at 358, 275 S.E.2d at 440.
223. Stare v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980).
224. 302 N.C. at 359, 275 S.E.2d at 441.
225. 47 N.C. App. at 213-17, 267 S.E.2d at 339-42.
N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. 1, § 1 (1970) provides:
The quality and rights ofpersonr. We hold it to be self-evident that all persons are cre-
ated equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the
pursuit of happiness.
Id art. 1, § 19 provides in part:
Law of the land; equalprotection of the laws. No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or
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lina Constitution was drafted and concluded that these laws had never held a
fetus to be a "person!' in the complete sense prior to birth.226 Criminal laws
prohibiting abortion and property laws granting rights to unborn children
were seen as protecting rights other than those of the child itself 227 or as being
based on a condition precedent of live birth.228 The court of appeals also
relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,2 29
which held that "person" within the fourteenth amendment due process clause
does not include the unborn.
In addition to its historical analysis and survey of relevant Supreme Court
cases, the court of appeals considered the legal and policy implications of
holding an unborn fetus to be a "person" in the constitutional sense.230 Under
Roe v. Wade a woman has a due process right to choose abortion in the first
trimester of pregnancy.231 This right cannot be substantially infringed by any
asserted interest of the father,23 2 the mother's parents,2 33 or the fetus itself.234
If the court had held the fetus to be a legal "person," the fetus would be enti-
tled to the due process and equal protection rights accorded other individuals
under the state constitution. 235 The child's interest in "life, liberty, or prop-
erty"236 would then take precedence over the abortion rights of the mother, in
contravention of Roe v. Wade.37 Additionally, the court of appeals feared
that protection of the child's interest would prevent any state assistance for
abortions, even when necessary to save the life of the mother and to terminate
pregnancies caused by rape or incest.238
Despite these noted reservations, the court of appeals stated in dictum
that "[o]ur ruling in the present case in no way implies that the unborn child is
to be accorded no rights at all. The General Assembly may, in recognition of
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.
226. 47 N.C. App. at 215, 267 S.E.2d at 340-41.
227. Id at 215, 267 S.E.2d at 340.
228. Id. at 216, 267 S.E.2d at 341.
229. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
230. 47 N.C. App. at 216-17, 267 S.E.2d at 341-42.
231. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
232. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
233. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
234. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159-60.
235. See id at 156-7.
236. N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 19 (1970).
237. 47 N.C. App. at 217, 267 S.E.2d at 341.
A similar issue was raised in Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980). In Charles
plaintiffs attacked the Illinois abortion statute on the ground that the preamble expressed an un-
lawful legislative purpose to prohibit abortion. The contested provision stated that "the unborn
child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes
of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right of life from conception." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (1977). The court concluded that the statute did not express an unlawful
purpose when read as a whole because a preceding provision of the preamble stated that "[it is
the intention of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to reasonably regulate abortion in
conformance with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court of January 22, 1973." 627
F.2d at 779 (quoting ILL. RV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (1977)).
238. 47 N.C. App. at 217, 267 S.E.2d at 342.
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the potentiality of life, continue to grant the rights and privileges which it
chooses. ' 239 As a result, the court left open the option of legislative action to
limit state abortion funding.24°
Plaintif's second contention in Siam was that the appropriation and ex-
penditure of state tax monies for elective abortions violated article V, section 5
of the North Carolina Constitution.241 The plaintiff argued that section 5 re-
quires every act levying a tax to "state the special object to which it is to be
applied." 242 Abortion funds are derived from taxes levied under chapter 105
of the North Carolina General Statutes. G.S. 105-1 provides that the purpose
of revenues raised under the subchapter will be for the "necessary uses and
purposes of the government and State of North Carolina . "... 243 The plain-
tiff argued that, as medically necessary abortions are not funded by the State
Abortion Fund,244 the appropriation of funds for unnecessary abortions could
not be within the "necessary uses and purposes" language of G.S. 105-1.245
The court of appeals rejected this argument, stating that "it is clear that if
funding for childbirth could be considered a 'necessary use and purpose of
government,' abortion funding is equally so. '"246 The opinion recognized a
state interest in ensuring that if an indigent woman chooses abortion, her
health is protected through her ability to obtain competent professional medi-
cal care.247 State funding of elective abortions was also seen as advancing the
legislative intent of ensuring low income women a meaningful opportunity to
exercise their constitutional choice to terminate their pregnancies.248
The plaintiff's third contention in Siam was that Wake County's expendi-
ture of state and county funds for elective abortions was without statutory
authorization. 249 The court of appeals found that county expenditure of state
funds was authorized by administrative rules enacted by the State Social Serv-
ices Commission.250 Authorization for the enactment of these rules was found
in G.S. 143B-137, which permits the Department of Human Resources of
which the Social Services Commission is a part, to make rules consistent with
239. Id
240. This kind of state action has been held constitutional in a number of United States
Supreme Court decisions. See Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980) (Illinois); Harris v.
McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (Connecticut); Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438 (1977) (Pennsylvania). See also notes 250-52 and accompanying text infra.
The court's deferral to legislative judgment is in accord with the language of the United
States Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe which states: "Indeed, when an issue involves policy
choices as sensitive as those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions the appro-
priate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature." 432 U.S. at 479.
241. 47 N.C. App. at 217, 267 S.E.2d at 342.
242. N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. V, § 5 (1970).
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-1 (1979).
244. See note 221 and accompanying text supra.
245. 47 N.C. App. at 218-19, 267 S.E.2d at 342.
246. Id
247. Id at 219, 267 S.E.2d at 343.
248. Id, 267 S.E.2d at 342.
249. Id, 267 S.E.2d at 343.
250. Id Administrative rules governing the State Abortion Fund are adopted by the Social
Services Commission. See note 221 and accompanying text supra.
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state law if they are necessary to carry out the purpose of providing "services
in the fields of general and mental health."251 The state supreme court did not
specifically address the issue of the county's expenditure of state funds,
thereby apparently affirming the court of appeals. 252
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on the question of the
county's statutory authority to levy taxes and appropriate local funds for elec-
tive abortions. The court of appeals had found statutory authorization for the
scheme in the provisions of G.S. 53A-149(c)(30) and G.S. 153A-255. 253 The
supreme court disagreed with this conclusion, stating "[a] grant to a county of
the power to levy taxes must be strictly construed." 254 G.S. 153A-149(c)(30)
was held to be limited by G.S. 153A-149(g) which provides in part that "[t]his
section does not authorize any county to undertake any program, function,
joint undertaking, or service not otherwise authorized by law."25 5 G.S. 153A-
255 was deemed insufficient to provide the necessary additional authority be-
cause the court believed its application limited to programs that provide the
poor with the "basic necessities of life."256 This limitation was based on the
North Carolina's Supreme Court's holding in Hughey v. Cloninger,257 which
ruled that G.S. 153A-255 does not confer authority for the county to establish
a school for dyslexic students. In Hughey the court stated that authorization
for county programs under G.S. 153A-255 is limited to programs "of the type
created in Chapters 108 and 111 of the General Statutes.' 258 Programs of the
type created in chapters 108 and 111 were limited to those which are "respon-
sive to the needs of impoverished citizens who are unable to provide for the
basic necessities of life." 259 While admitting that the decision in Hughey
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-137 (1978). G.S. 143B-153, which creates the Social Services
Commission of the Department of Human Resources, authorizes the commission to adopt rules
and regulations "under and not inconsistent with the laws of the State necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Article." Id § 143B-153.
252. The supreme court opinion in Stam states:
We have carefully examined the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals as it relates
to plaintitfs Assignments of Error Numbers 1 and 2. We conclude that the authorities
cited, the principles of law enunciated, and the reasoning.. . are correct and fully sup-
port the result reached on the questions of law presented by these assignments of error.
We therefore approve and adopt the decision insofar as it affirms the granting of sum-
mary judgment on these first two issues.
302 N.C. at 359, 275 S.E.2d at 441.
253. 47 N.C. App. at 222, 267 S.E.2d at 344. G.S. 153A-149(c)(30) permits a county to levy
property taxes to provide for the general welfare "through the maintenance and administration of
public assistance programs." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-149(c)(30) (1978). G.S. 153A-255 states
that "[e]ach county shall provide social services programs pursuant to Chapter 108 and Chapter
111 and may otherwise undertake, sponsor, organize, engage in, and support other social service
programs intended to further the health, welfare, education, safety, comfort, and convenience of
its citizens." Id § 153A-255.
254. 302 N.C. at 360, 275 S.E.2d at 441.
255. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-149(g) (1978).
256. 302 N.C. at 362, 275 S.E.2d at 442.
257. 297 N.C. 86, 253 S.E.2d 898 (1979).
258. Id at 92, 253 S.E.2d at 902. Under chapter 108 medical services are limited to those
"essential to the health and welfare of the recipients.' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-60 (1978). Chapter
111 deals exclusively with aid to the blind. Id §§ 111-1 to -47.
259. 297 N.C. at 93, 253 S.E.2d at 902. The Hughey court also stated that chapter 108 applies
"to citizens who cannot afford adequate health care." Id
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turned on the fact that the school in question was not limited to a class of
impoverished students, 260 the Siam court extended the holding to permit
county funding only when a program provides the class of poor with basic
necessities that they themselves are unable to provide. 261 With regard to elec-
tive abortion funding the court stated, "[w]e find it inconceivable that the leg-
islature would have intended medically unnecessary abortions to be basic
necessities of life."'262
The supreme court derived further evidence of legislative intent from
G.S. 17-707(21)-the predecessor to G.S. 153A-255. 263 G.S. 17-707(21), which
was repealed in 1973, authorized counties to provide for the "maintenance of
the poor."26" According to the court, funding of elective abortions was not
within the meaning of "maintenance." 265
Finally, in support of its holding, the supreme court stated that the legis-
lature would have specifically authorized counties to fund medically unneces-
sary abortions if this had been its intent. This conclusion was based on
judicial recognition of the "widespread emotional and intellectual debate"
over the legality of abortions.266
The supreme court's opinion in Stam strains to find a lack of statutory
authorization for county abortion funding. G.S. 153A-255 clearly allows
county social services to "undertake, sponsor, organize, engage in, and support
.. . programs intended to further the health, welfare, education, safety, com-
fort, and convenience of its citizens. ' 267 Although Hughey v. Cloninger limits
county funding under G.S. 153A-255 to programs "addressed exclusively to
the problems of poverty,"268 this would not appear to exclude funding of elec-
tive abortions for indigent women. As the court of appeals in Stam stated,
"[t]he grant of power in [G.S. 153A-255] is sufficiently broad to permit the
county to sponsor and support the program established by the State Abortion
Fund through the levy of taxes and the expenditure of county funds. '269 The
"basic necessities of life" argument, drawn from Hughey, appears overly nar-
260. Id The court stated, "[i]n sum, the programs in Chapters 108 and Ill are addressed
exclusively to the problems of poverty; whereas a school for dyslexic children is addressed exclu-
sively to the treatment of a learning disability without regard to the financial status of those af-
flicted." Id
261. 302 N.C. at 362, 275 S.E.2d at 442. Qualified programs were held to include nursing care,
employment opportunities, and food stamps. Id
262. Id This holding seems to conflict with the reasoning of the court of appeals (later
adopted by the supreme court) concerning plaintiff's allegation that state abortion funding was not
within the "necessary uses and purposes" language of G.S. 105-1. See notes 243-48 and accompa-
nying text supra.
263. Law of Aug. 14, 1868, ch. 20, § 8(24), 1868 N.C. Pub. Laws, Spec. Sess. 22 (repealed
1973).
264. Id The statute further authorized counties "[t]o provide by tax for the maintenance,
comfort and well-ordering of the poor." Id
265. 302 N.C. at 363, 275 S.E.2d at 443. The court failed to specify what programs would be
within the definition of "maintenance."
266. Id
267. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-255 (1978).
268. 297 N.C. at 92, 253 S.E.2d at 902.
269. 47 N.C. App. at 223, 267 S.E.2d at 344.
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row and possibly excludes programs for the poor that are specifically author-
ized under chapter 108.270
The Stam decision is particularly significant in light of the increasing
trend of state legislatures27' to limit state abortion funding to those medically
necessary procedures eligible for federal funding under the Medicaid Act.272
Such funding limits are said to promote the state's interest in encouraging
childbirth, while imposing no unconstitutional obstacle to a woman's recog-
nized right to choose abortion.273 Because Stam held that the State may con-
tinue to fund elective abortions without violating statutory or constitutional
law, it is likely that the state legislature will continue to be a target for anti-
abortion groups. Nothing in the supreme court's opinion would prevent a leg-
islative limit on funding of abortions.274
2. Education
In Sneed v. Greensboro City Board of Education275 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a 1970 revision of the state constitution, which guar-
anteed "free public schools" as opposed to "public schools . . . wherein tui-
tion shall be free," 276 did not preclude the school board from requiring public
school students to pay reasonable instruction, course, and use fees.277 The
state public school system has imposed modest fees continuously since
1868.278 Furthermore, the 1868 state constitution and its subsequent revisions
equated "free public schools" with tuition-free public schools.279 Finally, the
1970 decision to revise the Constitution of North Carolina merely demon-
270. G.S. 108-59 and -60 authorize the county to levy taxes for payments to such health care
providers as optometrists and dentists. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-59 to -60 (1978).
271. See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
272. See Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (1976 & Supp. 1980). In Harris v. McRae the
Supreme Court held that the Medicaid Act does not require a participating state to include in its
abortion funding plan any services for which a subsequent Congress had withheld federal fund-
ing. 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2684-85 (1980). Since 1976, Congress has limited the use of Medicaid funds
for reimbursement of the cost of abortions by means of the Hyde Amendment. The current ver-
sion of the Hyde Amendment, applicable for fiscal year 1980, provides:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions
except where the life of the mother would be endangered. . . or except for such medical
procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been
reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service.
Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923 (1979). See Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2680-81, for a
historical summary of the Hyde Amendment.
273. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
274. See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
275. 299 N.C. 609, 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980).
276. Compare N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2(1) ("a general and uniform system of public
schools, wherein tuition shall be free of charge") with N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2(1) (1970)
("a general and uniform system of free public schools").
277. Other states that have considered this issue have reached an opposite result. E.g., Bond
v. Public Schools, 383 Mich. 693, 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970) (per curiam) (new language in the 1963
Constitution providing for "a system of free public ... schools" held to prohibit textbook or
instructional fees).
278. 299 N.C. at 615, 264 S.E.2d at I11.
279. Id at 613-14, 264 S.E.2d at 110-11.
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strated a desire to eliminate the obsolete separation-of-the-races provision.280
Thus, a system of free public schools requires the state to furnish only "the
physical plant and personnel salaries"281 necessary to maintain a tuition-free
public educational system.282 For students unable to afford the fees, the court
held that procedural due process required the school board to give notice of its





280. Id at 616, 264 S.E.2d at 112.
281. Id at 617, 264 S.E.2d at 112.
282. The state legislature also requires the public schools to furnish free textbooks. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115-206.12 (1978).




In Pinkerton v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held that
a member of a criminal conspiracy is liable as a principal for all offenses com-
mitted by coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Although North
Carolina courts have never expressly adopted the Pinkerton rule, recent cases
have affirmed convictions apparently based on this theory of vicarious liabil-
ity.2 In State v. Small,3 however, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the Pinkerton rule as a basis for substantive criminal liability in North Caro-
lina, holding that involvement in a conspiracy to commit a crime does not
make one liable for the actions of coconspirators. 4
Defendant in Small allegedly hired two coconspirators to kill his wife.
Defendant was not present when the act was carried out. The State argued
that defendant was liable as a principal because he conspired with others to
commit the murder. The trial court instructed the jury to find defendant guilty
of first degree murder if it found that the crime had been carried out in fur-
therance of an agreement between defendant and the actual killers. The jury
found defendant guilty and he was sentenced to death.5 On appeal, the
supreme court6 rejected the theory of vicarious liability on which the convic-
tion was based.
The supreme court observed that the Pinkerton rule obviated the distinc-
tion between the liability of a principal and the liability of an accessory before
the fact to murder, as codified in G.S. 14-5 and 14-6.7 A principal is present at
the scene of the crime, while an accessory is not8 and under the statutory pro-
visions, an accessory before the fact to murder cannot receive the death pen-
alty, whereas a principal to murder may be sentenced to death.9 The court
found that because defendant was as an accessory before the fact, the court
could not expand the scope of accessorial liability beyond the statutory pre-
1. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
2. See State v. Bindyke, 298 N.C. 608, 220 S.E.2d 521 (1975); State v. Maynard, 247 N.C.
462, 101 S.E.2d 340 (1958). In these cases defendants who were absent from the scene of the crime
were held liable as principals on the basis of their participation in a conspiracy to commit the
crime.
3. 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980).
4. Id. at 420, 272 S.E.2d at 136-37.
5. Id. at 412, 272 S.E.2d at 131.
6. Justice Huskins dissented without opinion.
7. 301 N.C. at 417, 272 S.E.2d at 134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5 (1969) provides, in relevant
part: "Accessories before the fact.. . -If any person shall counsel, procure or command any
other person to commit any felony ... [he] shall be guilty of a felony...."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-6 (Supp. 1979), at the time the crime in Small was committed, pro-
vided, in relevant part, that "[alny person who shall be convicted as an accessory before the fact in
either of the crimes of murder, arson, burglary or rape or a sex offense shall be imprisoned for life
. In 1979 this section was amended to provide a maximum fifty years sentence. Law of
June 4, 1979, ch. 760, § 5, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 859.
8. State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 653, 174 S.E.2d 793, 801 (1970).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7 (1969).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
scription. 10
Apart from Pinkerton's conflict with the statutory distinction between ac-
cessories before the fact and principals to murder, the North Carolina
Supreme Court criticized Pinkerton for basing a conspirator's criminal liability
for an act "less upon the circumstances of his personal participation than upon
his presumed status as 'partner' in all actions which proximately result from
the venture originally agreed upon."'I The court was unwilling to sanction
the use of a rule that would impose liability as a party to the substantive crime
solely on the basis of participation in the agreement to commit the crime.' 2
Recent North Carolina Supreme Court cases had accepted a theory of
vicarious liability by affirming the imposition of principal liability for substan-
tive crimes solely on the basis of involvement in conspiracies to commit those
crimes. 13 The Small court held, however, that these cases had misapplied
their cited precedents.' 4 Earlier precedents involved defendants who were
present at the scene of the crime. Proof of their involvement in the conspiracy
was introduced only to establish their intent to further the crime by their pres-
ence.15 Although used as a rule of evidence, 16 rather than as a rule of substan-
10. 301 N.C. at 417, 272 S.E.2d at 134-35.
11. Id. at 415, 272 S.E.2d at 133-34. The court regarded this "stew of expanded criminal
liability" as a "rather startling result." Id.
12. Id. at 420, 270 S.E.2d at 138. The court was not solely concerned with the Pinkerton
rule's imposition of principal liability on one who otherwise would be liable only as an accessory
before the fact. Neither principal nor accessorial liability could properly be imposed, said the
court, solely on the basis of a defendant's involvement in a conspiracy. Id.
Another objection raised by the Small court was that Pinkerton dissolved the distinction be-
tween the crime of conspiracy and the criminal object of the conspiracy. In the Small court's
view, this conflicted with previous holdings that the two crimes are separate offenses and sepa-
rately punishable. Id. at 428, 272 S.E.2d at 141. This objection, however, does not appear to be
an independent ground for the decision in Small.
The prior cases referred to by the court had held that the merger doctrine does not merge the
offense of conspiracy into the substantive offense resulting from the conspiracy's furtherance. ld.
at 428 n.14, 272 S.E.2d at 141 n.14. When proof of one offense is an essential element in another
offense, the doctrine of merger operates to "merge" the offenses, and a defendant charged with
both crimes may be convicted and punished only for one or the other. Ordinarily the doctrine
does not merge conspiracy with its object, since the facts necessary to prove the conspiracy are not
essential ingredients in proving the substantive offense. The Pinkerton rule, however, when ap-
plied to conspirators whose personal involvement in the substantive offense, standing alone, is
insufficient to render them liable as parties to that crime, causes the conspiracy and substantive
offenses to merge. For these defendants proof of involvement in the conspiracy is the only means
of obtaining their convictions for the substantive offense, and therefore constitutes an essential
element of that offense. Merger logically should apply in this situation because equating guilt of
the conspiracy with guilt of the substantive offense results in an identity of offenses. A conviction
for both would be a violation of double jeopardy. See 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 182 (1965).
This result is not contrary to the court's earlier pronouncements that the two crimes are separate,
since in those cases proof of involvement in the conspiracy was not an essential element of the
substantive offense. Thus, the true basis for this objection would seem to be the court's antipathy
toward the Pinkerton rule's equation of conspiratorial and substantive criminal liability.
13. See cases cited at note 2 supra.
14. 301 N.C. at 423-27, 272 S.E.2d at 138-40.
15. Id.
16. The court observed,
The conspirator rule-the well established proposition that the acts and declarations of
one conspirator, made or done in furtherance of or within the scope of the original con-
spiracy, may be imputed to other conspirators who were not present at the time-is a
valid and useful evidentia rule .... It means, in essence, that [the] acts and declara-
1124 [Vol. 59
tive liability, the principle was worded broadly enough to permit its
application in the later cases to defendants who were not present at the
crime. 17 The Small court overruled these more recent cases.' 8
The significance of Small depends upon the reasoning behind the deci-
sion. One basis of the court's decision is the more lenient statutory provision
for sentencing accessories before the fact to murder. This narrow holding goes
no further than to say that the Pinkerton rule cannot be used to "expand the
scope of accessorial liability beyond the legislative design."' 19 It would not
condemn the use of the Pinkerton rule where it would not have this effect. For
example, if the rule were used merely to impose accessorial liability on a de-
fendant, or if the legislative design itself were to expand the scope of accesorial
liability (as it would if the legislature were to abolish the distinction between
principals and accessories before the fact20), then this basis for rejecting Pin-
kerton would not apply.
The broader basis for Small strikes at the heart of Pinkerton by proscrib-
ing the imposition of liability for a crime solely on the basis of a defendant
having agreed with others to commit the crime. The court criticized the em-
phasis that the Pinkerton rule gives to a defendant's presumed status as "part-
ner" in the crime, as opposed to the actual "circumstances of his personal
participation" in the substantive offense.2 ' While it conceded that in most
tions of one coconspirator are admissible against all.... When one who so conspires is
shown to have been present at the commission of the crime, contemplated by or a natural
consequence of the original conspiracy, evidence of the conspiracy, including the con-
spiratorial acts and declarations of all the conspirators, may then be relevant to show
.. that he aided and abetted in the commission of the crime, or acted in concert with
those who did, in which event he is substantively liable as a principal. Likewise, when
the defendant-conspirator is shown to have been absent from the scene of the crime,
evidence of the conspiracy may nevertheless be relevant to support that state's theory
that the defendant participated as an accessory before the fact.
301 N.C. at 418-20, 272 S.E.2d at 135-36.
17. An example of the broadly worded principle can be found in State v. Smith, 221 N.C.
400, 20 S.E.2d 360 (1942): "[I]f a number of persons combine or conspire to commit a crime...
each is responsible for all acts committed by the others in the execution of the common purpose
which are a natural or probable consequence of the unlawful combination .. ", quoted in 301
N.C. at 424-25, 272 S.E.2d at 139. This principle was applied in Smith to defendants present at
the scene of the crime, but was cited in State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 618-19, 220 S.E.2d 521,528
(1975), to support the imposition of principal liability upon a defendant who was absent from the
scene of the crime on the ground that defendant was involved in the conspiracy to commit the
crime. 301 N.C. at 425, 272 S.E.2d at 139.
18. 301 N.C. at 421, 272 S.E.2d at 137.
19. Id. at 417, 272 S.E.2d at 134-35.
20. The decision in Small precipitated prosecutorial pressure for legislation to make possible
the conviction as principals of persons who hire others to commit a felony but are not present at
the commission of the crime. Senate Bill 62, introduced Jan. 30, 1981, would abolish the distinc-
tion between accessories before the fact and principals, thereby conforming the North Carolina
approach to that of most states.
21. 301 N.C. at 415, 272 S.E.2d at 133-34. The basis for the court's objection to Pinkerton's
broad sweep is expressed in the following statement it quoted from a recent New York opinion:
"[I]t is repugnant to our system of jurisprudence, where guilt is generally personal to the defend-
ant.. . to impose punishment, not for the socially harmful agreement to which the defendant is a
party, but for substantive offenses in which he did not participate." 301 N.C. at 427, 272 S.E.2d at
140-41 (quoting People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48,58, 424 N.Y.S.2d 157, 162,399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182
(1979)).
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cases a conspirator's actual participation in the substantive crime will suffice to
render him liable for the crime, at least as an accessory before the fact,22 the
court held that such liability cannot be imposed solely on the basis of one's
status as a conspirator. 23
The result reached in Small is sensible. If a defendant's actual participa-
tion in a crime falls short of implicating him as either a principal or an acces-
sory before the fact, then there is no reasonable basis for holding him liable as
a party to the crime. Conspiracy to commit murder is itself a felony punish-
able by up to ten years imprisonment,24 and this seems adequate to deal with
defendants whose sole involvement consists of having agreed with others to
commit the crime.
B. Burden of Proof
The fourteenth amendment due process requirements relating to the bur-
den of proof in criminal cases were considered in two cases this year. In State
v. Benton25 the supreme court considered the validity of a mandatory pre-
sumption. An argument between defendant and the deceased escalated into a
gun battle. Defendant argued self-defense. Although the State's evidence did
not show who first used a weapon, the prosecution relied upon the inference of
unlawful killing which arises when proof that a death resulted from defend-
ant's intentional use of a deadly weapon is offered.
Defendant argued that this presumption violated his due process rights,
relying on the series of United States Supreme Court cases beginning with In
re Winshop.26 These cases attempt to draw a line between elements that the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and exculpatory or mitigating
circumstances upon which the defendant may be required to bear the burden
of proof. This line reflects the balancing of competing policies: society's judg-
ment, which is reflected in the reasonable doubt standard, that it is preferable
to acquit a guilty person than to convict an innocent one;2 7 as against the
22. 301 N.C. at 420 & n.ll, 272 S.E.2d at 137.
23. Id.
24. State v. Alston, 264 N.C. 398, 141 S.E.2d 793 (1965).
25. 299 N.C. 16, 260 S.E.2d 917 (1980).
26. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). This case established that the due process clause "protects the ac-
cused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have
refined this concept. The State cannot shift the burden of proof to the defendant by conclusively
implying an essential element of the crime absent negating evidence from the defendant. See
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (invalidating Maine's conclusive presumption of malice
aforethought upon proof of an unlawful and intentional killing). The State does not, however,
have the burden of proof on every exculpatory or mitigating circumstance. See, e.g., Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding New York homicide scheme under which the defend-
ant could reduce murder to manslaughter by proving extreme emotional disturbance); State v.
Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980) (rejecting the
argument that due process requires that the State, in a sentencing determination of whether to
apply the death penalty, disprove any mitigating circumstances).
27. "I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bot-
tomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an




policies of not overburdening the task of prosecutors28 and not discouraging
legislatures and courts from providing affirmative defenses and mitigating cir-
cumstances.
29
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the operation of the presump-
tion. The court noted that although the presumption has the effect of shifting
the burden of production to the defendant, with defendant's showing of self-
defense the mandatory presumption disappears.30 At that point the burden
returns to the State, which must show unlawfulness beyond a reasonable
doubt, although it may still rely on the permissive inference flowing from the
elemental facts.31 The court in Benton impliedly found that the inference was
sufficient to find the unlawful killing beyond a reasonable doubt.32
Analyzed in terms of its underlying policies, the court's decision is, in
theory, defensible. Requiring the defendant to come forward with some proof
of self-defense does not seem to alter the current balance against convicting an
innocent person since some proof of self-defense should be relatively easily
obtained and offered by defendants with valid claims to the defense. Such a
mechanism also fulfills the policy of not overburdening the prosecution by
requiring it to negate a defense that might not be argued.
Whether this method fulfills the constitutional policies in practice, how-
ever, is open to doubt. Surely the defendant in Benton would view this shift-
ing of burdens as a matter of semantics. The State's evidence of unlawfulness
was ambiguous. No one testified that the defendant provoked the dispute or
28. "'Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to
eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person."' Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
145 (1979) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
29. See, for example, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207 (1977), in which the majority
noted that the New York criminal code contained some 25 affirmative defenses which had to be
established by the defendant. The opinion continued: "The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does
not put New York to the choice of abandoning those defenses or undertaking to disprove their
existence in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to
sanction by substantial punishment." In his dissent, Justice Powell argued that the prosecutor
must bear the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt whenever the factor makes a
substantial difference in punishment and stigma and has historically held that level of importance.
New affirmative defenses would therefore not be affected, Id. at 228-230.
One method the states have used to attempt to satisfy these competing requirements is that of
creating inferences that arise when the state establishes particular basic facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Supreme Court has upheld such inferences, provided that they meet certain require-
ments. A permissive inference, one which allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer the
elemental fact, will be upheld if there is a "rational connection" between the basic facts proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is "more likely than not to flow from" the former.
See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). A mandatory presumption, under which the
jury must, absent rebutting evidence from the defendant, find the elemental fact upon proof of the
basic fact, subjects the statute to scrutiny "on its face." It will be invalidated unless the inference
is sufficient for a rational jury to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 157-59.
30. A showing of self-defense negates the element of unlawfulness. State v. Hankerson, 288
N.C. 632, 651-52, 220 S.E.2d 575, 589 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
31. The scheme in Benton is thus distinguishable from that which was invalidated in Hanker-
son v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977). In the pre-Hankerson scheme, the same presumption
arose and remained until the defendant proved to the jury's satisfaction that he acted in self-
defense. Here, only the burden of production is shifted to the defendant. Once that is met the
prosecution must prove unlawfulness beyond a reasonable doubt.
32. See note 29 supra. Whether the inference is this strong is probably questionable enough
to warrant at least some court discussion.
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was the first to draw a gun. The defendant's evidence tended to show that the
deceased was the first to fire, thus raising a valid claim of self-defense. 33 Al-
though theoretically, the burden reverted back to the prosecution at that point,
no new evidence of unlawfulness was produced. The effect in Benton was no
different than if the burden had remained on the defendant to disprove unlaw-
fulness. The problem, perhaps, is that the technical distinctions, reflecting
conflicting and closely competing policies, are too finely drawn to be capable
of explanation to a jury.
The issue raised in State v. Trmble34 involved an even more direct con-
frontation with the issues underlying the Winshp line of decisions. The de-
fendant was convicted of violating G.S. 14-401,35 which makes it unlawful to
place poisoned food in a public area. The statute provides that it does not
apply to certain poisonings aimed at insects, worms, and rats. The defendant
argued that this exception constitutes an element of the offense and that the
charge had to be dismissed since this element was not set forth in his arrest
warrant.3 6 The North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the exception is
not an element of the offense but is instead a "hybrid" factor in determining
criminal liability. It held that the prosecution would only be required to prove
that the exception does not apply if the defendant initially, in a "nonfrivolous
manner," puts forth evidence that the exception does apply.37
The initial issue is whether the exception in fact constitutes an element of
the offense. G.S. 14-401 does not address this issue. It is arguable that the
exception is, therefore, an element of the offense, which the state can not rede-
fine as an affirmative defense and thereby shift the burden of proof to the
defendant.38
The court, however, did not treat the exception as an affirmative defense.
It only placed the burden of production on the defendant, which is clearly
permissible under the federal due process analysis. In Mullaney v. Wilbur,3 9
the United States Supreme Court noted: "Many states do require the defend-
33. Justice Exum, dissenting from the decision, argued that defendant's evidence that the
deceased was the aggressor clarified the prosecution's evidence, which was ambiguous on this
point. Therefore, he reasoned, the presumption of unlawfulness was destroyed and the trial judge
should have granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit. 299 N.C. 16, 26-29, 260 S.E.2d 917,
923-24 (1980) (Exum, J., dissenting).
34. 44 N.C. App. 659, 262 S.E.2d 299 (1980).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401 (1969).
36. Under G.S. 15A-924(a)(5), all elements of the offense charged must be set forth in the
arrest warrant. G.S. 15A-924(e) and 15A-954(a)(10) require that, if the provisions of G.S. 15A-
924(a)(5) are not met, and the failure is not with regard to a matter as to which an amendment is
allowable, the charges must be dismissed. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-924(a)(5), (e), 15A-954(a)(10)
(1978).
37. 44 N.C. App. at 666, 262 S.E.2d at 303-04. The court found that the State, in any event,
had proved the nonexistence of the exception beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. Id. at 667,
262 SS.E.2d at 304 (1980).
38. Responding to the argument that allowing the burden of proof to be placed on the de-
fendant to show exculpating circumstances would lead to the states' labeling elements of offenses
as affirmative defenses, the United States Supreme Court noted, "But there are obviously constitu-
tional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 210 (1977).
39. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See note 27 supra.
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ant to show that there is 'some evidence'. . . before requiring the prosecution
to negate this element. . . beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Nothing in this
opinion is intended to affect that requirement. ''4°
Shifting the burden of production to the defendant of showing the appli-
cability of an exception to a criminal statute was upheld by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in UnitedStates v. Rosenberg.41 The court upheld a doctor's
convictions on twenty-seven counts of unlawfully distributing a controlled
substance. The statute contained a number of exceptions but expressly noted
that the burden of going forward with the evidence on any exception was on
the defendant. The court observed that, because a number of statutes contain
exceptions, without such a provision the government would be required to
waste court time disproving arguments that the defendant might never make.
In addition, the court noted, "[t]he important fact is that the quoted provision
does not shift the burden of proof. Once a defendant presents a claim that he
falls within the exception, the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused does not fall within it."42
The court's analysis, however, is flawed in other respects. First, it is not
clear that the court, as opposed to the legislature, is at liberty to put the burden
of production on the defendant. 43 This is particularly questionable in North
Carolina, where each element of the offense must be specified in the warrant. 44
The failure to require the allegation that the exception is not applicable in the
arrest warrant may be crucial. For example, a defendant who does not know
of the exception may admit that he has committed every element in the arrest
warrant, waive his right to an attorney, and plead guilty to the charge. Argua-
bly, the decision regarding what elements must be alleged in the arrest warrant
should, therefore, be left to the legislature. The policies underlying Winship
suggest that the shifting of the burden of production to the defendant should
not be implied when the statute is ambiguous.
Second, since the effect of the court's analysis of the exception as a hybrid
factor is the equivalent of having a permissive presumption of the nonexis-
tence of the exception, the presumption should meet the constitutional require-
ments that a rational connection between the basic facts proved and the
40. 421 U.S. at 701-02 n.28 (1975). See also Justice Powell's dissent in Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 230-31 (1977):
The State normally may shift to the defendant the burden of production, that is, the
burden of going forward with sufficient evidence "to justify (a reasonable) doubt upon
the issue."... If the defendant's evidence does not cross the threshold, the issue-be it
malice, extreme emotional disturbance, self-defense, or whatever-will not be submitted
to the jury.
(Footnotes and citations omitted.)
41. 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1031 (1975). See also United States v.
Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1973).
42. 515 F.2d at 199.
43. The statute involved in Rosenberg expressly provided that the burden of production
would be on the defendant. See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977): "[Mlore
subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have [sic] been left to the legisla-
tive branch."
44. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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ultimate fact presumed exist, and that the latter is more likely than not to flow
from the former.45 Whether the presumption that the poison is not aimed at
insects, worms, or rats arising from the placing of poisoned food in a public
place meets these requirements should at least be addressed by the court.
Finally, the court's analysis does little to provide a basis from which one
can determine if other exceptions or apparent elements will be treated as hy-
brid factors in the future. The court's test is to "ask what would be a 'fair'
allocation of the burden of proof, in light of due process and practical consid-
erations .... *46 In view of the fine lines drawn by both the United States
Supreme Court and North Carolina cases, and the tension between the under-
lying policies and practical considerations, what is "fair" may not be at all
apparent until the applicable court opinion is handed down.
C New Statute to Control Narcotics Traffic
On June 25, 1980, the North Carolina General Assembly ratified An Act
to Control Trafficking in Certain Controlled Substances.47 Section 1 of the
Act, effective July 1, 1980, amends G.S. 14-17, which defines murder in the
first and second degrees and sets the applicable punishment. The amendment
specifies that murders caused by the unlawful distribution of opium will be
considered murder in the second degree.48 Section 2, effective March 1, 1981,
further amends G. S. 14-17 to provide that anyone convicted of murder in the
second degree shall be punished as a Class D Felon.49
The portion of the Act treating narcotics trafficking directly is Section 6.
Effective July 1, 1980, it adds subsections (h) and (i) to G. S. 90-95. Subsection
(h) provides that any person who sells, manufactures, delivers, transports, or
possesses in excess of specified amounts of marijuana, methaqualone, cocaine,
opium or heroin, is guilty of a felony known as trafficking in that particular
drug. Further subdivisions set minimum and maximum penalties, depending
upon the quantity and the substance involved. Subsection (h) also specifies
that any person convicted under it must serve the applicable minimum prison
term before either unconditional release or parole; unless the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of
any accomplices, accessories, coconspirators, or principals; was not sentenced
as a committed youthful offender, and the sentencing judge notes this in the
record. Finally, this subsection provides that sentences imposed pursuant to it
45. See note 29 supra.
46. 44 N.C. App. 659, 666, 262 S.E.2d 299, 303 (1980).
47. Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1251, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 173 (amending N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1979) & 90-95 (1975)).
48. The amendment states:
All other kinds of murder, including that which shall be proximately caused by the un-
lawful distribution of opium or any synthetic or natural salt, compound, derivative, or
preparation of opium when the ingestion of such substance causes the death of the user,
shall be deemed murder in the second degree ....
Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1251, § 1, 1979 Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 173.
49. Id. § 2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides that a Class D felony
shall be punishable by imprisonment up to 40 years or a fine of up to $20,000, or both.
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shall run consecutively. Subsection (i) provides that the penalties imposed in
subsection (h) shall also apply to anyone convicted of conspiracy to commit
any subsection (h) offense.50
Section 7, effective March 1, 1981, essentially duplicates section 6, but it
does track the penalties into the new class felony system.51 Section 7 also
prescribes minimum sentences which are more severe than those required by
section 6. Section 7, however, eliminates the section 6 requirement that a per-
son must serve the applicable minimum prison term before unconditional re-
lease or parole.5 2
D. Jury Disagreement Acceptable Instructions from the Trial Judge
In State v. Linflrd53 the North Carolina Court of Appeals found no viola-
tion of G.S. 15A-1235 54 or coercion in additional jury instructions informing
the jury that a disagreement would mean more court time consumed and an-
other jury being called in a new trial.5 5 The jury had deliberated for one hour
and ten minutes and returned to court to inform the trial judge that some
members of the jury believed they had insufficient evidence to make a deci-
sion.
Defendants contended that the instruction challenged in Lofird was simi-
50. Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1251, § 6, 1979 Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 173.
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
52. Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1251, § 7, 1979 Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 173.
53. 48 N.C. App. 649, 269 S.E.2d 723 (1980).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235 (effective July 1, 1978). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the judge must give an instruction which
informs the jury that in order to return a verdict, all 12 jurors must agree to a
verdict of guilty or not guilty.
(b) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the judge may give an instruction which
informs the jury that:
(1) Jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judg-
ment;
(2) Each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial con-
sideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(3) In the course of deliberations, ajuror should not hesitate to reexamine his own
views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(4) No juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of
the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict.
(c) If it appears to the judge that the jury has been unable to agree, the judge may
require the jury to continue its deliberations and may give or repeat the instructions
provided in subsections (a) and (b) ....
55. 48 N.C. App. at 653-54, 269 S.E.2d at 726 (1980). The additional instructions included
the following:
I presume that you members of the jury realize what a disagreement means. It means,
of course, that it will be more time of the court that will have to be consumed in the trial
of this action again ....
A mistrial, of course, will mean that more time and another jury will have to be
called to hear the cases and this evidence again.
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lar to one found prejudicial in State v. Lamb.56 The court of appeals in Lamb
held that under existing law it was error for the court to charge the jurors "that
if they did not agree upon a verdict another jury might be called upon to try
the case; that the State and defendants had a tremendous amount of time and
money invested, and retrial involved a duplication of all the time and ex-
pense."'57 The Lifird court, in finding no error, distinguished Lamb because
the judge did not mention "inconvenience and expense."58
The charge given in Lpfird tracks almost verbatim the charge formerly
approved in the Pattern Jury Instructions, N.C.P.I.-Crim. 101-40. 59 A virtu-
ally identical charge was reviewed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Easterling.60 In Easterling the court acknowledged that although the
charge would be acceptable under previous case law,61 the legislature had en-
acted G.S. 15A-1235, which was now the "proper reference for standards ap-
plicable to charges which may be given a jury that is apparently unable to
agree on a verdict." 62 In finding the charge constituted error, the Easterling
court relied on the Official Commentary to G.S. 15A-1235, which states that
the Criminal Code Commission deleted a provision previously sanctioned
under North Carolina case laws that would have authorized the judge to in-
form jurors disagreeing on a verdict that "another jury may be called upon to
try the case." 63 The court went on to hold, though, that the error was not
prejudicial since there was no indication that the jury was in fact deadlocked
in its deliberations or open to pressure from the trial judge.64 The court con-
cluded by cautioning the trial bench
that our holding today is not to be taken as disapproval of the con-
trary result in State v. Lamb. . . a case in which init'aljury disagree-
ment preceded the offending instruction...
It should be the rule rather than the exception that a disregard
of the guidelines established in that statute will require a finding on
56. 44 N.C. App. 251, 261 S.E.2d 130 (1979).
57. Id. at 260, 261 S.E.2d at 135.
58. 48 N.C. App. at 656, 269 S.E.2d at 727.
59. In March 1980, N.C.P.I.-Crim. 101.40 was replaced with the following instruction:
Your foreman informs me that you have so far been unable to agree on a verdict. The
Court wants to emphasize the fact that it is your duty to do whatever you can to reach a
verdict. You should reason the matter over together as reasonable men and women and
to reconcile your differences, if you can, without the surrender of conscientious convic-
tions. But no juror should surender his honest conviction because of the opinion of his
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. I will let you resume your
deliberations and see if you can reach a verdict.
60. 300 N.C. 594, 268 S.E.2d 800 (1980).
61. Id. at 606-07, 268 S.E.2d at 808. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 294 N.C. 577, 594, 243 S.E.2d
354,365 (1978), wherein the court stated the "general rule ... that the trial judge may state to thejury the ills attendant upon disagreement including the resulting expense and that the case will in
all probability have to be tried by another jury in the event that the jury fails to agree."
62. 300 N.C. at 608, 268 S.E.2d at 809.
63. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235, Official Commentary (1978).
64. 300 N.C. at 609, 268 S.E.2d at 809. The court also noted the "charge itself makes clear
that the trial court did not intend that any juror surrender his conscientious conviction or judg-
ment and contains no such element of coercion as to warrant a new trial." Id.
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appeal of prejudicial error."65
The court of appeals in Lipfird failed to heed the caution of the supreme
court. Confronted with virtually identical language to that found erroneous in
Easterling, the court of appeals concluded that the instructions were not erro-
neous. In this holding, the Lpfird court did not adequately distinguish Eas-
terling since there was evidence in Lofird of jury disagreement prior to the
instruction. 66 Moreover, to distinguish Lamb on the basis that the judge did
not mention "inconvenience and expense" is a semantic distinction that is for-
malistic rather than substantive. Furthermore, the court in Lamb also found
error in informing jurors that another jury might be called upon to try the
case, 67 as the judge instructed here. The holding in Lipflrd once again clouds
an important area of law in North Carolina previously clarified by case law
and legislative proscription.
E. Felonious Intent
Two cases this year dealt with the element of felonious intent. In State v.
Brown,68 the North Carolina Supreme Court overturned Brown's conviction
of robbery with a firearm and remanded the case for a new trial.69 Brown was
charged with breaking and entering a house and stealing, among other things,
stereo equipment. Brown later met with the owner of the stereo and offered to
sell it to him for $300.00. The owner refused and told Brown that the stereo
was his. Brown returned with a gun and obtained the $300.00. Brown main-
tained that he had bought the stereo for $300.00, and regardless of whether the
person was the true owner, he believed that he had a right either to the stereo
or to the money.70
The issues on appeal related mainly to the essential element of felonious
intent in robbery with a firearm.7 1 The court, while holding that there was
sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find felonious intent,72 reversed on two
related grounds. First, the court ruled that the trial judge erred in not in-
structing the jury on the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly
weapon.73 Since the defendant asserted a claim of right in the stereo, there
65. Id. (emphasis supplied).
66. 48 N.C. App. at 653, 269 S.E.2d at 725.
67. 44 N.C. App. at 260, 261 S.E.2d at 135. See also State v. Hunter, 48 N.C. App. 689, 269
S.E.2d 736 (1980) (court conceded that a reminder that the case would be retried if a verdict is not
reached is contrary to the holding in Easterling).
68. 300 N.C. 41, 265 S.E.2d 191 (1980).
69. Id. at 54, 265 S.E.2d at 199.
70. Id. at 42-44, 265 S.E.2d at 193-94.
71. Felonious intent has been defined to be "the intent to deprive the owner of his goods
permanently and to appropriate them to the taker's own use." Id. at 47, 265 S.E.2d at 196 (em-
phasis in original) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 50, 265 S.E.2d at 197.
73. Id. The court reviewed the circumstances in which a judge must instruct on a lesser
included offense. If the evidence discloses no conflict relating to the essential elements of the
greater crime, it is not necessary to submit the lesser included offense. When there is conflicting
evidence of the essential elements of the greater crime and evidence of a lesser included offense is
also present, however, the trial judge must instruct on the lesser included offense even where there
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was conflicting evidence regarding felonious intent and the defendant was en-
titled to a charge on the lesser included offense.74 Secondly, the court held
that the trial judge did not fully explain the law and apply it to the facts "so as
to clearly bring into focus defendant's contentions and his theory of de-
fense."75
Felonious intent was also at issue in State v. Moore.76 Defendant's friend
picked up a bag of money that had been dropped on a sidewalk and shared the
proceeds with defendant and another friend. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals, in upholding the conviction, 77 reviewed the concept of felonious in-
tent in relation to found property. The court noted that "casually lost property
may be the subject of larceny as well as that which is mislaid"78 if the finder
had "reason to believe the owner and his property could be brought together
again."' 79 Since, in this case, the depository bank's name was printed on the
outside of the bag, and checks in the bag were made out to the true owner, the
court reasoned that the finders had sufficient "clues" to believe that they could
return the bag to its owner.80 The court also noted that the felonious intent
did not have to be present at the time the bag was first picked up: '"[W]here a
closed receptacle, container or pocketbook is found and the contents are not
known until later, a finder may be guilty of larceny if a felonious intent is
formed as soon as the contents are discovered."8'
F Defense of Habitation
In State v. Hedgepeth82 the North Carolina Court of Appeals confirmed
that a defendant is entitled to the benefit of an instruction on defense of
habitation when he acted to prevent a forcible entry into his home.83 Defend-
ant ordered the deceased to leave his home after the deceased had threatened
defendant's life. The deceased, a fugitive from Dorothea Dix Hospital, re-
turned to the porch of the house, stuck his head in the door, and again
threatened defendant's life. When the deceased stuck his head in the door a
third time, the defendant shot him in the neck.
is no request to do so. An error is not cured by a verdict finding the defendant guilty of the greater
crime. Id. This is well established in North Carolina. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 84
S.E.2d 545 (1954).
74. 300 N.C. at 50, 265 S.E.2d at 197.
75. Id. at 54, 265 S.E.2d at 199. The court also reversed the common law robbery conviction
of Brown's codefendant Coffey. Although Coffey was at the scene of the alleged crime and was a
friend of Brown's, the court found that there was no evidence that Coffey aided Brown or commu-
nicated an intent to aid him. Thus the state had failed to prove the necessary elements of aiding
and abetting under North Carolina law. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E.2d 185
(1976). The court held, therefore, that Coffey's motion for judgment of nonsuit should have been
granted. 300 N.C. at 56-57, 265 S.E.2d at 200-01.
76. 46 N.C. App. 259, 264 S.E.2d 899 (1980).
77. Id. at 261, 264 S.E.2d at 900.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 262, 264 S.E.2d at 900.
80. Id., 264 S.E.2d at 900-01.
81. Id. at 263, 264 S.E.2d at 901.
82. 46 N.C. App. 569, 265 S.E.2d 413 (1980).
83. Id. at 572, 265 S.E.2d at 416.
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The court of appeals found that the trial court erred in failing to charge
the jury on defense of habitation. The doctrine of defense of habitation gener-
ally applies when one prevents a forcible entry into his home.84 In applying
the doctrine the court relied on State v. McCombs.85 In McCombs the Hedg-
epeth court found one of the most compelling justifications for the defense of
habitation: "the desire to afford protection to the occupants of a home under
circumstances which might not allow them an opportunity to see their assail-
ant or ascertain his purpose."
8 6
The Hedgepeth court did not read McCombs, however, as limiting the
defense to situations in which the identity or purpose of the assailant was un-
known. Rather, it explained that the defense of habitation is a defense of per-
son, and the fear experienced when a fugitive from a mental institution
threatens to enter one's home and take the life of the occupant is no less real
than if the assailant's identity and intention were unclear.8 7
G. Breaking and Entering" Larceny
In State v. Bartlett" the North Carolina Court of Appeals sustained con-
victions of felonious breaking and entering and misdemeanor larceny in the
entry of a house, notwithstanding the owner's participation in the crime.89
Defendant was attempting to enter a house illegally when the owner of the
house arrived. Not realizing that he was dealing with the owner, the defend-
ant told him that he was "going in the house all the time." He then proceeded
to open the door with a knife, without opposition from the owner. Once inside
the house, defendant took various items of personal property and divided
them with the owner. After both men left the house, the owner excused him-
self and called the police. The owner testified that he did not stop the defend-
ant "because I was afraid. He could have had one of my guns or a knife." 90
The court held on appeal that the jury could conclude that defendant did
not have the owner's permission to enter the house from the evidence that the
owner was afraid defendant had a gun or knife.9 1 An essential element of
G.S. 14-54,92 the applicable statute, is that the breaking and entering be done
without consent. In State v. Goffney 93 the court confirmed the rule that "there
is no burglary where the occupant of a house.. . takes active steps to aid the
84. Id.
85. 297 N.C. 151, 253 S.E.2d 906 (1979) (defendant shot at police officer, dressed in blue
jean and denim jacket, after he gained entry into the home; only the rules of self-defense applica-
86. 46 N.C. App. at 572, 265 S.E.2d at 416 (citing McCombs, 297 N.C. at 157, 253 S.E.2d at
910).
87. 46 N.C. App. at 572-73, 265 S.E.2d at 416.
88. 45 N.C. App. 704, 263 S.E.2d 800 (1980).
89. Id. at 705, 263 S.E.2d at 801.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (1969).
93. 157 N.C. 624, 73 S.E. 162 (1911) (defendant charged under statutory predecessor to G.S.
14-54).
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suspect or to induce him to enter,. . . although he may intend to commit a
felony in the house." 94 In Goffney the owner was deemed to have given his
consent when he directed an employee to induce the defendant to enter his
store to steal some goods, and then apprehended him. Likewise, in State v.
Boone95 the court, relying on Goffney, held that entry into a place of business
through a door open to the public, during normal business hours, constituted
consent.
H. G.S. 20-66 Failure to Stop and to Give Information in Connection with
Automobile Accident
The North Carolina Court of Appeals had an opportunity to interpret
G.S. 20-16696 this year. In State v. Gatewood97 defendant struck and killed a
pedestrian with his car and then sideswiped another car. Defendant stopped,
made sure that someone had called the police and an ambulance, and then
disappeared until the early morning hours of the next day when he contacted
the sheriff's department. Defendant was indicted on two counts. 98
The first count charged defendant with violating G.S. 20-166(a) by failing
to stop in connection with the accident. The court held that the trial judge
acted properly in not submitting this count to the jury. Although defendant
did leave the scene of the accident almost immediately, the court found his
stopping the car sufficient to establish compliance with this section of the stat-
ute.99
The second count charged defendant with a violation of G.S. 20-166(c),
which requires a person involved in an accident resulting in death or injury to
give his name, address, license number and vehicle registration number to the
person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with, and to
render reasonable assistance to anyone injured. This count was submitted to
the jury and defendant was found guilty.l °° The court vacated this judgment,
reasoning that the pedestrian was obviously dead and that defendant was
therefore not required to attempt to give her the required information.',l The
court also held that although defendant was required to give certain informa-
94. Id. at 628, 73 S.E. at 164.
95. 297 N.C. 652, 256 S.E.2d 683 (1979).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166 (1978) imposes a duty upon a motor vehicle operator to stop in
the event of an accident, give information, and render aid in certain circumstances. It also insu-
lates a person who renders first aid from civil liability, absent wanton conduct or intentional
wrongdoing.
97. 46 N.C. App. 28, 264 S.E.2d 375, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 559, 270 S.E.2d 112 (1980).
98. Id. at 29-30, 264 S.E.2d at 376-77.
99. Id. at 31, 264 S.E.2d at 378.
100. Id. at 31-32, 264 S.E.2d at 378.
101. Id. at 32, 264 S.E.2d at 379. The court cited State v. Wall, 243 N.C. 238, 90 S.E.2d 383
(1955) and State v. Coggin, 263 N.C. 457, 139 S.E.2d 701 (1965) for the proposition that the statute
"does not require the doing of a vain or useless thing." 46 N.C. App. at 32, 264 S.E,2d at 378. The
court did not reach the question of defendant's possible duty to render aid to a dead person.
Though the indictment charged failure to render aid, the trial court did not instruct the jury on the
charge, and defendant could not be again held in jeopardy on the same charge contained in the
original indictment. Id. at 33, 264 S.E.2d at 379.
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tion to the driver of the car he sideswiped and his failure to do so constituted a
violation of G.S. 20-166(b), he was not so charged. Since no one in the car was
injured, the court held that G.S. 20-166(c) did not apply.10 2 The court con-
cluded that although "the legislature may find it appropriate to amend G.S.
20-166(c) by expanding the duty of a driver who strikes a pedestrian by requir-
ing him to give information to a witness at the scene or some proper person
who arrives at the scene," the court could not read this duty into the existing
statute.1
03
1 Judge's Role in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
The North Carolina Court of Appeals added to the due process protec-
tions afforded to juveniles in a delinquency proceeding this year.104 In In re
Thomas105 the judge examined the witness for the State during the trial pro-
ceedings because the District Attorney was not present. The court, finding
that the judge, at least technically, had assumed the role of prosecuting attor-
ney, and that such a procedure would violate due process in adult criminal
prosecutions, reversed the order and commitment.' 0 6 The court distinguished
the case of In re Potts,10 7 which upheld the commitment of a juvenile in spite
of the fact that the juvenile proceeding had taken place in the absence of the
solicitor.10 8 The court noted that the Potts record revealed that someone other
than the judge had examined the witnesses. 10 9
J False Pretense
In State v. Cronin' i0 the North Carolina Supreme Court construed the
language "with intent to cheat or defraud" in G.S. 14-100, North Carolina's
false pretense statute,"1 as requiring only an instruction that the defendant
intended to deceive. Defendant was convicted of false pretense where the evi-
102. 46 N.C. App. at 33-34, 264 S.E.2d at 378-79.
103. Id. at 33, 264 S.E.2d at 379.
104. Although the United States Supreme Court has ruled that at least some of the protections
of the 14th amendment due process clause apply to juvenile proceedings, it has not made clear
which provisions might not be applicable. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, however, has stated: "[W]e doubt the validity of the proposition that any
applicable provision might nevertheless be given less force or vigor in juvenile proceedings than in
adult criminal prosecutions." In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 644, 231 S.E.2d 614, 617 (1977).
105. 45 N.C. App. 525, 263 S.E.2d 355 (1980).
106. Id. at 526-27, 263 S.E.2d at 355-56. The court also noted that the trial judge did not
make appropriate findings of fact as required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-285 (1969) (repealed
1979); see also N.C. GuN. STAT. § 7A-577(f) (Cum. Supp. 1979). 'The conclusion that respondent
was an undisciplined child should have been supported by findings of fact relative to the charges
of breaking and entering and larceny." 45 N.C. App. at 527, 263 S.E.2d at 356.
107. 14 N.C. App. 387, 188 S.E.2d 643, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 622, 190 S.E.2d 471 (1972).
108. Id. at 393-94, 188 S.E.2d at 646-47.
109. 45 N.C. App. at 527, 263 S.E.2d at 356. See 14 N.C. App. at 393, 188 S.E.2d at 646.
110. 299 N.C. 229, 262 S.E.2d 277 (1980).
I11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (1969). Since the statute was first enacted, it contained the
phrase "intent to cheat or defraud." Ch. 11, § 2, 1811 N.C. Pub. Laws. The court of appeals
attempted to distinguish prior interpretation of this phrase on the ground that the cases were
decided prior to the 1975 amendment of the statute.
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dence showed that he falsely stated that he had a mobile home worth $10,800
as security for a loan. In fact, the mobile home was fire-damaged and worth
approximately $2,600. The court of appeals found the charge in error since an
intent to deceive means "to cause someone to believe something that is false"
and that an intent to "cheat or defraud" includes the intent to actually deprive
someone of something of value.112 The supreme court reversed, following a
long-recognized interpretation of intent to "cheat or defraud" as an intent to
deceive.'" 3 The court went on to hold that the crime of obtaining property by
false pretenses pursuant to G.S. 14-100 should be defined as: "(1) a false rep-
resentation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is
calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by
which one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another."' 1 4
K Pleas of No Contest
In State v. Sinclair,15 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether there was a sufficient finding of a factual basis to support a
series of no contest pleas. The defendant was charged in fourteen indictments,
each containing one count of forgery and one court of uttering a forged instru-
ment. After jury verdicts of guilty on six of the indictments, which were con-
solidated for trial, the defendant pleaded no contest to the remaining eight
indictments.' 6 The North Carolina Court of Appeals had held that the state's
evidence was insufficient to be submitted to the jury and reversed the judg-
ment and sentence on the six convictions that went to trial."i 7 The court of
appeals, however, affirmed the convictions in the eight indictments to which
the defendant pleaded no contest on the basis that an evidentiary hearing on
the question of the voluntariness of the pleas was not required." 8 The North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding that there was no factual basis for
the plea, as is required by G. S. 15A-1022(c). The court noted that at the time
of the pleas the only factual basis upon which the judge could have relied was
the jury verdicts of guilty on the indictments consolidated for trial. Since these
convictions were overturned they could no longer provide an adequate factual
basis. 119
L. Other Cases
The supreme court and the court of appeals decided several minor cases
in the criminal law area, addressing issues related to felonious possession of
112. 41 N.C. App. 415, 255 S.E.2d 240 (1979).
113. The court found that a majority of cases have followed the definition of the crime of false
pretenses as set forth in State v. Phifer, 65 N.C. 321 (1871).
114. 299 N.C. at 242, 262 S.E.2d at 286.
115. 301 N.C. 193, 270 S.E.2d 418 (1980), rev'g 45 N.C. App. 586, 263 S.E.2d 811.
116. 301 N.C. at 194, 270 S.E.2d at 419.
117. 45 N.C. App. at 591-92, 263 S.E.2d at 815.
118. Id. at 593, 263 S.E.2d at 815-16.
119. 301 N.C. at 198-99, 270 S.E.2d at 421-22. The court also noted that the Transcript of Plea
itself could not serve as the factual basis for the plea. Id. at 199, 270 S.E.2d at 421.
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stolen goods, 12 0 common law robbery, 12 1 and double jeopardy. 122
ELIZABETH A. MCNAMARA
DEBRA R. NICKELS
WILLIAM F. PATTERSON, JR.
120. In State v. Hicks, 44 N.C. App. 166, 260 S.E.2d 680 (1979), the North Carolina Court of
Appeals arrested the defendant's conviction of felonious possession of stolen goods. The trial
judge had submitted a possible verdict form to the jury which provided that they could find the
defendant guilty if they had reasonable grounds to believe that "the property was stolen pursuant
to a breaking or entering or that the property was worth more than $200." Id. at 167, 260 S.E.2d
at 681 (emphasis added). The verdict that the jury returned recited that the defendant was found
guilty of possession of stolen property. The court noted that the possible verdict form would allow
the jury to convict the defendant without a finding that he knew or should have known that the
property was stolen, and that the actual verdict returned by the jury did not show that they had in
fact found this element. Id. Judge Hedrick, concurring, noted that the judge should have refused
to accept the verdict, re-instructed the jury as to the proper possible verdicts, and directed the jury
to retire and return with a proper verdict. Id. at 169, 260 S.E.2d at 682 (Hedrick, J., concurring).
121. In State v. Norwood, 44 N.C. App. 174,260 S.E.2d 433 (1979), the North Carolina Court
of Appeals upheld the defendant's conviction of common law robbery. The court held that the
state's evidence showing that the defendant took $4.30 from the prosecuting witness was sufficient
evidence of asportation, even though it was not shown that the defendant left her home with the
money. Id. at 175, 260 S.E.2d at 434. This comports with the long-standing rule in North Caro-
lina that holds that it is sufficient to establish asportation if it is shown that "the goods are re-
moved from the place where they were, and the felon has for an instant the entire and absolute
possession of them." State v. Jackson, 65 N.C. 305, 308 (1871).
122. The issue of double jeopardy was examined by the North Carolina Surpeme Court in
State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E.2d 476 (1980), and by the North Carolina Court of Appeals
in State v. Mapp, 45 N.C. App. 574, 264 S.E.2d 348 (1980). In Revelle, the court held that defend-
ant's convictions of felonious larceny, armed robbery, burglary and rape arising out of the same
series of events did not place the defendant in double jeopardy. In Mapp, the court reached the
same conclusion about convictions of second degree murder, child abuse and child neglect. In
both cases the courts found each offense to be legally separate and distinct with different essential
elements, and none of the offenses was deemed a lesser included offense of another.
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,4. Right to Be Informed of Right to Counsel
In State v. Grimes' the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided that a
nonindigent criminal defendant has no constitutional right to be informed of
his right to counsel.2 Defendant was charged with driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. He entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to ninety
days, suspended on conditions. Defendant, who was not indigent, failed to
hire an attorney. He claimed that he had never been informed of his right to
representation. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that because he had
not been told that he had the right to hire an attorney, he could not knowingly
and voluntarily have waived his right to do so by pleading guilty. Although
the court was willing to assume that defendant had not been informed of his
right to counsel, the motion for a new trial was denied. The court found that
there was no authority in either the United States Constitution or relevant
statutory law for requiring that a nonindigent expressly waive counsel before
pleading guilty. The court additionally held that, even if such a right existed,
failure to inform defendant of his right to hire a lawyer was harmless error
absent some showing of prejudice.3
The court examined what it considered to be the relevant case law and
concluded that no "case which we have been able to find holds that a nonindi-
gent defendant must expressly waive his right to counsel before he may enter a
plea on his own behalf."4 The court buttressed this conclusion by reading
G.S. 15A-1012(a) to stand for the proposition that only indigent defendants
need expressly waive counsel. G.S. 15A-1012(a) provides that a "defendant
may not be called upon to plead until he has the opportunity to retain counsel
or, if he is eligible for assignment of counsel, until counsel has been assigned
or waived.' 5 Thus, a nonindigent defendant's statutory right is only to be
provided with the opportunity to retain counsel, and failure to take advantage
of this opportunity operates as an effective waiver. Only indigents must waive
expressly their right to counsel. 6 The court did not consider it significant that
the failure to retain counsel might be due to defendant's ignorance of his right
1. 47 N.C. App. 476, 267 S.E.2d 387 (1980).
2. The court considered this to be distinct from defendant's actual right to hire an attorney.
Id. at 477, 267 S.E.2d at 387. The importance, and the validity, of this distinction is not clear from
the opinion.
3. Id. at 478, 267 S.E.2d at 388. The prosecutor testified that the routine that always was
followed included informing defendants of their right to engage counsel. The court did not con-
sider it necessary to resolve the factual issue of whether this routine had been followed with
Grimes.
4. 47 N.C. App. at 478, 267 S.E.2d at 388. The court's two-page opinion cites only
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) and State v. Lee, 40 N.C. App. 165, 252 S.E.2d 225
(1979).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1012(a) (1978).
6. 47 N.C. App. at 478, 267 S.E.2d at 388. This distinction ignores the fact that the court
must first determine if a defendant is indigent, a process which is sure to involve informing the
defendant that he may hire an attorney if he has the funds, unless the trial judge takes a very
cryptic approach to questioning defendant.
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to do so. 7
This aspect of Grimes is at odds with the standards governing an effective
waiver of counsel enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson
v. Zerbst8 and with previous decisions of the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals. In Johnson the Supreme Court held that an effective waiver of a funda-
mental constitutional right ordinarily must be "an intentional relinquishment
.. . of a known right."9 Waiver of the right to counsel is a waiver of a funda-
mental constitutional right,' 0 whether defendant is facing trial or is entering a
plea of guilty.II A court's determination whether a purported waiver is effec-
tive should be based on the facts before it, including "the background, experi-
ence, and conduct of the accused."'12 For an appellate court to sustain a trial
judge's finding of waiver "there must be an allegation and evidence which
show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understand-
ingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." 13
Previous decisions by the North Carolina Court of Appeals did not devi-
ate from these principles. In State v. Pickens14 the court stated that an "ac-
cused is entitled as a matter of due process of law to be informed that he is
entitled to counsel. . and to court-appointed counsel if he is found to be
indigent unless he understandingly and voluntarily waives counsel."' 15 The
clear import 6f this language is that every defendant, regardless of his financial
status, is entitled to be informed of his right to representation. The Grimes
decision did not consider Pickens in its search for support for defendant's
claim.
The court also considered the more recent holding in State v. Lee.' 6 In
Lee defendant pleaded guilty to violating a support obligation. As in Grimes,
the defendant in Lee was not indigent and had not been informed of his right
to hire an attorney.' 7 In Lee the court of appeals granted defendant a new
trial on the grounds that his right to counsel had been violated. The court in
Grimes distinguished Lee from Grimes' claim by focusing on the inability of
the defendant in Lee to hire an attorney because he was a member of the
armed forces, while Grimes had suffered no such impediment.' 8 This distinc-
tion misreads Lee and ignores the requirement that a waiver of counsel be
knowing and voluntary. The court in Lee emphasized that defendant had not
7. See id.
8. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
9. Id. at 464.
10. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708,721 (1948). See also Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Although Argersinger requires counsel only for defendants actually imprisoned, the court in
Grimes did not base its decision on the inactive nature of defendant s sentence.
12. 304 U.S. at 464.
13. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
14. 20 N.C. App. 63, 200 S.E.2d 405 (1973).
15. Id. at 65, 200 S.E.2d at 406.
16. 40 N.C. App. 165, 252 S.E.2d 225 (1979).
17. Id. at 170, 252 S.E.2d at 227-28.
18. 47 N.C. App. at 477, 267 S.E.2d at 388. It is not clear why this prevented defendant in
Lee from hiring a lawyer.
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been informed of his right to counsel in its finding that no waiver occurred. 19
While this precise question has not been confronted in many jurisdictions,
those decisions that have dealt with it insist that a defendant be informed of
his right to hire an attorney.20 The distinction in Grimes between the stan-
dards to be applied in determining the effectiveness of an indigent's waiver
and those applied to waiver by a nonindigent is a novel one and is without
support in previous North Carolina court decisions.2 ' The Grimes court of-
fered no justification for this distinction, and there would appear to be none to
offer. A nonindigent who is unaware of his right to hire an attorney cannot be
said to have waived knowingly and voluntarily his right to do so simply by
failing to take advantage of that right. G.S. 15A-1012(a) should be read as
requiring more than that the defendant be given adequate time in which to
engage counsel; "opportunity" should be read as including the knowledge of
one's right to do so. The decision in Grimes deprives defendant of a funda-
mental right in a situation where enforcing that right would not burden the
state.22
The holding in Grimes also rested on the alternate ground that failure to
inform defendant of his right to counsel was harmless error unless prejudice
was demonstrated by defendant.23 The court supported this holding by citing
Justice Huskins' dissent in State v. Hill.24 Justice Huskins' argument, assum-
ing that it is valid, should not be applied in this context. Defendant in Hill
was denied access to his attorney for one night while he slept off the effects of
alcohol in jail. Justice Huskins urged that this amounted to harmless error.
His lawyer could have done little or nothing for defendant that night and was
given adequate time to prepare the case for trial, 25 This is not analogous to a
situation in which a defendant pleads guilty without ever consulting an attor-
ney. In the Grimes situation, not only could a lawyer benefit defendant but
any damage done by denial of counsel is irreparable.
Reliance on Justice Huskins' dissent can be faulted at another level. De-
nial of the right to counsel should never be considered harmless error.26 Al-
though the Supreme Court has recognized that deprivation of some
19. 40 N.C. App. at 170, 252 S.E.2d at 228.
20. See, e.g., Martin v. Warden, 234 F. Supp. 495, 496 (E.D. La., 1964); Vf. Bement v. State,
91 Idaho 388, 422 P.2d 55 (1966) (statutory duty to inform indigent of right to have counsel in-
cludes duty to inform him that attorney will be compensated at public expense).
21. See State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 13, 181 S.E.2d 561, 569 (1971). The only effect of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-450 (1969) (governing indigent's waiver of counsel) is to require that an indi-
gent's waiver be in writing. This does not reduce the constitutional standard applied to
nonindigents.
22. The importance of Grimes may be lessened by a current practice of a prosecuting attor-
ney to inform defendants of their right to hire an attorney. 47 N.C. App. at 476,267 S.E.2d at 387.
However, as the facts in Grimes indicate, this routine may not always be followed.
23. Id. at 478, 267 S.E.2d at 388.
24. 277 N.C. 547, 178 S.E.2d 462 (1971).
25. Id. at 557-58, 178 S.E.2d at 469 (Huskins, J., dissenting).
26. Although the majority in Hill did not hold that denial of counsel was per se prejudicial,
they did state that on the facts presented a finding of harmless error would be "to assume that
which is incapable of proof." Id. at 554, 178 S.E.2d at 466. Proof of prejudice is equally impossi-
ble when defendant pleads guilty.
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constitutional rights may only amount to harmless error, this is limited by the
caveat that "some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that their
infringement can never be treated as harmless error."' 27 The right to counsel is
one such basic right.28 The presence of counsel ensures that the defendant will
receive a fair trial or plead in an intelligent manner. It is impossible to meas-
ure the prejudice that may result from denial of access to counsel.29
Although the court of appeals could have denied defendant's claim on the
basis that his sentence was inactive, which would have prevented the sentence
from every being activated,30 it chose not to do so and instead set a dangerous
precedent. The decision in Grimes is worthy of reconsideration, and the issues
presented should be more carefully examined.
B. State's Withdrawalfrom Plea Bargain Agreement
In State v. Collins3 1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
State can withdraw from a plea bargain agreement prior to a defendant's plea
of guilty or other change in position constituting detrimental reliance on the
agreement.32 The United States Supreme Court had recognized the legitimacy
of plea bargains in Santobello v. New York 3 3 by granting remedial relief to a
defendant who pleaded guilty in reliance upon a plea agreement. The
Santobello Court permitted specific enforcement of the plea bargain breached
by the government subsequent to the defendant's guilty plea.34 In Cooper v.
United States35 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit extended this
principle to enforcement of a prosecutorial promise breached prior to any
guilty plea or other detrimental reliance by a defendant. The court held that a
defendant's right to enforcement of a breached plea agreement is not depen-
dent on the law of contracts and may arise "on the basis alone of expectations
reasonably formed in reliance upon the honor of the government in making
and abiding by its proposals." 36 The North Carolina Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected Cooper in refusing to enforce the broken prosecutorial prom-
27. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
28. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
29. See Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REv. 814, 820-21
(1970).
30. See note 11 supra. This was the focus of the arguments before the court, Brief for De-
fendant-Appellant at 11-15, and may have been the unspoken reason that the court held that any
error was harmless.
31. 300 N.C. 142, 265 S.E.2d 172 (1980).
32. Id. at 148, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
33. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
34. In Santobello the defendant pleaded guilty in reliance on a prosecutor's promise to make
no sentence recommendation. At the sentencing hearing, another prosecutor unknowingly vio-
lated the plea agreement by recommending the maximum sentence. The Supreme Court held this
to be a breach of the agreement and ordered the state court to grant relief of either vacatur of the
guilty plea or specific performance of the agreement. Id. at 262-63. On remand, the state court
ordered specific performance over the objection of the defendant who sought vacatur. People v.
Santobello, 39 A.D.2d 654, 331 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1972).
35. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979). Contra, Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir.
1980) (rejected defendant's right to specific performance).
36. 594 F.2d at 18.
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ise in Collins.37
In Collins defendant was charged with possession of both lysergic acid
diethyliamide (LSD) and phencycidine (PCP).38 On January 17, 1979, the
defendant and the State entered into the following written, signed plea agree-
ment:
Keith Collins is charged with possession of LSD, PCP, and ma-
rijuana, and he is willing to cooperate fully with the WSPD [Win-
ston-Salem Police Department] in the giving of information and
assistance to the WSPD which will lead to the arrest of known
criminals. In return, the State will allow the defendant to plead
guilty as charged in the Superior Court and will guarantee that he
will not receive active time. That the defendant has three (3) months
to perform tasks assigned to him by the WSPD to their satisfaction.
The defendant agrees that he will not raise his speedy trial rights
under Chapter 15. That the defendant's cases now pending in Dis-
trict Court will be dismissed under the pretext of an illegal search.
s/ H. COLE, Ass. D.A.
s/ W. GRAINGER, WSPD
s/ B. ERVIN BROWN, 1139
The signing parties were, respectively, an assistant district attorney, a repre-
sentative of the arresting police department, and the defendant's attorney.
Later the same day, another assistant district attorney refused to honor
the plea agreement. This assistant district attorney had initial responsibility
within the district attorney's office for determining whether to enter into a plea
bargain; he was in charge of the criminal docket for that month and usual
office procedure required that he be consulted. Defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to honor the plea agreement was denied.40
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the motion to
dismiss. 4 1 The court could find "no basis in logic or fundamental fairness for
the holding in Cooper."42 Since the defendant had not changed his position to
his detriment in reliance upon the agreement, the court ruled that the agree-
ment was not enforceable. 43 Furthermore, under G.S. 15A-1023(b) the agree-
ment could not become an enforceable contract until approved by the trial
court.
44
37. 300 N.C. at 148, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
38. Id. at 143. 265 S.E.2d at 173. Possession of these substances is a violation of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-95(a)(3), (d)(2) (1978).
39. 300 N.C. at 143, 265 S.E.2d at 173.
40. Id. at 143-44, 265 S.E.2d at 173.
41. State v. Collins, 44 N.C. App. 141, 260 S.E.2d 650 (1979).
42. Id. at 145, 260 S.E.2d at 653.
43. Id.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1023(b) (1978) provides:
Before accepting a plea pursuant to a plea arrangement in which the prosecutor has
agreed to recommend a particular sentence, the judge must advise the parties whether he
approves the arrangement and will dispose of the case accordingly. If the judge rejects
the arrangement, he must so inform the parties, refuse to accept the defendant's plea of
guilty or no contest, and advise the defendant personally that neither the State nor the
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The North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously affirmed State v. Col-
lins,45 following the decisions of courts in other states.46 The court likened a
plea agreement to a unilateral contract in which one party becomes bound to
the agreement only upon the other party's completion of performance.47 The
supreme court emphasized the alternative holding of the court of appeals that
G.S. 15A-1023(b) requires trial court approval for plea bargains that include a
recommended sentence.48 Although the court carefully analyzed the Cooper
decision, it elected to follow other jurisdictions without explaining why their
reasoning should be preferred to that of the Fourth Circuit. 49 The court fa-
vored the position that contract principles should be the exclusive determinant
of the law of plea bargaining. To justify its use of "analogous '50 contract
principles in deciding Collins, the court cited United States v. McIntosh,5 1 a
Fourth Circuit case decided after Cooper.52
In relying on McIntosh to support its decision, the court erred on two
counts. First, McIntosh is not on point;53 some other basis must be found to
limit plea bargain law to the law of contracts. Second, even if Collins were
analyzed under the principles of contract law, the prosecution's promise
should have been enforced. 54
Judge Phillips, the author of the majority opinion in Cooper, pointed out
in a concurring opinion in McIntosh that the two decisions are "completely
distinguishable. 55 Cooper involved the withdrawal of a specific proposal
which the prosecutor had the authority to make.56 In McIntosh, the court
found that the proposal the defendant sought to enforce had not been made.57
Moreover, the proposal allegedly was made by a state prosecutor who had
neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the federal prosecutor.58 The
majority opinion in McIntosh also acknowledged that the issues of plea bar-
gain content and authority for entering into a plea bargain were not presented
defendant is bound by the rejected arrangement. The judge must advise the parties of
the reasons he rejected the arrangement and afford them an opportunity to modify the
arrangement accordingly. Upon rejection of the plea arrangement by the judge, the de-
fendant is entitled to a continuance until the next session of court. A decision by the
judge disapproving a plea arrangement is not subject to appeal.
45. 300 N.C. at 150, 265 S.E.2d at 177.
46. Id. at 148, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
47. Id. at 149, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
48. Id.
49. The court merely stated, "We reject the holding in Cooper and elect to follow the deci-
sions in other jurisdictions which we interpret to be consistent with Santobello." .d. at 148, 265
S.E.2d at 176.
50. Id. at 149, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
51. 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979).
52. "[W]here the content and validity of a plea bargain are at issue.. . traditional precepts
of contract and agency should apply." 300 N.C. at 148, 265 S.E.2d at 175-76 (quoting 612 F.2d at
837).
53. See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
54. See text accompanying notes 62-103 infra.
55. 612 F.2d at 837 (Phillips, J., concurring).
56. 594 F.2d at 19.
57. 612 F.2d at 836.
58. Id.
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in Cooper.59
The Collins case, on the other hand, involved the same basic fact situation
as Cooper: the government made a specific and unambiguous proposal to the
defendant; it was made without reservation related to a superior's approval; its
content was reasonable in context; and it was made by a prosecutor who had
authority to enter into the agreement.60 The bargaining went further than that
enforced in Cooper, however. Unlike Cooper, Collins was able to communi-
cate his assent to the government's proposal. The parties even signed a docu-
ment enumerating the duties of each.61 Since McIntosh is distinguishable
from Cooper, and Collins involved the same factual situation (although more
developed) as Cooper, McIntosh provides no authority for the court's refusal
to follow the Cooper approach.
The Collins court's rejection of the plea bargain on a strict contract anal-
ogy also fails to withstand scrutiny. Assuming, arguendo, that either the Mc-
Intosh rationale or some other reasoning mandates a strict contract analogy as
the exclusive determinant of the validity of a plea bargain, proper application
of basic contract principles requires enforcement of the prosecutorial promise
in Collins.62 The parties entered into a written executory contract.63 Such
contracts are enforced routinely in commercial and other contexts. 64 Unless
some failure to comply with the technical principles of the law of contracts can
be shown, the plea bargain contract likewise should be enforced. The State
argued that the agreement should not be enforced because it was a unilateral
contract65 dependent upon the defendant's prior performance and because it
was conditional upon trial court approval.6 6 Neither of these contentions can
survive careful examination.
In rejecting Cooper, the supreme court elected to follow jurisdictions
which hold that plea bargains are "not binding on the prosecutor, in the ab-
sence of prejudice to a defendant resulting from reliance thereon, until they
receive judicial sanction."'67 The rationale is that if a defendant may withdraw
from a plea bargain prior to his entry of a guilty plea, the prosecutor likewise
59. Id. at 837.
60. Compare 300 N.C. at 143, 265 S.E.2d at 173 with 594 F.2d at 19.
61. 300 N.C. at 143, 265 S.E.2d at 173.
62. Of course, the plea agreement cannot be fully enforced since it is subject to trial court
approval. See note 44 supra. The analogy to contract principles discussed herein is meant to
apply only to a contractual agreement between the prosecution and the defendant. Such a con-
tract would bind both the prosecution and the defendant until the trial court either approves or
rejects it, but would in no way affect the discretion of the trial court itself. See text accompanying
notes 91-103 infra.
63. An executory contract is a contract in which a party binds himself to do or not to do a
particular thing in the future. Whitt v. Whitt, 32 N.C. App. 125, 230 S.E.2d 793 (1977).
64. "All contracts to a greater or less extent are executory. When they cease to be, they cease
to be contracts." S. WILLIsToN, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 15 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1959).
65. For a definition of a unilateral contract, see text accompanying note 47 supra and text
accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
66. 300 N.C. at 149, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
67. Id. at 148-49, 265 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22, 262
N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977)).
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should be able to withdraw from a plea agreement at that point. 68
Such a theory assumes that all plea bargains are unilateral contracts in
which the government makes a promise in return for defendant's act of plead-
ing guilty. In a true unilateral plea bargain agreement, the consideration given
for the prosecution's promise is not defendant's corresponding promise to
plead guilty, but defendant's actual performance by so pleading.69 Thus, the
prosecutor agrees to perform if and when the defendant performs, but has no
right to compel performance.70 Before the defendant begins performance, the
prosecutor may rescind his offer.71
In fact, not all plea bargains are unilateral contracts. Some, including the
agreement in Collins, constitute bilateral contracts. In a bilateral contract,
each party promises to perform.72 The corresponding promises typically, func-
tion as each party's consideration.73 The parties in Collins signed a written,
executory contract. The defendant promised to cooperate with the police de-
partment by providing information and assistance to lead to the arrest of
criminals and further agreed to waive his right to a speedy trial.74 In return,
the State agreed to allow the defendant to plead guilty to some charges and
agreed to dismiss others.75 The State also guaranteed that the defendant
would not be imprisoned.76 Such an exchange of promises of future perform-
ance creates a bilateral contract.77
Under a bilateral contract, both parties are bound at the time the requisite
return promise is made by the offeree.78 Neither party can revoke his promise
without breaching the contract. This principle applies equally in the context
of plea bargains.7 9 The prosecutor should be compelled to fulfill his promise
and the defendant should be required to plead guilty. To determine whether
the plea is voluntarily and intelligently given,80 the defendant's entry into the
executory contract can be treated as the act of pleading guilty.81 An executory
bilateral agreement to plead guilty thus would be valid and enforceable




72. S. WILLISTON, supra note 64, at § 13.
73. Id. § 103.
74. 300 N.C. at 143, 265 S.E.2d at 173.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. S. WILLISTON, supra note 64, at § 103.
78. Id. § 65.
79. See Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66
CAL. L. REv. 471, 525 n.189 (1978); but see Jones, Negotiation, Ratocation, and Rescission of the
Guilty Plea Agreement: A Contractual Analysis and Typology, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 591 (1978-79).
80. To be valid, guilty pleas must be voluntary, "knowing, intelligent acts done with suffi-
cient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
81. Under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), a voluntary and intelligent waiver can-
not be presumed from a silent record. In applying Boykin, courts have required the trial court to
warn the defendant that he is waiving his constitutional protection and to inquire into the volunta-
riness and intelligence of the guilty plea. See Westen & Westin, supra note 79, at 525 n.189.
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against a defendant if he entered into it intelligently and voluntarily, just as a
defendant can be held to a guilty plea which he subsequently seeks to vacate.82
Even if the defendant cannot be compelled to fulfill his promise to plead
guilty,s3 the agreement should be enforceable against the prosecutor. A viable
argument might be advanced that a promise to plead guilty is unenforceable
both under constitutional law84 and under the contractual principle that it is
contrary to public policy. Nevertheless, this argument does not lead to the
conclusion that the defendant's promise is thus insufficient consideration to
support the promise of the prosecution, or that there is a lack of mutuality.85
A promise that is unenforceable under a rule of law may nevertheless still bind
the other party.86 The maker of such a voidable promise may enforce the
promise of the other party.87
The second reason the supreme court gave for refusing to enforce the plea
agreement was that the agreement was subject to trial court approval. The
court accurately noted that plea bargains involving a recommended sentence
must be submitted to the trial court under G.S. 15A-1023(b). 88 If the trial
court rejects the agreement, it is void. The supreme court found this factor
unnecessary to its decision.89 In light of the court's misapplication of contract
law, however, the effect of this statutory provision should be re-evaluated.
When some event, not certain to occur, must happen before a duty of
performance can arise under a contract, that event is labeled a condition pre-
cedent.90 A statute that must be complied with before duties of performance
arise constitutes a condition precedent implied in law.91 The effect of predi-
cating performance of a contract on a condition is that once the condition is
fulfilled the parties are bound to perform.92 If the condition fails, the parties
are excused from performance. 93 In the context of a plea bargain subject to
G.S. 15A-1023(b), if the trial court approves the bargain, both the prosecutor
and the defendant must perform their contractual duties. On the other hand,
if the judge rejects the bargain, neither party is bound.
In Collins the trial court neither approved nor rejected the plea bargain
82. See, ag., United States v. Levine, 457 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1972); Everett v. United
States, 336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See generally Westen & Westin, supra note 79, at 525 n.189;
J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GuILTY PLEAS 309 (1975).
83. See People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 262 N.W.2d 890 (1977), cftedin 300 N.C. at 149.
84. See Jones, supra note 79, at 597-600.
85. Mutuality refers to an obligation held by each party to do an act in consideration of the
other party's act or promise; neither party is bound unless both are bound. BLAci's LAW DIc-
TIONARY 1173 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
86. Lumber Co. v. Corey, 140 N.C. 462,467-69,53 S.E. 300, 302 (1906) (plaintiff who had not
signed a contract within the Statute of Frauds could still enforce the contract).
87. S. WILLISTON, supra note 64, at § 105.
88. 300 N.C. at 149, 265 S.E.2d at 176. For text of G. S. 15A-1023(b), see note 42 supra.
89. 300 N.C. at 149, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
90. Cox v. Funk, 42 N.C. App. 32, 255 S.E.2d 600 (1979) (contract subject to condition of
closing a real estate transaction).
91. J. CALAmARi & J. PERILLO, CONTRAcTs 388 (2d ed. 1977).




agreement. 94 Instead, the State attempted to revoke its promise. By so doing,
the state prevented the court from reviewing the agreement. The supreme
court held that the lack of court approval made the contract null and void.95
The supreme court confused the validity of a contract with the arising of a
duty of performance. 96
An executory contract is no less valid because it is subject to a condi-
tion.97 The North Carolina Supreme Court so held in 1962, saying "[tihe fact
that no duty of performance on either side can arise until the happening of a
condition does not necessarily make the validity of the contract depend upon it
happening." 98 Both parties are bound when they enter into the contract. If
the condition is fulfilled, both parties must perform.99 If the condition fails,
both parties are excused.l10 If a party attempts to revoke his part of the agree-
ment before the condition either occurs or fails, he has repudiated the con-
tract.101 In attempting to withdraw from the plea bargain agreement before
the court could review it, the prosecution repudiated the contract in Collins.
Moreover, by withdrawing from the plea agreement, the prosecution pre-
vented the condition from arising. One party's prevention of a condition ex-
cuses the condition.'0 2 The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled in Barron v.
Cain 103 that a plaintiff could enforce a contract despite the failure of condition
if the defendant's own acts interfered with the occurrence of the condition.1 4
Applying that reasoning to the instant case, the prosecution's prevention of the
trial court's review of the plea bargain should result in the plea bargain being
held enforceable against the prosecution.
Had the supreme court properly applied contract law by requiring the
enforcement of this plea bargain, the court would not have confronted the
Cooper holding that constitutional protections for defendants involved in plea
bargaining are broader than the law of contract. The court failed to find a
contractual protection, misconstruing McIntosh to justify its decision that con-
stitutional protections are no more expansive than those provided by the law
of contract. In using an irrelevant case to justify its decision, the court also
failed to evaluate the merits of the rejected doctrine.
94. The State dishonored the agreement on the same day it was made, before the trial court
had an opportunity to review it. 300 N.C. at 143, 265 S.E.2d at 173.
95. Id. at 149, 265 S.E.2d at 176.
96. See text accompanying notes 98-100 infra.
97. S. WILLISTON, supra note 64, at § 666.
98. Harris and Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain and Denbo, Inc., 256 N.C. 110, 118, 123 S.E.2d
590, 596 (1962).
99. S. WI.ISTON, supra note 64, at § 663.
100. Id.
101. J. CALAMARI & J. PERULLO, supra note 91, at 459.
102. Id. at 441-44. "When one says that the condition is excused one means that even though
the condition did not take place, the plaintiff may recover on the contract provided he can show
that he would have been ready, willing and able to perform but for the prevention." Id. at 441
n.70.
103. 216 N.C. 282, 4 S.E.2d 618 (1939).
104. Id. at 284, 4 S.E.2d at 620.
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C Jury Charges
1. Pressuring Deadlocked Jury
In State v. Easterling'0 5 the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted
G.S. 15A-1235(b) 10 6 for the first time since the statute went into effect on July
1, 1978. The court held that while the statute forbids the use of the "Allen
charge"--a coercive charge used to pressure a deadlocked jury to reach a ver-
dict T07-a trial court which uses such instructions will not be reversed on ap-
peal unless the defendant can prove that the charge was prejudicial.108 The
court did not establish guidelines for determining when a specific charge might
be prejudicial.
In Easterling the defendant was tried for felony murder. The jury began
its deliberations on a Friday afternoon; on Saturday morning the trial judge
called the jury back to the courtroom, instructing them that a retrial would
mean the selection of a new jury and the consumption of another week of the
court's time.1 9 The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that while instruc-
tions of this type had been approved by North Carolina courts, 110 the statute
now provides the standard for charges that may be given to the jury.' 1' The
105. 300 N.C. 594, 268 S.E.2d 800 (1980).
106. Before the jury retires for deliberation, the judge may give an instruction which informs
the jury that:
(1) Jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment;
(2) Each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial considera-
tion of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(3) In the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own
views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(4) No juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the
evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the purpose of re-
turning a verdict.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235(b) (1978).
107. The United States Supreme Court approved the use of the Allen charge in Allen v.
United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). For a summary of the history of the Allen charge, see State v.
Lamb, 44 N.C. App. 251, 261 S.E.2d 130 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 739, 267 S.E.2d 667 (1980).
The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the practice of pressuring deadlocked juries into
reaching verdicts two months before the effective date of G.S. 15A-1235 in State v. Alston, 294
N.C. 577, 243 S.E.2d 354 (1978). The court found that under North Carolina law an Allen charge
was acceptable so long as the judge did not coerce a verdict or imply that the jurors in the minor-
ity should surrender their convictions to the views of the majority. Id. at 592-93, 243 S.E.2d at
364. The court held that there was no error in mentioning the time and expense a retrial would
entail but declined to establish any guidelines for trial courts since the statute would provide the
standard in the future. Id. at 596, 243 S.E.2d at 366.
108. 300 N.C. at 608-09, 268 S.E.2d at 809.
109. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
Members of the jury, I realize what a disagreement means, and I presume you un-
derstand and realize what a disagreement means. It means that there will be another week
or more of the time of the Court that will have to be consumedin the trial of these actions
again. I do not want to force you or coerce you in any way to reach a verdict, but it is
your duty to try to reconcile your differences and to reach a verdict, if it can be done,
without any surrender of anyone's conscientious convictions.
300 N.C. at 606, 268 S.E.2d at 808 (emphasis supplied by court).
110. See note 107 supra.
111. Shortly after the Easterling opinion was filed the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that G.S. 15A-1235(b) did not limit the instructions a trial judge could give, so long as the charge
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language of the statute sets out instructions that a trial court may give to a jury
with respect to its duty to reach an agreement, 112 but it is ambiguous as to
whether the "Allen charge" is acceptable.1 13 The court considered the stat-
ute's legislative history for guidance and noted that the General Assembly had
deleted part of the statute which allowed a trial court to inform the jury that a
deadlock would cause additional expense in a retrial.114 On the basis of this
history, the court interpreted the statute to forbid the use of this type of in-
struction." 15
The North Carolina Supreme Court then held that the trial court's charge
was not reversible error. It established that a violation of G.S. 15A-1235(b)
was not reversible per se;" 1 6 defendant has the burden to prove that the error
was prejudicial. 1 7 The court indicated that when faced with this type of error
appeals courts should consider all the circumstances of the instruction and its
probable impact on the jury.'18 Despite its own finding that there was no
prejudice to defendant in the Easterling charge the court warned that "it
should be the rule rather than the exception" that a violation of the statute
requires a finding of prejudicial error.119 This final caveat offers little gui-
dance, though, because the court found the instructions in question to be
within the exception, without giving any significant justification. The court
as a whole was not coercive. State v. Darden, 48 N.C. App. 128, 268 S.E.2d 225 (1980). It is
presumed that the Easterling opinion, filed three weeks before the Darden decision, was not avail-
able to the court of appeals, as no mention of it was made in the latter court's opinion.
112. G.S. 15A-1235(b) provides, "Before the jury retires for deliberation, the judge may give
an instruction which informs the jury that .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235(b) (1978).
113. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law--Criminal Procedure, 1977,56 N.C.L.
Rav. 843, 1020 (1978).
114. 300 N.C. at 608, 268 S.E.2d at 809. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235 (1978), Official Com-
mentary states:
The Commission considered three possible approaches to the deadlocked jury:
(1) the 'weak' charge set out in the A.B.A. Standards;
(2) the 'strong' Allen charge traditionally used in the federal courts; and
(3) the even stronger charges authorized under North Carolina case law.
After much discussion, the Commission. . . deleted from its draft a provision pre-
viously sanctioned under North Carolina case law which would have authorized thejudge to inform the jurors that if they do not agree upon a verdict another jury may be
called upon to try the case.
115. 300 N.C. at 608, 268 S.E.2d at 809. The North Carolina Court of Appeals had reached
the same conclusion in State v. Lamb, 44 N.C. App. 251, 261 S.E.2d 130 (1979), cert. denied, 299
N.C. 739, 267 S.E.2d 667 (1980). It reversed defendant's conviction, finding that the trial judge's
repeated mention of the time and money involved in a retrial to the jury after they had failed to
agree on a verdict was in violation of the statute.
116. 300 N.C. at 608-09, 268 S.E.2d at 809. The court expressly stated that its holding did not
imply disapproval of State v. Lamb. In Lamb, the court of appeals found that an Allen charge
was prohibited by the statue and reversed without considering the issue of prejudice to defendant.
Id. (citing State v. Lamb, 44 N.C. App. at 260, 261 S.E.2d at 135).
117. 300 N.C. at 609, 268 S.E.2d at 809. The court cited N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1443(a)
(1978), which provides in pertinent part:
A defendant is prejudiced by errors. . . when there is a reasonable possibility that, had
the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at
the trial out of which the appeal arises. The burden of showing such prejudice under this
subsection is upon the defendant.
118. 300 N.C. at 609, 268 S.E.2d at 809.
119. Id. at 609, 268 S.E.2d at 810.
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based its finding on three factors: (1) no disagreement among the jurors
prompted the instructions; (2) no evidence existed that the jury was otherwise
open to pressure; and (3) the charge, taken as a whole, was not coercive, espe-
cially since it informed the jurors that they should not surrender their convic-
tions to the majority view. 120
These factors do not provide clear standards for distinguishing the excep-
tional cases when the violation of the statute will not be subject to reversal.
The first factor is illogical because G.S. 15A-1235(b) expressly refers to in-
structions to be given "[b]efore the jury retires for deliberation" as well as
when it seems to the trial judge that the jury has been unable to agree.' 2 ' The
second factor supporting the finding of no prejudice is more vague. The court
stated that the jury was not otherwise open to pressure from the trial judge.122
It would seem that all juries are open to pressure from the judge, and it is hard
to imagine circumstances more likely than a deadlock to make a jury espe-
cially impressionable.
The third basis for the court's decision was the content of the charge itself.
The instructions were acceptable because they complied with the standards
established by the supreme court before the passage of G.S. 15A-1235.123
Since no more definite rules were established in Easterling, it appears that
appeals courts can continue to use the common-law rule. This result could
vitiate Easterling'8 holding that the statute forbids any mention to the jury of
the time and expense of a retrial following the jurors' failure to agree. De-
fendants will have little protection from the harm which the legislature in-
tended to prevent.
This result is illustrated by a court of appeals case following Easterling.
In State v. Hunter'24 the jury returned to the courtroom less than one hour
after retiring and informed the court that it had been unable to agree. The
trial judge then instructed the jurors that they were not expected to agree im-
mediately but that it was their duty to deliberate and reach a unanimous ver-
dict. In the course of these instructions, the judge mentioned that the case
would have to be retried if a verdict were not reached.1 25 The court of appeals
120. Id.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235(b), (c) (1978). In State v. Darden, 48 N.C. App. 128, 268
S.E.2d 225 (1980), the North Carolina Court of Appeals drew the opposite conclusion, looking to
the title of the section: "Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury." The Easterling court distin-
guished State v. Lamb on this ground alone and approved it, implying that prejudicial error oc-
curs whenever an Allen charge is given to a disagreeing jury. 300 N.C. at 609, 268 S.E.2d at 809-
10.
122. 300 N.C. at 609, 268 S.E.2d at 809.
123. "mhe charge itself makes clear that the trial court did not intend that any juror surren-
der his conscientious conviction of judgment and contains no such element of coercion as to war-
rant a new trial." Id.
124. 48 N.C. App. 689, 269 S.E.2d 736 (1980). The court of appeals reviewed Allen instruc-
tions in another post-Easterling decision, State v. Darden, 48 N.C. App. 128, 268 S.E.2d 225
(1980), but held that the statute did not controL In State v. Jones, 47 N.C. App. 554, 268 S.E.2d 6
(1980), filed by the court of appeals on the same day Easterling was filed, an Allen charge simi-
larly was found to be nonprejudicial under Alston, see note 107 supra, and Lamb.
125. The judge instructed the jury as follows:
First of all, let me point out, Members of the Jury, that it's not anticipated that all of you
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conceded that this reminder probably violated the statute, citing Easterling,
but it held that defendant had not shown prejudice. 26 The court relied on
two factors: the reminder was followed by an almost verbatim recital of the
instructions suggested by G. S. 15A-1235(b), and the charge given was hardly
coercive, containing no reference to either the time or expense of a retrial. The
court ignored the consideration that the Allen charge followed an initial disa-
greement by the jury-the factor stressed by the supreme court in Easterling.
It is significant that the court of appeals used as a standard for determining
whether or not to reverse the guidelines established by the supreme court
before the statute was passed, ignoring Easterling.127 By relying on the pre-
statute standard to determine reversibility of violations of G.S. 15A-1235, the
court returned to the common-law rule. It disregarded the supreme court's
warning that a finding of prejudice should be the rule rather than the excep-
tion and ignored the one objective factor which Easterling established: that a
charge to a deadlocked jury is more likely to be prejudicial. Hunter illustrates
the probable impact of the Easterling decision--trial courts are forbidden to
use the Allen charge but will not be reversed for doing so.
2. Power of Nullification
In State v. Lang 128 a jury was instructed that if it found the State had
proven all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, then "it would be
[the jury's] duty to return a verdict of guilty. .... ,129 Defendant argued that
the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it was required to return a
guilty verdict because it violated the jury's nullification power--the power to
should be of the same opinion as to what your verdict in this case should be when you go
into the jury room.
If a verdict is not reached, of course, would [sic] mean that the case has to be retried,
and I'm sure that... you can arrive at a verdict as well as anybody else could be
expected to do if given the opportunity to do so.
And this reminder that it's your duty to consult with one another and to deliberate
with a view to reaching an agreement as to what your verdict should be if an agreement
can be reached without violence to any individual judgment. [sic.]
48 N.C. App. at 691, 269 S.E.2d at 737-38.
126. Id. at 693, 269 S.E.2d at 739.
127. The court of appeals used the test established in State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220
S.E.2d 558 (1975) to measure whether the instructions were prejudicial. 48 N.C. App. at 693, 269
S.E.2d at 739.
128. 46 N.C. App. 138, 264 S.E.2d 821 (1980). Two other cases of note in 1980 also dealt with
jury instructions. The North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Harris, 46 N.C. App. 284, 264
S.E.2d 790 (1980), held that when a judge mentioned the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden
fifteen times in his charge to the jury, no possible prejudice could remain from having informed
the jury one time that the burden of proof meant showing "by. . .greater weight all of the
essential elements of his guilt." In State v. Matthews, 299 N.C. 284, 261 S.E.2d 872 (1980), the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the judge does not have to repeat the elements of a crime
when instructing a jury in a joint trial.
129. 46 N.C. App. at 148, 264 S.E.2d at 828. Instructions of this type are typical in North
Carolina. See N.C. CONFERENCE OF SUPERoR COURT JUDGES, N.C. PATrERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES (1973).
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acquit even when the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. 130 The
court of appeals rejected defendant's argument.' 31
Defendant relied on a series of federal courts of appeals cases during the
Vietnam War that recognized that the jury has a power of nullification.' 32 It
followed, according to defendant, that this power could not be denied in the
jury instructions.133 The court of appeals, however, held that Sparfand Han-
sen v. United States134 was controlling. 135 There the United States Supreme
Court held that it was the "duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from
the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the
evidence." 13 6
The court failed to mention a fundamental difference between Lang and
the Vietnam War jury nullification cases. Those cases recognizing the implicit
power to nullify involved political issues--protests against the war.137 The
jury was viewed "as the conscience of the community" and was "permitted to
look at more than logic.' 138 In political trials there often is a great deal of
community support for the defendant's action. Forcing a jury to convict a
defendant under those circumstances could risk alienation of the jurors from
the system. 139 In ordinary criminal trials, as in Lang,140 however, there is no
community support for such criminal violations. 141
3. Submission of Lesser Included Offenses
As a general rule of law in North Carolina, the submission of a lesser
included offense unsupported by the evidence is error favorable to the defend-
130. 46 N.C. App. at 148, 264 S.E.2d at 828. See Scheflin, Aury Null/Fcation: The Right to Say
No, 45 S. CALIF. L. REV. 168 (1972).
131. 46 N.C. App. at 148, 264 S.E.2d at 828.
132. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Simp-
son, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cer.
denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
133. 46 N.C. App. at 148, 264 S.E.2d at 828.
134. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
135. 46 N.C. App. at 149, 264 S.E.2d at 828.
136. 156 U.S. at 102.
137. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (trial of the D.C. Nine who
broke into the Dow Chemical Co. office and destroyed its property in protest of its participation in
the war); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant burned records at the
local board of the Selective Service); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.), cer.
denied, 387 U.S. 910 (1968) (defendants entered a local board of the Selective Service and de-
stroyed draft cards).
138. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (Ist Cir. 1969). "A juror who is forced by the
judge's instructions to convict a defendant whose conduct he applauds, or at least feels is justifia-
ble, will lose respect for the legal system which forces him to reach such a result against the
dictates of his conscience." Scheffin, supra note 130, at 183.
139. 417 F.2d at 1006. But see 473 F.2d at 1140-41 (Bazelon, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
140. Defendant was charged with kidnapping and assault with intent to commit rape. 46 N.C.
App. at 139, 264 S.E.2d at 821.
141. See Scheflin, supra note 130, at 191. Scheflin notes, however, that even a typical criminal
case may have social overtones, especially when there is a question of criminal responsibility. Id.
at 193-94. See also Everett v. Umted States, 336 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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ant and therefore not appealable.14 2 In State v. Ray 143 the North Carolina
Supreme Court had occasion to reexamine that rule and added an important
caveat; the error is not favorable to the defendant as a matter of law where
there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant would have been acquitted
of the greater offense if the lesser offense had not been submitted to the jury.
The error then is prejudicial, and the defendant is entitled to appeal. 44
Defendant in Ray was tried on a first degree murder charge. All of the
evidence presented at trial demonstrated that defendant intentionally shot the
victim, and defendant's defense rested entirely on the theory that he acted in
self-defense and defense of another.145 At the close of the evidence the trial
judge dismissed the charge of first degree murder and submitted to the jury
alternative verdicts of second degree murder, manslaughter, involuntary man-
slaughter, and not guilty by reason of self-defense. He further instructed the
jury that involuntary manslaughter is "the unintentional killing of a human
being.... ."146 The jury found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Defendant appealed on the grounds that the charge of involuntary manslaugh-
ter was unsupported by the evidence and therefore was submitted erroneously
to the jury. The court of appeals, relying on the rule mentioned above, af-
firmed the conviction.' 4
7
The supreme court reversed, finding that under these circumstances erro-
neous submission of the lesser offense was prejudicial to defendant.148 First,
the court noted that the definition of involuntary manslaughter given to the
142. See State v. Vestal, 283 N.C. 249, 195 S.E.2d 297, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (de-
fendant charged with first degree murder, convicted of manslaughter though evidence of man-
slaughter was lacking); State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 93 S.E.2d 431 (1956) (defendant tried for
murder and convicted of manslaughter); State v. Roy, 233 N.C. 558, 64 S.E.2d 840 (1951) (defend-
ant charged with rape, rape proved; verdict of assault with intent to commit rape); State v. Chase,
231 N.C. 589, 58 S.E.2d 364 (1950) (indictment for armed robbery, armed robbery proved; verdict
of common law robbery); State v. Bentley, 223 N.C. 563, 27 S.E.2d 738 (1943) (defendant charged
with assault with intent to kill using a deadly weapon, convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon--an alternative not submitted to the jury by the trial court); State v. Robertson, 210 N.C.
266, 186 S.E. 247 (1936) (defendant charged with burglary, burglary proved; verdict of attempted
burglary); State v. Quick, 150 N.C. 820, 64 S.E. 168 (1909) (defendant tried for second degree
murder;, defense of self-defense; convicted of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Matthews, 142
N.C. 621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906) (defendant indicted for first degree murder, convicted of second
degree murder;, affirmed despite defendant's claim that there was no evidence to support the ver-
dict).
143. 299 N.C. 151, 261 S.E.2d 789 (1980).
144. Id. at 167, 261 S.E.2d at 799.
145. Id. at 152, 261 S.E.2d at 790-91. The only witnesses to the homicide were defendant and
his brother. According to their testimony the victim had been drinking and had threatened de-
fendant with a shotgun while defendant sat in his car parked in his own front yard. When defen-
dan's brother attempted to intervene, the victim approached the house and fired through the front
door, wounding the brother in the hand. Defendant testified that he then fired at the victim's legs.
The victim then turned in defendant's direction, holding the pistol. Defendant, believing that he
was about to be fired upon, shot twice at the victim. Id. at 153-57, 261 S.E.2d at 791-93.
The State offered an out-of-court statement allegedly made by defendant to a policeman at
the time of the shootings. It might be inferred from this statement that defendant shot at the
victim while the victim was retreating. Id. at 154-55, 261 S.E.2d at 792. There was no evidence to
suggest that defendant unintentionally shot the victim.
146. Id. at 157, 261 S.E.2d at 793 (emphasis in original).
147. Id. at 152, 261 S.E.2d at 790.
148. Id. at 163, 261 S.E.2d at 797.
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jury was incorrect, focusing at it did "on the presence or absence of an intent to
kill rather than the presence or absence of an intentional act." 149 Moreover,
because absolutely no evidence was presented in the case that would support a
finding of involuntary manslaughter, 150 the submission of that charge was er-
ror. Also, under the facts of this case, that error was prejudicial to defendant.
Given the trial court's erroneous definition of involuntary manslaughter,15 1
the jury might well have concluded that defendant was guilty of that offense as
defined. "In effect, the erroneous submission of the offense of involuntary
manslaughter, coupled with the misleading definition of that offense by the
trial court, may have short-circuited the jury's consideration of defendant's
claim of self-defense."' 152 The error therefore was prejudicial to defendant.15 3
In reaching that conclusion, the court distinguished North Carolina cases
stating the general rule that erroneous submission of a lesser offense is harm-
less error.' 54 In all of those cases the evidence was such that, had the lesser
offense not been submitted, the jury would have convicted the defendant of
the greater offense. The situation is quite different when there is a reasonable
possibility that the defendant would have been acquitted of the greater offense
had the lesser offense not been submitted to the jury. The defendant certainly
is prejudiced in that event, and the general rule should not apply.
The exception stated in State v. Ray is compelling logically and is sup-
ported in the case law of other jurisdictions.155 Ray is simply an express state-
ment of what was implicit in the North Carolina cases stating the general rule
that submission of a lesser included offense not supported by the evidence is
not invariably error favorable to the defendant as a matter of law, and whether
149. Id. at 165, 261 S.E.2d at 798 (emphasis in original).
150. Id. at 159, 261 S.E.2d at 794.
151. Although the misleading definition of the lesser offense in this case contributed to the
prejudice to defendant, it would not seem to be a necessary element of prejudicial error in every
case because the jury's attention would be distracted by the submission of even a correctly defined
lesser offense not supported by the evidence. Indeed, the court of appeals has applied Ray in a
situation where there was no misleading definition of the lesser offense. In State v. Brooks, 46
N.C. App. 833, 266 S.E.2d 3 (1980), defendant was tried for second degree murder, claimed self-
defense, and was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Although there was no claim that the
trial court incorrectly defined involuntary manslaughter, the court of appeals found that there was
no evidence to support the lesser charge and reversed in reliance on State v. Ray.
152. 299 N.C. at 165, 261 S.E.2d at 798.
153. Id. at 167, 261 S.E.2d at 799. Justice Copeland, joined by Chief Justice Branch, dissented
from this holding. The dissent found that the trial court's definition of involuntary manslaughter
was correct id. at 168-69, 261 S.E.2d at 800 (Copeland, J., dissenting), and that the jury reason-
ably could have weighed and rejected defendant's claim of self-defense as they were instructed, Id.
at 169-71, 261 S.E.2d at 800-01. Furthermore, the dissent urged that the decision was controlled
by State v. Vestal, 283 N.C. 249, 195 S.E.2d 297, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973), under which the
submission of a lesser included offense not supported by the evidence is nonprejudicial error if
there is sufficient evidence that the jury could have convicted the defendant of the greater offense.
According to the dissent, whether the erroneous submission of a lesser offense is prejudicial is not
a question of harmless error, but simply one of the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury on
the higher offense.
154. 299 N.C. at 163-64, 261 S.E.2d at 797.
155. See, ag., Parham v. State, 135 Ga. App. 315, 217 S.E.2d 493 (1975); People v. Gajda, 87
Ill. App. 316, 232 N.E.2d 49 (1967); Martin v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. Ct. App.
1966).
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such error is harmless will depend on the particular facts of each case. 156
4. Closing Argument
In State v. Hardy157 the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to hold
that remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument to the effect that
defendant had the burden of proving his innocence constituted prejudicial er-
ror. The court relied on the principle that closing arguments are within the
trial court's discretion and will not be reviewed "unless the impropriety of
counsel's remarks is extreme and is clearly calculated to prejudice the
jury .... ,,158 The remarks in question did not meet this standard. Any
prejudice from the prosecutor's rhetorical question, "Can the defendant, based
on this evidence, show you a valid conclusion of his innocence?" was found to
have been cured by the trial judge's instruction that the jury should apply the
law as the judge give it to them.' 5 9 Similarly, the court noted that the prosecu-
tor's statement that "[t]he word 'beyond' is an unnecessary appendage to the
words 'reasonable doubt,"' was confusing when considered in isolation, but
found that the closing argument as a whole did not misstate the law suffi-
ciently to force the judge to instruct the jury to disregard it.160
D. Right to Speedy Trial
1. Preindictment Delay
In State v. Davis161 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a de-
fendant who seeks dismissal of charges against him for unreasonable pre-
indictment delay, in violation of his due process rights under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments,' 62 must sustain a dual burden of proof.163 In order
to carry the burden of his motion to dismiss, the defendant must show both
actual and substantial prejudice from the delay and that the delay was inten-
tional on the part of the State to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant
or impair his defense. 64
Defendant in Davis sold narcotics to an undercover agent of the State
Bureau of Investigation in April, 1978.165 In order to protect a confidential
156. See 299 N.C. at 166, 261 S.E.2d at 798-99.
157. 299 N.C. 445, 263 S.E.2d 711 (1980).
158. Id. at 453, 263 S.E.2d at 717 (citing State v. Taylor, 289 N.C. 223, 221 S.E.2d 359 (1976)).
For the other holding of Hardy, see notes 236-45 and accompanying text supra.
159. 299 N.C. at 453-54, 263 S.E.2d at 717.
160. Id. at 454, 263 S.E.2d at 717.
161. 46 N.C. App. 778, 266 S.E.2d 20 (1980).
162. In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) the United States Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment's speedy trial clause does not apply to preindictment delay, Stat-
utes of limitation, the Court said, provide the primary guarantee against the bringing of "stale"
criminal charges, id. at 322, but the Court did recognize for the first time that unreasonable pre-
indictment delay may violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment as well. Id. at 324.
See also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
163. 46 N.C. App. at 782, 266 S.E.2d at 23.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 779, 266 S.E.2d at 21.
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informant1 66 defendant's arrest was delayed so that he was not formally in-
dicted until January, 1979, more than eight months after his offense.167 De-
fendant moved to dismiss the case on the basis of the preindictment delay and
produced evidence to show that the delay had prejudiced his case168 but did
not contend that the State intentionally had delayed the indictment with the
motive of impairing his defense. The trial court dismissed the motion.
The court of appeals affirmed. 169 Although the court noted that there
appeared to be some "dissonance" in the North Carolina cases170 over this
question, it held17' that the issue is controlled by the United States Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Lovasco,172 where the Court held that
"proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due
process claim, and. . . the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for
the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused."' 73 Following Lovasco, Da-
vis clearly sets forth for the first time in North Carolina the rule that a defend-
ant must show both prejudice and an improper state motive 1 74 to support a
motion to dismiss for unreasonable preindictment delay.
2. Speedy Trial Act
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided two cases in 1980 that re-
quired interpretation of North Carolina's Speedy Trial Act 175 and clarified
ambiguities in that statute not previously dealt with by the courts.
166. The sale of narcotics was part of an ongoing investigation in which the S.B.I. used a
confidential informant who had been promised that, in order to prevent drug traffickers from
connecting him with the investigation, any arrests resulting from the investigation would be
delayed. Id.
167. Id.
168. In support of his motion defendant produced testimony of a Florida motel desk clerk
which tended to show that defendant was in Florida at the time of the alleged offense. Because
the motel had been sold on January 15, 1979, however, the witness was unable to produce records
to substantiate her testimony. Id. at 779-80, 266 S.E.2d at 21.
169. Id. at 782, 266 S.E.2d at 23.
170. Id. at 780, 266 S.E.2d at 22. Defendant argued that State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223
S.E.2d 357 (1976) and State v. Herring, 33 N.C. App. 382, 235 S.E.2d 88 (1977) are authority for a
single-burden test in North Carolina. Both of these cases were decided prior to Lovasco, as the
Davis court noted, 46 N.C. App. at 781, 266 S.E.2d at 22, and neither contains the definitive
holdin suggested by defendant. The following language in Dietz might be read to support a
single-eurdn test: "We therefore hold that under the facts of this case, defendant has not demon-
strated either intentional delay on the part of the State in order to impair defendant's ability to
defend himself or 'actual and substantial prejudice' from the preindictment delay," 289 N.C. at
495, 223 S.E.2d at 362 (emphasis in original); but that language can be read just as easily to say
that defendant had met neither prong of a two-part test. Herring merely quoted the above lan-
guage, 33 N.C. App. at 385, 235 S.E.2d at 90, and added nothing to Dietz.
171. 46 N.C. App. at 781, 266 S.E.2d at 22.
172. 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (preindictment delay of eighteen months held not to violate due
process where delay was in good faith and was not intended to prejudice defendant's case).
173. Id. at 790.
174. That is, intent to prejudice defendant's case. Investigative delay, on the other hand, is
"fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely 'to gain tactical advantage
over the accused,'" id. at 795, and is permissible. Lovasco also notes that preserving the "cover"
of an undercover informant is a proper motive for preindictment delay. Id. at 797 n.19, cited In
Davis, 46 N.C. App. at 782, 266 S.E.2d at 23.
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-701 to -704 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
[Vol. 591158
CRIMINAL PROCEDU 1
In State v. Ward,17 6 the court of appeals addressed the question of when
the ninety-day statutory period 177 begins to run after criminal charges are dis-
missed without prejudice to the State for a violation of the Act-a question
upon which the Act itself is silent. Defendant in Ward filed a motion to dis-
miss a charge of first degree murder because of violation of the Speedy Trial
Act.178 Granting the motion, the trial court dismissed the charge without
prejudice to the State, and the State appealed the order.
Although the court dismissed the State's appeal, 79 it elected to treat the
appeal as a petition for certiorari in order to reach the more important ques-
tion the case presented-if the State can reindict defendant upon dismissal
without prejudice, when does the ninety-day period under the Act begin to run
in the second prosecution? In the face of the Act's silence upon this question,
the court held that "where a criminal charge is dismissed without prejudice
upon a defendant's motion under the Speedy Trial Act, the trial of the defend-
ant upon further prosecution by the state must begin within [ninety days] from
the date the order is entered dismissing the charge without prejudice."' 80 In
so construing the statute, the court intended to further the legislative policy of
prompt disposition of criminal cases, and to avoid the manifest unfairness to
the State that would result if the ninety-day period were held to run from the
original start of the time period in the first action.18
In State v. Boltinhouse, 82 the court of appeals construed yet another am-
biguity in the Act concerning the start of the time period for bringing defend-
ants to trial. G.S. 15A-701(al)(3) provides: "When a charge is dismissed,
other than under G.S. 15A-703, or a finding of no probable cause pursuant to
G.S. 15A-612, and the defendant is afterwards charged with the same offense,"
the time period under the Act begins to run from the last of the stated
events 83 in connection with the original charge. Defendant in Boltinhouse
argued that under this statute, when a finding of no probable cause is made
and defendant subsequently is prosecuted for the same offense, the time period
runs from the date of the original charge.184 The court of appeals rejected this
176. 46 N.C. App. 200, 264 S.E.2d 737 (1980).
177. The time period is 120 days if the event from which it is measured occurred before Octo-
ber 1, 1980. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
178. Defendant was indicted on February 12, 1979, but his case was not brought to trial until
the week of August 20, 1979, under an agreement between the solicitor and defendant's counsel.
46 N.C. App. at 201, 264 S.E.2d at 738.
179. Deciding a question of first impression in North Carolina, the court also held that the
State has no appeal as a matter of right from an order dismissing charges without prejudice for
violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Id. at 204, 264 S.E.2d at 740. Such an order does not bar
further prosecution by the State nor finally dispose of the charge against the defendant, and there-
fore is not an appealable final order. Id.
180. Id. at 206, 264 S.E.2d at 741.
181. Such an interpretation would be unfair to the State because a large portion of the time
period will ordinarily have passed before the motion to dismiss is filed. Id.
182. 49 N.C. App. 660, 272 S.E.2d 148 (1980).
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701(al)(3) (Supp. 1979). The time period runs "from the date
that defendant was arrested, served with criminal process, waived an indictment, or was indicted,
whichever occurs last, for the original charge." Id.
184. 49 N.C. App. at 662, 272 S.E.2d at 149-50. Defendant in Bolinhouse was arrested on a
charge of possessing stolen property on May 24, 1979, but a finding of no probable cause was
19811 159
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interpretation. Although the statute is ambiguous and "admittedly subject to
the interpretation for which defendant contends," the court found that it is
equally subject to the interpretation that a finding of no probable cause is a
circumstance in which the period begins to run from the last of the listed items
relating to the new charge.185 The court adopted the latter construction and
held that, when a finding of no probable cause is entered under G.S. 15A-612
and defendant subsequently is prosecuted for the same offense, the period of
the Act begins to run from defendant's indictment186 on the new charge rather
than the original charge.187 This construction was supported by reference to
the legislative purpose expressed in G.S. 15A-612(b) 88 of permitting subse-
quent prosecution for the same offense after a finding of no probable cause has
been entered; if the time period were to begin with reference to the original
charge in such cases, subsequent prosecution* would often be barred by the
Act.18 9
E Searches and Seizures
1. Warrantless Searches and Seizures
State v. Le Duc190 tested fourth amendment restrictions against illegal
searches and seizures in the circumstance of abandoned property. In Le Duc a
resident noticed a trawler whose rigging and lines were not secured in the
usual manner moored at a pier. Four days later, the resident called a sheriff,
who boarded the boat. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that this
was permissible in light of the officer's responsibility for the safety of property
and concern for the life and health of anyone on board. 191 Because the of-
ficer's initial boarding was amply justified by exigent circumstances, 192 the
marijuana he found on board was admissible.
The officer then drove the boat to a Coast Guard station, where an inten-
sive, warrantless search was performed, during which evidence of defendant's
ownership of the boat was discovered. Although the court held that the "bet-
ter course" would have been for the officers who conducted the search to have
submitted their initial findings to a magistrate for a probable cause determina-
tion, no violation of defendant's fourth amendment rights occurred because he
entered on the charge on September 5, 1979. On September 24, 1979, defendant was indicted for
felonious possession of the same property. His trial on that charge began on January 7, 1980-105
days after the September 24th indictment, but more than 120 days from his arrest on May 24,
1979. Id. at 661, 272 S.E.2d at 149.
185. Id. at 663, 272 S.E.2d at 150.
186. Or arrest, service of process, or waiver of indictment. See note 183 supra.
187. 49 N.C. App. at 663, 272 S.E.2d at 150.
188. "No finding made by a judge under this section precludes the state from instituting a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115A-612(b) (1978).
189. Id.
190. 48 N.C. App. 227, 269 S.E.2d 220 (1980).
191. Id. at 239, 269 S.E.2d at 228. The court relied on United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979) (Coast Guard officers reasonably believing the
situation an emergency boarded a boat and found marijuana debris and a marked navigational
chart whose directions led to the discovery of a large cache of marijuana).
192. 48 N.C. App. at 239, 269 S.E.2d at 228.
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had abandoned the vessel. 193 The court's standard for abandonment was
based on the psychological factors of relinquishment:
The issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but
whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily dis-
carded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the prop-
erty in question so that he could no longer retain reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.194
In concluding that defendant's vessel had been abandoned, the court pointed
to its careless mooring, its open windows and doors, defendant's lack of notifi-
cation to others of his identity or his intention to return, and his presence at
the time in Florida, where he was later apprehended. 195 The court conceded
that the officers could not have known this last fact but said that a court justifi-
ably could consider it as evidence of abandonment under the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals' decision in Pannan v. United States.196 The
rationale behind the Parman rule is that one who abandons property has
abandoned his fourth amendment rights in that property, just as a third party
without fourth amendment rights of ownership or control in an item cannot
object to its illegal seizure.
2. Searches Under Warrant
The question of the sufficiency of evidence pointing to probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant arose in two North Carolina Supreme Court
cases, one of which dealt with staleness of evidence, the other with the seizure
of evidence not named in the search warrant but seen by officers searching for
the specified articles.
In State v. Jones197 the court held that revelations by an accomplice to a
murder supplied ample probable cause for a search warrant to issue for a
hatchet and leather-welder's gloves used in that crime. The court rejected a
charge that the five-month interval between the homicide and the search made
the information in the accomplice's affidavit stale. Because the items sought
were not incriminating in themselves and because they were of enduring util-
193. Id. at 240, 269 S.E.2d at 229.
194. Id., 269 S.E.2d at 228-29 (quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.
1973)). These factors also seem to be behind the court of appeals' decision in State v. Turgeon, 44
N.C. App. 547, 261 S.E.2d 501 (1980), where the defendant gave a briefcase containing incriminat-
ing evidence to a friend for safekeeping. The friend later turned it over to police officers on
request and signed a statement indicating the voluntariness of the surrender. The court, holding
the seizure valid, relied on State v. Woods, 286 N.C. 612, 213 S.E.2d 214 (1975), as precedent. In
that case a wife, confronted in her home by officers requesting permission to search, voluntarily
relinquished rings given to her by her husband and linking him to a crime. The Woods case and
other cases dealing with the consent of a third person to search depend upon joint ownership or
control of the premises or object searched. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1968).
The Turgeon court, however, did not examine the relationship between the defendant and his
friend, presumably basing its decision upon the lessened expectation of privacy and assumption of
risk in defendant's effective abandonment of the briefcase.
195. 48 N.C. App. at 241, 269 S.E.2d at 229.
196. 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968).
197. 299 N.C. 298, 261 S.E.2d 860 (1980).
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ity, 198 a common-sense assessment199 would lead a reasonably prudent magis-
trate to conclude that they were probably still on the identified premises.2° °
The admissibility of photographs and letters under the plain-view excep-
tion to the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures was examined in State v. Williams.20 1 The photographs and letters
were glimpsed inadvertently as officers, armed with a search warrant for her-
oin, searched in bedroom drawers for the drugs. The letters and photographs
were seized after the heroin was found, when an officer seeking evidence of
who resided in the trailer recalled seeing those items and confiscated them for
that purpose. The North Carolina Supreme Court found the seizure specifi-
cally authorized by G.S. 15A-253 20 2 and by Coolidge v. New Hampshire,20 3
which authorized the plain-view exception on similar facts.2° 4 Following the
Coolidge model, the Williams court found that the officers were on the prem-
ises justifiably by virtue of a valid search warrant, that, having seen the letters
inadvertently, they were not required to forget or ignore the fact that they had
seen them, and that the possibility of the items' being subject to removal or
destruction if not seized immediately, plus the fact that the officers did not
seize the heroin and then initiate a search to prove ownership, contributed to
the validity of the seizure.20 5
The question of the sufficiency of probable cause also arose before the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Sheetz. 2° 6 In Sheetz a court order
requested by the sheriffs department, which authorized the examination of
defendant's bank records and of business records in his shop, was based upon
conclusory allegations "of irregularities which, if supported by evidence and
found to be true, would constitute serious violations of the law on the part of
the defendant. '20 7 Because the sheriffs request contained no recital of the
underlying circumstances upon which a magistrate could conclude that proba-
ble cause existed, 20 8 the order was invalid and evidence obtained was there-
fore excluded from evidence. 20 9
198. Id. at 305, 261 S.E.2d at 865.
199. See United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1047 (1977).
200. 299 N.C. at 305, 261 S.E.2d at 865.
201. 299 N.C. 529, 263 S.E.2d 571 (1980).
202. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-253 (1978) provides that items not named in a search warrant
may be seized: "[I]f in the course of the search the officer inadvertently discovers items not speci-
fiedin the warrant which are subject to seizure under G.S. § 15-242, he may also take possession
of the items so discovered." An item is subject to seizure if it "constitutes evidence of. . .the
identity of a person participating in an offense." Id. § 15A-242(4).
203. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
204. "An example of the applicability of the 'plain view' doctrine is the situation in which the
police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search
come across some other article of incriminating character." Id. at 465.
205. 299 N.C. at 532, 263 S.E.2d at 573.
206. 46 N.C. App. 641, 265 S.E.2d 914 (1980).
207. Id. at 648, 265 S.E.2d at 919.
208. Id. See State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 130-31, 191 S.E.2d 752, 756 (1972).




Three North Carolina Court of Appeals cases probed the validity of vehi-
cle searches, one authorized by warrant, the others not.
In State v. Trapper210 a deputy sheriff, long suspicious of activities occur-
ring on property in his neighborhood, followed a truck leaving that property
and stopped it on the pretense of a routine license check.2 11 Both license and
registration were in order, but the officer detained the driver long enough for
two other law enforcement officers to arrive and walk around the vehicle. The
officers detected a strong odor of marijuana. The officers then obtained a
search warrant. The affidavit for the warrant erroneously stated that the odor
had been detected while the license check was being made. 21 2 The court held,
however, that because the affidavit did not show on its face that the driver's
license check was improper, the magistrate did not err in issuing the warrant.
Hence, because the vehicle search was made pursuant to a valid warrant, the
marijuana found in the truck was likewise validly seized.213
The court of appeals found that the officer's suspicions validated his de-
tention of the driver of the truck under a number of United States Supreme
Court decisions,214 most notably Terry v. Ohio,215 which held that a person
may be detained for further investigation (in that case a search for weapons)
by a law officer without a warrant and without probable cause to believe a
crime has been committed if there is a reasonable suspicion which can be ar-
210. 48 N.C. App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680 (1980).
211. The court distinguished this situation from that in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979), relied upon by defendant, wherein a random vehicle check led to the discovery of an
ongoing crime. In Prouse, there was no reason to think the driver of the vehicle was violating any
law at the time he was stopped, and the affidavit stated that the officer stopped the vehicle because
he was not busy at the time. In Trapper, the affidavit was too ambiguous to establish on its face
that the license check was improper. Further, decisios by the North Carolina Supreme Court
and by the Fourth Circuit in State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973), and United States
v. Kelley, 462 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1972), respectively, held vehicle stops under the pretense of
license checks without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to be constitutionally valid. See
Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978---Crminal Procedure, 57 N.C. L. REv. 827,
1007-11 (1979).
212. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, (1978), the Supreme Court held that a search war-
rant must be voided where a false statement in an affidavit is shown to have been made intention-
ally or in a reckless disregard for the truth and where the false material is necessary to the finding
of probable cause. If the affidavit's remaining content is sufficient to establish probable cause, the
warrant is valid. Id. at 171-72. The latter situation controlled the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Louchheim, 296 N.C. 314,250 S.E.2d 630 (1979). The court of appeals
failed to discuss this issue in Trapper, looking instead only to the question of the license check, not
to the issue of delay for the purpose of "sniffing out" probable cause. It is likely that the court's
ruling on this issue was based on the test of G.S. 15A-978(a), which permits a defendant to chal-
lenge the validity of a search warrant by contesting the truthfulness of the testimony showing
probable cause for its issuance. Truthful testimony is that which "repqrts in good faith the cir-
cumstances relied on to establish probable cause." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-978(a) (1978). Under
this broad criterion, the officer's imprecise recounting of the order of events might have been
considered permissible.
213. 48 N.C. App. at 486, 269 S.E.2d at 683.
214. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
215. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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ticulated that a crime is being committed.21 6 The Trapper court accepted as a
sufficiently articulated, reasonable suspicion the facts that (1) the officer was
experienced, (2) the coastal county was regularly used by smugglers, (3) the
officer had seen a boat inexplicably grounded in the area, (4) he had been
fired on while surveying the suspect property from the water, and (5) he had
seen the truck leaving that property.2 17
The most bothersome aspect of the Trapper decision is whether the facts
in that case constitute a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime is being
committed. The cases cited in the court's decision do not clearly determine
what is meant by that standard. In Terry v. Ohio the Supreme Court restricted
its holding to a "narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual ... -"218 The
Court warned that an "unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'" was insufficient
grounds for such a search. Only "specific reasonable inferences which he is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience" would suffice.219 In
Sibron v. New York 220 .the Court described the standard for these inferences
more precisely as "specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the
suspect to the evidence of crime." 22 1 Neither evidence of crime nor specific
knowledge of crime was present in Trapper. Rather, the officer's experiences
led to hunches about the possibility of some unspecified illegal activity going
on in connection with the property in his vicinity. This is much less than is
required by the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The second North Carolina Court of Appeals case involving a vehicle
search, State v. Gauldin,222 concerned a straightforward application of the suit-
case-rule exception to permissible automobile searches and seizures.223 Of-
ficers stopped a vehicle on reliable information that it contained marijuana.
Their search of a suitcase in the back of the car was not justified by the auto-
216. Id. at 27.
217. 48 N.C. App. at 486, 269 S.E.2d at 683.
218. 392 U.S. at 27. The Court's decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975), was similarly limited to its factual circumstances. In that case the Court allowed border
patrols "to stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts," indicating that the vehicles contained illegal aliens. Id. at 884. Fac-
tors leading to such suspicions included proximity to the border, usual traffic patterns, a road's
reputation for alien traffic, a driver's erratic or evasive behavior, the vehicle's appearance and size,
and the appearance of the driver and passengers. Id. at 884-85. While a general suspicion of
smuggling similarly was present in Trapper, no other fact or experience of the officer in that case
pointed particularly to that crime being committed by the truck's driver.
219. 392 U.S. at 27.
220. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The holding in Sibron also was confined to a weapons search. Be-
cause officers made no effort to explore for weapons but thrust their hands into Sibron's pockets to
seize drug packets that they suspected were there, the "search was not reasonably limited in scope
to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception--the
protection of an officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man." Id. at 65.
221. Id. at 66-67. See also State v. Blackwelder, 34 N.C. App. 352, 238 S.E.2d 190 (1977).
222. 44 N.C. App. 19,259 S.E.2d 779 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 333, 265 S.E.2d 399 (1980).
223. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (holding that once a suitcase had been
seized from defendant's automobile, it could not be searched without a warrant).
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mobile-search exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement be-
cause the exception does not apply when the car is under the control of the
police officer. Furthermore, the automobile-search exception does not apply
to luggage taken from automobiles. 224 The court also held that the officers'
search was not justified by a plain smell doctrine because this novel doctrine
would conflict with the objective of necessary searches being as limited as pos-
sible. "The sense of smell, unlike eyesight, does not always pinpoint what is
being sensed and where the material is located. '225
In a third court of appeals case, State v. Greenwood,226 the odor of mari-
juana detected by an officer making a license check of a "suspicious individ-
ual"227 was held sufficient as probable cause to search defendant's vehicle.
The court acknowledged judicial controversy over whether the odor of mari-
juana is in itself adequate probable cause to search for the substance itself,228
224. 44 N.C. App. at 20-21, 259 S.E.2d at 780-81.
225. Id. at 22, 259 S.E.2d at 781. While smell cannot suffice as a "plain view" exception to the
requisite warrant to search, it is permissible in the context of establishing probable cause. See,
eg., State v. Trapper, 48 N.C. App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680 (1980).
226. 47 N.C. App. 731, 268 S.E.2d 835 (1980).
227. Id. at 736, 268 S.E.2d at 838. The arrest in Greenwood presents the same questions of an
arrest on the pretense of a routine license check as those in State v. Trapper. See note 211 supra.
In Greenwood, an officer responded to a call about a suspicious person in a vehicle in a church
parking lot. The officer approached the car, and asked defendant to roll down his window and
present his driver's license. Id. at 732, 268 S.E.2d at 836. As in Trapper, the court in Greenwood
held the warrantless arrest valid under the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences
standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Greenwood opinion also cited State v. Thomp-
son, 296 N.C. 703, 252 S.E.2d 776, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979), where the North Carolina
Supreme Court admitted that the Terry standard, reaffirmed in Adams v. Walker, 407 U.S. 143
(1972), to permit "[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information," 407 U.S. at 146, "clearly
falls short of the traditional notion of probable cause, which is required for arrest." 296 N.C. at
706, 252 S.E.2d at 779. It is important to note, however, that the Adams facts, like those in Terry,
were confined to a weapons search for the officer's self-protection. Neither Thompson nor Green-
wood involved the officers' suspicion of weapon possession, but only the broader, looser criterion
of reasonable suspicion that defendants could be engaged in or connected with criminal activity.
See id. at 707, 252 S.E.2d at 779, and 47 N.C. App. at 737, 268 S.E.2d at 839. This is the precise
problem presented by the officers' similarly unspecific suspicion in Trapper, although the presence
of marijuana odor in Greenwood comes closer to legitimizing a search on these broader grounds
than did the facts in Trapper.
228. Compare United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1965) (odor of non-taxpaid
whiskey valid basis on which to seek a search warrant, but not sufficient to justify search and
seizure without a warrant); People v. Hilber, 403 Mich. 312, 269 N.W.2d 159 (1978) (even if it was
reasonable to conclude that a person smoking marijuana would have unburned marijuana in his
vehicle, a warrantless search was unjustified because it was unreasonable to conclude defendant
had been the smoker); and State v. Schoendaller, 578 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1978) (officer approached
defendant's vehicle, which was blocking traffic, smelled marijuana and incense, and searched ve-
hicle. "Odor alone, absent evidence of visible contents, is [not] equivalent to plain view... "'
Id. at 734.) with State v. Zamora, 114 Ariz. 75, 559 P.2d 195 (1977) (faint odor of marijuana
detected by officer arresting defendant for speeding sufficient probable cause to search defendant's
trunk); State v. Harrison, 111 Ariz. 508, 533 P.2d 1143 (1975) (where officer stopped car because
rear tire was bouncing and smelled marijuana while examining tire, search of car was valid); and
State v. Childers, 13 Or. 622, 511 P.2d 447 (1973) (when an officer smells marijuana in a vehicle,
he has probable cause to believe a crime is being committed in his presence and probable cause to
search for evidence of crime).
In other cases cited by the Greenwood court, probable cause to search was not based on
marijuana odor alone. See, e.g., United States v. Fortecha, 576 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 558 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977) (the detection of marijuana odor was
accompanied by officers' observation of marijuana bricks in plain view); State v. Ballestros, 23
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but held that "probable cause to search is established where, from surrounding
circumstances, there exists at least a 'probability' that contraband substances
are contained within the vehicle. '229 The court highlighted such circum-
stances in Greenwood as the officer's training in marijuana detection by odor,
his recognition of that odor emanating from defendant's car, and the exigen-
cies of the situation-where, had the officer left to get a search warrant, it
would have been unlikely that the defendant and his car would have been in
the lot when the officer returned.230
4. Searches Incident to Arrest
In State v. Booker23' an officer, acting on a reliable informant's tip, ap-
proached defendant in a parking lot and told her of the information received
and of the officer's right to search her purse for cocaine. Defendant refused to
allow the search and resisted the officer, whereupon she was arrested for de-
laying an officer. Her purse was searched incident to that arrest.232 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that, where probable cause to arrest already
existed, the officer was not compelled to place defendant formally under arrest
before the search. Because of existing probable course, "the arrest had, for the
purposes of constitutional justification, already taken place before the search
had commenced.'2 33 This decision accords with that of the United States
Supreme Court in Peters v. United States,234 where an officer pursued a fleeing
suspect, seized him by the collar, and searched him, finding burglar's tools.
The personal search was upheld as incident to a valid arrest, probable cause to
arrest and the physical apprehension of the defendant sufficing as announce-
ment of arrest. 235
Ariz. App. 211, 531 P.2d 1449, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975) (officers' initial stop of van was
justified by informant's tip that the car carried marijuana); United States v. Barron, 472 F.2d 1215
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973) (drivers near border checkpoints obviously were at-
tempting to evade officers). Yet the Greenwood court erroneously states that
in most, if not all [of these latter cases], probable cause to search was grounded on the
expertise and sound judgment of the investigating officer in assessing the probability that
the odor detected [was] that of a contraband substance and that it [was] reasonable to
assume that a search of the vehicle would reveal that substance.
47 N.C. App. at 741, 268 S.E.2d at 841. While the officers' expertise and judgment in detecting
marijuana odor were certainly factors in these cases, neither such skills nor the odor itself pro-
vided sole probable cause to search. Indeed, in United States v. Strickland, 534 F.2d 1386 (10th
Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 831 (1976), also cited in Greenwood as authority for marijuana odor as
probable cause to search without a warrant, the court stated outright that odor cannot supply
probable cause when an otherwise unjustified search is in progress. Id. at 1389.
229. 47 N.C. App. at 741, 268 S.E.2d at 841.
230. Id. at 742, 268 S.E.2d at 841-42.
231. 44 N.C. App. 492, 261 S.E.2d 215 (1980).
232. Id. at 492-93, 261 S.E.2d at 216. This act was suspect facially because a search incident to
arrest may not precede the arrest nor serve as part of its justification. See Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948).
233. 44 N.C. App. at 493, 261 S.E.2d at 217 (quoting Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67
(1968)).
234. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).




In State v. Hardy236 the supreme court rejected a claim that G.S. 15A-978
requires the state to reveal the identity of an informant whose tip is used to
establish probable cause in a warrantless arrest.237 Defendant sought to sup-
press evidence seized after a warrantless arrest on the ground that there was no
probable cause for the arrest. The court held that G.S. 15A-978 applies only
to search warrants,238 despite the plain language of subsection (b) which pro-
vides
In any proceeding on a motion to suppress evidence .. . in
which the truthfulness of the testimony presented to establish proba-
ble cause is contested and the testimony includes a report of informa-
tion by an informant. . . the defendant is entitled to be informed of
the informant's identity unless:
(1) The evidence. . was seized by authority of a search war-
rant or incident to an arrest with warrant; or
(2) There is corroboration of the informant's existence .... 239
This language seems to grant criminal defendants an absolute right to know
an informant's identity except when either of the two exceptions applies. The
Official Commentary reveals, however, that the legislature intended to restrict
challenges to searches entered into with a search warrant. 24° In addition, sub-
section (c) provides that "[t]his section does not limit the right of a defendant
to contest the truthfulness of testimony offered in support of a search made
without a warrant." 241 The intent of this subsection, according to the Official
Commentary, was "to make it clear that attacks upon the validity of probable
cause for a search without a warrant are left to case law development." 242
The court also found that defendant had no constitutional right to learn
the identity of an informant at a probable cause hearing under McCray v. Illi-
nois243 and that the evidence in the record revealed probable cause for the
arrest. 244 This holding is in line with past North Carolina decisions refusing
to disclose an informant's identity even when the informant's tip is the only
basis for the arrest.245
236. 299 N.C. 445, 263 S.E.2d 711 (1980).
237. Id. at 452, 263 S.E.2d at 716. For the other holding of Hardy, see notes 157-60 and
accompanying text supra.
238. The court quoted from subsection (a) which refers to the "validity of a search warrant,"
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-978(a) (1978), and found that this was the only concern of the statute. 299
N.C. at 452, 263 S.E.2d at 716.
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-978(b) (1978).
240. The Criminal Code Commission agreed with the Council of the American Law Institute's
conclusion that "'[w]hen the witness (usually an officer) has given hearsay evidence by reporting
what he has been told by an informant.. . the truth of the hearsay evidence so reported should
not be open to challenge, as long as the officer's report of the hearsay evidence was an honest
report." Id. § 15A-978, Official Commentary.
241. Id. § 15A-978(c).
242. Id. § 15A-978, Official Commentary.
243. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
244. 299 N.C. at 452-53, 263 S.E.2d at 716-17.
245. See, e.g., State v. Ketchie, 286 N.C. 387, 211 S.E.2d 207 (1975).
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G. Defendant's Silence
In State v. Lane246 the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a de-
fendant's silence while in custody cannot be used to impeach his alibi given at
trial. Even though defendant in Lane had not received his Miranda warnings,
the court held that the use of his silence for impeachment purposes violated his
privilege against self-incrimination. 247
Defendant was charged with selling heroin to an undercover police of-
ficer. While the indictments were being read but before the Miranda warnings
were given and interrogation began, defendant stated, "Hell, I sold heroin
before, but I didn't sell heroin to this person." 248 No other statements were
made. At trial defendant testified that he was out of town when he allegedly
committed the crime. Other evidence corroborated his alibi. On cross-exami-
nation the assistant district attorney asked defendant if he had informed the
police of this alibi.249 Defendant objected to the questioning, but the court
allowed the examination.250
Defendant argued that Doyle v. Ohio251 prevented the State from im-
peaching him with his failure to tell his alibi to the police. In Doyle defend-
ants were given their Miranda warnings when arrested and remained silent
until trial. The United States Supreme Court held that when defendants were
assured by the Miranda warnings that their silence would not be used against
them, it would violate their right to remain silent to impeach them by ques-
tioning their silence.252 Chief Justice Branch, writing for the North Carolina
Supreme Court, rejected the argument that Doyle applied to the facts in Lane.
The court reasoned that since defendant had not been advised of his Miranda
rights he was not exercising his rights under the due process clause as applied
in Doyle.253
The court recognized, however, that the right to remain silent attaches
when a person is arrested.254 The court then determined that defendant's si-
lence did not amount to a prior inconsistent statement. Further, the court
ruled that this error was prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial.255 Since
the cross-examination violated a constitutional right-defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination--the State must show that it was harmless beyond a
246. 301 N.C. 382, 271 S.E.2d 273 (1980).
247. Id. at 384, 271 S.E.2d at 275.
248. Id. at 382, 271 S.E.2d at 274.
249. Id. at 382-83, 271 S.E.2d at 274.
250. Id. at 383, 271 S.E.2d at 274.
251. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
252. Id. at 611.
253. 301 N.C. at 384, 271 S.E.2d at 275. In the same case, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals applied Doyle to hold that the assistant district attorney's use of silence for impeachment
purposes was unconstitutionaL State v. Lane, 46 N.C. App. 501, 265 S.E.2d 493 (1980). The court
held that while the Miranda warnings are an "easily recognizable signpost," Doyle should be
extended to this case where the defendant was aware of his rights (because of previous arrests) and
was relying on those rights (he stated at trial, "I wasn't going to make no statement"). Id. at 505-
06, 265 S.E.2d at 496. See also note 259 infra.
254. 301 N.C. at 384, 271 S.E.2d at 275.
255. Id. at 387, 271 S.E.2d at 277.
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reasonable doubt.25 6 In this case, the State was trying to convince the jury that
the alibi was an "after-the-fact creation," and since the alibi was crucial to the
defendant's defense, the court found that it was likely that the impeachment
"substantially contributed to his conviction. ' 25 7
The court's recognition that the right to remain silent is guaranteed absent
Miranda warnings is important, but by requiring the evidentiary test that the
silence be unnatural,2 58 the court diminished the significance of the case. The
court was correct in noting that it may have been natural for the defendant to
respond that he did not sell the drugs, but it should not be considered a possi-
ble relinquishment of his right to remain silent. A better approach would have
been for the court to extend the Doyle holding to include in-custody silence
even if Miranda warnings were not given.259 Alternatively, the court could
have adopted the view taken by the federal courts that silence at the time of
arrest has a highly prejudicial effect but little probative value and therefore
should not be admitted. 260 Only in cases where the defendant has waived his
right of silence should courts analyze whether it was natural to mention a ma-
terial circumstance in a prior statement.
In a second case, State v. Haith,261 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. The Lane court said, "If the former statement fails to mention a material circumstance
presently testified to, which it would have beween natural to mention in theprior statement, the prior
statement is sufficiently inconsistent." Id. at 385, 271 S.E.2d at 275 (citing State v. Mack, 282 N.C.
334, 339-40, 193 S.E.2d 71, 75 (1975)). Thus, silence will be a prior inconsistent statement only if
it is unnatural.
259. North Carolina courts have been reluctant to adopt this approach. In State v. Burnett, 39
N.C. App. 605, 251 S.E.2d 717, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 302, 254 S.E.2d 924 (1979), defendants were
convicted of felonious larceny of photography equipment. While they were in custody, absent
Miranda warnings, they remained silent. At trial they claimed they bought the equipment from a
third party. The court of appeals ruled that the silence was admissible for impeachment purposes.
In limiting Doyle to cases in which Miranda warnings were given, the court reasoned that since
defendants had no assurance of their right to remain silent, it was not "unreasonable or unfair to
expect" defendants to inform the authorities of the third party. Id. at 609, 251 S.E.2d at 720.
Also, while the lower court in Lane applied Doyle, see note 253 supra, the supreme court rejected
it.
The right to remain silent, however, is conferred by the Constitution, not by the Miranda
warnings. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2134 n.l (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Therefore, if a defendant was interrogated and remained silent without being given his Miranda
warnings, his silence should be inadmissible. While recognizing the possible distinction in Doyle,
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Jenkins, felt that the highly prejudicial effect on defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination compared with the low probative value of the evidence mandated
that defendant's silence be excluded. Id.
260. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), ruled
that "silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative value." Id. at 176. Many factors may
induce the silence, including Miranda warnings. Id. at 177. As a result, the court exercised its
supervisory power over the federal courts and held that a defendant's post-arrest silence was not
admissible. Id. at 181.
In State v. Love, 296 N.C. 194, 250 S.E.2d 220 (1978), the North Carolina Supreme Court
appeared to be adopting the Hale approach. In holding that silence while in custody cannot be
used for impeachment, the court equated a prior case which it deemed to be controlling, State v.
Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975), with Hale. 296 N.C. at 202,250 S.E.2d at 226. But
in other cases, silence has been held admissible. E.g., State v. Burnett, 39 N.C. App. 605, 251
S.E.2d 717, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 302, 254 S.E.2d 924 (1979).
261. 48 N.C. App. 319, 269 S.E.2d 205 (1980).
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found that defendant's silence was admissible for impeachment purposes
where defendant made a statement262 while in custody with regard to the mur-
der of his sister's boyfriend but did not state that he killed the deceased in self-
defense. The court stated that the recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Jenkins v. 4nderson263 was controlling.264 In Jenkins, defendant con-
tended that he killed the deceased in self-defense. On cross-examination he
was asked why he waited two weeks before surrendering to authorities. The
prosecutor, in his closing statement, implied that defendant would have spo-
ken out if he had killed in self-defense. 265 The Court held that "[ejach juris-
diction may formulate its own rules of evidence to determine when prior
silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by refer-
ence to such silence is probative. '266 In this case "no government action in-
duced petitioner to remain silent before arrest;" therefore, there was no
fundamental unfaimess. 267
The Haith court applied Jenkins to the facts and held that the admissibil-
ity of defendant's silence did not violate the North Carolina Constitution.268
Furthermore, the court noted that defendant had given up his right to remain
silent since he had made a statement after being informed of his rights. 269
The court was correct in ruling that defendant had given up his right to
remain silent. As a result, however, it should have ruled on the admissibility
of defendant's silence using typical evidentiary standards. 270 The court's reli-
ance on Jenkins however, is misplaced. 271 Unlike the defendant in Jenkins,
defendant in Haith was in custody, had been read his rights, and gave a state-
ment which he tried to change on the stand.272 Jenkins, on the other hand,
dealt with pre-arrest silence where the silence was inconsistent with later testi-
mony.2 73
262. Defendant made the following statement:
Johnny came from around the corner saying he was going to get me. I then went
into the house and got a .22 caliber pistol and came back out. He, Johnny, kept on
running his mouth about he was going to get me, and he took off running and I shot at
him one time and that was it. I then went back into the house. This statement is of my
own free will and I have been advised of my rights, and I understand them. No pressure
or coercion of any kind has been used against me.
Id. at 327, 269 S.E.2d at 210.
263. 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980).
264. 48 N.C. App. at 328, 269 S.E.2d at 211.
265. 100 S. Ct. at 2125.
266. Id. at 2129. The holding in Doyle, where defendant was informed of his Miranda rights,
is an exception. Id. at 2130.
267. I1d. at 2130.
268. 48 N.C. App. at 328, 269 S.E.2d at 211.
269. Id.
270. Where a defendant has omitted a material circumstance in a prior statement, to deter-
mine if it is inconsistent, the court must determine if it would have been natural to mention it. See
note 258 and accompanying text supra.
271. On the other hand, the court in Lane noted Jenkins but correctly stated that it did not
apply. Jenkins dealt with pre-arrest silence, while Lane was a post-arrest case and within the
"ambit of fifth amendment protections." 301 N.C. at 385, 271 S.E.2d at 275.
272. 48 N.C. App. at 328, 269 S.E.2d at 211.
273. 100 S. Ct. at 2130. The court should have relied on Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404
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H. Suppression Hearing Statements
In State v. Bracey,274 defendant moved to suppress a confession, claiming
that he was on PCP when he made the statement. The motion was denied,
and at trial defendant was asked, over his objections, if he used PCP. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that this was a proper line of question-
ing.2 75
Defendant argued that Simmons v. United States276 should control.277 In
that case defendant moved to suppress a suitcase that he claimed was the fruit
of an unlawful search. The motion was denied, and defendant's statements of
ownership made at the suppression hearing were introduced into evidence.
The United States Supreme Court held this to be error, stating that a defend-
ant should not have to give up his fifth amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation to assert his fourth amendment right against illegal searches and
seizures. 278 In Bracey, defendant argued that if the state has the right to cross-
examine him concerning matters that he testified to at the suppression hearing,
he may be forced to give up his fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion to suppress the confession.279
The court, however, distinguished Simmons on several grounds. First, in
Simmons the statements were used directly against the defendant. Defendant
in Bracey, on the other hand, was not questioned about his testimony at the
suppression hearing, but only was asked whether he used PCP.28 0 Also, the
court stated that the information may have come from another source and that
it should not be incompetent simply because defendant testified on a motion to
suppress.28 '
I Other Cases
The supreme court and the court of appeals made several other notewor-
thy decisions in the area of criminal procedure in 1980, most of them related to
(1980). Charles dealt with a situation similar to Haith, where defendant added a fact to his state-
ment at trial which he did not include in his statement while under custodial interrogation. The
court held that Doyle did not apply. "Each of two inconsistent descriptions of events may be said
to involve 'silence' insofar as it omits facts included in the other version. But Doyle does not
require any such formalistic understanding of 'silence,' and we find no reason to adopt such a view
in this case." Id. at 409.
274. 48 N.C. App. 603, 269 S.E.2d 289 (1980).
275. Id. at 605-06, 269 S.E.2d at 291.
276. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
277. 48 N.C. App. at 605, 269 S.E.2d at 290.
278. 390 U.S. at 394.
279. 48 N.C. App. at 605, 269 S.E.2d at 291.
280. Id. at 605-06, 269 S.E.2d at 291.
281. Id. at 606, 269 S.E.2d at 291.
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282. The North Carolina Supreme Court held in State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126,261 S.E.2d 803
(1980), that jurors who answered "I don't believe I would" and "I don't think so" when asked
whether they could vote to impose the death penalty could be excluded for cause. In State v.
Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 114 (1980), the supreme court held that in determining whether to
grant defendant's motion for directed verdict, the trial court need not determine "that the evidence
excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence," Id. at 101, 261 S.E.2d at 119. In State v.
Goode, 300 N.C. 726, 268 S.E.2d 82 (1980), the supreme court held that it was an abuse of discre-
tion for the trial judge to deny defense counsel's request for a recess at the close of the state's
evidence to determine whether defendant should testify. In State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 266
S.E.2d 631 (1980), the supreme court held that the State may offer defendant's statement without
making a preliminary examination into his mental competence if the statement was not made in
response to custodial interrogation. In State v. Cole, 46 N.C. App. 592, 265 S.E.2d 507 (1980), the





Chavis v. North Carolina' has generated much attention in state and na-
tional media in the last few years. After a series of appeals and collateral
attacks in state and federal courts, 2 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the convictions of the "Wilmington l10"3 in a habeas corpus action be-
cause the prosecutor withheld documents from the defense suitable for
impeaching key state witnesses, thus violating defendants' constitutional right
to confront the witnesses against them.4
On February 6, 1971, as the culmination of weeks of racial conflict,
Mike's Grocery in Wilmington, N.C. was firebombed, and fire and police per-
sonnel were fired upon as they attempted to extinguish the blaze. Defendants
were charged with, and convicted of, felonious burning and conspiracy to as-
sault emergency personnel.5
The testimony of Allen Hall, directly incriminating defendants, was cru-
cial to the state's case. Yet Hall's testimony was subject to attack on several
grounds, most significant of which were inconsistencies between his prior
statements and testimony at trial,6 and potential bias because of special treat-
ment accorded him by the prosecution. 7 Hall gave a short statement to police
on May 30, 1971, and gave a second, more complete statement on February
18, 1971, after his conviction for participation in these crimes.8 These two
statements were furnished by the prosecutor to the defense in response to a
motion to produce any statements made by potential witnesses. When he fur-
l. 637 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1980).
2. After the trial in Wilmington district court and a post-conviction hearing, defendants'
convictions were affirmed in State v. Chavis, 24 N.C. App. 148, 203, 210 S.E.2d 555, 589 (1974),
and certiorari was denied by the North Carolina and United States Supreme Courts. 287 N.C.
261, 214 S.E.2d 434 (1975) (appeal dismissed); 423 U.S. 1080 (1975). Judge Dupree of the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina then reviewed the case and denied
habeas corpus relief, from which this appeal to the Fourth Circuit was taken. 637 F.2d at 213-14.
3. The Wilmington 10 included defendants Benjamin F. Chavis, Connie Tindal, Willie Earl
Vereen, Marvin Patrick, Anne Shepard Turner, Joe Wright, Wayne Moore, Reginald Epps, Jerry
Jacobs, and James McKoy. 637 F.2d at 214 n.l.
4. Defense counsel presented many contentions as to why the Wilmington 10's constitu-
tional rights were violated, many of which had a sharply contested factual basis. The court, how-
ever, based its decision only on those issues for which the facts were undisputed. Id. at 215.
Issues excluded from consideration by the court included: the prosecutor's omission of fourteen
names from the pre-trial witness list presented to defense counsel; the prosecution's use of testi-
mony which it knew or had reason to know was perjured; the prosecution's pretrial exhibition of
photographs of petitioners to key prosecution witnesses for identification purposes; the trial court's
refusal to permit inquiry into the jury's racial attitudes and bias, and its refusal to conduct the voir
dire examination of each potential juror out of the presence of jurors already chosen and other
prospective jurors. Id.
5. Id. at 213.
6. Id. at 217-19.
7. Id. at 220-22.
8. Id. at 217. This statement was reduced to nine typewritten pages by the prosecutor, and
Hall signed it under oath. Id.
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nished these statements, the prosecutor represented that Hall had made no
other statements. On cross-examination, however, Hall, in an attempt to ex-
plain away inconsistencies between his prior statements and his direct exami-
nation, referred to an "amended" version of his statement of February 18.9
Defense counsel made five separate motions for production of this "amended"
statement, and was opposed by the prosecutor, who stated that the corrections
were made by him, for his use only, and part of work product.10 These correc-
tions were made during a series of interviews between Hall and the prosecutor.
All motions for production were denied by the trial court.I1 It appeared later
that many of Hall's claimed "amendments" did not exist, thus there was fertile
ground for impeaching Hall if the defense could obtain the "amended" state-
ments.1
2
Brady v. Maryland,13 as refined and expanded upon in United States v.
Agurs,14 states the basic rule that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution." 15 Agurs explains the test for materiality. If the ma-
terial was specifically requested by the defense, and might have affected the
outcome of the trial, its nonproduction is a denial of due process. 16 If the
request was merely a general request for exculpatory documents, a stricter
standard of materiality is mandated.' 7 The Chavis court found that the
"amended" statement had been specifically requested six times,18 and that any
work product privilege was waived by the prosecutor when his witness testified
as to the subject matter covered by the privilege.' 9
The second document at issue was a psychiatric report prepared on Hall
at Cherry Hospital in Goldsboro in October 1971 to determine his competency
9. Id. at 218.
10. Id. at 218 n.9.
11. Id. at 218-19. The trial court apparently agreed with the prosecutor's work product
claim.
12. Id. at 219. One such inconsistency was the failure of Hall to place Mitchell, another
witness, at the scene of the crime, but then testifying that Mitchell was present. Other inconsisten-
cies included Chavis' supposed instructions on throwing firebombs, and Hall's whereabouts on
February 6. Id.
13. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
14. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
15. 373 U.S. at 87.
16. 427 U.S. at 104.
17. Id. The court did not elaborate on what the stricter standard of materiality entailed.
18. 637 F.2d at 223.
19. Id. at 224. The Chavis court quoted United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975):
The privilege derived from the work product doctrine is not absolute. Like other
qualified privileges, it may be waived.. . .Respondent, by electing to present the inves-
tigator as a witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters covered in his testimony.
Respondent can no more advance the work product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testi-
monial use of work product materials than he could elect to testify in his own behalf and
thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross-examination on matters
reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination.
422 U.S. at 239-40 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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to stand trial.20 The prosecutor had failed to produce this report in response
to a pretrial motion to produce all "scientific or medical, psychiatric or other
reports which might tend to reflect on the credibility or competence of any of
the prospective witnesses for the State." 21 Applying the Agurs test to the psy-
chiatric report, the court concluded that it also had been specificallyrequested
and that its contents clearly might have affected the jury's decision.22
A third error which the court found sufficiently prejudicial to require re-
versal was the refusal of the trial court to permit cross-examination of two
witnesses, Allen Hall and Jerome Mitchell, on the special favorable treatment
accorded them by the state in return for their testimony.23 This special treat-
ment, as found by the post-conviction court, consisted of lodging in hotel
rooms and a cottage at Carolina Beach during the trial, rather than prison
incarceration permitting small stakes card games with deputies, using money
supplied by the deputies; concealing an attack by Hall on one of the deputies,
transporting Hall's girlfriend from Asheville to Carolina Beach and giving a
minibike to Mitchell. 24
The court's holding that defendants' sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion had been violated was grounded on the Supreme Court's decision in Davis
v. 41aska.25 In Davis the Court held that a defendant must be allowed to
impeach a prosecution witness for bias because "the exposure of a witness'
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitution-
ally protected right of cross-examination." 26 Davis recognized several limita-
tions on these rights, including the witness' constitutional protection against
self-incrimination or an attempt to harass, annoy, or humiliate the witness.2 7
The Chavis court found none of these conditions to be present.28 This appears
consistent with accepted North Carolina law that the bias of a witness toward
either parties or cause may be shown by influence, contributions, payment for
testimony, and that cross-examination on bias should be as broad as possi-
ble.29
The Chavis decision is a clear-cut application of the rules set forth in
Davis and Brady v. Maryland. It is puzzling that the case could have gone
through so many reviews without reversal on these grounds. The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals did consider the concealment of Hall's amended state-
ment and the limitation on cross-examination.30 The court of appeals
20. 637 F.2d at 219-20.
21. Id. at 219-20. The report stated that Hall was a "borderline defective" and "[als to the
charge of arson of a grocery store, he states that he did not participate in this, but he was present
on the scene when the store was burned." Id. at 19.
22. Id. at 224. For the relevant portions of the pyschiatric report, see note 21 supra.
23. 637 F.2d at 225-26.
24. Id. at 221-22 & n.13.
25. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
26. Id. at 316-17 (citing Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)).
27. Id. at 320 (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931)).
28. 637 F.2d at 226.
29. 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EvIDENCE § 45 (H. Brandis rev. 1973).
30. 24 N.C. App. 148, 210 S.E.2d 555 (1974).
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believed that the answers of Hall to defense questions on his treatment by the
prosecutor were properly excluded because they did not disclose bias and that
exclusion was necessary to protect the witness. 31 The court at this point was
only considering the housing provided Hall during the trial, and not other
inducements which the trial court also excluded from questioning. 32 The
Fourth Circuit chose to review a wider range of prosecutorial activities.
The court of appeals also considered the application of the Brady and
Davis rules, as applied by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Gaines,33 to the concealment of the amended statement. The court held that it
was not materially favorable to the defense, therefore its concealment was not
prejudicial to defendants.34 The statements were held nonmaterial for two
reasons: (1) the amendments were not complete statements or sentences, and
were "obviously meaningless to anyone" except the prosecutor,35 and (2) Hall
could not have known during the interviews what the prosecutor was writing,
and so he could not have adopted the statements as his own.3 6 However, it
appears that Hall later adopted these statements in his testimony at trial, yet
the court ignored the effect of this action. Hall was allowed to wiggle out of
past inconsistencies by alleging the existence of the amended statement, which
the defense had no way of disproving since the trial judge denied them access
to the statements. The disparate application of Brady is apparently due to the
Fourth Circuit's belief that nondisclosure of the document limited the im-
peachment of a crucial prosecution witness, thus constituting prosecutorial
suppression of a material document favorable to the defense.
2. Impeaching the Defendant
Two North Carolina Supreme Court cases re-examined North Carolina's
rule on impeachment of a defendant through questioning about prior acts of
misconduct. The majority ofjurisdictions limit this type of questioning to acts
which have some relation to the character of the defendant for truth and ve-
racity.37 In North Carolina, however, "[a]ll kinds of disparaging facts may be
elicited," 38 subject only to four limitations: (1) the sound discretion of the
trial judge; (2) the prohibition against questions asked about mere indictments
or charges; (3) the requirement that the questioner be bound by the witness'
answer, and (4) the mandate that questions be asked in good faith.39
31. Id. at 195, 210 S.E.2d at 583-84.
32. Id. at 194, 210 S.E.2d at 583.
33. 283 N.C. 33, 194 S.E.2d 839 (1973).
34. 24 N.C. App. at 183-84, 210 S.E.2d at 577-78.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 183-84, 210 S.E.2d at 578.
37. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 42 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
See, e.g. FED. R. Evm. 608(b). For a list of state jurisdictions adhering to this view, see Annot.,
36 A.L.R. Fed. 564 (1978).
38. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 29, § 111, at 341.
39. State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954). All jurisdictions allow questioning
about prior convictions, but the North Carolina rule of questioning about prior misconduct is not
limited to misconduct which has been the subject of a conviction, and a witness may be asked
whether he actually committed a crime. 1 D. STANSBURY, azqra note 29, § 112.
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In State v. Leonard4° defendant was charged with the murder of her sis-
ter.4 1 The trial court preliminarily ruled that questioning on prior homicides
committed by defendant would be prohibited if she had been acquitted by
reason of insanity. The prosecutor had a Police Information Network (PIN)
report showing that defendant had been acquitted by reason of insanity in a
prior homicide in Florida in 1973. Nevertheless, on cross-examination, the
prosecutor questioned defendant about commission of the prior homicide42
despite defense objections and requests for PIN reports. Four days later the
trial defense counsel and the court were told that defendant had been found
not guilty by reason of insanity in the prior homicide.43 The court sustained
the prosecutor's questioning under the theory that he may ask if defendant has
committed an act of prior misconduct, but not whether he was accused, ar-
rested or indicted. The court viewed the prior homicide as misconduct that
would be a proper subject of good faith cross-examination." Despite defend-
ant's contention that the prosecutor concealed the exculpatory PIN report
from the trial court and defense counsel, the aIpellate court stated that the
report provided a sufficient basis for the prosecutor to question defendant
about the prior killing. The court declined to extend the "good faith" rule to
the prosecutor's failure to disclose the PIN report for three reasons. First, the
prosecutor still could have questioned her about the Florida homicide as long
as he did not ask if she had been arrested or indicted for it. Second, the only
value the report had to defendant was to corroborate her testimony that she
was never tried for the offenses because of her insanity. However, "[h]er state-
40. 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980).
In State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978), the court announced that North
Carolina will admit declarations against penal interest as a valid exception to the hearsay rule.
Codefendants were charged with assault in Haywood, and one defendant sought to have his code-
fendant's otherwise inadmissible confession admitted as a declaration against penal interest. Then
Chief Justice Sharp, writing for the court, overruled many prior decisions in adopting the excep-
tion, but held that it would not apply to the present facts because exclusion was deemed not to be
prejudicial to defendant. Furthermore, the trial judge relied on long-standing precedent in mak-
ing his ruling. Id. at 721, 249 S.E.2d at 437.
State v. Honeycutt, 46 N.C. App. 588, 265 S.E.2d 438 (1980), seeks to clarify that the rule
announced in Haywood is to be prospective only. The court in Honeycutt concluded that the
changed rule was a mere change in evidentiary rules, affecting no vested right of defendant, thus
did not rise to the magnitude of a constitutional reform which would mandate retroactivity. To
give retroactive effect to a change in such a long-standing rule "could easily disrupt the orderly
administration of our criminal law." Id. at 591,265 S.E.2dat 440 (quoting the Attorney General).
In declaring the prospective application of Iaywood, the Honeycutt court apparently reached in-
dependently the same decision reached by then Chief Justice Sharp in Haywood when she de-
clined to apply the changed rule to the facts of Haywood, but stated that the new rule would apply
in cases thereafter. 295 N.C. at 721, 249 S.E.2d at 437. For a general discussion of Haywood, see
Note, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 375 (1979).
41. 300 N.C. at 225, 266 S.E.2d at 633.
42. Id. at 231, 266 S.E.2d at 637.
43. d. at 237, 266 S.E.2d at 640. There was also a question concerning defendant's sanity in
the present action. Defendant filed a pretrial motion suggesting her incapacity to proceed to trial,
but she was certified competent after observation at Dorothea Dix Hospital. Id. at 226, 266 S.E.2d
at 633. At trial, she entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. On appeal she urged
that it was error for the trial court to deny her motion for a directed verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity, but the court rejected this, holding that she had failed to overcome the presumption of
sanity. Id. at 234, 266 S.E.2d at 638.
44. Id. at 232, 240, 266 S.E.2d at 637, 641.
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ment was not challenged in any way and there is no reason to believe that the
jury did not accept it at face value."45 Finally, the trial judge himself had not
censured the prosecutor for failing to disclose the PIN report.46
There was a vigorous dissent, written by Justice Copeland, and joined by
Justices Exum and Carlton, disputing the majority's analysis on two points.
First, Copeland argued that this was not misconduct, since killing is not al-
ways wrongful. "Under our law and the mores of our society, killing is not
categorically wrong..... When a question is put to a witness about some
prior act for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, and the question does
not show by its phrasing that the act was wrongful, an objection to it should be
sustained." 47 The conduct must be morally or legally wrong to impeach the
character of the defendant, but "[ajn insane person cannot be held accountable
for his actions because, by definition, he knows not the difference between
right and wrong."'48 Second, Copeland argued that in withholding this infor-
mation from the court and defense counsel the prosecutor deliberately disre-
garded an instruction from the trial judge that no cross-examination on a prior
killing would be allowed if there had been an acquittal by reason of insanity.49
The prosecutor directly caused an error which prejudiced defendant because
he incorrectly put before the jury information about a prior killing for which
defendant was not legally responsible.50
Another case in which the court split on the use of questions about prior
acts of misconduct to impeach a defendant is State v. Royal.51 In Royal de-
fendant was charged with armed robbery, burglary, and assault with intent to
kill.52 At trial, defendant was asked by the prosecutor whether he had, prior
to the present charge, "kidnapped and robbed Mr. Robert Knowles of
$1,125.00 on 24 May, 1979." 53 The prosecutor knew before questioning that
45. Id. at 241, 266 S.E.2d at 642.
46. Id. at 241-42, 266 S.E.2d at 642.
47. Id. at 243, 266 S.E.2d at 643 (Copeland, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Purcell, 296 N.C.
728, 733, 252 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1979) (Exum, J., dissenting)). Justice Exum wrote a similar dissent
in State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978), which is discussed in Survey of Developments
in North Carolina Law, 1978-Evidence, 57 N.C.L. REv. 1071-73 (1978).
48. 300 N.C. at 245, 266 S.E.2d at 644.
49. Id. at 245-46, 266 S.E.2d at 644-45.
50. Id. at 246, 266 S.E.2d at 645.
51. 300 N.C. at 515, 268 S.E.2d at 517 (1980).
52. Id. at 517, 268 S.E.2d at 520. There was also an issue whether a photographic identifica-
tion of defendant by his victims was unduly suggestive. The court found no merit to this conten-
tion, since the victims immediately identified defendant's picture from a group of five
photographs. Id. at 521, 268 S.E.2d at 522.
53. Id. at 529, 268 S.E.2d at 526. Additionally, the court had to consider whether certain
leading questions by the prosecutor to his witness were reversible error. The court stated that the
use of leading questions was within the discretion of the trial judge and would only be disturbed
on appeal when there was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 526, 268 S.E.2d at 525. The factors
controlling this discretion are set out in State v. Greene, 285 N.C. 482, 206 S.E.2d 229 (1974),
which allowed leading questions when the witness is (I) hostile or unwilling to testify, (2) having
difficulty understanding the questions, (3) testifying on subject matter of a delicate nature,
(4) contradicting prior witnesses, (5) at the end of his memory, (6) giving preliminary testimony,
(7) straying from the subject matter, or (8) is unlikely to testify truthfully without the use of
questions best calculated to elicit the truth. Id. at 492-93, 206 S.E.2d at 236. After reviewing the
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the prior charge had been dismissed for lack of probable cause.54 The court
held that this questioning was permissible to show prior acts of degrading con-
duct, and did not discuss whether the questioning was in good faith. Justice
Exum, joined by Justice Carlton, dissented on the grounds that the question-
ing was not in good faith,55 stating that although one may ask about prior acts
of misconduct, a recent decision of the court, State v. Williams, 56 prohibited
questions about mere charges that have not resulted in convictions. The pros-
ecutor's knowledge that the charges had been dismissed for lack of probable
cause indicates that he "must have been motivated by his desire to put before
the jury the fact that defendant had been charged with an offense similar to
the one for which he was being tried. '57 Thus, the question was not asked in
good faith.
Justice Exum has consistently argued58 against permitting cross-examina-
tion about prior charges of which the defendant was not convicted because of
Greene factors, the court concluded there had been no abuse of discretion. 300 N.C. at 526, 268
S.E.2d at 525.
54. Id. at 532, 268 S.E.2d at 528.
55. Id. at 532, 268 S.E.2d at 528. The questioning, at the very end of defendant's testimony,
was as follows:





REDIRECT EXAMINATION (By Mr. Taylor).
I was charged with kidnapping and robbing Mr. Knowles. Mr. Knowles testified under
oath that he could not identify me as the man who robbed him. He did testify to that
and no probable cause was found in the District Court of Wayne County. The charges
were dismissed. Those charges were brought against me after I was arrested on these
charges.
RECROSS EXAMINATION (By Mr. Jacobs).
Mr. Knowles did testify that I looked like the man but he wasn't a hundred percent sure.
He told the court that. He said he wouldn't stake his like on it. He didn't say I looked
like the man. He said, the officer, Officer Stan Flowers brought him some photographs
and said I had been charged with something that happened, was a suspect and he asked
him to look at the photographs to recognize me. No, sir, he didn't say that I look like
him.
Id. at 531, 268 S.E.2d at 528.
56. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971). Williams was the case where
North Carolina, with then Chief Justice Bobbitt writing the opinion, finally joined the majority of
state jurisdictions in prohibiting questioning as to whether a defendant has been arrested, charged,
or indicted for a particular crime. Id. at 672, 185 S.E.2d at 180. Wlliams left unchanged the rule
that a defendant maybe questioned on whether he has committed a certain act, if the question is
otherwise correct. Id. at675, 185 S.E.2d at 181.
57. 300 N.C. at 532, 268 S.E.2d at 528.
58. See State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 225, 266 S.E.2d 631 (1980) (Copeland, J., dissenting,
joined by Exum and Carlton, JJ.), discussed in notes 40-50 and accompanying text supra; State v.
Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 259 S.E.2d 263 (1979) (Exum, J., concurring); State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488,
246 S.E.2d 780 (1978) (Exum, J., dissenting), discussed in note 47 supra.
Exum wrote in Herbin:
When one has been tried for and acquitted of a particular crime that should end the
matter for all purposes. A person so acquitted should not be required to defend himself
against the charge in subsequent criminal proceedings in which he may become in-
volved.
298 N.C. at 453, 259 S.E.2d at 271.
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its highly prejudicial effect. "The jury reasons that a man who has previously
been implicated in criminal activity is more likely than not to be guilty this
time."59
Although the Leonard and Royal dissents concern the same subject mat-
ter, they are different in their approach. While in Leonard it was conceded
that the conduct, homicide, had occurred, the question was whether such con-
duct was wrongful because of defendant's mental illness at the time. In Royal
the issue was whether defendant ever committed the misconduct at all.60 The
information possessed by the prosecutors in both cases should have been suffi-
cient to challenge the good faith basis of the questioning, yet the court found it
was not. Thus, the combination of North Carolina's liberal impeachment
rules about prior acts of misconduct 61 and the loose interpretation of the good
faith rule62 yields results which quite often are prejudicial to a defendant's
right to a fair trial.
3. Impeaching the State's Witness63
Two North Carolina cases, State v. Lovelte64 and State v. Moore65 reaf-
firmed the rule that a party may not impeach his own witness absent genuine
surprise. 66 These cases illustrate why there is increasing dissatisfaction with
59. 300 N.C. at 533, 268 S.E.2d at 529.
60. The Fourth Circuit appears to have accepted Justice Exum's reasoning that questioning
on prior misconduct cannot be in good faith when there is little or no evidence that the defendant
has committed the act. The court reversed the North Carolina Supreme Court in the case of
Watkins v. Foster, 570 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1978). At trial Foster was questioned about prior bur-
glares, even though the state had only minimal evidence that Foster had ever committed them.
Even though Foster denied commission of the burglaries, the court of appeals believed the ques-
tions to be insinuating, detrimental to defendant's credibility, and not asked in good faith. For a
discussion of both the appellate and state court decisions in Watkins, see Survey ofRecent Develop-
ments in North Carolina Law, 1978--Eidence, 57 N.C.L. REv. 1074-77 (1979).
61. See notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text, supra.
62. See notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text, supra.
63. In State v. Austin, 299 N.C. 537, 263 S.E.2d 574 (1980), the supreme court rejected
defendant's claim that N.C.R Cw. P. 43(b) which allows a party to impeach his own witness,
should apply to criminal cases. The court extended the reasoning in several cases which held that
the district attorney could not impeach state witnesses in a criminal case to defendants in criminal
cases. See State v. Pope, 287 N.C. 505, 215 S.E.2d 139 (1975); State v. Anderson, 283 N.C. 218,
195 S.E.2d 561 (1973).
In Austin, defendant was charged with first degree burglary. 299 N.C. at 537, 263 S.E.2d at
574. Defendant sought to call an eight year old daughter of the family that lived in the house he
was accused of trying to burglarize. Defendant had some information that the daughter had made
statements to several persons that "there was no one in the house that night." The trial court
refused to declare the child a hostile witness and refused to allow defendant to impeach the child
by prior inconsistent statements. Id. at 538, 263 S.E.2d at 574-75. Because the defendant was not
suprised" by the girl's testimony, he failed to qualify for any exception to the anti-impeachment
rule. 299 N.C. at 540, 263 S.E.2d at 575. See generally C. McCoRMICK, supra note 37, § 38 (the
rule against showing prior statements of one's own witness, to aid in evaluating his testimony, is
criticized as a serious obstruction to the ascertainment of truth).
64. 299 N.C. 642, 263 S.E.2d 751 (1980).
65. 300 N.C. 694, 268 S.E.2d 196 (1980).
66. The common law rule was that a party calling a witness vouched for his credibility, thus
could not impeach the witness' testimony. C. McCoRMicK, supra note 37, § 38. Two exceptions
to this rule are if the subject matter of the witness' testimony is a surprise to the calling party, and
if the testimony is positively harmful to the calling party's theory of the case. Id. North Carolina
ascribes to this view, requiring that a voir dire be held to determine whether the prosecutor has
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that rule.67
In Lovette, a murder trial, the prosecutor called Clifford Johnson to the
stand, who testified that he was with defendant after the murder took place but
that defendant did not discuss the murder with him. The prosecutor claimed
surprise, and moved to declare Johnson a hostile witness so that he might im-
peach him.6 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed defendant's con-
viction, holding that the prosecutor was not genuinely surprised, because he
knew or had reason to know Johnson intended to repudiate his prior state-
ments by his present testimony.69 An investigating officer had stated on voir
dire that Johnson informed him three weeks after giving his pretrial statement
that he did not want to testify to what he had stated, and the district attorney
learned of Johnson's reservations the following day in a meeting with the of-
ficer.70
In State v. Moore71 the supreme court ruled that when a prosecutor
knows beforehand that his witness intends to testify differently from her pre-
trial statements, he cannot impeach her. Other witnesses may not be used to
impeach her testimony through statements made by her to them, under the
guise of corroborating her testimony, when their testimony is not indepen-
dently admissible. 72 The court followed earlier precedents in ruling that the
prosecutor cannot impeach his own witness when there is no genuine surprise,
and in this case no surprise was shown to exist at the voir dire.
73
Most commentators no longer see any justification for a rule limiting im-
peachment of one's own witness. 74 This view was recognized by the federal
been genuinely surprised or misled by the testimony and if the testimony is positively harmful to
his case. Both elements must be shown before he will be allowed to impeach his own witness'
credibility. State v. Pope, 287 N.C. 505, 512-13, 215 S.E.2d 139, 144-45 (1975). Pope held that
despite a witness' testimony, he remains the witness of the party calling him, and that neither
surprise nor positive harm will automatically trigger the exception to the general rule. Id. at 512-
13, 215 S.E.2d at 145. When the prosecutor, before the witness is called, knows or has reason to
know the testimony will not be as he expects, there is no surprise, and the prosecutor will not be
allowed to impeach the witness. Id. at 514, 215 S.E.2d at 145. See 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note
29, § 40.
67. See note 74 infra.
68. 299 N.C. at 645, 263 S.E.2d at 754.
69. Id. at 649, 263 S.E.2d at 756. The court followed the ruling of the Pope case, note 68
supra.
70. 299 N.C. at 649, 263 S.E.2d at 756. Johnson stated to Sink that his pretrial statement was
true, "but that he did not want to testify due to the fact that it might get the three people some
time and he did not want to be responsible for that." Id. Additionally, the court found that the
evidence on cross-examination was incompetent anyway, since the judge had not limited consider-
ation of the evidence to impeachment purposes only, and that the cross-examination was calcu-
lated to prove the truth of the prior statement. Id. at 650-51, 263 S.E.2d at 756-57.
71. 300 N.C. 694, 268 S.E.2d 196 (1980).
72. Id. at 697, 268 S.E.2d at 199. Defendant was charged with felonious burning of a dwell-
ing house. The defendant's sister, Moore, testified that defendant did not set a couch in the house
on fire. After claiming surprise, the prosecutor called one Baker to impeach Moore's testimony by
testifying she told him her brother was setting the house on fire. Id. at 694-96, 268 S.E.2d at 198-
99. Baker's testimony was substantively inadmissible because it was hearsay, and was not corrob-
orative because it contradicted the sister's testimony.
73. Id. at 698-99, 268 S.E.2d at 200-01.
74. 1 A. MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENcE 64 (1954). Professor Morgan says that the
rule "has no place in any rational system of investigation in modem society. And all attempts to
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court system when it adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 607, which allows an
attack on the credibility of a witness by any party, including the party calling
him.75 By adopting a rule similar to the federal rule, North Carolina would
allow more opportunities to elicit the truth at its trials, and would bring this
means of impeachment into line with its other liberal impeachment rules.
B. Expert Testimony 76
1. Opinion: Basis of Expert Testimony
In State v. Franks7 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a non-
treating psychiatrist could state an opinion, based on observations and conver-
sations with defendant, that defendant knew the difference between right and
wrong and know the nature and quality of his acts.78 Defendent in Franks
confessed to a first degree murder and presented his own psychiatrist to testify
to his insanity. Upon cross-examination, defendant's psychiatrist gave his
opinion of defendant's legal sanity without the aid of a hypothetical ques-
tion.79 The Franks decision is significant in its extension of an exception to
the hearsay rule beyond that articulated in several recent supreme court deci-
sions.
The general rule in North Carolina is that an expert witness can testify on
facts about which he has personal knowledge, without resort to a hypothetical
question,80 but he cannot base his opinion on hearsay evidence. 8 ' Statements
made to an expert witness by a patient that are the basis of an expert's opinion
run the risk of being excluded under this general rule. The court in Penland v.
modify arralify it so as to achieve sensible results serve only to demonstrate its irrational-
ity.......
75. FED. R. EvlD. 607. North Carolina is at present studying the feasibility of adopting the
Federal Rules of Evidence. For a case in which the inability to impeach may lead to a denial of
due process under the fourteenth amendment, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
(defense precluded from calling witness and then cross-examining him on a prior confession be-
cause of Mississippi's voucher rule).
76. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, several other cases decided by the supreme
court involved expert opinion issues. In State v. Fulton, 299 N.C. 491, 263 S.E.2d 608 (1980), a
prosecution for armed robbery and armed assault, the supreme court held that the trial court erred
in permitting a police officer to give his opinion that the tread design in a photograph of shoe
tracks found near the scene of the crime was the same as the design on defendant's shoes. The
court reasoned that the jury was as qualified as the officer to draw the comparison. The error was
found to be nonprejudicial because an F.B.I. agent trained in shoe track comparisons gave
essentially the same testimony. Id. at 494-95, 263 S.E.2d at 608.
In State v. Hunter, 299 N.C. 29, 261 S.E.2d 189, a prosecution for rape, the supreme court
held it was not error to permit a forensic seroloist to testify in response to a hypothetical question
that the blood types of defendant and complainant were consistent with the semen blood types
found on complainant's clothing. Id. at 35-36, 261 S.E.2d at 193-94. See also Fulton, supra, in
which the court held that it was not prejudicial to allow a forensic serologist to testify that blood
found on defendant's tennis shoes was consistent with the victim's blood type and only 11% of the
United States population had that blood type, since it was only weak probative evidence and its
exclusion would not change the result of the trial. 299 N.C. at 495-96, 263 S.E.2d at 610-11.
77. 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980).
78. Id. at 9, 265 S.E.2d at 182.
79. Id. at 5-6, 265 S.E.2d at 180.
80. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 29, § 136, at 446. (H. Brandis rev. 1973 & Supp. 1979).
81. See Cogdill v. Highway Comm'n, 279 N.C. 313, 182 S.E.2d 373 (1971).
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Coal Co. ,82 however, recognized an exception to the general rule, thus al-
lowing a physician to give an opinion based wholly or in part on statements
made to him by a patient if those statements were made in the course of pro-
fessional treatment and with the purpose of effecting a cure, or during an ex-
amination made for the purpose of treatment and cure.83 The reasoning
behind this exception is that a patient would desire to tell the doctor the truth
in order to further his own treatment.84 Without a treatment motive in the
patient, any desire that would have prompted the patient to tell the truth is
absent, and the patient might be motivated to make self-serving statements in
anticipation of litigation.85 This distinction between statements made to a
physician during treatment and those made during diagnosis for litigation cre-
ates great problems when applied to testimony by a psychiatrist who examines
a defendant in order to give an opinion on defendant's legal sanity.86
The supreme court expanded this general exception in State v. DeGreg-
ory, 87 to encompass the nontreating psychiatrist's statements if they were
based on official records and the psychiatrist's personal observations. The ad-
missibility of the personal examination presented no problem to the court be-
cause it was firsthand knowledge of the psychiatrist. The official records were
also a permissible basis for the psychiatrist's opinion because a "physician
making a diagnosis must necessarily rely upon observations and tests per-
formed by others and recorded by them; records sufficient for diagnosis in the
hospital ought to be enough for opinion testimony in the courtroom. 88
The DeGregory decision did not deal with an opinion based directly on
conversations with a defendant, but the court did address this issue in State v.
Wade.89 In Wade the court allowed a psychiatrist to give his opinion on
mental capacity in a criminal case based on personal knowledge, including
conversations with the patient, although the conversations would not be inde-
pendently admissible. The court indicated that to be admissible as a basis for
an opinion the statements must be inherently reliable. In Wade the court
found two indicia of reliability: (1) Defendant was sent to psychiatrist for
treatment as well as diagnosis; and (2) The psychiatrist's examination was a
"thorough, carefully designed attempt to gain an understanding of defendant's
state of mind ... conducted with professional safeguards." 90
Franks differed from Wade because the psychiatrist in Franks had no
82. 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
83. Id. at 31, 97 S.E.2d at 436.
84. See State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 162-63, 217 S.E.2d 513, 524 (1975).
85. Id.
86. This difficulty does not exist under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(4) provides
an exception to the hearsay rule for "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably perti-
nent to diagnosis or treatment." FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
87. 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
88. Id. at 134, 203 S.E.2d at 802.
89. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
90. Id. at 463, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
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treatment motive. Defendant's psychiatrist testified, in response to a hypothet-
ical question, that defendant suffered from chronic undifferentiated schizo-
phrenia. On cross-examination, the psychiatrist stated his opinion that
defendant knew the difference between right and wrong and that he did un-
derstand the nature and quality of his acts with reference to the murder. De-
fendant was found guilty and he appealed, claiming that since the psychiatrist
was not treating him it was error for the court to allow the psychiatrist to give
his opinion on cross-examination without the use of a hypothetical question.91
The supreme court relied on the Wade test and held that the conversations
were a permissible basis for the psychiatrist to state an opinion although the
psychiatrist was not treating defendant.92 Despite the absence of the first indi-
cium of reliability-treatment-in Franks, the court, reciting the hortatory
language of Wade, found that the second indicium, thoroughness of the exam-
ination, had been proved: "Dr. Harper was not a treating physician but he
conducted thorough and professional examinations of the defendant. He took
into account the entirety of what defendant said together with his own inter-
pretation and analysis of it and the objective manifestations that accompanied
it."'93 The Franks court held that the psychiatrist's opinion was properly ad-
mitted into evidence. Furthermore, it was proper for the psychiatrist to testify
concerning the content of his conversations with defendant in order to show
the basis for his opinion and diagnosis.94
The Franks extension of Wade to the nontreating psychiatrist must be
read in light of the supreme court decision in State v. Bock.95 In Bock the
court excluded a psychiatrist's opinion based partially on conversations with a
defendant charged with first-degree murder. The psychiatrist examined de-
fendant in relation to defendant's claim that he could not remember the events
of the crime, not that he was insane. The court found that since the psychia-
trist was examining defendant not for the purpose of treating his amnesia, but
for the purpose of testifying as a witness for defendant, the motive which ordi-
narily prompts a patient to tell his physician the truth was absent.96
The Bock court made no suggestion that the psychiatrist did not conduct
a "thorough and professional examination." The distinction between Wade,
Franks and DeGregory on the one hand and Bock on the other may be the
practical realization that a psychiatrist has no alternative to conversation to
form an adequate basis for an opinion on the mental capacity of a defendant.
The Wade court noted, and the Franks court agreed, that "[c]onversation and
its interpretation and analysis by a trained professional, is undoubtedly supe-
rior to any other method the courts have for gaining access to an allegedly
91. 300 N.C. at 6, 265 S.E.2d at 180.
92. Id. at 9, 265 S.E.2d at 182.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975).
96. Id. at 162-63, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
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insane defendant's mind."97 There appears to be no way a diagnosis could be
made except through conversations and tests of a defendant. In this sense, the
supreme court's expansion of the hearsay exception articulated in DeGregory,
Wade and Franks could be viewed as mandated by necessity. Unlike the case
of the insane defendant, the defendant in Bock may appear in court and testify
to his loss of memory directly and the jury may be competent to judge his
credibility.
The supreme court could avoid creating strained exceptions to the hear-
say rule for psychiatric diagnosis by defining the conversations with the psy-
chiatrist as nonhearsay. The North Carolina courts have defined hearsay as
an out of court statement made for the truth of the matter asserted. 98 A state-
ment made by a patient to a medical doctor about his physical condition, used
by a doctor to form an opinion, is generally going to be introduced in evidence
for the truth of the matter asserted by the patient. Similarly, in Bock, the
statement of defendant to his psychiatrist about his amnesia would arguably
be for the truth of the matter asserted. In contrast, statements made by a de-
fendant to his psychiatrist manifesting the presence or absence of medical or
legal insanity would probably not be for the truth of the matter asserted in the
statements themselves.
The Franks court was presented with another evidentiary issue when de-
fendant took exception to the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to
question its psychiatrist by way of a hypothetical. Prior to the psychiatrist's
examination at trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence of previous inci-
dents in his life as part of a foundation for a hypothetical question put to his
psychiatrist concerning the diagnosis of chronic undifferentiated schizophre-
nia.99 The trial judge refused to allow the testimony and suggested that de-
fendant must elicit the psychiatrist's opinion and then introduce evidence to
explain the basis for the opinion. The supreme court in Franks found the trial
court to be in error on this point because defendant may proceed through
hypothetical questions even though the psychiatrist had personal knowledge
and could testify in the form of an opinion.10° The supreme court did not
reverse the trial court's exclusion of defendant's evidence, however, because it
was too remote in time to have any relevance to defendant's mental condition
at the time of the crime.10 1 This holding was supported, in the court's opinion,
by In re W1 of Hargrove,10 2 in which the supreme court held that testimony
from witnesses concerning a testator's capacity to write a will in 1906 was too
remote and was improperly admitted when the witnesses first became ac-
quainted with testator at times ranging from two to twenty years after execu-
97. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. at 463, 251 S.E.2d at 412, quotedin State v. Franks, 300 N.C. at
9, 265 S.E.2d at 182.
98. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hartford Ins. Co., 272 N.C. 183, 158 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
99. 300 N.C. at 9-10, 265 S.E.2d at 182. Specifically, defendant sought to introduce evidence
of his childhood school attendance, his father's drinking and an incident seventeen years prior to
the crime when defendant cut his wrists. Id.
100. Id. at 10, 265 S.E.2d at 182-83.
101. Id. at 11, 265 S.E.2d at 183.
102. 206 N.C. 307, 173 S.E. 577 (1934).
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tion of the will.10 3
Hargrove is distinguishable from Franks in at least two significant ways.
First, the evidence sought to be introduced in Franks was prospective; inci-
dents in the past were introduced to show mental condition in the present.
Conversely, the evidence in Hargrove was retrospective; present observations
were submitted to prove mental condition in the past. Second, in Franks, un-
like Hargrove, the witness involved was an expert qualified to judge the rele-
vance of past incidents to a present condition. Lay witnesses testifying on
mental capacity to make a will, are, arguably, less able to form a relevant
opinion based on a pattern of lifetime behaviors. 104 In summary, the Franks
opinion extended and clarified the hearsay exception for diagnosis by a psy-
chiatrist based on conversations with a defendant, but the court may have mis-
applied a precedent involving lay witnesses in ruling that certain past incidents
were too remote to be relevant to a psychiatrist's opinion on defendant's san-
ity.
2. Opinion: Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses
In a condemnation proceeding, the party seeking to introduce the value of
other property as circumstantial evidence of the value of land sought to be
condemned must lay a foundation showing that the property is comparable to
the land that is the subject of the suit. 10 5 In Duke Power Co. v. Winebarger,106
the supreme court reviewed the previous North Carolina cases setting out the
permissible parameters of cross-examination of an expert value witness by
testing his knowledge of property transactions in the area.
In Winebarger Duke Power sought to condemn a power line easement on
respondent's land. During cross-examination of respondents' value witnesses,
Duke Power's counsel repeatedly asked if the witnesses knew of particular
sales of land. In each case, respondents' witnesses answered negatively. Duke
Power's counsel then repeated the question, phrasing it to include the sale
103. Id. at 312, 173 S.E.2d at 580.
104. In addition to the issues discussed in text, defendant in Franks also objected to the trial
court's refusal to allow defendant's psychiatrist to restate his opinion on redirect examination.
The supreme court noted the defendant had no new material to bring out on redirect and merely
sought to repeat testimony; the restatement was properly excluded. 300 N.C. at 12, 265 S.E.2d at
183 (citing Spivey v. Newman, 232 N.C. 281, 59 S.E.2d 844 (1950)).
Defendant also cited as error the trial court's refusal to exclude from evidence the state's
psychiatrist's account of his conversations with defendant even though the trial court excluded the
psychiatrist's opinion itself. The supreme court first found that the opinion of the state's psychia-
trist should have been admitted under the same hearsay exce ption as that of defendant's psychia-
trist. The conversations, on the other hand, should not have been admitted, in the court's
judgment, since the only justification for allowing them was to show the basis of the psychiatrist's
opinion. Evidently, the court was not willing to admit the basis of an opinion without the opinion
itself, perhaps because of fear that the jury was not competent to reach its own conclusions on the
conversations. In this case, however, the court found the admission of the conversations to be
nonprejudicial because substantially the same information came into evidence when defendant
testified and when defendant's confession was admitted. Id. at 15, 265 S.E.2d at 185.
105. See I D. STANSBURY, supra note 29, § 100.
106. 300 N.C. 57, 265 S.E.2d 227 (1980).
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price per acre of the particular transaction. 0 7
The supreme court held that while it was permissible to ask the value
witnesses if they knew of a particular land sale, the impeachment purpose of
cross-examination was satisfied when the witness answered negatively.108 Any
further inquiry that sought to elicit specific values of property dissimilar to the
property that was the subject of the suit was at best surplusage, and at worst an
attempt by the cross-examiner to get before the jury information which should
be excluded from its consideration. 10 9 If the witness answers positively and
states an erroneous sales price for the property, the cross-examiner should be
bound by the witness' answer. 110 The Winebarger opinion breaks little new
ground, but it is a clear statement of the permissible scope of cross-examina-
tion of a value witness."'
C. Hearsay112
1. Statements by Agent or Employee
There are two instances in North Carolina in which a statement of an
agent to a third party may be admissible into evidence as an admission of the
principal: (1) When the statement is spoken within the scope of the agent's
authority to speak for his principal, and (2) When the statement relates to an
act presently being done by the agent within the scope of his agency or em-
ployment. 113 In Pearce v. Southern Bell' a the supreme court was faced
squarely with the opportunity to reject this rule in favor of the interpretation
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under the federal approach an agent's
statements are admissible and are not hearsay when they are made by an agent
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment
107. Id. at 59-62, 265 S.E.2d at 229-30. The initial question is permissible as the scope of the
value witness' knowledge of values and sales prices of dissimilar properties in the area is relevant
to the limited purpose of testing that witness's credibility and expertise. Id. at 66, 265 S.E.2d at
232.
108. Id. at 66, 265 S.E.2d at 232-33. Respondents objected to this line of questioning with the
first value witness but failed to object to the same questions asked of the second witness. The
court of appeals ruled that respondents waived their objections to the line of questioning by failing
to object to the questions asked of the second witness. The supreme court reversed the court of
appeals on this issue, finding Rule 46 (a)(1) and Appellate Rule (10) persuasive as they operate to
preserve the continued effect of a specific objection, once made, to a particular line of questioning.
Id. at 67-68, 265 S.E.2d at 233-34.
109. Id. at 66, 265 S.E.2d at 232.
110. Id. (citing Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 137 S.E.2d 139 (1964)).
111. See also State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 191 S.E.2d 641 (1972); Templeton v. Highway
Comm'n, 254 N.C. 337, 118 S.E.2d 918 (1961); Barnes v. Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 378, 109
S.E.2d 219 (1959); Highway Comm'n v. Privett, 246 N.C. 501, 99 S.E.2d 61 (1957). The
Winebarger court did not consider the trial court's error in permitting the line of questioning
cured by the instruction to the jury telling them to consider the witnesses' testimony "relating to
the sales prices of other properties" only insofar as it bore upon the witnesses' knowledge of val-
ues. 300 N.C. at 66, 265 S.E.2d at 233. The court felt that Duke Power's counsel persisted in the
line of questioning to such an extent it pervaded the entire trial and could only have served to
prejudice respondent's case. Id.
112. See also note 40 supra.
113. See 2 D. STANSBURY, srupra note 29, § 169.
114. 299 N.C. 64, 261 S.E.2d 176 (1980).
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and are made during the existence of the relationship.' " 5 The supreme court
chose to reaffirm the existing North Carolina interpretation over the dissents
of Justices Copeland, Exum, and Carlton." 6
Plaintiff in Pearce tripped over anchor brackets left in a sidewalk when
defendant removed a telephone booth a month before the accident. Plaintiff
called defendant's offices and was connected with the service foreman for tele-
phone booth maintenance. The foreman went to the scene of the accident and
confessed negligence to plaintiff and informed plaintiff that "[w]e will take
care of everything for you." 117 The trial court allowed the service foreman's
statement into evidence and the supreme court held this to be error. Applying
the traditional rule, the court concluded that there was no evidence that the
service foreman had authority to speak on behalf of Southern Bell in handling
negligence claims.' 18 The second exception did not apply in the court's view
because the "record did not indicate that the statements related to an act pres-
ently being done by the agent," rather, "they related to an accident that oc-
curred an hour and a half earlier.""19
The court's application of the traditional North Carolina rule is particu-
larly harsh on the facts of Pearce and, indeed, the majority may have misap-
plied the North Carolina rule. The dissent disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that there was no evidence to show the foreman's authority. The
dissent pointed out that the foreman "was the man sent by Southern Bell to
deal with both aspects of the emergency situation." 120 Judge Copeland also
criticized the restrictive reading of the exception by the majority: "It has never
been required that the agent be authorized to make the exact statements that
he in fact made. Companies rarely, if ever, will authorize an agent to admit
negligence or the facts that constituted negligence. The rule states simply, that
to bind the principal, the agent must be authorized to speak; then, whatever he
says during that speech will bind his principal."' 12
The dissent in Pearce also criticized the court's characterization of the
second branch of the rule as tied to the resgestae exception to the hearsay rule
rather than to the application of the substantive law of agency, which would
hold the hearsay exclusion rule inapplicable because the agent's statement is
considered as though made by the principal himself.'22 The three dissents to
the majority opinion indicate that there is some dissatisfaction on the court
115. FED. R. Evil. 801(d)(2)(D).
116. 299 N.C. at 69, 75, 261 S.E.2d at 179, 182 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
117. 299 N.C. at 65, 261 S.E.2d at 177. "Plaintiff's evidence tends to show . . . [p]laintiff
called Southern Bell, and one Rovert Rochelle, service foreman for telephone booth maintenance,
promptly came to the location of the accident and in a conversation with plaintiff concerning the
accident confessed negligence 'on their behalf and informed plaintiffthat someone from Southern
Bell would contact him and furnish the name of a physician. Mr. Rochelle said: 'We will take
care of everything for you.'" Id.
118. Id. at 68, 261 S.E.2d at 179.
119. Id. at 69, 261 S.E.2d at 179.
120. Id. at 71, 261 S.E.2d at 180.
121. Id. at 70, 261 S.E.2d at 179.
122. Id. at 72-73, 261 S.E.2d at 180. See also Note, Eyidence--Admissibility oaanAgent's Dec-
laration Against His Principal, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1146 (1966); C. McCoRMiCK, supra note 37, § 267,
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with the North Carolina rule and that there is sentiment for overturning a long
line of precedents in favor of the approach of the Federal Rules.
2. Statements of Future Intent
Long v. Asphalt Paving Co. ,123 decided by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, is primarily significant as a clear statement of the applicability of the
hearsay rule to statements made by a decedent about intended business travel.
The Court examined the admissibility of statements made by and about a de-
cedent in a challenge to a finding by the North Carolina Industrial Commis-
sion that the decedent had died from an "accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment." 124
Decedent Long, president of Asphalt Paving Co., died in a plane crash in
Florida.12 5 The principal issue before the Commission was whether Long had
been in Florida on a business trip connected with his employment with
Asphalt Paving Co. Several pieces of evidence were challenged on hearsay
grounds.
The first statement challenged on appeal was that of Terrell Weeks, who
testified he observed Long and Martin walking around the woods of a soon-to-
be-developed subdivision. 126 The second statement was related in testimony
of a witness claiming that he heard Martin tell Long where asphalt could be
obtained nearby.127 The court of appeals decided that both of these state-
ments were outside the definition of hearsay.128 The first was conduct not
intended as an assertion that they were on business, 12 9 and the second was not
offered to prove the truth of what was said-where asphalt could be ob-
tained-but to prove business was discussed. 1
30
at 640 (criticizing the res gestae interpretation of the admissibility of an agent's statements as an
"inadequate" theory).
123. 47 N.C. App. 564, 268 S.E.2d 1 (1980).
124. Id. at 566, 268 S.E.2d at 3. To be compensable under the North Carolina Workers' Com-
pensation Act, the injury must be accidental and must arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1979). Such "occurs while the employee is engaged in some
activity or duty which he is authorized to undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or
indirectly, the employer's business." 47 N.C. App. at 566, 268 S.E.2d at 3.
125. Id. at 565, 268 S.E.2d at 2.
126. Id. at 568, 268 S.E.2d at 4.
127. Id. at 569, 268 S.E.2d at 4.
128. Id. at 569-70, 268 S.E.2d at 4-5. Many definitions of hearsay abound. Perhaps the sim-
plest is Stansbury's, stating that whenever an assertion other than that of the testifying witness is
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is hearsay, and inadmissible. 1 D. STANSBURY,
supra note 29, § 138. Stansbury also offers the definition frequently used in North Carolina
courts: "Evidence, either oral or written, is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in
whole or part, upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it." Id. See, e.g., Potts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737
(1968). At most, however, a definition is but "a helpful starting point for discussion of the
problems. .. ." C. McCoRMicK, supra note 37, § 246.
129. 47 N.C. App. at 569-70, 268 S.E.2d at 4-5. The definition of hearsay covers only conduct
or statements asserted to prove the truth of the matter therein. See 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note
29, § 138. Here, the conduct of Long and Martin, in walking around the subdivision, could not be
viewed as a positive assertion of anything, and certainly not a positive assertion that the motive for
the trip was business. Therefore it was not covered by the hearsay rule.
130. 47 N.C. App. at 569-70, 268 S.E.2d at 4-5. Again, this statement was not offered to prove
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The third statement was made by the decedent to his spouse the night
before the trip, that he "had to go to Florida on business."131 This was clearly
offered to prove that he did go to Florida on business, and was clearly hearsay,
since the declarant was not the witness. However, the court of appeals held
this statement properly admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for
statements of a present intention to do a future act.132 The court of appeals
believed this statement met the two-fold test for admissibility as an exception
to the hearsay rule articulated by the supreme court in State v. Vestal.133 Ves-
tal required a showing of necessity and a reasonable probability of truthful-
ness.134 Vestal involved a similar trip and a prior statement by a decedent of
his intended destination. The Vestal court held necessity was shown by proof
of the death of the declarant.135 Furthermore, the statement had a reasonable
probability of truthfulness because "a man leaving his home, or his business
establishment, for an out-of-town trip will, for domestic and business pur-
poses, inform his family. . . as to his destination."' 136 The Long court found
that the test in Vestal was fully satisfied by the facts presented in Long. The
continued use in Long of the test set forth in Vestal rather than the res gestae
doctrine, 137 to determine the admissibility of a present statement of intention
to do a future act is welcome.
the truth of what it asserted (ie.,,where to get asphalt). A statement "offered for any purpose
other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement is not hearsay." Id. at 569,
268 S.E.2d at 4.
131. 47 N.C. App. at 570, 268 S.E.2d at 5.
132. Id. This exception arose from the doctrine of res getae, which admitted statements
made in connection with an act which was at issue. McCormick explains res gestae as "words
which accompanied the principal litigated fact." C. McCORMICK, sJupra note 37, § 288. Stans-
bury states that "there is no single resgestae rule," but that when words are closely connected with
an act at issue, the words are admissible without examining the hearsay implications. 2 D. STANS-
BURY, supra note 29, § 158. The statement has to be closely related to the act both in time and
meaning to fall under this doctrine, and this limits the admissibility of many statements under the
res gestae exception. Id.
Theresgestae rule has become much criticized. North Carolina recently expressed its disap-
proval of the confusion which the use of the phrase has generated. See State v. Hammonds, 45
N.C. App. 495, 263 S.E.2d 326 (1980). Stansbury recognizes that in the past it was helpful in
getting evidence admitted, but that now it is relied upon to exclude evidence which is otherwise
independently admissible. 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note 29, § 158. Most commentators criticize it
as vague and imprecise, no longer needed for the purposes it once served. C. McCoRMICK, supra
note 37, § 288. The modem justification for allowing a present statement of future intent to be
admissible is that it describes a mental state otherwise hard to prove, and the declarant is dead or
otherwise unavailable to testify. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 37, § 295. Stansbury notes that its
reliability depends on many factors-the truthfulness of the present description, the continuing
existence of the intention and the good faith of the declarant, and the occurrence or nonoccur-
rence of other future events. 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note 29, § 162.
133. 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E.2d 755 (1971).
134. Id. at 582, 180 S.E.2d at 769.
135. Id. at 581, 180 S.E.2d at 769.
136. Id. at 582-83, 180 S.E.2d at 769.
137. See note 132 supra.
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D. Videotapes as Illustrative Evidence 138
Under North Carolina case law, photographs,' 39 movies,140 and video-
tapes 141 are not admissible as substantive evidence, but are admissible for the
limited purpose of explaining or illustrating the testimony of a witness on facts
that are relevant and material to the case.142 This restriction, allowing the
introduction of such an item as illustrative evidence only, has been severely
criticized. 143
In State v. Jeers144 the court of appeals applied the North Carolina rule
and found the trial court's admission of a videotape as substantive evidence
erroneous, but the court refused to overturn the trial court's result because the
error was not prejudicial.' 45 Defendant in Jefers was charged with possession
of a firearm by a felon. The State's evidence consisted primarily of a video-
tape, made through a one-way mirror, of defendant selling a .38 caliber re-
volver to an undercover "sting" operation and the testimony of the officers
who ran the "sting". 14 6
The trial judge allowed the admission of the videotape as substantive evi-
dence over defendant's objection and instructed the jury that the videotape
was substantive evidence. 147 The court of appeals noted some erosion of the
illustrative evidence rule in two recent cases. In State v. Foster,148 the
supreme court upheld the admission of photographs of fingerprints as substan-
tive evidence when shown by extrinsic evidence to represent the fingerprints
138. Several cases were decided by the supreme court on the admissibility of real or scientific
evidence. See, eg., State v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180,265 S.E.2d 223 (1980), in which the court upheld a
trial court's exclusion from evidence of a marijuana identification test.
In State v. Fulton, 299 N.C. 491, 263 S.E.2d 608 (1980), the supreme court upheld the trial
court's determination that the "chain of custody" of defendant's tennis shoes had not been broken
even thoug the agent who received the shoes left them unattended for an hour in an unlocked
private office and someone other than the agent carried the package to the mail pickup point after
the agent had made the track comparisons. Id. at 497-98, 263 S.E.2d at 611-12. See note 76 supra.
139. See State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42, 203 S.E.2d 38 (1974), modfed, 428 U.S. 903 (1976).
140. State v. Garnett, 24 N.C. App. 489, 211 S.E.2d 519, appeal dismissed, 287 N.C. 262, 215
S.E.2d 622 (1975).
141. State v. Johnson, 18 N.C. App. 606, 197 S.E.2d 592 (1973) (videotape is a motion picture
and admissible under the same rule).
142. State v. Bass, 249 N.C. 209, 105 S.E.2d 645 (1958).
143. See, eg., C. McCoRMICK, supra note 37, § 214; 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 29, § 34
(Prof. Brandis urges that the illustrative doctrine be given the death sentence. Id. at 99 n.23
(Supp. 1979)); Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N.C.L. REv. 233, 245 (1946). The General
Assembly amended chapter 8 of the General Statutes to remove this distinction. The newly en-
acted statue, effective October 1, 1981, provides that
any party may introduce a photograph, video tape, motion picture, x-ray, or other photo-
graphic representation as substantive evidence upon laying a proper foundation and
meeting other applicable evidentiary requirements. This section does not prohibit a
party from introducing a photograph or other pictorial representation solely for the pur-
poses of illustrating the testimony of a witness.
Law of May 26, 1981, ch. 451, § 1, 1981 Sess. Laws 470 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-92).
144. 48 N.C. App. 663, 269 S.E.2d 731 (1980).
145. Id. at 667, 269 S.E.2d at 734-35.
146. Id. at 664, 269 S.E.2d at 732-33.
147. Id. at 666, 269 S.E.2d at 734.
148. 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973).
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accurately, and in State v. Hunt 149 the supreme court admitted into evidence a
photograph of a shoe sole impression when the same safeguards were present.
Despite the evidence relaxation of the rule in these cases, the Jeffers court
believed that the more recent supreme court decision in State v. Davis,150 up-
holding the illustrative-substantive distinction, forced the court of appeals to
recognize that the videotape was admissible for illustrative purposes only.' 5
Although the Jeffers court found the trial court erred in instructing the
jury that the videotape was substantive evidence, the court found that it was
not prejudicial enough to justify a new trial because the defendant failed to
show a different result would have obtained with a different instruction; the
jury also heard the uncontroverted testimony of the officers who viewed the
sting operation while the videotape was being made. 152 In practical effect, the
court of appeal's treatment of the illustrative-substantive distinction may obvi-
ate the need for maintaining the classification in most cases. The prerequisite
of a proper foundation for the introduction of the videotape or photograph
may in many cases such as Jeffers render any erroneous instruction-that the
evidence is substantive-nonprejudicial.
E. Character Evidence:53 Rape Shield Statute
In State v. Fortney'54 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
newly enacted rape shield statute against a claim that it violated defendant's
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.' 55 General Statute
8-58.6 provides that evidence of sexual behavior of a complainant is presump-
tively irrelevant unless it falls within one of five specific exceptions. Even then
the defendant must submit his evidence in advance for an in camera review of
its relevancy.156
149. 297 N.C. 447, 255 S.E.2d 182 (1979).
150. 297 N.C. 566, 256 S.E.2d 184 (1979).
151. 48 N.C. App. at 667, 269 S.E.2d at 734.
152. Id. at 668, 269 S.E.2d at 735.
153. In State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 298, 261 S.E.2d 860 (1980), the supreme court held evidence of
previous involvement in certain crimes by defendant was properly admitted into evidence in a
prosecution for first degree murder. The court recognized the "general rule that evidence of the
commission of other crimes is not admissible to prove defendant's guilt of the crime for which he
is on trial." Id. at 306, 261 S.E.2d at 866 (citing State v. Hight, 150 N.C. 817, 63 S.E.2d 1043
(1909)). But the court upheld the trial court's decision to admit the evidence under the motive
exception to the general rule, finding that the evidence of prior criminal acts was admitted to show
that defendant's motive for killing the deceased, his accomplice in the crimes, was his fear that the
deceased was "talking too much" and would "tell them everything." 299 N.C. at 307, 261 S.E.2d
at 866.
The supreme court noted that motive was "always a relevant fact, and evidence tending to
prove it will not be excluded merely because it also shows the accused to have been guilty of an
independent crime." Id. at 307, 261 S.E.2d at 866. See also State v. Williams, 292 N.C. 391, 233
S.E.2d 507 (1977); State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954) (eight exceptions to the
general rule of no admissibility discussed). See generally 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 29, §§ 91 &
92.
154. 301 N.C. 31, 269 S.E.2d 110 (1980).
155. Id. at 34, 269 S.E.2d at 112.
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979). For a discussion of this statute see Survey
of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1977-Evidence, 56 N.C.L. REv. 1069-75 (1978).
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In Fortney defendant alleged that the complainant consented to sexual
intercourse and oral sex. The trial judge excluded from evidence test results
showing three different blood type groupings of semen found on clothing the
complainant wore on the night of the attack. 157 The supreme court upheld the
trial court's ruling on the evidence as well as the constitutionality of the stat-
ute, stating:
G.S. 8-58.6 is nothing more. . . than a codification of this juris-
diction's rule of relevance as that rule specifically applies to the past
sexual behavior of rape victims. As such the statute embodies a leg-
islative recognition that [North Carolina Supreme Court] decisions
. . . '[reject] the notion that all sexual behavior, however proved, has
some intrinsic relevance in a sexual assault proceeding, and [require]
a more specific showing of relevance before such behavior can be
proved.' 158
Building on this reasoning, the court dismissed defendant's constitutional
challenge by noting there was no constitutional right to ask a witness questions
that were irrelevant, that the statute is primarily procedural rather than sub-
stantive in its effect, and there were valid policy grounds, such as encouraging
reporting of sexual assaults by victims, behind the legislature's enactment of
the statute.15 9
EVAN KENT AUBERRY
MELEGIA LEE DANIELS, JR.
157. 301 N.C. at 33, 269 S.E.2d at 111.
158. Id. at 37, 269 S.E.2d at 113. The supreme court's statement is a bit generous in its view
that previous North Carolina decisions excluded past sexual behavior as irrelevant. See, e.g,
State v. Satchell, 17 N.C. App. 312, 194 S.E.2d 51, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 260, 195 S.E.2d 692
(1973). See generally Burger, Man's Trial, Womans Tribulation, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977);
Ordover, ddmissibility ofPatterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character
for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 90 (1977).





In Wheeler v. Wheeler2 the Supreme Court of North Carolina held cove-
nants in a separation agreement to be dependent, a breach by one party excus-
ing the nonperformance of the other. In Wheeler the parties had entered into
a separation agreement in 1956. 3 Under the agreement the wife took custody
of the children and the defendant was allowed to visit them at his option.4
The husband was to pay specified amounts to the wife for alimony and child
support and to relinquish certain personal property.5 In 1975 the wife insti-
tuted suit against the husband, alleging that he had failed to pay alimony re-
quired by the contract.6 The husband contended that his obligation to pay
should be excused because the wife had breached the promise to allow him to
visit his children.7 The jury decided that the wife had breached the visitation
provision of the agreement, but defendant's performance was not excused be-
cause he had waived the right to assert his visitation rights by failing to en-
force them after 1964.8
The North Carolina Supreme Court sustained the judgment for the plain-
tiI9 in an opinion largely devoted to a discussion of the legitimacy of applying
the doctrine of waiver to a separation agreement. Scant attention was given to
the departure from prior decisions implicit in the court's failure to inquire into
the intention of the parties regarding the dependency of the promises con-
tained in the agreement. The opinion merely recited that defendant's duty to
pay alimony was "conditional,"' 10 the agreement providing that payments be
made only "so long as plaintiff observes and performs the conditions of this
contract." I1
Although previous cases have recognized that it would be possible for
parties to a separation agreement to explicitly condition each party's obliga-
tion to fulfill their promises under the agreement upon the performance of the
other spouse, until Wheeler courts have consistently refused to find that the
1. The North Carolina Supreme Court held in Flippen v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d
482 (1980), that a divorced mother who has custody of a child and provides at least one-half ofhis
support has standing to sue for medical expenses and loss of the child's service in a negligence
action. Traditionally the father has had the primary obligation to support and provide medical
care for his children, and the mother has had a secondary support obligation. While there can be
no double recovery, a parent with a secondary support obligation will not be barred from suit even
though claims for loss of services and medical expenses arise out of the parental support duty.
2. 299 N.C. 633, 263 S.E.2d 763 (1980).




7. Id. at 635, 263 S.ES.2d at 764.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 642, 263 S.E.2d at 768.
10. Id. at 634, 263 S.E.2d at 764.
11. Id.
parties intended their covenants to be mutually dependent. In Smith v.
Smith 12 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a wife's breach of a
clause promising not to "molest" or "speak disparagingly" of her husband was
no defense in her action to enforce his promise to make support payments
pursuant to the agreement, even though the preface to the separation agree-
ment made clear that the promises were given in consideration of the mutual
covenants and agreements of the parties. 13 In W711#ford v. Willford1 4 the in-
corporation of the provisions in a separation agreement regarding visitation
and alimony into the divorce decree was held insufficient to make them depen-
dent.
Smith and Williford were distinguished by the Wheeler court on the
ground that the agreements in the former cases did not specifically condition
defendant's duty to pay alimony upon plaintifi's performance under the con-
tract.15 Yet the court failed to mention relevant dicta in cases in which the
courts of North Carolina have been called upon to apply the law of other
states to disputes involving separation agreements. Those cases contain lan-
guage to the effect that the rule in North Carolina is to construe support provi-
sions as being independent of visitation provisions in separation agreements. 16
12. 225 N.C. 189, 34 S.E.2d 148 (1945). The Supreme Court of North Carolina articulated
the elements necessary to support a finding that covenants in a separation agreement are mutual:
(1) that it is not every violation of the terms of a separation agreement by one spouse
that will exonerate the other from performance; (2) that in order that a breach by one
spouse of his or her covenants may relieve the other from liability from the latter's cove-
nants, the respective covenants must be interdependent rather than independent; and
(3) that the breach must be of a substantial nature, must not be caused by the fault of the
complaining party, and must have been committed in bad faith.
Id. at 197-98, 34 S.E.2d at 153 (citing 30 C.J., 1065; H & W, 845).
13. Id. at 190, 34 S.E.2d at 148.
14. 10 N.C. App. 451, 179 S.E.2d 114 (1971).
15. 299 N.C. at 642, 263 S.E.2d at 149.
16. In Laughridge v. Lovejoy, 234 N.C. 663, 68 S.E.2d 403 (1951), the court determined that
it was not competent under the full faith and credit clause to adjudicate a claim for unpaid child
support based on an Alabama divorce decree. Id. at 666, 68 S.E.2d at 404. In dictum, however,
the court stated the majority rule regarding the relationship between visitation and support
clauses:
It seems to be the general rule that where the wife is awarded the custody of the child
and the father is given the right to visit it, and the order requires him to make periodic
payments for the support of the child, the order for such support will not be construed as
being conditioned on the father's right of visitation which he may claim has been denied
him.
Id.
In Cole v. Earon, 26 N.C. App. 502, 216 S.E.2d 422 (1975), the court of appeals, applying
New York law to a separation agreement, held that "the wife's violation of visitation provisions in
a separation agreement precludes her from maintaining against the husband an action to recover
unpaid installments of support stipulated under such agreement." Id. at 503, 216 S.E.2d at 423.
But the court indicated that a contrary result would have been reached had it been called upon to
apply North Carolina law:
In North Carolina the support provisions of the separation agreement are considered as
being independent of the provisions relating to the husband's visitation rights, with the
result that the wife's breach of her covenant not to interfere with the husband's visitation
rights ... does not excuse the husband from making the support payments in conform-
ity with the separation agreement.
Id. (citing Williford v. Williford, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 114 (1971)).
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Thus, the holding in Wheeler is unquestionably a tacit departure from
established precedent. But Wheeler must be considered in light of considera-
tions that consistently have been important to the courts of North Carolina in
their interpretation of separation agreements. In order to determine whether a
clause conditioning payments to a former spouse upon that spouse's perform-
ance under the contract will cover the covenants dependent the courts will
examine two factors.
The first of these factors is the complexity that is superimposed upon the
construction of a separation agreement when minor children are involved.
This aspect was not a factor in Wheeler because the defendant did not stop
paying alimony until the children of the marriage had reached majority. 17 But
practitioners drafting and litigating separation agreements will have to evalu-
ate the impact of Wheeler upon situations in which minor children are in-
volved. The general maxim that a separation agreement is to be treated like
any other contract' s is limited by the court's inherent power to determine any
issue involving the welfare of a minor child.19 Provisions in a separation
agreement for support, custody, and visitation are never final.20 Any aspect of
the agreement dealing with a minor child is subject to review by a court at any
time for a determination whether adherence to that provision would be in the
best interest of the child.21
A myriad of questions are raised when the covenants of a separation
agreement that deal with minor children purport to be conditional. Suppose
the supporting spouse in Wheeler had withdrawn child support payments in-
stead of alimony in response to the custodial spouse's denial of visitation
rights. Although some jurisdictions have held that a noncustodial parent who
is denied visitation rights is justified in terminating support payments, 22 sanc-
tioning such retaliatory behavior would be difficult to reconcile with the rule
17. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. at 635, 263 S.E.2d at 764.
18. Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 409-10, 200 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1973); Church v. Han-
cock, 261 N.C. 764, 765, 136 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1963); Bowles v. Bowles, 237 N.C. 462, 465, 75
S.E.2d 413, 415 (1953).
19. Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 134 S.E.2d 227 (1964); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635,
639, 133 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1963); Perry v. Perry, 33 N.C. App. 139, 234 S.E.2d 449 (1977).
20. Davis v. Davis, 269 N.C. 120, 127, 152 S.E.2d 306, 312 (1967); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C.
189, 195, 146 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1966).
21. The court articulated both its power to decide matters regarding minor children irrespec-
tive of the terms of a separation agreement, and the standard to be used in making determinations
regarding minor children, in Story v. Story, 221 N.C. 114, 116, 19 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1942):
No agreement or contract between husband and wife will serve to deprive the court of its
inherent as well as statutory authority to protect the interests and provide for the welfare
of infants. They may bind themselves by separate agreement or by a consent judgment,
* , . but they cannot thus withdraw children of the marriage from the protective custody
of the court. . . . The child is not a party to such agreement and the parents cannot
contract away the jurisdiction of the court which is always alert in the discharge of its
duty toward its wards-the children of the state whose personal and property interests
requireprotetion.... In such the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration
to which even parental love must yield and the court will not suffer its authority in this
regard to be either withdrawn or curtailed by any act of the parties.
22. See, e.g., Cole v. Earon, 26 N.C. App. 502, 503, 216 S.E.2d 422, 423 (1975); Annot., 95
A.L.R.2d 118, 155-62 (1964).
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that the welfare of the child is to be the paramount consideration when resolv-
ing family disputes. The situation of a child who has been deprived of the
company of one parent is in no way improved by a resulting reduction of
financial assistance. Furthermore, a reduction in the income to the custodial
parent is likely to have a deleterious effect on the child,23 whether the termi-
nated payments are alimony or child support. Because the potential conflict
between "the central place of the law of contracts in interpreting separation
agreements," 24 and the doctrine that the best interest of the child supersedes
any agreement made by the parents was not before the court in Wheeler, a
supporting, noncustodial parent who is unjustly denied visitation rights con-
fronts a dilemma. Clearly, after Wheeler he cannot wait until the child
reaches majority to terminate the payments or he will be deemed to have
waived the breach. If he stops paying immediately upon his former spouse's
breach, he risks a holding that the best interest of the child controls and even
explicit language in the agreement making the payment and visitation rights
mutually dependent will not excuse his nonperformance. His alternatives are
to withhold alimony and continue child support, the success of which will de-
pend on whether the court recognizes the hardship that could befall the child
as a result of such action,25 or to petition the court for specific enforcement of
the separation agreement, a remedy that was available prior to Wheeler.2 6
A second factor that has been of concern to courts interpreting separation
agreements is that such agreements often entail multiple provisions, with each
party undertaking several obligations and receiving several benefits. Separa-
tion agreements typically contain a property settlement, to be complied with at
the time of the agreement, as well as continuing obligations including custody,
visitation rights, and support payments. In the absence of specific language it
is difficult to determine which terms should be held interdependent. The court
in Smith v. Smith27 was troubled by the inequity that would result from a
holding that the breach of the nonmolestation clause by the wife allowed the
husband to terminate support payments. By the terms of the agreement, those
payments had been exchanged for more than visitation rights. She also gave
up "support owed to her by him, as a matter of law,. . . her right of dower,
and all other rights in this property acquired by marriage." 28
23. Williford v. Williford, 10 N.C. App. 451,456, 179 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1971). Conversely, if
the supporting spouse ceases making agreed-upon payments, is the custodial spouse justified in
refusing to allow visitation? Most courts that have considered this issue have held that the poten-
tial effectiveness of this tactic as a collection device is insufficient justification to satisfy the "best
interest of the child" standard. Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 520, 525-26 (1973).
In addition, North Carolina courts have held that a noncustodial parent has a "natural and
legal right to visit his or her child," In re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 551, 179 S.E.2d
844, 848 (1971), which may be denied only if denial is for the welfare of the child. Id.; Griffin v.
Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 113 (1953).
24. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 642, 263 S.E.2d 763, 768 (1980).
25. See note 13 and related text supra.
26. Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 18, 252 S.E.2d 735, 739 (1979).
27. 225 N.C. 189, 34 S.E.2d 148 (1945).
28. Id. The promises in question were therefore held independent, despite the introductory
sentence which referred to the agreement as consisting of "mutual covenants." Id.
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In Willford the court also held that the executory provisions of a separa-
tion agreement could not be inferred as dependent, even when they were sin-
gled out by the parties to be incorporated into the divorce decree. It appeared
to the court that part of the consideration for the husband's agreement to pay
continuing support to the wife may have been her relinquishment of rights in
the property settlement. Rather than involve itself in apost hoc determination
of which clauses were intended to be dependent, possibly drawing into ques-
tion property rights that had long been considered settled, the court held the
covenants in question to be independent.29
The court in Wheeler avoided unraveling an intricate web of obligations
in a separation agreement, some fully performed and some continuing, by
holding that defendant had waived the breach. What then is the impact of
Wheeler upon a defaulting spouse who attempts to rely on a clause condition-
ing his performance under the separation agreement upon that of his spouse?
It appears that after Wheeler the court will no longer have the option of de-
claring such a general clause insufficient to render the covenants mutually de-
pendent. Thus, a court seems to have only two routes available to avoid
delving into a morass of covenants in order to determine which were intended
to be independent. One route would be to declare that in the absence of spe-
cific language to the contrary, the executed portions of the separation agree-
ment are considered to be independent from the executory portions. A general
clause reciting dependence of covenants could therefore be construed as mak-
ing the executory covenants mutual, in conformity with Wheeler, without dis-
turbing the rights established in the property settlement. Although such a
presumption seems to ignore the complexity inherent in most separation
agreements, the approach has been taken by the North Carolina Supreme
Court to render the task of interpreting consent decrees concerning separation
and divorce manageable.30
Another approach would be to broadly interpret one of the elements of
waiver articulated in Wheeler--that the nonbreaching party "intentionally
waives his right to excuse or repudiate his own performance by continuing to
perform or accept the partial performance of the breaching party. '31 If reten-
tion by the nonbreaching party of any benefits conferred by the property set-
tlement were construed to be acceptance of partial performance, thus
constituting a waiver, it is unlikely that it would be to the benefit of a non-
breaching party to use the other party's breach to excuse his own performance.
One of the hidden traps of the Wheeler holding regarding dependent cove-
29. Id.
30. In White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979), the Supreme Court of North
Carolina was called upon to decide whether support and maintenance provisions in a consent
judgment were independent and separable from the property division provisions. The issue arose
when the wife moved to increase the periodic payments required in the consent judgment. The
court did not have the power to modify the order if the support payments and the property divi-
sion were meant to be consideration for each other. It was held tat the support payments would
be presumed to be independent and separable from the property settlement unless a contrary
intention was manifested in the agreement.
31. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 639, 263 S.E.2d 763, 767 (1980).
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nants would therefore be avoided, but it would be at the cost of rendering the
decision a practical nullity.
In conclusion, the holding of Wheeler recognizing dependent covenants
in a separate agreement raises more issues concerning the role of courts in
interpreting separation agreements than it resolves. It is an attempt to deal
with the custodial parent who denies the noncustodial parent access to the
children. The court viewed the separation agreement primarily as a contract
between two parties, governed according to ordinary contract rules.32 How-
ever, the court was not required to consider two factors commonly involved in
disputes involving separation agreements that are not susceptible to resolution
according to general rules of contract law: the interests of minor children, and
the consequences of invalidating the resolution of a complicated economic re-
lationship involving both executed and executory provisions. Applying the
holding of Wheeler in a case in which these factors are present will require
more of the court than the application of basic contract principles. Yet the
breadth of the decision, allowing a very general clause to import dependence
to the covenants in a separation agreement, will make it difficult for courts to
avoid its reach in the future.
2. Support Obligations 33
The court of appeals in Bradshaw v. Smith34 affirmed the trial court's
judgment that a father's duty to support his child, pursuant to a valid separa-
tion agreement, survived his death.35 The father had contracted to support his
child until her majority, completion of high school, or discontinuance of her
32. Id. at 642, 263 S.E.2d at 768. The court noted:
(Diefendant has contracted to pay alimony only so long as plaintiff "performs the condi-
tions of the contract." Each party's respective duties are clearly interdependent, not in-
dependent, and defendant's duty to pay alimony existed only so long as plaintiff
performed her duties under the contract. To argue that plaintiff's breach did not excuse
defendant's duty to pay alimony is to ignore the clear language of the separation agree-
ment and to overlook the central place the law of contracts has in interpreting separation
agreements.
Id.
33. In Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980), the supreme court held that
a spouse seeking permanent alimony may qualify as a dependent spouse even though she could
maintain her accustomed of living by depleting her estate. The court determined that the
legislature did not intend to require estate depletion when it listed "estates" in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.5 (1976) as one of the factors that may be considered in awarding alimony.
Williams illustrates that alimony must be awarded on the basis of the financial resources of
the two parties in comparison to one another, considering the family's accustomed standard of
living. The wife in Williams had an estate worth $761,975, with the husband's estate worth
$870,165. She qualified as a dependent spouse, however, because her yearly income of $21,000
was insufficient to meet her accustomed expenses, and her husband's annual income was $116,660.
She was a dependent spouse to the extent of the shortfall between her income and the cost of
maintaining her at the family's accustomed standard of living. 299 N.C. at 187, 261 S.E.2d at 858.
The court of appeals, in Department of Social Services v. Skinner, 48 N.C. App. 621, 269
S.E.2d 678 (1980), held that a governmental agency of another state has standing to sue in North
Carolina courts under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [U.R.E.S.A.], N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52A-8.1 (1976), when the agency has been assigned U.R.E.S.A. rights by an obligee
in its state.
34. 48 N.C. App. 701, 269 S.E.2d 770 (1980).
35. Id. at 705-06, 269 S.E.2d at 752.
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high school education, whichever event happened last, and also agreed to pro-
vide medical insurance for her during the same period. The agreement was
silent on the effect of his death.3 6
The court noted that the common law duty to support a child ended with
the parent's death, but that a parent can contractually bind his estate to sup-
port the child.37 The court applied the rule of Mullen v. Sawyer,38 which
stated that a deceased father's intent to bind his estate may be inferred from
several factors including a specified termination date and an obligation in ex-
cess of the common law duty to support.39 The court found that the father in
Bradshaw intended to bind his estate, because he specified the time of termi-
nation of the duty without mentioning termination at his death and agreed to
provide medical insurance for the entire period, a duty not required under the
common law.4° Policy considerations such as easing the support burden of
single parents and keeping families off of the welfare rolls support this deci-
sion.4 1
3. Resumption of the Marital Relationship
While it is clear that resumption of a marital relationship serves to termi-
nate a separation agreement,42 it is not always easy to determine what conduct
constitutes a resumption. In Hand v. Hand 3 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the husband's moving back into the marital domicile for a
two-week period did not void a separation agreement. The evidence about the
purpose of his return was conflicting, as was the testimony on whether the
parties had engaged in sexual intercourse during the time in question.44 The
court of appeals determined that the evidence of the parties' intention not to
reconcile was sufficient to affirm the trial court's decision. Defendant was held
to be in civil contempt for failure to comply with his payment obligation under
the separation agreement.45
This decision represents an attempt to limit the development of a harsh
trend in the case law that made any attempt at reconciliation potentially de-
36. Id. at 702, 269 S.E.2d at 751.
37. Id. at 703, 269 S.E.2d at 751.
38. 277 N.C. 623, 178 S.E.2d 425 (1971).
39. Id. at 630, 178 S.E.2d at 429. Two other factors considered significant in Mullen, but not
present in Bradshaw, were the presence of language creating a lien on the father's property and
special consideration in favor of the father. 48 N.C. App. at 705-06, 269 S.E.2d at 752.
40. 48 N.C. App. at 705, 269 S.E.2d at 752.
41. It appears that the court's decision is in line with those of the majority of the jurisdictions
deciding the issue. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1126, 1131-33 (1951), and cases cited therein.
42. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976); Tilley v. Tilley, 268 N.C.
630, 151 S.E.2d 592 (1966); State v. Gossett, 203 N.C. 641, 166 S.E. 754 (1932).
43. 46 N.C. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 597 (1980).
44. The wife contended that the husband returned temporarily to help her care for their
infant and that they did not engage in intercourse during the period when both occupied the
marital domicile. Id. at 85, 264 S.E.2d at 598. The husband's evidence indicated that they had
resumed living together and that they did have sexual intercourse during this time. Id.
45. Id. at 87, 264 S.E.2d at 600.
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structive of a separation agreement.46 In In re Estate ofAdamee47 the North
Carolina Supreme Court had emphasized the importance of conduct creating
the appearance that the parties had re-established marital ties.48 The court
believed that similar factors were involved in determining if the marital rela-
tionship had been resumed, whether the issue was the status of the separation
agreement or the ability to obtain a divorce based upon length of separation.49
Evidence that a man and a woman have "held themselves out as husband
and wife living together"50 will defeat a divorce because of reluctance to de-
pend on evidence that must" 'be sought behind the closed doors of the marital
domicile' -51 to prove separation. Thus, the thrust of Adamee was that the test
for determining whether a husband and wife had resumed the marital rela-
tionship was whether they "held themselves out" to the public as husband and
wife, rather than their subjective intent to re-establish their relationship.
The relevance of the intention of the parties to a determination of
whether the marital relationship was resumed was also minimized in Murphy
v. Murphy.5 2 In that case the court held that a single act of sexual intercourse
between separated spouses constituted a resumption of the marital relationship
as a matter of law, thus the intent of the parties was irrelevant.53
Hand54 is significant in that it represents an attempt by the court of ap-
peals to resurrect the intention of the parties as a consideration relevant to
finding whether they have resumed the marital relationship. The court in
Hand acknowledged that certain language inAdamee, "standing alone, would
indicate that the actual intention of the parties to resume their marital cohabi-
tation is not relevant to determining a resumption of the marital relation-
ship."'55 Nevertheless, the court concluded that this language was not binding
because the court in Adamee had decided as a matter of law that the undis-
puted facts constituted a resumption of the marriage. The court declined to
follow the trend indicated by the dicta inAdamee and the holding of Murphy,
and decided that "'[t]he issue of the parties' mutual intent is an essential ele-
46. See notes 47-53 and related text infra.
47. 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).
48. Id. at 391-93, 230 S.E.2d at 545-46.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 392, 230 S.E.2d at 546.
51. Id. (quoting Hava v. Chavigny, 147 La. 330, 331, 84 So. 892 (1920)).
52. 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
53. Id. at 395-97, 245 S.E.2d at 697-98. In her opinion Justice Sharp acknowledged that the
decision in Murphy was contrary to that adopted by a majority of other states. Id. at 395, 245
S.E.2d at 697. The policy reasons for retaining the minority position involved a reluctance to
allow parties to engage in sexual intercourse, an activity legitimated by the marital status, while
failing to fulfill the duties imposed by that status. Thus, enforcing a separation agreement when it
had been acknowledged that the parties had engaged in sex during the period of the separation
would be to "'sanction and approve, for all practical purposes, illicit intercourse and promiscuous
assignation.' Id. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting State v. Gossett, 203 N.C. 641, 644, 166 S.E.
754, 755 (1932)). The essence of the majority opinion was summarized: "Severance of marital
relations by a separation ageement and continued sexual intercourse between the parties are 'es-
sentially antagonistic and irreconcilable notions."' Id. (quoting from I A. LINDEY, SEARATION
AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUrTiAL CONTRACTS § 8, at 8-13 (1978).
54. 46 N.C. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 597 (1980).
55. Id. at 86, 264 S.E.2d at 599.
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ment in deciding whether the parties were reconciled and resumed cohabita-
tion.' "56
4. Contractual Nature of Consent Decrees
An absolute divorce terminates all rights of the spouses "arising out of the
marriage, '57 including the right to support of a dependent spouse.58 However,
an obligation to make payments pursuant to a separation agreement is deemed
to arise from the contract and thus survives an absolute divorce. In Haynes v.
Haynes59 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a right to receive
support payments that is conferred by a consent decree is contractual in nature
and therefore is not automatically voided upon absolute divorce.60 Whether a
support provision in a consent decree will survive an absolute divorce depends
upon the intent of the parties.61 In Haynes the language of the decree antici-
pated the possibility that the parties would obtain a divorce at some time in
the future and did not include divorce as one of the events that would termi-
nate the obligation to make support payments. The court held this language to
be indicative of the parties' intent to continue the payments after the divorce.62
Defendant also argued that the decree, a court order enforceable by con-
tempt, could not be contractual, thus it must arise from the marriage and be
terminated upon divorce.63 The court rejected this position, analogizing the
consent judgment to an order for specific performance of a separation agree-
ment. The separation agreement retains its contractual nature despite enforce-
ability of the order for specific performance through contempt proceedings. A
consent decree in which a husband agrees to provide support is to be accorded
similar treatment. 64
B. Paternity
1. Role of Presumptions
In reviewing a conviction of abandonment and nonsupport of a child, the
56. Id. at 87, 264 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Newton v. Williams, 25 N.C. App. 527, 532, 214
S.E.2d 285, 288 (1975)).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(a) (1976).
58. McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 117, 221 S.E.2d 490, 495 (1976) (dictum).
59. 45 N.C. App. 376, 263 S.E.2d 783 (1980).
60. Id. at 382, 263 S.E.2d at 786.
61. Id., 263 S.E.2d at 786-87.
62. Id., 263 S.E.2d at 787. Because the intent was found to be present for the payments to
continue even after absolute divorce, the court determined that the case of Bland v. Bland, 21 N.C.
App. 192, 203 S.E.2d 639 (1974), was not controlling. In Bland the consent judgment stated that
the husband's obligation to make support payments to the wife was to continue "until he is re-
lieved therefrom by operation of law." The court determined the language of that clause to re-
lieve the husband's estate of any duty to continue the payments, because the husband's duty to
support terminated by operation of law upon his death. Thus, although Haynes demands that the
intention of the parties control in interpreting consent decrees, inclusion of a clause like that con-
tained in Bland could be construed to indicate that the parties intended for the payments to termi-
nate upon divorce.




North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. White, 65 rejected the application of
a conclusive presumption of paternity. The court held that to require defend-
ant-husband to offer evidence of the physical impossibility of his fatherhood in
order to rebut the presumption places upon him a burden of production so
strict that, in effect, it unconstitutionally shifts the burden of persuasion to
him. 66
The evidence showed that defendant, husband of the mother, separated
from her 265 days before the birth, and that the mother began living in open
adultery with another man 262 days before the birth.67 Thus, both men had
access to the mother during the normal gestation period.68 The trial court
instructed the jury that unless defendant could prove he had no access to the
mother during the normal gestation period, he was conclusively presumed to
be the father.69 Defendant, who provided no such proof, was found guilty of
abandonment and nonsupport. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction,
though it admitted that the conclusive presumption might be unconstitu-
tional.7 0
The supreme court, relying on a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions, distinguished permissive from mandatory presumptions. 7 1 The na-
ture of the presumption is determined by careful examination of the instruc-
tions to the jury in light of how a reasonable juror might interpret them.72 A
permissive presumption permits, but does not require, the factfinder to infer
the elemental fact 73 from proof of the basic fact. Since the inference is permis-
65. 300 N.C. 494, 268 S.E.2d 481 (1980).
66. Id. at 509, 268 S.E.2d at 490.
67. State v. White, 42 N.C. App. 320, 321, 256 S.E.2d 505, 506 (1979).
68. One series of North Carolina cases sets the normal gestation period at seven to ten
months, another group finds it to be 280 days, and yet another notes that there is no agreement
even among medical experts on the normal period. See 42 N.C. App. at 322, 256 S.E.2d at 507.
Because the time periods were so close together, absent proof of the time of conception, either man
could be the father regardless of the standard used to measure the gestation period.
69. 300 N.C. at 498, 268 S.E.2d at 484. The instructions described the definition of North
Carolina's common law presumption of legitimacy. In civil cases, a child born in wedlock is
presumed to be legitimate, that is, the child of the mother's husband. This presumption is rebutta-
ble by proof that the husband could not have been the father due to impotence or nonaccess to his
wife. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 197, 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968). The confusion exper-
ienced by North Carolina courts, resulting in application to criminal proceedings of rules estab-
lished for civil cases, is discussed in Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1979-Family
Law, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1181, 1478-79 (1980).
70. 42 N.C. App. at 323, 256 S.E.2d at 507.
71. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Court dealt with a jury instruction which
conclusively presumed malice aforethought absent proof by the defendant that he acted in the
heat of passion. The Court concluded that the intrusion impermissibly relieved the prosecution of
the burden of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 704.
In upholding a New York statutory presumption, the Court in Ulster County Court v. Allen,
442 U.S. 140 (1979), distinguished mandatory and permissive presumptions in the context of due
process rights. It reiterated its view that a presumption must not undermine the factfinder's re-
sponsibility at trial to find every elemental fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 156.
72. 300 N.C. at 506, 268 S.E.2d at 489. The principle that the exact words spoken to the jury
by the trial judge are to be weighed in determining the nature of the presumption emerges trom
bath Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979).
73. Elemental facts are those constituent parts of a crime which must be proved by the prose-
cution to sustain a conviction. In White the elemental facts are that defendant was the father and
1981] 1203
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sive in nature, defendant does not bear the burden of production-absent
other evidence the inference will not support a finding of the elemental facts74
beyond a reasonable doubt.75 If, however, the instructions indicate that an
inference must be drawn upon proof of the basic facts, then the presumption is
mandatory in nature.76 A mandatory presumption places upon defendant the
burden to produce sufficient evidence to raise a factual issue on the existence
of elemental facts.77 Applying these principles to the language of the trial
judge's instructions, the court determined that the state benefited from a
mandatory presumption requiring the jury to find the issue of paternity
against defendant absent proof that he could not be the father.78 Thus, de-
fendant's burden of production was so great that, in effect, he bore the burden
of the nonexistence of an elemental fact.79 Since the state was not, therefore,
required to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, use
of the presumption violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.80
Though it found that the instructions to the jury placed too great a burden
on defendant to rebut the mandatory presumption, the court nevertheless af-
firmed the conviction, holding that defendant was not prejudiced because he
offered no evidence to counter the mother's evidence that she first missed men-
struation while living with defendant. 81 An interesting dichotomy between
criminal and civil paternity actions results from the decision in White. By
showing that some other man could be the father a defendant could, absent
other evidence by the state, defeat a finding of paternity in a criminal action.82
that he willfully abandoned and failed to provide adequate support for the child. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-322 (1969).
74. Elemental facts are those which the jury can infer from basic facts. The basic facts in
White are that defendant was married, that he and the mother had sexual relations, and that the
mother first missed menstruation while living with defendant.
75. 300 N.C. at 506, 268 S.E.2d at 489.
76. Id. at 507, 268 S.E.2d at 489.
77. State v. Hankerson, 388 N.C. 632, 649-52, 220 S.E.2d 575, 583-89 (1975). The United
States Supreme Court has not definitively determined the exact quantum of evidence that a de-
fendant may be required to produce, within the dictates of due process, to rebut a mandatory
presumption. It has spoken of "some evidence," Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975),
but has cautioned against requiring a defendant to produce "considerably greater than 'some'
evidence." Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517 (1979).
78. 300 N.C. at 507-08, 268 S.E.2d at 490. The trial judge instructed the jury that "the only
way the assumption of legitimacy may be rebutted is by evidence tending to show the husband
could not have had access to the wife during the period of time referred to. Id. at 498, 268 S.E.2d
at 484.
79. Id. at 509, 268 S.E.2d at 490.
80. The United States Supreme Court, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), held the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment "protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." Id. at 364.
81. The evidence indicated that the mother first missed menstruation while she and defend-
ant were living together, and before she began her relationship with the other man. The court
held that the defendant thus bore the burden of producing evidence suggesting that either concep-
tion did not cause the missed menstruation or that some other man had sexual relations with the
mother prior to that time. Since defendant did not produce such evidence, the court held that he
was not prejudiced by the mandatory presumption. 300 N.C. at 510-11, 268 S.E.2d at 491.
82. The court expressly held that such a showing would constitute sufficient evidence to raise
a factual issue and rebut the mandatory presumption. Id. at 509,268 S.E.2d at 491. Once defend-
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The same evidence, however, would not preclude a finding of paternity in a
civil action, since the common law presumption that the husband is the father
would not be rebutted.83 Given the dual procedure it is preferable to allow
this distinction to exist than to force a criminal defendant to disprove the
state's case.
2. Equal Protection for Illegitimates
The court of appeals, in Cogdell v. Johnson,84 held that G.S. 49-14(c)(1)
discriminates against illegitimate children in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.85 The statute imposes a three year limi-
tation on the commencement of civil actions to establish the paternity of a
child born out of wedlock.86 Establishment of paternity is a condition prece-
dent to imposing on the father the duty to support the child.87 Because a child
born in wedlock is rebuttably presumed to be the child of the mother's hus-
band,8 8 a legitimate child generally is not burdened with having to establish
paternity. An action for support of a legitimate child may thus be brought at
any time during the child's minority,8 9 while illegitimate children are placed at
ant raises the factual issue, the burden is on the state to prove the elemental fact beyond a reason-
able doubt.
83. See note 69 supra. When the defendant in a civil paternity action is the husband of the
mother, he is presumed to be the father of the child, absent proof that he could not possibly be the
father. The public policies of promoting the family unit and ensuring legitimacy of children born
of married parents favor placing the burden on the defendant-husband. When the putative father
is not married to the mother, however, the state's interest in the family unit is not present. Proof
of paternity beyond a reasonable doubt is required in civil cases by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-
14(b)(1976), in furtherance of the state's interest in preventing fraudulent claims. See note 86
infra.
84. 46 N.C. App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980).
85. Id. at 189, 264 S.E.2d at 821.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979) states in pertinent part:
(a) The paternity of a child born out of wedlock may be established by a civil ac-
tion .... Such establishment shall not have the effect of legitimation. (b) Proof of pa-
ternity pursuant to this section shall be beyond a reasonable doubt. (c) Such action shall
be commenced within one of the following periods: (1) Three years next after the birth
of the child; or (2) Three years next after the date of the last payment by the putative
father for the support of the child ....
87. "The duty of the father of an illegitimate child to support such child is not created by the
judicial determination of paternity. That determination is merely a procedural prerequisite to the
enforcement of the duty by legal action. The father's duty to support his child arises when the
child is born." Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 116, 225 S.E.2d 816, 827 (1976). See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 49-15 (1976).
88. "When a child is born in wedlock, the law presumes it to be legitimate, and this presump-
tion can be rebutted only by facts and circumstances which show that the husband could not have
been the father, as that he was impotent or could not have had access to his wife." Eubanks v.
Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 197, 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968).
This common law presumption of legitimacy (that the mother's husband is the father) may
not be applied conclusively in a criminal nonsupport action. To do so would relieve the state of its
burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. White, 300
N.C. 494,268 S.E.2d 481 (1980). For a discussion of White see notes 62-83 and accompanying text
supra.
89. A parent's obligation to support his child continues throughout the child's minority.
Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 616, 44 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1947). There is no express limitation on the
period within which an action for support may be commenced. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4
(1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
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a disadvantage by the limitation of G.S. 49-14.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of discrimina-
tion against illegitimates and found a state law denying the right of support to
illegitimate children while granting it to legitimate children violative of equal
protection. 90 The Court recognized the problems inherent in proving pater-
nity, but held that those problems cannot be made into an "impenetrable bar-
rier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." 91 Although
classifications based on illegitimacy are not subject to strict judicial scrutiny,
they must nevertheless be substantially related 92 and narrowly tailored 93 to
permissible state interests. Since illegitimate children are entitled to the same
right to support from their fathers as that afforded legitimate children, the
question becomes whether the statute of limitations provided in G.S. 49-14(c)
is substantially related to a state interest or whether it constitutes an impene-
trable barrier to the enforcement by illegitimate children of their right to sup-
port.
9 4
Jurisdictions that have considered the constitutionality of statutes similar
to G.S. 49-14 have reached inconsistent results. Those upholding their statutes
have determined that the statute of limitation is substantially related to the
goal of preventing the litigation of stale and fraudulent claims.95 The North
Carolina court of appeals was not convinced by the reasoning of those deci-
sions, and found that G.S. 49-14(c) does not bear a substantial relationship to
those interests. 96
The court discussed several bases for its holding. First, it reasoned that
since a child is entitled to support from its father throughout his minority, a
claim for such support can never be stale,97 and noted that "[t]he purposes of
Article 3 of Chapter 49 are manifestly to enable an illegitimate child to receive
support from its biological father and prevent it from becoming a public
90. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
91. Id. at 538.
92. Lalli v. Lali, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). Accord, Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254
S.E.2d 762 (1979).
93. The Supreme Court in Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.s. 495, 513 (1976), indicated that dis-
criminatory classifications must be "carefully tuned to alternative considerations" to be valid. See
also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977).
94. The Supreme Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of a statute of
limitation when applied to actions to establish paternity. There have been a number of decisions
regarding other legal disabilities of illegitimates: Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (right to
bring wrongful death action); Lal v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (right to inherit by intestate suc-
cession); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (right to inherent by intestate succession); Jimi-
nez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (entitlement to disability insurance benefits under the
Social Security Act); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (right to equal
participation in welfare programs); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (right to
recover worker's compensation benefits upon father's death); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (unwed father's right to custody upon death of children's mother); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1978) (right to sue for wrongful death of mother).
95. See 46 N.C. App. at 186-87, 264 S.E.2d at 820, and cases cited therein.
96. 46 N.C. App. at 188-89, 264 S.E.2d at 820-21.
97. Id. at 188, 264 S.E.2d at 821. The court reasoned that to bar a child from asserting
paternity is to bar it from receiving support from its natural father. Id. at 189, 264 S.E.2d at 821.
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charge."98 In Joyner v. Lucas99 the court held that the statute of limitations of
G.S. 49-14 is tolled when the putative father leaves the state. 1°° To bar plain-
tiff's paternity action would lead to the anomalous result that a claim which
would be barred by the statute because of staleness if the defendant remained
in the state, would be allowed if he left the state and returned many years
later.
Second, in determining that the need of the child manifestly outweighs
the benefit provided by the statute of limitations, the court rejected defend-
ant's claim that the statute of limitations is necessary to avoid fraudulent
claims.101 Recent advances in blood typing would permit defendant to dis-
prove paternity if wrongfully accused. Requiring proof of paternity beyond a
reasonable doubt102 adequately protects against fraudulent claims and indi-
cates that the three year limitation is neither necessary nor substantially re-
lated to furtherance of this state interest.
Finally, the court of appeals concluded that G.S. 49-14 is not tailored
narrowly enough to its purpose. 10 3 The trial court in this case was able to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the child's father, but held that
the three year statute of limitation barred the action.' °4 Since the statute is not
substantially related to any legitimate state interest, but merely presents an
impenetrable barrier to illegitimates seeking support, it unconstitutionally dis-
criminates against illegitimate children in violation of the equal protection
clause.
C Alimony
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Clark v. Clark,105 held that the
income tax consequences of an award of alimony are to be considered by a
trial court in determining the appropriate amount to award. 1°6 Alimony pay-
ments received by the wife because of a court decree are taxable income to the
wife and deductible by the husband.'0 7 While G.S. 50-16.5(a) does not ex-
pressly include the income tax consequence as a factor to be considered,108 the
98. Id. at 184, 264 S.E.2d at 818.
99. 42 N.C. App. 541, 257 S.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 297, 259 S.E.2d 300 (1979).
100. Id. at 546-47, 257 S.E.2d at 109.
101. See 46 N.C. App. at 188-89, 264 S.E.2d at 821.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(b), reprinted at note 86 supra.
103. 46 N.C. App. at 189, 264 S.E.2d at 821. Rather than focusing on rebuttable presumptions
that might be created by the results of medically accepted blood tests, or the presence of the
father's name on the child's birth certificate, the statute merely set an arbitrary time limit for suits
by illegitimates.
104. 46 N.C. App. at 183, 264 S.E.2d at 818. The action was commenced when the child was
ten years old. Id.
105. 301 N.C. 123, 271 S.E.2d 58 (1980).
106. Id. at 133, 271 S.E.2d at 66. This decision finds support in many other jurisdictions. See
generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 461 (1973).
107. I.R.C. § 71.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5(a) (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979) states in pertinent part: "Ali-
mony shall be in such amount as the circumstances render necessary, having due regard to the
estates, earnings, earning capacity, condition, accustomed standard of living of the parties, and
other facts of the particular case."
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court determined that its language is broad enough to authorize such consider-
ation. It cautioned, however, that tax consequences are in no way preeminent
in the determination, but merely one factor for a court to consider.' 0 9 Judicial
consideration of this "tax bite" flows naturally from the principle that the
amount of alimony to be awarded is a question of fairness and justice to all
parties.I10
D. Marriage Ceremony
In State v. Lynch I 1I the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed a court
of appeals holding that a marriage solemnized by a "minister" of the Univer-
sal Life Church, Inc. was valid under North Carolina law. Defendant was
convicted of bigamy because he participated in two marriage ceremonies, the
first of which was officiated by an individual who had obtained a certificate of
ordination by sending ten dollars to the Universal Life Church, Inc., an organ-
ization which "will ordain anyone without question of his or her faith.""12
The supreme court held that defendant's motion for a nonsuit should have
been granted." 13 The statutory definition of those qualified to perform a mar-
riage ceremony 41 4 was not sufficiently broad to sanction "[a] ceremony solem-
nized by a Roman Catholic layman in the mail order business who bought for
$10.00 a mail order certificate giving him 'credentials of minister' in the Uni-
versal Life Church, Inc.""1t5
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109. 301 N.C. at 133, 271 S.E.2d at 66.
110. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).
111. 301 N.C. 479, 272 S.E.2d 349 (1980).
112. Id. at 481, 272 S.E.2d at 350.
113. Id. at 484, 272 S.E.2d at 352.
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (1976) requires that a marriage be solemnized "in the presence of
an ordained minister of any religious denomination, minister authorized by his church, or of a
magistrate." Marriage by consent is not recognized in North Carolina. State v. Afford, 298 N.C.
465, 259 S.E.2d 242 (1979); State v. Samuel, 19 N.C. 177 (1836).




In Smith v. Mitchell1 the North Carolina Supreme Court decided the effi-
cacy of a preemptive right-to-repurchase clause in a deed.2 A preemptive right
clause is a direct restraint on alienability of land; therefore it is not favored in
the law. Restraints on alienability that have been held void in North Carolina
include restrictive covenants limiting a grantee's right to convey to a small
group,3 preventing alienation absolutely for a certain period of time,4 and
granting an absolute and permanent right of first refusal.5 However, the court
held that the preemptive right clause in this deed was valid and enforceable.
6
In Smith, the original owner placed certain restrictive covenants expressly
running with the land on a parcel of real property in 1967. One covenant
required any future owner who wished to sell the land to first offer it to the
original owner or his successors. 7 The covenant stated that the property was to
be offered at a price no higher than the lowest price the current owner would
accept from other purchasers and that the right of repurchase was limited in
duration to the lifetime of the original owner plus twenty years.8
The heir of the original owner conveyed the property subject to the cove-
nant to the defendant in 1974. In 1976 the defendant conveyed the property
without honoring the preemptive right clause. The plaintiff, an heir of the
original owner, brought an action for specific performance or alternatively for
damages. The defendant alleged, and the trial court and court of appeals
agreed, that any preemptive right of this nature was an impermissible restraint
on alienation.9 As authority for this position,10 the defendant and court of
1. 301 N.C. 58, 269 S.E.2d 608 (1980).
2. A preemptive right requires that before property conveyed can be sold to another, it must
first be offered to the conveyor or his heirs or other designated person. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 26.64 (A. Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413 (1944). Although
analogous, an option differs from a preemptive right; an option creates the power in the holder of
the option to compel a sale of the land. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64. Because of
the analogy between preemptive rights and options, the court stated that specific performance,
often used in option situations, would be a suitable remedy here. 301 N.C. at 68, 269 S.E.2d at
614.
3. See Norwood v. Crowder, 177 N.C. 469, 99 S.E. 345 (1919).
4. See Welch v. Murdock, 192 N.C. 709, 135 S.E. 611 (1926).
5. See Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892). Hardy was cited as authority
for holding the restraints invalid in the cases cited in notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
6. 301 N.C. at 61, 269 S.E.2d at 610.
7. Id at 59-60, 269 S.E.2d at 610. The clause stated:
If any future owner of lands herein described shall desire to sell the lands owned by
him, he shall offer the parties of the first part the option to repurchase said property at a
price no higher than the lowest price he is willing to accept from any other purchaser.
Parties of the first part agree to exercise said option or to reject same in writing within 14
days of said offer. This covenant shall be binding on the parties of the first part and their
heirs, successors, administrators, and executors or assigns for as long as W. Osmond
Smith, Jr. shall live and for 20 years from the date of his death unless sooner rescinded.
8. Id at 60, 269 S.E.2d at 610. This provision was technically within the period allowed by
the rule against perpetuities. See note 17 infra.
9. 301 N.C. at 60, 269 S.E.2d at 610.
10. Id at 61, 269 S.E.2d at 611.
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appeals relied on Hardy v. Galloway.l I In Hardy, which was a 1892 decision,
a vendor of realty attempted through a restrictive covenant in a deed to retain
the right to repurchase the land when sold; the covenant did not specify any
time or price limitations. The court held this to be an impermissible restraint
on alienation.' 2
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision in
Smith, holding that Hardy v. Galloway did not prohibit all preemptive right
clauses. 13 Rather, the latter case held void a preemptive right that did notlimit the duration of the clause or specify a method of determining price.14
The court held that preemptive right clauses that are limited in duration and
specify some pricing mechanism will be valid and enforceable if they are rea-
sonable.' 5 A price will be deemed reasonable if it in some manner links the
purchase price to the fair market value of the land or to the price the seller will
accept from a third person.16 A duration will be reasonable if it falls within
the period covered by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 17 Since the clause in
Smith met the reasonableness standard in both price and duration, it was held
valid.
In reaching this result the court discussed the bases of the policy against
restraints on alienation. This policy was rooted in the belief that the living
members of a society must be able to control the wealth of that society if it is
to be used efficiently.' 8 The policy, however, was never absolute; indirect re-
straints have long been held valid. 19 Also, it confficts with another strong
common law policy that allows a property owner to convey his property sub-
ject to whatever conditions he desires.20 This conflict has caused courts to
allow direct restraints that are deemed reasonable but to disallow all others.21
The Smith court found that the policy reasons for prohibiting these restraints
was not violated by a preemptive right that was limited and reasonable in
11. 111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892).
12. Id at 523, 15 S.E. at 891.
13. 301 N.C. at 61, 269 S.E.2d at 611.
14. Id at 64, 269 S.E.2d at 612. In Hardy, the deed contained a clause stating that the ven-
dors retained for themselves and their heirs "the right to repurchase said land when sold"; it
further stated that if vendee attempted to sell the land without compliance with the covenant, the
deed was void. This clause was held void as an impermissible restraint on alienation. 111 N.C. at
519, 15 S.E. at 890.
15. 301 N.C. at 61., 269 S.E.2d at 611.
16. Id at 66, 269 S.E.2d at 613. In adopting this standard, the court adopted the majority
rule. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413 (1944).
17. 301 N.C. at 66, 269 S.E.2d at 613. This adoption of the Rule Against Perpetuities as the
duration standard saves the court from tedious litigation over what is a reasonable time. See
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413 (1944). The Rule describes a period of twenty-one years plus
some life in being at the creation of the interest. For a criticism of this application of the Rule to a
right to repurchase, see Link, TheRuleAgainst Peretuitesin North Carolina, 57 N.C.L. REV. 727,
807 (1979).
18. 301 N.C. at 62, 269 S.E.2d at 611.
19. For example, a vendor can convey a fee subject to a possibility of reverter or a condition
subsequent. Id
20. Id
21. See, ag., Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 920 (1971). The basic rationale in these cases is that the
interference of a preemptive right with the policy of control of wealth is negligible. 301 N.C. at
62-63, 269 S.E.2d at 611.
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terms of duration and price.22
Smith's recognition of the validity of preemptive rights has some impor-
tant ramifications for property owners. The use of these clauses affords the
owner an additional opportunity to plan the future of his land. He can insure
for a limited time that the property will not be conveyed to certain purchasers
or used for certain purposes. Also, purchasers will be more likely to submit to
this kind of clause in a deed than to a separate option to repurchase requested
by the original owner.
In Beech Mountain Property Owners' Association, Inc. v. Sefart,23 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals found affirmative covenants requiring the
property owners to pay annual assessment charges insufficiently definite to be
enforceable. Property owners in the Beech Mountain development purport-
edly were committed to being members of the property owners' association
and to making "reasonable" annual payments for the maintenance of roads
and recreational areas.24 The court held that the covenants were not enforcea-
ble because they did not establish a standard by which a lot owner's liability
could be measured and because they did not identify the property to be main-
tained.25
The decision is consistent with cases that hold restrictive covenants void
unless they are clear and unambiguous.26 Because there were no North Caro-
lina cases on point, the majority relied on other states' decisions to support the
Beech Mountain ruling.27 Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc. 28, a New Jersey case, is
especially convincing in arguing that a formula to calculate assessments must
be included in the covenant if it is to be enforceable. 29 Arkansas' holding in
Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Association30 conflicts with Peter-
sen, however. In Kell the court determined that because the property owners'
association acts as a trustee for the benefit of the property owners, the owners
have recourse in a court of equity to prevent any arbitrary action by the associ-
ation. The court found this recourse in equity to be an adequate formula for
determining assessments. 31
22. The court also found that the policies behind the utilization of options were similarly
applicable to preemptive rights. Options have long been valid and useful devices for disposition
of property. See 301 N.C. at 63, 269 S.E.2d at 611. The court also analogized preemptive rights to
the valid technique used by developers of placing restrictive covenants in deeds to control devel-
opment of the property. Id, 269 S.E.2d at 612.
23. 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178 (1980).
24. Id at 287-88, 269 S.E.2d at 179-80.
25. Id at 295-96, 269 S.E.2d at 183.
26. See Hullett v. Grayson, 265 N.C. 453, 144 S.E.2d 206 (1965); Hege v. Sellers, 241 N.C.
240, 84 S.E.2d 892 (1954).
27. See Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 NJ. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (1971). Other cases
have upheld covenants that contained formulas or stated amounts. See Nassau County v. Ken-
sington Ass'n, 21 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Kennilwood Owners Ass'n v. Jaybro Realty &
Dev. Co., 156 Misc. 604, 281 N.Y.S. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
28. 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (1971).
29. Id at 171-72, 283 A.2d at 921-22.
30. 258 Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651 (1975).
31. Id at 763, 528 S.W.2d at 655.
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B. Rule Against Perpetuities
In Joyner v. Duncan,32 the North Carolina Supreme Court applied two
constructional techniques to uphold various class gifts against the Rule
Against Perpetuities.33 First, the court narrowly construed the class term
"great-grandchildren" to exclude remote class members. Second, the court ap-
plied the presumption of early vesting 34 so that reaching a specified age merely
indicated postponed enjoyment of a vested interest, rather than a condition
precedent to vesting. The class gifts thus were able to meet the requirement
that the maximum and minimum membership in the class be determined
within the period of the Rule or the entire class gift fails. 35
In interpreting the testamentary trust, 36 the court construed the first sec-
tion of the trust to give a present life income interest to the testator's son.37 In
the second section, Edwin Duncan, Jr., and Jane Cannon Duncan, testator's
grandchildren, received vested remainder income interests for life.38 The
court interpreted the third section of the trust as a class gift to testator's
grandchildren with each grandchild to be paid $5000 at age twenty-five, $5000
at age thirty, $5000 at age thirty-five and $5000 at age forty.39 The court con-
strued the language to give the grandchildren a vested interest at birth subject
to open with enjoyment postponed until the ages of twenty-five, thirty, thirty-
five and forty; thus, the class gift was valid because the interests vested and the
class closed within the perpetuity period.40
The court construed the fourth section of the trust to give to testator's
great-grandchildren born of Edwin Duncan, Jr., and Jane Cannon Duncan a
vested interest at birth in monetary gifts for their college education, subject to
divestment if the great-grandchildren failed to make passing grades at col-
lege.4 ' The court construed the trust language to set a condition subsequent to
vesting, rather than a condition precedent.42 Also, the court construed testa-
tor's intent to be that when testator used the term "great-grandchildren," he
32. 299 N.C. 565, 264 S.E.2d 76 (1980).
33. The Rule Against Perpetuities reads: "No devise or grant of a future interest in property
is valid unless the title thereto must vest in interest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years, plus
the period of gestation, after some life or lives in being at the creation of the interest." Id at 568,
264 S.E.2d at 81. See note 66 infra for an additional definition.
34. Id at 574, 264 S.E.2d at 84-85.
35. Id at 573, 264 S.E.2d at 84.
36. In this action for declaratory judgment, the superior court judge validated the trust under
the Rule Against Perpetuities. The supreme court granted discretionary review pursuant to G.S.
7A-31 prior to determination by the court of appeals. Id at 568, 264 S.E.2d at 81.
37. Id at 570-71, 264 S.E.2d at 82.
38. Id at 571-72, 264 S.E.2d at 83.
39. Id at 572-74, 264 S.E.2d at 83-84.
40. Id at 575, 264 S.E.2d at 84-85. All of testator's grandchildren would have to be born not
later than the death of testator's son plus any period of gestation. Because testator's son was the
life in being and because the grandchildren's interests vested at birth, there was no perpetuity
violation. Id at 575, 264 S.E.2d at 85. "Subject to open" signifies in this instance that the class of
remaindermen may be enlarged by the birth of additional grandchildren, in which event each
vested share would be reduced proportionately.
41. Id at 575-76, 264 S.E.2d at 85.
42. Id. at 576, 264 S.E.2d at 85.
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was referring only to children born of Edwin Duncan, Jr., and Jane Duncan
Miller and not to any child born of a later-born grandchild.43 Because the two
named grandchildren were lives in being and the interests of the great-
grandchildren vested at birth, the interests of all great-grandchildren covered
by the clause must vest, if at all, within the period prescribed by the Rule
Against Perpetuities. 44
Pursuant to sections five and six, each great-grandchild was to receive
one-half of his interest in the trust remainder when he reached age twenty-five,
and when the youngest great-grandchild reached age twenty-five and the
grandchildren were deceased, final per capita distribution of all remainder in-
terests to the great-grandchildren was to occur.45 In sustaining this portion of
the trust, the court held that testator's great-grandchildren born of Edwin
Duncan, Jr., and Jane Duncan Miller had vested remainders at birth subject to
open until the first great-grandchild reached age twenty-five. 46 In providing
for one-half distribution at age twenty-five and final distribution at the stated
termination occurrence, the court held that testator was prescribing the times
when the vested interest could be possessed. In reaching this conclusion, the
court applied the same construction of the term "great-grandchildren" as it
had in section four, and the court showed the same preference for early vesting
of interests with postponed enjoyment as it did in section three. Because the
remainder vested at birth, the interest did not violate the perpetuities period
because the named grandchildren were lives in being. Additionally, the class
of great-grandchildren would close no later than the death of the survivor of
the two named grandchildren, so both maximum and minimum membership
would be determined within the period of the Rule.47
As recognized by the Joyner court, both maximum and minimum mem-
bership in a class must be determined within the perpetuities period.48 This is
in line with the established construction of class gifts. 4 9 In Joyner, the court's
construction of the term "great-grandchildren" and its preference for early
43. Id at 577-78, 264 S.E.2d at 86-87.
44. Id at 578, 264 S.E.2d at 87.
45. Id at 578-79, 264 S.E.2d at 87.
46. Id at 580, 264 S.E.2d at 88.
47. Id Also in section six, the trust provided for final distribution to each great-grandchild
or the heirs of any deceased great-grandchild. This did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities
because these words did not create a contingency; the words merely denoted the inheritable quali-
ty of a vested remainder. Id at 581, 264 S.E.2d at 88.
The court also noted that application of the "wait and see" doctrine would mean there were
no perpetuities violations in the trust. Because of earlier holdings in the case, however, the court
stated that application of the doctrine was unnecessary. Id at 581-82, 264 S.E.2d at 88-89. The
court has yet to apply the "wait and see" doctrine despite ample opportunities to do so. See Link,
supra note 17, at 780.
48. 299 N.C. at 573, 264 S.E.2d at 84.
49. In order to avoid the Rule Against Perpetuities, the class gift must be certain to vest
within lives in being plus twenty-one years, and it must cease to be subject to open within that
time; otherwise, the entire gift fails. 3 L. Simas & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 1265 (2d ed. 1956).
Apparently, no past North Carolina cases expressly state this class gift doctrine (also known
as the 'all-or-nothing rule" of Leake v. Robinson, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817)), although the
doctrine has been recognized in the state by implication. See Link, supra note 17, at 771, 780.
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vesting were necessary to validate the class gifts in the trust. If the court had
not limited the term "great-grandchildren" to children born of the two named
grandchildren the entire class gift would have been invalid.50
In limiting the term "great-grandchildren," the court used various rules of
construction, such as giving effect to the presumed intent of testator and pre-
ferring a construction that produces a valid distribution. 51 Judicial construc-
tion can be a sensible way of avoiding unwarranted consequences caused by
the conclusive presumption of fertility.52 The use of this construction in
Joyner, however, is questionable. Testator specifically made a gift in section
three of the trust to his two named grandchildren and "any other child born to
Edwin Duncan," thus indicating that he was aware of the possibility of after-
born grandchildren. In addition, when testator executed his will his son was
forty-six years old. It is debatable whether age forty-six is advanced enough to
warrant a judicial construction that sidesteps the presumption that a man can
have children as long as he lives. Finally, the Joyner court noted that when a
will is subject to two constructions, one that results in a perpetuities violation
and another than renders the will valid, the court should give preference to the
latter.53 From this premise, and from a study of the will and surrounding
circumstances, the court based its construction of the term "great-grandchil-
dren" on testator's presumed intent.54 The problem with this analysis is that
the term "great-grandchildren" as used in the trust appears to be unambigu-
ous.55 Given the approach taken in Joyner, it will be difficult to determine
how far the court will go to find an expression open to alternate interpreta-
tions. The Joyner court may have found the term ambiguous simply to avoid
a possible perpetuities violation.56
The second constructional technique used to uphold the trust in Joyner
was the preference for early vesting. In Joyner, this presumption meant a con-
structional preference for no condition of survivorship to a certain age. In
interpreting sections three, five and six of the trust, the court found the lan-
guage gave a vested interest at birth with enjoyment postponed until certain
ages.57 If the court had determined that surviving to those ages was an im-
50. A great-grandchild born of an after-born grandchild could have a remote interest; his
interest could vest beyond the perpetuities period because he could be born more than twenty-one
years after a life in being at testator's death.
51. 299 N.C. at 576-78, 264 S.E.2d at 86-87.
52. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 216
(1966).
53. 299 N.C. at 576, 264 S.E.2d at 86 (citing Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258
N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963)). For a discussion of the application of this constructional prefer-
ence in North Carolina, see Link, supra note 17, at 765-67.
54. 299 N.C. at 577-78, 264 S.E.2d at 86-87.
55. Testator expressly named the two grandchildren in section two where they were given life
income interests. Id at 571, 264 S.E.2d at 83. In the other sections of the trust, testator referred
only to "grandchildren." The language is clear and appears on its face only to evidence an intent
for separate distributions in separate trust sections.
56. The court limited its interpretation to the facts of the case. Id at 578, 264 S.E.2d at 87.
57. Id at 575, 580, 264 S.E.2d at 84, 88. The court also made use of the preference for early
vesting in section four where it held that making passing grades in college was a condition subse-
quent (which will divest a vested interest) rather than a condition precedent to vesting. The court
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plied condition precedent to vesting, the class gifts would have violated the
Rule.5 8
The presumption in favor of early vesting has been widely accepted, 59
and findings of vested gifts with enjoyment postponed until a certain age are
present in other North Carolina cases.60 Given that the distinction between a
contingent interest and a vested interest with enjoyment postponed is ulti-
mately one of language, courts have considerable leeway to find a gift vested
in order to save it from the Rule.61 In .Joyner, the court was not faced with
any express survivorship condition and did not find in the trust any implied
condition of survivorship to a certain age such that the presumption of early
vesting was rebutted. Instead, in section three, the court found that the express
language reinforced its presumption for a vested remainder. The accepted ju-
dicial construction of a gift to be "paid" at a certain age is that the interest
created is a vested remainder with enjoyment postponed.62 The court appar-
ently held that the use of the phrase "to pay . . . $5000 as each grandchild
shall reach the age" in section three came within this judicial construction.63
Joyner demonstrates the willingness of the North Carolina Supreme
Court to utilize constructional techniques to save trusts from violating the
Rule. Although limiting its construction of the term "grandchildren" to the
facts, the court apparently evidences a desire to validate trusts where construc-
tionally possible. While it is difficult to estimate the significance of Joyner on
future cases, the court has demonstrated that it is capable of limiting the im-
pact of the Rule.
cited to Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205 (1950) for the proposition that a condition
subsequent construction is to be preferred unless the language forbids it. The language of section
four not only does not forbid the construction, it appears to be framed in condition subsequent
form. See 299 N.C. at 575-76, 264 S.E.2d at 85.
58. 4dditional developments: In Moore v. Hunter, 46 N.C. App. 449, 265 S.E.2d 884 (1980),
the court of appeals considered what evidence of intent was necessary to rebut the presumption of
definite issue under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1976). The court interpreted a devise to the testator's
son "in fee unless he should die without leaving issue" as requiring only that the son survive his
father, or not die without issue before his father. 46 N.C. App. at 456, 265 S.E.2d at 888. The
court's holding was based on a desire for early vesting and on other provisions in the will that
showed testator's intent to provide for his son in the event of his own death. Id at 457-58, 265
S.E.2d at 889.
59. See 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 49, § 573.
60. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 255 N.C. 122, 120 S.E.2d 588 (1961); Fuller v.
Hedgpeth, 239 N.C. 370, 80 S.E.2d 18 (1954).
61. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 52, at 217.
62. See W. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPET mrrs § 24.19, at 61 (1957); T.
BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 52, at 135.
63. See 299 N.C. at 575, 264 S.E.2d at 83. The court noted Clobberie's Case, 86 Eng. Rep.
476 (1677), in which the construction regarding a gift "to be paid at a certain age" was first articu-
lated.
The court's holding regarding sections five and six, while supportable, is less clear-cut. The
court stated that the great-grandchildren's remainder interest is subject to no condition precedent
other than the termination of the preceding life income interests, and therefore the interests vest at
birth. 299 N.C. at 576, 264 S.E.2d at 88. The court apparently ignored the possibility that the
trust language may contain a condition of survivorship to a certain age. Although the term "to
pay" is present in section five, the entire phrase reads: "to pay upon each great-grandchild reach-
ing the age of 25." This phrase appears more likely to connote surviving to the age of 25 as a
condition precedent to vesting, which would cause the class gift to violate the Rule. The court
obviously disagreed and relied on the presumption of early vesting.
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In Rodin v. Merritt64 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a
contract for the sale of land that postponed the vesting of title until certain
conditions65 were met did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. 66 While
recognizing that at first glance it appeared all of the conditions might not be
performed within twenty-one years,67 the court found that the conditions must
be met, if at all, within a reasonable time.68 In the transaction at issue, a
reasonable time would not extend beyond twenty-one years.69
In reaching this conclusion, the court argued that the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities has little relevance to commercial transactions. 70 The period of the
Rule, lives in being plus twenty-one years, may be a fairly appropriate unit of
measure for family settlements, but often lives in being cannot be related to
commercial interests. 71 Also, parties to business dealings, unlike some family
benefactors, usually have no desire to inhibit the alienability of property for
generations.7 2 Not only did this argument make it easier for the court to avoid
a violation of the Rule, it also suggests that the court may be receptive to
future arguments that other exceptions to the Rule should be created for com-
mercial transactions.
C Escheats and Abandoned Property
In 1980 the North Carolina General Assembly passed a new statute on
escheats and abandoned property.7 3 The new law, G.S. 116B, repeals the old
escheats and abandoned property statute74 and also substantively amends G.S.
28A-22. 75 In general, the new law carries forward the provisions of the re-
pealed statute with respect to escheated property and the administration and
64. 48 N.C. App. 64, 268 S.E.2d 539 (1980).
65. Among the conditions were having the property rezoned and annexed to the city, ob-
taining approval for the desired development from the necessary governmental agencies, and
filing the required subdivision plats. Id at 66-67, 268 S.E.2d at 541.
66. The classic statement of the rule is by Gray: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." J.
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINsT PEuETurrls § 201 (4th ed. 1942). See generally Link, supra note 17.
67. 48 N.C. App. at 68, 268 S.E.2d at 542.
68. Id at 71, 268 S.E.2d at 543. The court cited Scarborough v. Adams, 264 N.C. 631, 142
S.E.2d 608 (1965), for the proposition that in determining what is a reasonable time for perform-
ance, the parties' purposes and intentions must be taken into account.
69. 48 N.C. App. at 71, 268 S.E.2d at 543. There being no North Carolina law on point, the
court relied upon several out-of-state cases, especially Wong v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d
817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963).
70. 48 N.C. App. at 68, 268 S.E.2d at 542.
71. See Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives, 73 HARY. L.
REv. 1318, 1321-22 (1960); Link, supra note 17, at 807.
72. See Note, Rule Against Perpetuities Application to a Lease to Commence Upon Comple-
lion of Building, 47 CAL. L. Rlv. 197, 198 (1959).
73. Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1311, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 225 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 116B (Interim Supp. 1980)).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116A (1979).
75. Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1311, § 2, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 225 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-22-9 (Interim Supp. 1980)). This amendment to G.S. 28A-22 allows the share
of known but unlocated heirs to be turned over to the clerk of superior court before the final
accounting; the clerk is required to pay this share over to the Escheat Fund if not claimed within
five years of the final accounting.
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uses of the Escheat Fund.76 The major changes of the new statute are in the
provisions dealing with abandoned property and with reporting and adminis-
trative procedures.
The abandoned property section begins with a definitions section 77 and
then G.S. 116B-1 Ito -21 sets out a comprehensive list of when various catego-
ries of property will be presumed abandoned.78 This list sets forth criteria
such as length of time property must be held, what notice to the owner must be
given, and what acts by the owner will rebut the presumption of abandon-
ment. The list is much more comprehensive and specific than the provisions
of the old statute.
The new statute effects changes in the administration of the abandoned
property and the attendant procedural aspects. As in the old statute, the new
provisions call for all abandoned property to be placed in the Escheat Fund
under the control of the state treasurer. 79 The new Act places new notice and
reporting requirements on holders and insurers of property presumed to be
abandoned. Insurers holding such property must file a report on the property
with the commissioner of insurance yearly before September 1st,80 and the
insurer must also mail a notice to the last known address of the owner of the
property by May 1st.81 Other holders of such property must file a report with
the treasurer before March 1st 8 2 and must also mail a notice to the last known
address of the owner before November Ist.83 The costs of this notice may be
deducted from the held property, if cash, or may otherwise be claimed against
76. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-1 to -4, -27, -36 (Interim Supp. 1980). There are some
changes in the wording of some of the sections, but the overall effect remains almost the same.
77. Id § 116B-10.
78. The list includes these categories of property and these requirements: deposits and funds
of financial institutions if unable to locate owner and owner has not changed amount of deposit,
corresponded in writing concerning deposit or indicated interest in deposit within five years; certi-
fied check or written instrument on which financial institution directly liable if owner has not
negotiated instrument, corresponded in writing about it or indicated interest in it within ten years
from date payable; traveler's check or money order if owner has not negotiated it, corresponded in
writing about it or indicated interest in it within fifteen years from date payable, id § 116B-12;
funds due and payable held by life, fire, casualty or other insurance companies when not claimed
within five years, id §§ 116B-13 to -14; deposits, property, refunds held by utility ifunclaimed for
five years after termination of services to owner or due to owner, id § 116B-15; dividends held by
business association if not claimed or owner has not corresponded in writing about it within five
years, id § 116B-16; stocks if property distributable under dissolution of business association,
financial institution, insurer or utility if unclaimed within six months after dissolution, id § 1 16B-
17; shares of stock not delivered following merger of corporations within two years, id; property
held in fiduciary capacity if owner has not changed principal, accepted payment, corresponded in
writing or given other evidence of interest in it within five years, id § 116B-18; salary, wages
owing by business association if unclaimed within five years after date payable, id § 116B-20;
property not otherwise covered and held by court, public body, or state if not claimed within five
years, id § 116B-19; property not otherwise covered and held in ordinary course of holder's busi-
ness with value of $500 or more if not claimed within five years, id § 116B-21.
79. Id § 116B-27. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-27 to -30 contain the provisions for actual
tender of the property to the treasurer and the effect of actual delivery to the treasurer.
80. Id § 116B-29. The report must contain all properties being held as of the prior Decem-
ber 31st. The contents of the report are set out in G.S. 116B-29(b).
81. Id § 116B-28(a). Publication of notice was sufficient under the old statute, but now di-
rect mailing is required. The contents of the notice are set out in G.S. § 116B-28(c).
82. Id § 116B-29. The report must include all property held on the previous June 30th.
83. Id § 116B-28(b).
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the Escheat Fund, but costs are limited to fifty cents per notice.8 4 Anyone
filing a report must certify that they have mailed the notices; failure to do so is
a misdemeanor punishable by fine, and the owner can recover actual damages
at law.8 5 Each business association (including financial institutions and life
insurers) holding presumptively abandoned property must certify on its tax
return that it is holding this property.8 6
The treasurer will use these reports to compile a list of escheated and
abandoned property valued at more than fifty dollars.8 7 This list is to be de-
livered to the clerk of superior court by November 1st, and the treasurer will
publish notification that these lists are available from the clerk of superior
court.88 Persons claiming an interest in the escheated or abandoned property
may file a claim with the original holder of the property if possible; if the
original holder is satisfied with the validity of the claim, he shall notify the
treasurer who will return the property or its value.8 9 If the claimant cannot
contact the original holder, he may make a claim directly against the treasurer,
who will make the determination of validity. 90
The new statute enlarges the treasurer's powers over the escheated or
abandoned property once the state's right to the property is established. The
treasurer can refuse to accept property if he feels it is worthless or not in the
public interest,9 1 or he may destroy or otherwise dispose of valueless prop-
erty.92 Once property has been held by the state for three years the treasurer
can sell it at auction.93 The treasurer may elect to retain securities in which
escheated funds can be invested,94 and he can also retain historical property.95
The statute does place some limits on the treasurer's use of the fund, including
limits on the use of the fund as security for bonds96 and the establishment of a
minimum refund reserve balance.97 The new law also gives the treasurer and
commissioner of insurance certain new discovery powers, including the power
to examine and compel production of records,98 make regulations,9 9 and hire
84. Id § 116B-28(d).
85. Id §.l16B-28(e). A failure or refusal to file reports or falsification of reports is also
punishable by fine and 12% interest pursuant to G.S. 116B-41.
86. Id § 116B-49. This certification is not confidential, and it must be filed even though the
business association does not have to file a tax return.
87. Id § 116B-30(a).
88. Id § 116B-30(a) to -30(b).
89. Id § 116B-38(a).
90. Id § 116B-38(a) to -38(b). There is no longera seven year bar for claims on escheated or
abandoned property. Also, the claims will be pai without interest.
91. Id § 116B-31(c).
92. Id § 116B-35(d).
93. Id § 116B-35(a).
94. Id § 116B-35(b)(1).
95. I.d § 116B-35(c).
96. Id § 116B-36(d). The amount of bonds that can be secured by the Escheat Account is 10
times the amount held for credit in the Account.
97. Id § 116B-36(f). The refund reserve minimum required to be kept in the Fund is
$5,000,000. Any amount over $5,000,000 in the Fund is to be transferred to the Escheat Account;
any amount over $35,000,000 in the Account is to be used for student loans.
98. Id § 116B-39(a) to -39(d).
99. Id § 116B-42.
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experts to appraise property and perform other functions.100
D. Wills, Trusts, and Estates10
In Thompson v. Soles10 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
when a deed contains a recital that the transferred property is an advancement
of the transferee's interest in his parents' estates, there is sufficient evidence to
go to the jury on the effect of the recital under a theory of equitable election.
The court also held that plaintiffs are not entitled to go to the jury on the
theory of equitable estoppel when there is no evidence of detrimental reliance.
100. Id § 116B-47.
101. Additional developments: In Anderson v. Gooding, 300 N.C. 170, 265 S.E.2d 201 (1980),
the North Carolina Supreme Court decided the sufficiency of notice by publication to creditors of
an estate to present their claims. Starting on April 27th, 1977, the executor published the notice
weekly for four successive weeks, as specified m G.S. 28A-14-1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-14-1
(Cum. Supp. 1979). If this notice had been sufficient, all claims not presented within six months of
the initial date of publication would be time barred by G.S. 28A-19-3(a).
The court found this notice insufficient under G.S. 28A-14 because the notice did not name
the final day on which claims would be timely, nor did it state that the final day for timely claims
was six months from the date of first publication of the notice. 300 N.C. at 174, 265 S.E.2d at 204.
Thus, when a claim was presented to the executor seven months after the initial publication, it was
not barred by G.S. 28A-19-3(a). Anderson stands for the proposition that when an executor raises
G.S. 28A-19-3(a) as a defense against claims on the estate, he must prove speciic compliance with
the notice provisions of G.S. 28A-14-1.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals dealt with the application of G.S. 28A-19-13 to claims
against an insolvent estate in Rodgers v. Tindal, 46 N.C. App. 783, 266 S.E.2d 691 (1980). The
decedent was indebted at the time of his death to the defendant for a purchase and rentals arising
from a business deal. The defendant made purchases on credit from the estate with the result that
she owed more to the insolvent estate than it owed her. Plaintiff brought an action to recover the
defendant's debt to the estate. The defendant counterclaimed for her claim against the estate to be
set-off against her debt to the estate.
The court of appeals, reversing the trial court, held this attempted set-off improper. Since the
estate was insolvent, no counterclaim could be allowed that would give any general creditor undue
priority. The debt owed to the estate must be paid in toto, and the proceeds then applied to apro
rata payment of all general claims against the estate. The fact that the defendant was both a
creditor and a debtor of the estate was not determinative, because her debt to the estate arose after
the decedent's death. The court found that allowing the set-off would contravene the intent of
G.S. 28A-19-13, which forbids giving preference to any claims against an estate. Id at 785-86, 266
S.E.2d at 693.
In Keener v. Kom, 46 N.C. App. 214, 264 S.E.2d 829 (1980), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 92, 273
S.E.2d 299 (1981), the court of appeals implied a devise of a life estate to the testator's wife
because he had given her a life estate in his farming equipment but had provided for devising his
real property "after [her] death." The court also implied a power in the wife to dispose of the
property because the testator, in the devise of his land, devised only that property "remaining" at
the wife's death. Id at 217, 264 S.E.2d at 832. The general rule is that when land is conveyed
with a power to dispose, the donee takes a fee, and _any purported gift over is void. Carroll v.
Herring, 180 N.C. 369, 371, 104 S.E. 893, 893 (1920). The exception to this rule lies when there is
a life estate created by express terms. Under this exception, the devisee takes only a life estate,
and his grantee has a fee. In Keener the court of appeals went a step further by implying the life
estate, rather than requiring clear and express terms. 46 N.C. App. at 218, 264 S.E.2d at 832.
In O'Brien v. Reece, 45 N.C. App. 610, 263 S.E.2d 849 (1980), the court of appeals strictly
construed the requirement in G.S. 41-2.1(a) that the right of survivorship in deposit accounts be
expressly provided. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(a) (1976). The court held that a bank account
signature card signed by two depositors did not expressly provide for the right of survivorship as
required by the statute because the space on the card that gave effect to the survivorship provision
was left unmarked. The court also held that the certificate of deposit could not qualify as a
"separate instrument" providing for right of survivorship under G.A. 41-2.1(a) because it was not
a signed writing as required by the statute.
102. 299 N.C. 484, 263 S.E.2d 599 (1980).
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The father of plaintiffs and of defendant devised real property to his wife
for life, remainder to his children as tenants in common. The mother of the
children conveyed a tract that she owned in fee simple to defendant. The deed
contained a recital that the conveyance was an advancement to defendant of
his entire interest in his parents' estates.103 Plaintiffs then sought a declaratory
judgment that they owned in fee simple the property that had been originally
devised to them and defendant as tenants in common.1°4
The doctrine of equitable election provides that a beneficiary under a will
cannot take under the instrument if he also asserts a title or claim that is in-
consistent with the same writing.'05 Although it is usually applied to wills,
there is authority that the doctrine also applies to deeds. 106 The Thompson
court held that if the fact recited in the deed is of the essence of the transac-
tion, the doctrine of equitable election will bar the defendant from claiming
ownership in the contested property. 10 7
The decision's language is confusing. Estoppel by recital' 08 is the doc-
trine that the court actually applied. As the court recognized, when a recital
fact is of the essence of the agreement and it is the intention of the parties to
make the fact the basis of the contract, the recital is effective to operate as an
estoppel against the parties to the deed and their privies.'0 9 The statement of
the test should end at this point because no purpose is served by mentioning
the doctrine of election. Estoppel by recital is a hybrid of estoppel by deed
and equitable estoppel. Estoppel by deed does not ordinarily apply to grant-
ees.110 Equitable estoppel does not apply when the party has been innocently
silent, 1' which may or may not have been the situation in this case. 1 2 Estop-
pel by recital avoids these problems and accurately describes the doctrine that
the court applied.
The court of appeals in Moore v. Jones 113 held that a wife could reach an
inter vivos trust if she claimed under her statutory share rights in article 1 of
103. The transfer could not be an advancement under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-23 (1976) be-
cause the theory of advancement applies only in the case of intestacy. However, equity looks to
the substance rather than the form of a transaction. See In Re Pendergrass' Will, 251 N.C. 737,
112 S.E.2d 562 (1960).
104. 299 N.C. at 485, 263 S.E.2d at 601.
105. See Rouse v. Rouse, 238 N.C. 568, 78 S.E.2d 451 (1953).
106. See Norwood v. Lassiter, 132 N.C. 52, 43 S.E. 509 (1903).
107. 299 N.C. at 490, 263 S.E.2d at 604.
108. See 28 AM. Jun. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 19 (1966).
109. 299 N.C. at 486, 263 S.E.2d at 601-02 (citing Fort v. Allen, 110 N.C. 183, 14 S.E. 685
(1892)).
110. See 28 AM. Jun. 2D, supra note 108, at § 13.
111. Id §53.
112. If defendant did not know that the manner in which his mother attempted to transfer his
interest was improper and he did not then intend to breach the agreement, estoppel cannot be
applied. But if he had this knowledge or intent, it appears that his silence was misleading and that
his mother relied to her detriment. Although the court found no detriment, the mother reduced
her fee interest to a life estate, and the plaintiffs are her privies because they are donee benefi-
ciaries. See generally D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDiES § 2.3 (1973).
113. 44 N.C. App. 578, 261 S.E.2d 289 (1980).
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G.S. chapter 30.114 In permitting the wife to reach the trust, the court adopted
the rule that when the husband's control is tantamount to retained ownership
until his death, the trust will be viewed as part of the husband's estate in deter-
mining and satisfying the wife's share, though the unaffected portion of the
trust corpus will still be distributed pursuant to the trust agreement.' 15
In Moore, plaintiffs husband established an inter vivos trust one year af-
ter they married, retaining a life estate in himself and the power to withdraw
assets, change beneficiaries, and modify or revoke the trust agreement."l 6
Twelve years later the husband died and the wife challenged the validity of the
trust. The court found the trust valid under North Carolina law and noted
that retaining a life estate and the power to revoke or modify does not invali-
date a trust if it was not executed with the Wills Act formalities.' 17 Here the
court found a clear intention to create a trust, a trust res, active duties for the
trustee and named beneficiaries; thus, it refused to find the trust invalid.' 18
This approach rejected that taken by several other jurisdictions. 19 These ju-
risdictions examine the trust validity to determine if it gives so much control
that the settlor has in reality made a testamentary disposition without comply-
ing with the Wills Act formalities. If the settlor has the requisite control, the
trust is deemed invalid, and the wife is allowed to reach it to obtain her statu-
tory share.' 20 The North Carolina Court of Appeals' approach is the better
one. The finding that the trust is valid allows the settlor to dispose of his own
property, except for the portion given to his spouse under the statute. 121 By
contrast, the other approach declares the whole trust invalid, and the property
must pass under intestacy laws that may not reflect accurately the testator's
original design. 122 The approach taken by the court of appeals also seems to
give more protection to the surviving spouse'23 because courts seem more
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a) (1976) specifies circumstances under which a spouse has a
right to dissent. Id § 30-3(a) provides that a surviving spouse
shall take the same share of the deceased spouse's real and personal property as if the
deceased had died intestate; provided, that if the deceased spouse is not survived by a
child, children, or any lineal descendents of a deceased child or children, or by a parent,
the surviving spouse shall receive only one half of the deceased spouse's net estate as
defined in G.S. 29-2(5), which one half shall be estimated and determined before any
federal estate tax is deducted or paid and shall be free and clear of such tax.
115. 44 N.C. App. at 583, 261 S.E.2d at 292.
116. Id at 579, 261 S.E.2d at 290.
117. Id at 580, 261 S.E.2d at 291 (citing Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956)).
118. 44 N.C. App. at 581, 261 S.E.2d at 291.
119. See, e.g., Freed v. Judith Realty & Farm Prods. Corp., 201 Va. 791, 113 S.E.2d 850
(1960); In re Steck's Estate, 275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W.2d 729 (1957). For an extensive list of other
jurisdictions which follow the same approach as the Virginia and Wisconsin courts, see Annot., 39
A.L.R.3d 14, 23 (1971).
120. See cases in note 119 supra.
121. 44 N.C.App. at 583, 261 S.E.2d at 292. The court notes that allowing the surviving
spouse to dissent against the trust serves both the primary public policy of guarding against disin-
heritance of the surviving spouse and the secondary policy of favoring alienability of property
inter vivos. Id at 582-83, 261 S.E,2d at 292.
122. See cases in note 119 supra.
123. 44 N.C. App. at 583, 261 S.E.2d at 292. The court finds protection of the spouse to be the
prevailing public policy as expressed through N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1, -3 (1976). See notes 114
& 121 supra.
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likely to find the control necessary to allow the spouse to reach a portion of the
trust.
The court of appeals also rejected a third approach, taken by some juris-
dictions, 124 which invalidates inter vivos trusts that perpetrate a fraud upon the
wife's rights, by noting explicitly that the record could not support any finding
of fraudulent intent by the husband in this case. 125 The control test adopted
by the court is also superior to the fraud test. It provides more protection for
the spouse and also allows the husband to dispose of his property. Because of
the difficulty of proving fraud the wife will get more protection under the rule
adopted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The test also provides the
husband with substantial power to dispose of his property since only if he has
retained substantial control will the court allow the wife to reach it, and even
then, the rest of the trust passes under his original scheme. Another advantage
of the control test is that it is objective, with the court inquiring into the set-
tlor's control of the property at his death, rather than asking what his intent
was in establishing the trust.126
In Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. 127 the North Carolina Supreme
Court refused to presume that any omission or error in an attorney's will was
intentional, and thus declined to fashion a special rule for members of the
legal profession. Testator, an attorney, established an elaborate trust with the
income divided into twenty equal shares and distributed to various family
members. Three shares were given to the testator's two brothers and sister,
and one share was given to his nieces and nephews. These shares were ex-
pressly limited to their respective lifetimes. The remaining sixteen shares were
given to his great nieces and great nephews alive at his death, or born within
the twenty-one years following his death. The great nieces and great nephews
would eventually receive all of the trust income.128 The will did not provide
for the distribution of the trust corpus. While a gift of income without limita-
tion to duration amounts to a gift of the principal, 129 the testator did provide
that the trust would extend until the death of the great nieces and great neph-
ews and no longer, thus providing for the eventual termination of the trust.
The supreme court implied a gift of the trust principal to the great nieces and
great nephews. The supreme court rejected the court of appeals' reliance on
the presumption that the testator must have realized his omission because he
was an attorney and focused instead on the intent of the testator as gathered
124. See, eg., Richard v. James, 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956); Smith v. Northern Trust
Co., 322 M. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944). For a list of additional cases, see Annot., supra note
119, at 25-26.
125. 44 N.C.App. at 583, 261 S.E.2d at 292.
126. Some jurisdictions have also applied an illusory trust test, finding that the trust was so
extensive that the trustee was a mere agent of the settlor or that the trust was used merely to mask
ownership. While this test seems similar to the control approach taken by the court of appeals, the
cases using the illusory trust approach imply that the illusion was to deprive the wife, combining
elements of the fraud and control tests. See Annot., supra note 119, at 25-28.
127. 301 N.C. 456, 272 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
128. Id at 460, 272 S.E.2d at 93-94.
129. Id at 465, 272 S.E.2d at 97 (citing Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C.
371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963)).
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from the four comers of the will and on the presumption for complete testacy
over partial intestacy. 130 The will contained several indications that testator
did not intend his property to pass by intestacy. One clause, purporting to
dispose of the bulk of his estate through the trust, demonstrated that testator
did not intend a partial intestacy.131 Other portions made clear that his over-
all plan was to benefit the great nieces and great nephews. He expressly lim-
ited the other beneficiaries' share to their lifetime, but did not make the same
express restriction on the great nieces' and great nephews' share. He further
provided that the great nieces and great nephews were to receive eventually all
of the trust income. The supreme court also considered the fact that the testa-
tor made a class gift with a per capita distribution. To have the principal pass
by intestacy would produce a contrary result by having the property pass per
stirpes. 13 2
In addition to the evidence that the testator wanted to benefit the great
nieces and great nephews, the supreme court also considered the termination
clause in light of the law at the time of the will. 133 The court found the clause
was not meant to limit the beneficiaries' interests, but was designed to ensure
the trust's validity by limiting its duration to avoid a violation of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. With the termination clause viewed in light of this pur-
pose, and with the evidence showing that the testator intended to benefit the
great nieces and great nephews, the court considered the evidence so over-
whelming that a contrary result was impossible; therefore the court implied
the gift of the principal to the great nieces and great nephews. 134
The decision to reject the stricter standard should provide little comfort to
the legal profession because the court did note that a testator's intelligence and
profession are still relevant to determining intent in a will.1 35 In Wing, there
was strong evidence of the testator's intent to negate any inference that the
omission was intentional-evidence which will not always be present. The
case is important as an example of the necessity for good draftsmanship.
130. 301 N.C. at 463, 272 S.E.2d at 95 (citing In re Will of Wilson, 260 N.C. 482, 133 S.E.2d
189 (1963); Little v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 113 S.E.2d 689 (1960); Ferguson
v. Ferguson, 225 N.C. 375, 35 S.E.2d 231 (1945)).
131. 301 N.C. at 464, 272 S.E.2d at 96.
132. Id at 466-67, 272 S.E.2d at 97-98.
133. Id at 465-66, 272 S.E.2d at 97. At the time of the execution of the will, North Carolina
followed the minority rule, requiring that trusts for private purposes terminate within a life in
being plus twenty-one years, so as not to violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Mercer v. Mercer,
230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949). North Carolina ado pted the majority rule in 1952 in Mc-Queen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
134. 301 N.C. at 467, 272 S.E.2d at 98.
135. Id at 466, 272 S.E.2d at 97.
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E. Mortgages and Deeds of Trust136
In Tarkington v. Tarkington,137 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
136. Additional developments: In National Mortgage Corp. v. American Title Ins. Co., 299
N.C. 369, 261 S.E.2d 844 (1980) the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the general rule that
title insurance protects the insured only against defects or encumbrances of title that exist at the
time the insured acquires title. The owners of a fee simple leased the tract to a developer. The
lessor/owner agreed to subordinate its fee simple title to a lien of a deed of trust placed on the
property by the lessee to acquire construction financing. A condition of this agreement was that
funds secured by the lien would be used only for construction of improvements. The
lessee/developer recorded this executed agreement on July 18, 1969, at 12:23 p.m. At 12:26 p.m.,
he also recorded a deed of trust in favor of National Mortgage Corp., from whom he had obtained
financing. National Mortgage obtained title insurance insuring its deed of trust "as of the 18th
day of July, 1969, at 12:26 p.m." Id at 375, 261 S.E.2d at 846. The subordination agreement was
breached by the lessee/developer's misappropriation of the funds that were disbursed in boto on
July 24, 1969. This breach invalidated National Mortgage's lien, and it sought recovery from the
insurer.
The supreme court held the loss was not covered by the insurance policy. The breach of the
subordination agreement and the ensuing invalidation of the lien were not caused by matters in
existence at the time the title policy was issued. Title insurance is retrospective only, covering
defects affecting title that are in existence when the insured takes title. Id at 374-75, 261 S.E.2d at
846-47. Since the loss of the lien was caused by actions subsequent to the insured taking title, the
loss was not reimbursable. Id at 376, 261 S.E.2d at 848.
In reaching this result the court cited no cases from North Carolina; however, this is the
consistent position taken by other states. See, eg., Strass v. District-Realty Title Insurance Corp.,
31 Md. App. 90, 358 A.2d 251 (1976); Butcher v. Burton Abstract Title Co., 52 Mich. App. 98, 216
N.W.2d 434 (1974); Mayers v. Van Schaik, 268 N.Y. 320, 197 N.E.2d 296 (1935).
In Seashore Properties, Inc. v. East Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 47 N.C. App. 675,267 S.E.2d 693(1980), the court of appeals interpreted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16 (Cum. Supp. 1979) to mean
that notice of hearing on foreclosure must be given to mortgagor but not to persons who
eventually will have a right of ownership under a recorded management agreement. The statute
was amended in 1977, Law of May 10, 1977, ch. 359, §§ 2-10, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 364, to comply
with the due process requirements owed mortgagors, which were identified in Turner v.
Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975). 47 N.C. App. at 677, 267 S.E.2d at 694.
Consequently, the term "record owner" used in G.S. 45-21.16 applies to present owners and
mortgagors only. 47 N.C. App. at 677, 267 S.E.2d at 694.
In McCay v. Morris, 46 N.C. App. 792, 266 S.E.2d 5 (1980), the court of appeals refused to
apply the doctrine of frustration to a contract to convey land with a clouded title. The court relied
on the decision in Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975), which required that
notice be given to a mortgagor or else the foreclosure would be voidable. In McCoy seller could
have removed the cloud, and the contract would have evidenced the parties' bargain. Frustration
applies only when a radical change in conditions has occurred through the fault of neither party
and consequently performance would be different from what the parties had contracted. 46 N.C.
App. at 793-94, 266 S.E.2d at 7.
In In re Foreclosure of Burgess, 47 N.C. App. 599, 267 S.E.2d 915, appeal dismissed, 301 N.C.
90, 273 S.E.2d 311 (1980), the court of appeals found that under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21-16(d)
(Cum. Supp. 1979), a clerk of court may find a valid debt and a right to foreclose even when there
is a dispute over the amount of the debt. The purpose of the statute is to satisfy minimum due
process requirements of notice and hearing, and determination of the amount of debt is beyond
the scope of the hearing. 47 N.C. App. at 603-04, 267 S.E.2d at 918. The court also noted that the
parties were not deprived of due process since they could utilize N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.34
(1976) to enjoin the sale. These statutes were passed in 1975 after a federal district court found
that te prior statutory procedure lacked the rudiments of due process. See Turner v. Blackburn,
389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975). For a discussion concluding that these statutes and early
cases interpreting them do not give the type of hearing contemplated by Turner, see Survey of
Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978---ropery, 57 N.C.L. REV. 827, 1104-07 (1979).
In Kavanau Real Estate Trust v. Debnam, 299 N.C. 510, 263 S.E.2d 595 (1980), the supreme
court interpreted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1976), an antideficiency judgment statute, to apply
only in cases involving sales of real property. The statute, therefore, is not a bar to an in personam
suit and money judgment on a purchase money note securing assignment of a leasehold interest
since a lease is considered personal property.
137. 301 N.C. 502, 272 S.E.2d 99 (1980).
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that a presumption of a resulting trust exists in favor of a wife who furnished
the consideration for a purchase of realty deeded to her and her husband as
tenants by the entirety, even when both husband and wife signed a note and
deed of trust for the balance of the purchase price, and the husband made
some of the monthly payments.1 38 The court stated that the trial court erred in
holding that the husband's financial obligation and payments on the note
overcame the presumption, because a resulting trust is created, if at all, at the
time of execution of the deed. 139
Unlike the presumption in favor of the wife, a resulting trust does not
arise in favor of the husband who provides similar consideration. Instead, a
gift to the wife of an entirety interest is presumed. 140 In light of this distinc-
tion and the changes in property law relating to wives since the presumption's
origin, the court of appeals, in dicta, had questioned the propriety of the pre-
sumption in contemporary marriages. 14' The supreme court, while stating
that some jurisdictions have abolished the trust presumption, 142 held that the
present case offered no compelling reason to change the long-standing rule. 143
F Adverse Possession
Two cases decided by the court of appeals, Stone v. Conder'44 and.4llen v.
Morgan,145 involved the application of G.S. 1-38146 to situations of adverse
possession under color of title.147
In Stone v. Conder the court faced the issue of whether the defendant had
adversely possessed the land in question under color of title for seven years, as
required by G.S. 1-38(a).14 8 The plaintiffs' father had owned a life estate in
the property, with the plaintiffs the designated remaindermen. In 1950, plain-
tiffs' father conveyed what purportedly was a fee simple by a deed containing
a metes and bounds description that corresponded with a recorded partition
138. The wife paid a down payment of$19,800 from her own funds toward the purchase price
of $36,000. Id at 503, 272 S.E.2d at 100.
139. 301 N.C. at 506, 272 S.E.2d at 102.
140. Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955).
141. 45 N.C. App. 476, 480, 263 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1980).
142. 301 N.C. at 506,272 S.E.2d at 101-02. See Hogan v. Hogan, 286 Mass. 524, 190 N.E. 715
(1934); Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251 (1948); Peterson v. Massey, 155 Neb. 829, 53
N.W.2d 912 (1952).
143. 301 N.C. at 506, 272 S.E.2d at 101-02.
144. 46 N.C. App. 190, 264 S.E.2d 760, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 105 (1980).
145. 48 N.C. App. 706, 269 S.E.2d 753 (1980).
146. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 1-38 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
147. Color of title refers to the situation where the vendee has actually taken a purported title
to the property through the transaction, but the title is defective in some way.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979) states:
When a person or those under whom he claims is and has been in possession of any
real property, under known and visible lines and boundaries and under color of title, for
seven years, no entry shall be made or action sustained against such possessor by a per-
son having any right or title to the same, except during the seven years next after his
right or title has descended or accrued, who in default of suing within that time shall be
excluded from any claim thereafter made; any such possession, so held, is a perpetual
bar against all persons not under disability: Provided, that commissioner's deeds injudi-
cial sales and trustee's deeds under foreclosure shall also constitute color of title.
19811 PROPERTY L,4V¢ 1225
NORTH C.4ROLINA LW PEVIEW [o
plat. 149 When this conveyance was made, the vendor showed the vendee the
boundaries that were marked by steel stakes at least eighteen inches high and
which conformed with the recorded plat. The vendee was in continuous pos-
session for twenty-six years' 50 and then conveyed the land to the defendant.
From the time of purchase, the defendants listed the property in their
name and paid all taxes assessed against it. They encumbered the property
with a deed of trust, and made improvements.'-' The defendants also subdi-
vided and sold lots, with the deeds being duly recorded. When new houses
were being constructed on these lots, the plaintiffs brought this action of eject-
ment and cancellation of the deed of trust. 152
Although some of the plaintiffs had been on the property several times
after 1950, the defendants and their predecessors had maintained uninter-
rupted hostile possession of the land under a claim of right for twenty-nine
years.' 53 However, the youngest plaintiff-remainderman had only come of
age in 1964,154 so the twenty year adverse possession statute was inapplica-
ble.155 The defendant had the burden of showing superior title by adverse
possession, 156 and did this by showing adverse possession under color of title
for a period of seven years.' 57 Defendant additionally had to demonstrate
actual possession of the real property, 158 and did this by invoking the prima
facie evidence provisions of G.S. 1-38(b) and (c).' 59 These sections provide
that if the property in question has visibly and distinctively marked bounda-
ries, 160 and a map of the property prepared by a survey has been recorded,
then the listing and paying of property taxes on the realty shall constitute
prima facie evidence of possession of the property.' 61 Since the defendant
149. 46 N.C. App. at 191, 264 S.E.2d at 761. The plaintiff's father had received only a one
tenth remainder. The land was partitioned after the previous life tenant died; a surveyor was
hired who surveyed the property and drew up a plat that was recorded with the register of deeds in
1949.
150. The vendee planted saplings that matured during his tenancy; he cut firewood and had a
conspicuous garden on the land; and he went upon the property often to protect it. Id at 192, 264
S.E.2d at 761-62.
151. Id at 193, 264 S.E.2d at 762.
152. Id at 190, 264 S.E.2d at 760-61.
153. The plaintiffs had never before brought their claim to any official attention. Although at
least one of the plaintiffs had been to the property several times to cut Christmas trees and rake
pinestraw and claimed he had never seen anyone on the property, this was not enough to interrupt
any possession. Id at 199, 264 S.E.2d at 765.
154. Id It is an established rule that a statute of limitations cannot begin to run against a
minor during minority. See Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 79 S.E.2d 479 (1954). The period of
adverse possession is m effect a statute of limitations, and thus adverse possession did not begin to
run until the remainderman reached majority. 46 N.C. App. at 199, 264 S.E.2d at 765.
155. The plaintiffs seemed to have premised their case on the defendants' not having actual
possession for the twenty year period. Id. at 196, 264 S.E.2d at 764.
156. Id The plaintiffs had demonstrated legal title pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42
(1969).
157. This seven year possession under color of title is contained in G.S. 1-38. Here, of course,
defendant acted under color of the title he took from plaintiffs' father.
158. The elements of adverse possession are set out in Mizzel v. Ewell, 27 N.C. App. 507, 219
S.E.2d 513 (1975).
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
160. The boundary markers must be clearly visible and at least 18 inches high. Id § 1-38(b).
161. Id G.S. § 1-38(c) states that maps made and recorded before Oct. 1, 1973, shall qualify if
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established prima facie possession which plaintiff was unable to rebut, judg-
ment was for the defendant.' 62
Allen v. Morgan 163 concerned the application of G.S. 1-38 to the adverse
possession of a lappage.164 Defendants had occupied the lappage pursuant to
a quit-claim deed 165 and claimed adverse possession under claim of title for
seven years when plaintiff sought their ejectment. In lappage situtaions, the
general rule is that the junior grantee need not show the boundaries of the
lappage to be visible on the ground.' 66 However, the claimants must offer
proof fitting the description in the deed for the land it covers and also must
prove actual adverse possession within the lines of the lappage as contained in
the description in the deed.167 In this case, the defendants were unable to
prove that they actually possessed the area described in their quit-claim
deed. 168 Since the plaintiff established legal title 169 and no adverse possession
was proved, the case went for the plaintiff.170
G.S. 1-38, though seldom used, gives a putative landowner a means of
protecting his land. By establishing visible and distinct boundary markers of
the correct height and by recording a surveyor's map of the property, a land-
holder can demonstrate prima facie actual possession. Proof of actual posses-
sion always turns on the nature of the property, and this possession can be
difficult to prove. The method provided in the statute can be less burdensome
than other attempts to prove actual possession. Allen v. Morgan, however,
demonstrates that G.S. 1-38 will not always be effective in proving actual pos-
session.
the map can be proved to conform to the boundary lines on the ground and in the recorded
instruments of conveyance.
162. 46 N.C. App. at 191, 264 S.E.2d at 761. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of
the trial court. Id at 200, 264 S.E.2d at 766. The defendant had not possessed the land for seven
years, but since his predecessor had possessed the land under the same boundaries, the defendant
could tack his possession to that of his predecessor in privity.
163. 48 N.C. App. 706, 269 S.E.2d 753 (1980).
164. A lappage occurs when a deed under which one person claims covers an area that an-
other party claims under a grant. Here plaintiff established a connected claim of title to a grant
from the State to his predecessor. Id at 707, 269 S.E.2d at 753.
165. Id Defendants alleged that they had maintained open, notorious and adverse possession
since they received their deed in 1948, and that they occupied the land "under known and visible
boundaries conforming with the description in their deed." Id
166. Id at 709, 269 S.E.2d at 754. See Price v. Tomrich, 275 N.C. 385, 394, 167 S.E.2d 766,
772 (1969).
167. 48 N.C. App. at 709, 269 S.E.2d at 754-55.
168. Id Plaintiffs offered several family members as witnesses. However, none of the wit-
nesses could establish the area they possessed on a map of the entire area. They were unable to
correlate the description in their deed to landmarks on the property. Id at 707-08, 269 S.E.2d at
754.
169. The plaintiff made a prima facie showing of legal title by showing a connected chain of
title back to the original grant. Id at 708, 269 S.E.2d at 754. See Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112,
10 S.E. 142 (1889).
170. 48 N.C. App. at 709, 269 S.E.2d at 755. The trial court had found that twenty years of
adverse possession had been demonstrated by the defendants and decided for them. The court of
appeals reversed. Id
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G. Eminent Domain
In Board of Transportation v. Terminal Warehouse Corp. 171 the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that a noncompensable injury to property val-
ues, resulting from enactment of valid traffic regulations, will not be regarded
as compensable merely because some property was taken. The court also
ruled that the reasonable use doctrine adopted by North Carolina in Pender-
grast v. Aiken 172 does not govern the rights of private landowners in condem-
nation proceedings. 173
A portion of defendant's land was condemned as a part of a project to
relocate a federal highway. After the relocation, defendant's land was left on a
cul-de-sac, rather than fronting the highway, and this inhibited access to his
trucking terminal. The use of the trucking terminal was also hindered by
flooding due to the diversion of a creek and construction of a drainage system
by the plaintiff.' 74
In disallowing recovery for changing the access to the defendant's prop-
erty, the court relied on the police power of the state to change traffic pat-
terns, 175 and the settled rule that as long as these changes do not foreclose
reasonable access to the roadway from abutting property, no compensation
need be made. 176 The court correctly rejected the defendant's argument that
this rule should not apply because his property was also taken, noting that
they had rejected this same argument 177 in Barnes v. State Highway Commis-
sion.178 A different rule would have resulted in the inequitable situation in
which all landowners whose access had been restricted would suffer injury, but
only those who coincidentally had property taken would obtain damages.
In reversing the court of appeals' application of the reasonable use doc-
trine to condemnation proceedings, the supreme court recognized that the pur-
pose of the rule was to encourage orderly utilization of water by private
landowners, not public entities, and it thus had no application in this case. 179
The court further recognized that the injury was a takingl80 of property for
171. 300 N.C. 700, 268 S.E.2d 180 (1980).
172. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 209-10, 236 S.E.2d 787, 792 (1977), defined the rule
of reasonable use as allowing "each landowner to make reasonable use of his land even though, by
doing so, he alters in some way the flow of surface water thereby harming other landowners.
Liability is incurred only when this harmful interference is found to be unreasonable." (citations
omitted) See generally 5 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 453 (1972 & Supp. 1978);
Aycock, Introduction to Water Use Law in North Carolina, 46 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1967); Note, Real
Property-Disposition of Dffused Surface Waters in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. REv. 205 (1968).
173. 300 N.C. at 705-06, 268 S.E.2d at 183-84.
174. Id at 701-02, 268 S.E.2d at 181-82.
175. Id at 703-04, 268 S.E.2d at 182-83.
176. Id at 703, 268 S.E.2d at 182. In Wofford v. State Highway Comm'n, 263 N.C. 677, 140
S.E.2d 376, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 822 (1965), the court ruled that valid traffic regulations which
change traffic patterns and cause circuity of travel and inconvenience will not be compensable so
long as there is a reasonable access to the highway. The injury is one shared with the general
public.
177. 300 N.C. at 703, 268 S.E.2d at 182-83.
178. 257 N.C. 507, 126 S.E.2d 732 (1962).
179. 300 N.C. at 705-06, 268 S.E.2d at 183-84.
180. Id at 706, 268 S.E.2d at 184.
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public use, and just compensation must be made. 181
In Terminal Warehouse the court went further than it needed by recogniz-
ing this damage as a taking. It could have allowed recovery based strictly on
the measure of compensation for lands actually taken, which includes "how
the use of the land taken results in damage to the remainder."182 By finding
this damage a taking, the court is allowing all landowners with physical dam-
age caused by the state to recover, as was the law before this issue was con-
fused by Pendergrast. 183 Again, the court adopted the most equitable rule by
allowing recovery based on actual injury and not on whether a taking was
involved.
H Landlord-Tenant
In Davis v. McRee18 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that, in
determining whether an agreement renewing a lease incorporates the option to
purchase provision of the original lease, it is proper to examine all relevant
circumstances to ascertain the parties' intent. Also, the court held that only
rent payments made during the term of the second agreement can be counted
in computing the amount due on the purchase price when there are two sepa-
rate leases rather than one that has been continued.
The parties entered into a lease agreement for the period from January
31, 1972 to January 31, 1974. The agreement contained an option to purchase
that permitted the rental payments to be applied against the purchase price.
The lessee continued in possession of the property following the expiration
date of the lease and continued to make rent payments. On August 13, 1974,
the parties added a clause to the first agreement that provided only that the
lease would extend from January 31, 1974 to January 31, 1976. The lessee
later decided to exercise his option.' 85
The supreme court decided that the purchase option had been incorpo-
rated into the second agreement because both parties' actions demonstrated
that they thought it was part of the agreement.1 86 It chose to construe the
contract by ascertaining the parties' intent from the relevant circumstances
rather than by adopting the majority position.'8 7 The widely accepted rule is
that if the subsequent agreement refers to and continues the original lease, the
option is extended. If the subsequent agreement merely continues the tenancy,
the option is not extended.' 88 The court found the rule more confusing than
181. Id (citing Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955)).
182. Board of Transp. v. Brown, 34 N.C. App. 266, 269, 237 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1977), a 'dper
curiam, 296 N.C. 250, 249 S.E.2d 803 (1978).
183. See State Highway Comm'n v. Phillips, 267 N.C. 369, 148 S.E.2d 282 (1966); State High-
way Comm'n v. Yarborough, 6 N.C. App. 294, 170 S.E.2d 159 (1969).
184. 299 N.C. 498, 263 S.E.2d 604 (1980).
185. Id at 499-500, 263 S.E.2d at 605.
186. Id at 502, 263 S.E.2d at 607. The lessee had exercised the option, and the lessor had
begun to have the deed of purchase drafted.
187. Id at 502, 263 S.E.2d at 606.





The court also held that only rent payments made during the term of the
second agreement can be counted in computing the amount due on the
purchase price.190 It reasoned from the language of the second agreement that
the term extended from January 31, 1974 through January 31, 1976, made it a
separate lease from the first one. 191 Therefore, the first estate terminated upon
the expiration of the term, and rent payments made during that term are not
relevant to the second lease.' 92 It is ironic that when addressing the first issue
the court rejected the majority position of construing the lease by looking to
the agreement's language and instead chose to examine all relevant circum-
stances, but when addressing the second issue, the court looked solely to the
agreement's language without further attempting to ascertain the parties' in-
tent.
In Couch v. ADCRealty Corp. 193 the court of appeals refused to infer a
right to terminate a lease for nonpayment of rent, and thereby avoided barring
the operation of G.S. 42-33. The statute provides:
If, in any action brought to recover the possession of demised prem-
ises upon a forfeiture for the nonpayment of rent, the tenant, before
judgment given in such action, pays or tenders the rent due and the
costs of the action, all further proceedings in such action shall
cease.
194
The statute has no application if the lease permits the lessor to terminate
upon failure to pay rent. 195 The court's holding is consistent with other cases
that hold that unless there is an express provision for a forfeiture in a lease, a
breach of covenant does not work a forfeiture. 196
189. 299 N.C. at 502, 263 S.E.2d at 606.
190. Id at 503, 263 S.E.2d at 607.
191. Id
192. Id
193. 48 N.C. App. 108, 268 S.E.2d 237 (1980).
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-33 (1976). The statute further provides that "where there is a defi-
nite time specified for the payment of rent, even though the lease is silent as to forfeiture for
nonpayment, upon the tenant's failure to pay all past due rent within ten days from demand
therefor the lessor may re-enter and dispossess the tenant." J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA § 216 (1971) (footnotes omitted). However, G.S. 42-33 still protects the tenant
if he tenders payment before judgment.
195. See Tucker v. Arrowood, 211 N.C. 118, 189 S.E. 180 (1937).
196. See Morris v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 152 S.E.2d 155 (1967); Brewington v. Loughran,
183 N.C. 558, 112 S.E. 257 (1922).
1230 [Vol. 59
I Procedure 197
In Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Commissioners1 98 the
North Carolina Supreme Court defined the scope of judicial review of town
board decisions on applications for conditional use permits. The court limited
judicial review to reviewing for errors in law, ensuring that statutory proce-
dures are followed, guaranteeing appropriate due process rights of a peti-
tioner, ensuring that the decisions rest on competent, material and substantial
evidence in the record, and ensuring "that decisions are not arbitrary and ca-
pricious."'199
The decision cleared up an ambiguity concerning North Carolina judicial
review. A 1974 decision held that administrative agency review statutes then
in force were applicable to municipal decisions regarding issuance of condi-
tional use permits.2°° The current North Carolina Administrative Procedures
Act,20' however, provides judicial review only for agency decisions,202 from
which the decisions of local municipalities are expressly exempt. 20 3 Despite
this apparent change, the court relied on a long tradition of judicial review of
town zoning ordinances 20° to hold that the scope of judicial review in the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act is highly pertinent to judicial review of town
board decisions and to itemize provisions nearly identical to those in the
Act.205
. Family Settlement Agreements
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Holt v. Holt20 6 held that a fam-
ily settlement agreement that required the later execution of real estate deeds
was a partially executed agreement to convey realty and thus barred by the
Statute of Frauds. The decision followed from the court's recognition that a
family settlement agreement concerning a real estate conveyance is subject to
197. Additional developments: In Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 269
S.E.2d 142 (1980), the supreme court held that notice published once a week for four consecutive
weeks in which the area to be annexed was described by metes and bounds fulfills the
requirements of due process since it is reasonably calculated to appraise all interested parties of
the pendency of action, (see Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950)), even when all parties to be annexed are commercial entities. 301 N.C. at 9, 269 S.E.2d at
148. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of this case and the annexing of commercial
areas, see this Survey-Constitutional Law, notes 56-84 and accompanying text supra.
198. 299 N.C. 620, 265 S.E.2d 379 (1980).
199. Id at 626, 265 S.E.2d at 383. The court held that the superior court and court of appeals
failed to follow these appropriate standards in reversing the town board's denial of a permit. The
court then examined the evidence and sustained the town board's denial.
200. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Alderman, 284 N.C. 458, 470, 202 S.E.2d 129,
137 (1974). See also Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 480, 128 S.E.2d 879, 883
(1963).
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A (1979).
202. Id § 150A-50.
203. Id § 150 A-2(1).
204. See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E.2d 128 (1946); In re Pine Hill
Cemeteries, Inc., 219 N.C. 735, 15 S.E.2d 1 (1941).
205. See 299 N.C.' at 625-26, 265 S.E.2d at 382-83.
206. 47 N.C. App. 618, 267 S.E.2d 711 (1980).
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the Statute of Frauds, as is a partially executed contract to convey realty.20 7
The court also limited to agreements concerning the interests of minors
the rule that a family settlement agreement needs as a condition precedent the
existence of an emergency not contemplated by the testator. In so doing, it
effectively narrowed the holding in OWeil v. O'Nei, 208 which originally ex-
pressed the condition precedent requirement without limiting it to agreements
involving minors. 209 The court in Holt restricted OWeil to its factual con-
text-agreements affecting interests of minors. 210
The Holt court was correct in limiting OWeil. The supreme court in
O'Neil cited two cases as support for its broad language, but both of the cases
state the need for the existence of an emergency as a means of protecting the
interests of infants.211 In justifying the need for a special condition precedent
for agreements affecting minors, the Holt court apparently was concerned that





207. Id at 620, 267 S.E.2d at 713. The court of appeals found that a jury question was
presented in determining the application of the Statute of Frauds to the specific agreement. If ajury were to believe the defendant's version that the agreement was to deny probate of a codicil,
probate only the will, and then execute deeds to complete the transaction, such that one defendant
would receive a larger share, the agreement would be voided by the Statute of Frauds as a par-
tially executed agreement to convey realty. If, however, the jury believed the plaintiffs version
that the agreement was to deny probate of a codicil and probate only the will with plaintiff and
defendants sharing equally in the realty, the agreement would be valid as a fully executed agree-
ment and not subject to the Statute of Frauds. .d
208. 271 N.C. 106, 111, 155 S.E.2d 495, 499 (1967).
209. See 6 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3d § 33.1 (1977); Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 8, 37
(1970).
210. 47 N.C. App. at 621, 267 S.E.2d at 714.
211. 271 N.C. at 111, 155 S.E.2d at 499 (citing Rice v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 232 N.C.
222, 59 S.E.2d 803 (1950); Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 38 S.E.2d 203 (1946)).
212. See, ag., Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 370, 38 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1946).
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X. TAXATION'
4. Ad Valorem Taxation: Exemption of State-Owned Property2
In In re University ofNorth Carolina,3 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that property owned by the State is exempt from ad valorem taxation
regardless of the purpose for which the property is held.4 Orange County and
the towns of Chapel Hill and Carrboro attempted to tax certain property
owned by the University of North Carolina (UNC), a state agency. The North
Carolina Property Tax Commission determined that several parcels were re-
ceiving commercial use and thus were subject to taxation pursuant to G.S.
105-278.1, which provides for exemption of State-owned property only if it is
used wholly and exclusively for public purposes.5 The superior court affirmed
the Commission's decision.6
The supreme court reversed, holding that the North Carolina Constitu-
tion expressly exempts property belonging to the State without any use limita-
tion.7 The decision expressly overruled a line of cases holding to the
contrary.8 The public purpose requirement was first mentioned in 1876 in 4t-
lantic and North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of Carteret County.9
Because the State owned two-thirds of the railroad's stock in that case, the
railroad argued that a corresponding amount of its property was tax exempt.
The Atlantic court rejected this rationale, concluding that the constitutional
exemption applies only to "property of the State held for State purposes."' 10
The court rejected the Atlantic holding as binding precedent on the public
purpose issue because there the State had no title to the taxed property, so the
1. North Carolina courts also decided several other tax issues in 1980: Keener v. Korn, 46
N.C. App. 214, 264 S.E.2d 829, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 92, 273 S.E.2d 299 (1980) (payment of
attorney's fees not required to extinguish tax lien under G.S. 105-374, which applies to taxing
units, not private citizens); In re Assessment of Tax, 46 N.C. App. 631, 265 S.E.2d 461 (1980)
(laundry machines in apartment complexes operated by the complex management are a business
operated for profit and subject to the G.S. 105-164.4(4) sales and use tax even though the machine
owners do not have to purchase a privilege license); Stam v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d
335, motion to dismiss appeal denied, 301 N.C. 95, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980) (appropriation and
ex nditure of state tax revenues for funding of elective abortions is not in violation of article V,
§ 5of the North Carolina Constitution). For further discussion of the Stam case, see this Surve-
Constitutional Law, supra.
2. For the history of property exemptions in North Carolina, see generally Coates, The
Battle of Exemptions, 19 N.C.L. REv. 154 (1941). See also R. Sentell, Caesar Confronts Caesar:
Local Government Property Taxation and Local Government Property, 31 MERCER L. REv. 293
(1979) (analysis of Georgia's exemptions).
3. 300 N.C. 563, 268 S.E.2d 472 (1980).
4. Id. at 565, 268 S.E.2d at 474.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278.1(b)(1) (1979).
6. 300 N.C. at 563-64, 268 S.E.2d at 473.
7. N.C. CONST., art. 5, § 2(3) ("Property belonging to the State, counties, and municipal
corporations shall be exempt from taxation ....").
8. 300 N.C. at 570, 268 S.E.2d at 476 (overruling Winston-Salem v. Forsyth County, 217
N.C. 704, 9 S.E.2d 381 (1940); Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N.C. 342, 2 S.E.2d 463 (1939);
Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N.C. 751, 185 S.E. 6 (1936); Board of Financial Control v. Hen-
derson County, 208 N.C. 569, 181 S.E. 636 (1935)).
9. 75 N.C. 474 (1876).
10. Id. at 476.
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public purpose requirement was mentioned only in dictum. Therefore, the
court reasoned, later decisions based on the Atlantic public purpose require-
ment had a faulty foundation.'l
Instead, the court adopted the reasoning of a second line of cases decided
almost simultaneously with the Atlantic holding.12 In Town ofAndrews v. Clay
County13 and Weaverville v. Hobbs14 the court emphasized the clear and un-
ambiguous language of the constitution, which left "no room for judicial con-
struction."' 5 Similarly, the court determined that by imposing a public
purpose requirement in G.S. 105-278.1 the legislature exceeded its authority,
because of the conflict between the statute and the constitution. 16
By examining the circumstances and reasoning of Atlantic rather than re-
lying solely on Town of Andrews and Weaverville as precedent, the court was
able to reach a well-founded conclusion: As the court recognized, a public
purpose requirement should become law only through an amendment to the
constitution. 17 Left unclear, however, is whether the court's waiver of the pub-
lic purpose requirement extends to counties and municipal corporations. The
court emphasized that taxation of State property by a local entity is unjustified
because the authority to tax is derived from the State.'8 When one local entity
seeks to tax another this dilemma disappears. Nevertheless, the constitutional
provision in question refers to counties and municipal organizations as exempt
bodies. 19 Furthermore, the State was not involved in three of the four cases
overruled, giving force to the conclusion that the elimination of the public
purpose doctrine applies to local entities. Upon the appropriate factual situa-
tion, the court should extend the exemption to the other governmental bodies
specified in the constitution.
B. Ad Valorem Taxation: Preferential Assessment for Agricultural Use20
For a corporation to qualify its land for a preferential agricultural use
valuation its principal business must be agriculture, forestry, or horticulture.21
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in W. A Company v. North Carolina
11. 300 N.C. at 570, 268 S.E.2d at 476.
12. Though the court twice reversed the At/antic decision in the 1930's, changes in the
makeup of the court, not wavering views of individual judges, was the major factor. Coates, supra
note 2, at 177.
13. 200 N.C. 280, 156 S.E. 855 (1931).
14. 212 N.C. 684, 194 S.E. 860 (1938).
15. 300 N.C. at 570-71, 268 S.E.2d at 477 (citing Town of Andrews v. Clay County, 200 N.C.
280, 282, 156 S.E. 855, 856 (1931)). The intent of the 1868 constitutional convention with respect
to requiring a public purpose is uncertain. Coates, supra note 2, at 178.
16. 300 N.C. at 572-73, 268 S.E.2d at 478.
17. See id. at 572, 268 S.E.2d at 478.
18. Id. at 576, 268 S.E.2d at 480.
19. See note 7 supra.
20. See generally Henke, Pre/erentialProperty Tax Treatmentfor Farmland, 53 OR. L. REv.
117 (1974); Comment, Farmland Preservation Techniques: Some Foodfor Thought, 40 U. PaTT. L.
REv. 258 (1979).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.3 (1979).
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Property Tax Commission ,22 enumerated several criteria for making the deter-
mination of what activity constitutes a corporation's principal business, noting
that gross income is not the sole factor.23
Plaintiff, a corporation, purchased 600 acres of farmland in 1967. During
the next ten years it sold 250 acres for $4.4 million, retaining the remainder as
farm and woodland. Farming operations on the remaining land produced
$32,000 in income in this same period. Plaintiff applied for a present-use valu-
ation, which would have reduced the appraisal from over two million dollars
to under $300,000. Both the Board of Equalization and the Property Tax Com-
mission denied this change. The trial court reversed on the basis that plain-
tiff's principal business was not sale of land for development but commercial
production of agricultural products.24
The court of appeals reinstated the Commission's holding because the
facts supported the latter's conclusion that the corporation's principal business
was the sale of land.25 After considering the positive and negative effects of
preferential tax treatment for agricultural property, the court analyzed the leg-
islative history of the North Carolina provision with respect to corporations.
Although corporations were specifically excluded when the legislation was first
enacted in 1973,26 a 1975 amendment modified the requirements under G.S.
105-277.2(4) to include corporations whose principal business is agriculture
and whose owners are actively engaged in agriculture.27 The court thought
that this expansion was intended to permit "family corporations" to qualify
for the preferential treatment because of an increase in corporations for estate
planning purposes.28 And in 1980 the legislature postponed consideration of a
bill that would have permitted any corporate entity to obtain a present use
assessment. These factors led the court to conclude that the legislature's intent
was restrictive with regard to qualification of corporations. 29
Because the term "principal business" had not been interpreted before in
this context or the context of a similar statute, the court looked to dictionary
definitions. Because "principal" means "most important," the court reasoned
that there could be but one principal business.30 To decide what activity is the
corporation's principal business, the court held that gross income is the major
criterion, though net income, annual receipts and disbursements, the corpora-
tion's purpose as stated in its charter, and the corporate function as related to
22. 48 N.C. App. 245, 269 S.E.2d 636 (1980).
23. Id. at 260, 269 S.E.2d at 644.
24. Id. at 246-53, 269 S.E.2d at 637-41. The property had been in continual use as a farm
since 1935. Id. at 251, 269 S.E.2d at 639.
25. Id. at 262, 269 S.E.2d at 645-46.
26. Law of May 23, 1973, ch. 709, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st sess. 1054 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.2(4) (1979)).
27. Law of June 24, 1975, ch. 746, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st sess. 1007 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-277.2(4)(b) (1979)).
28. 48 N.C. App. at 258-59, 269 S.E.2d at 643-44.
29. Id. at 259, 269 S.E.2d at 644.
30. Id. at 259-60, 269 S.E.2d at 644.
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its stated purpose also merit consideration.31
The court supported the Commission's decision on the basis of several
factors. Over 99% of gross income resulted from real estate transactions.
Moreover, because of the continuous sales of real estate, which occurred in all
but one year of plaintiffs existence, the actual corporate function was to sell
land.3 2 The court also noted that the corporate charter mentioned real estate
sales and development but not agricultural activities.33
One of the strongest criticisms of preferential tax treatment for agricul-
tural lands is that it provides a windfall tax shelter for land speculators.34 By
allowing family farm corporations to qualify under G.S. 105-277.2(4) the legis-
lature left an opening for corporate land developers to qualify. Rather than
examine only the use of the land in question,35 the court of appeals sensibly
looked beyond the farming operations and made a logical interpretation of the
principal business requirement.
One issue that requires further clarification in this area is whether the
owners of a corporation personally must be engaged in agricultural operations
on the specific property, or must merely be operating any farming property in
order to meet the statutory requirement 36 that they be "actively engaged" in
farming activities. The statute is unclear with respect to this issue. The Prop-
erty Tax Commission in WR. Company recognized that the owners had oper-
ated farms for many years, but pointed out that the owners were not active in
actual cultivation of the crops on the particular land in question.3 7 The court
of appeals, however, noted that because the corporate owners had individual
interests in other farms, the land would qualify in this respect.38 To resolve
this conflict in a manner consistent with the intent to restrict preferential treat-
ment to farming families, the legislature should require the corporate owners
actually to farm the land for which a present use valuation is sought. At pres-
ent, the statutory requirement that the corporate owners be "actively en-
gaged" 39 in farming activities gives too much leeway for corporate land
speculators to qualify for preferential assessments never intended for them.
C Estate Taxation; Deductibility of Decedent's Debts
In In re Kapoor4° the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that life
31. Id. at 260, 269 S.E.2d at 644.
32. Id. at 261, 269 S.E.2d at 645.
33. Id. at 262, 269 S.E.2d at 645.
34. See generally Henke, supra note 20, at 122-24.
35. Use is the overriding consideration in classification of land for preferential valuation in at
least one state. See Comment, 7 FLA. ST. L. REv. 571 (1979) (criticizing holding in Roden v. K &
K Land Mgmt., Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978), as rendering ineffective a statutory provision to
restrict speculators from qualifying for preferential treatment).
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.2(4)(b) (1979).
37. 48 N.C. App. at 251-52, 269 S.E.2d at 640-41.
38. Id. at 261, 269 S.E.2d at 645.
39. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.2(4)(b) (1979).
40. 47 N.C. App. 500, 501, 267 S.E.2d 418, 419, cert. granted, 301 N.C. 90, 273 S.E.2d 296
(1980).
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insurance proceeds are not "debts of the decedent," and are not deductible
from the North Carolina estate tax return even though the decedent had obli-
gated himself to maintain a life insurance trust and had paid all necessary
premiums. Kapoor is the first interpretation of "debts" as used in G.S. 105-
9(4)41 and conflicts with the determination of deductibility made by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service in this instance.4 2
Pursuant to a separation agreement, decedent obligated himself to main-
tain a life insurance trust for his wife and children. The executor of his estate
included the policy proceeds, which had been collected by the trustee, on both
the state and federal returns, although the federal taxes paid on the proceeds
were later refunded. The superior court ordered a refund of the state taxes.43
In reversing, the court of appeals relied on the dictionary definition of
debt as "something owed" from one person to another. 44 It concluded that
what decedent owed was a life insurance trust maintained in full force and
effect. Once the premiums were paid, the contractual obligation was fulfilled
and thus, the court reasoned, no debt existed at the time of death.45 The court
noted that the language of the North Carolina statute does not parallel that
used in the federal statute and that there were no indications of legislative
intent to have the state provision reach identical results.46
Without further facts, it is difficult to determine to what extent, if any, the
court's result differs from the one that should be reached under federal law. A
recent federal revenue ruling holds that where insurance proceeds are payable
pursuant to a divorce decree issued by a court with the power to determine a
settlement of all property rights, I.R.C. section 2053(a)(4) allows a deduc-
tion.47 A claim founded upon a property settlement alone does not appear to
satisfy this requirement. Alternatively, should the claim be enforceable
against the decedent's estate and be founded on a bona fide agreement for full
consideration in money or money's worth, the amount may be deducted under
section 2053(c). 48 As the court's opinion did not indicate whether there was a
divorce decree or any consideration paid, one can only speculate on the ration-
ale for the I.R.S. refund.
The court of appeals took a narrow view of decedent's obligation, con-
cluding that he was required merely to maintain the trust with no personal
obligation to pay the face amount of the policy. Despite the federal refund
and the court's apparent acceptance that the state and federal provisions dif-
fer,49 the court's interpretation may actually be in accordance witih accepted
federal analysis. On a factual situation that would justify a federal deduction,
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-9(4) (1979).
42. 47 N.C. App. at 501, 267 S.E.2d at 419.
43. Id. at 500, 267 S.E.2d at 419.
44. Id. at 501, 267 S.E.2d at 419.
45. Id.
46. 47 N.C. App. at 501, 267 S.E.2d at 419.
47. Rev. RuL 76-113, 1976-1 C.B. 276.
48. Gray v. United States, 541 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1976).
49. See 47 N.C. App. at 501, 267 S.E.2d at 419.
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it is hoped, however, that the North Carolina courts will recognize such obli-
gations as a debt of the decedent. Generally, the applicable state and federal
statutes are similar enough that considerations of judicial and administrative
efficiency would be served best if the state courts interpreted G.S. 105-9(4) in




The court of appeals in Thompson v. KylesI recognized for the first time in
North Carolina the propriety of a per diem argument when used to calculate
damages for pain and suffering, if there is a showing that plaintiff was in con-
tinuous pain.2 The per diem or fixed formula argument uses a mathematical
equation to derive the amount of compensation that should be awarded to a
plaintiff. The period that the plaintiff is in pain is broken into small units of
time: weeks, days, hours or minutes. Then a relatively small monetary value
for pain and suffering is applied to each unit. Through mathematical compu-
tation a total value for pain and suffering for the entire period is derived.3
The North Carolina Supreme Court previously has ruled that a per diem
argument is improper when the plaintiff was not in continuous pain. In Jen-
kins v. Hines Co. 4 the court reversed the superior court's decision to allow a
per diem argument, but did so solely because the evidence did not show that
the plaintiff was in continuous pain and therefore "the argument of plaintiffs
counsel. . . was without factual or legal justification and was prejudicial to
defendant."'5 The court noted, however, that under North Carolina law coun-
sel are given wide latitude and have the right to argue law as well as fact.6
Per diem arguments have been the source of much controversy. The lead-
ing case against the use of these arguments is Botta v. Brunner.7 The New
Jersey court held that per diem arguments impermissibly invade the domain of
the jury and that compensation cannot be measured in small units of time.8
Other courts have expressed a fear that the mathematical formula arguments
produce an illusion of certainty that will lull the jury into an easy acceptance
of counsel's arguments.9 The opponents of per diem arguments further con-
tend that the arguments actually are mere speculation on the part of plaintiffs
and that counsel are giving their opinion without a basis in fact and without
supporting evidence.' 0 Possibly underlying all of these considerations is the
fear that per diem arguments unfairly favor the plaintiff and that their use will
1. 48 N.C. App. 422, 269 S.E.2d 231, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 239, - S.E.2d - (1980).
2. Id at 424-25, 269 S.E.2d at 233. The court properly limited the application of the per
diem argument to cases in which there is evidence of continuous pain. See notes 4-5 and accom-
panying text infra.
3. See 3 A.L.R. 4th 940 (1981).
4. 264 N.C. 83, 141 S.E.2d 1 (1965).
5. Id at 91, 141 S.E.2d at 7. Plaintiff testified that her hand felt "drawn up" or tight, but
that the only discomfort was the feeling of being drawn. She also said that it did not interfere with
her rest at night. Id
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-14 (1975 & Supp. 1979): "In jury trials the whole case as well of
law as of fact [sic] may be argued to the jury." See also 12 J. STRONG, N.C. INDEX Trial § 11, at
368 (3d ed. 1977).
7. 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
8. Id at 103-04, 138 A.2d at 725. Plaintiffs counsel asked the jury if fifty cents an hour for
damages would be too high.
9. See Caley v. Manicke, 24 l. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82,
138 A.2d 713 (1958).
10. See Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138
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result in excessive verdicts. When a small value, often as low as one cent, is
suggested as the compensation for a minute of pain and suffering, it appears
quite reasonable. However, if that value is multiplied by the minutes that the
plaintiff will be in pain if he or she lives to his or her life expectancy, the total
compensation can become quite large."
Jurisdictions that favor the per diem arguments view the mathematical
formula as a proper inference drawn from the evidence and useful as an aid to
the jury.1 2 In fact, some courts prefer this evidence instead of a blind guess or
random figure that a jury may derive without any practical consideration.' 3
There are also safeguards to the excessive verdict because a court has the
power to reduce an award that is deemed too high.14 Further, the judge can
instruct the jury about the weight and emphasis that it should place on such
arguments. Proponents argue that defendant as well as plaintiff can present a
per diem argument to the jury, thereby offsetting any advantage plaintiff may
gain by suggesting an amount or method to determine damages.' 5
The court of appeals observed that many jurisdictions oppose per diem
arguments because of the difficulty in determining a value for pain and suffer-
ing and because the threshold of pain varies among individuals. 16 However,
the court recognized that the jury must use some criteria to establish the
amount of the award for damages and will usually take into account the very
factors that the opponents of per diem arguments are trying to avoid. There-
fore, the court reasoned that a plaintiff who has been in continuous pain
should have the right to argue that the jury consider the amount of pain and
suffering plaintiff experienced during specific units of time comprising the en-
tire period. 17
While per diem arguments may not be the ultimate or ideal solution to
the difficult problem of awarding damages for pain and suffering, they do pro-
A.2d 713 (1958); Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 124 S.E.2d 54 (1962); Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va.
421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961).
11. See Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Trans. Corp., I 1 Wis. 2d 604, 614, 106 N.W.2d 274,
280 (1960). This argument is effective if the jury only returns an award for a certain amount per
unit of time. This, however, is not the case. While counsel may suggest applying a small value per
unit of time, at some point the jury will have to arrive at a total amount of compensation. Al-
though the initial value may seem reasonable, it will soon become apparent to the jury that the
total award may not be reasonable. Indeed, if the value that counsel suggests is too large when
computed into the total award, the tactic may have a negative effect on the jury.
12. See Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. 2d 129 (1966); Higgins v.
Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 552 P.2d 1227, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620 (1976).
13. See Imperial Oil v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4, 11 (6th Cir. 1956). "We are more concerned with
the result, reached by a reasonable process of reasoning and consistent with the evidence, than we
are with which one of several suitable formulas was actually used by the juror or judge." Id
14. Plaintiff may also alienate a jury if the award suggested is unreasonably high. See note
11 supra.
15. Although defendant can argue in the alternative, he is still at a disadvantage. It is diffi-
cult for defendant to argue reasonably that a seemingly small amount per small unit is excessive.
Defendant can argue that the entire award would be too large. This approach, however, would
not suggest an alternative but would focus the jury's attention on the amount of damages. This
focus may or may not work to defendant's advantage.
16. 48 N.C. App. at 424, 269 S.E.2d at 233.
17. Id at 425, 269 S.E.2d at 233.
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vide some guidelines that may be helpful to the jury. The per diem arguments
recognized by the court merely deal with reducing the measurement of the
period that the plaintiff is in pain to small units of time. This method may
enable the jury to make a more realistic assessment of damages.18
B. Loss of Consortium
In Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, Inc. 19 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court recognized a spouse's cause of action against a negligent
third party for loss of the other spouse's consortium, as long as the claim is
joined with any suit the other spouse may institute to recover for personal
injuries. This case reverses a longstanding bar to recovery20 and places North
Carolina solidly within the mainstream of states on the issue.2 1
Nicholson closes a peculiar chapter in tort law development in this state.
Until 1921, only husbands could sue for loss of consortium.22 In that year,
however, the supreme court in Hipp v. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co. 23 ruled
that a wife had standing to sue for loss of her husband's consortium. The
wife's cause of action was abruptly removed four years later in Hinnant v.
Tidewater Power Co. 24 Twenty years later, in Helmstetler v. Duke Power
Co. ,25 the court remedied the unequal treatment of spouses by removing the
husband's cause of action. Therefore, the court in Nicholson has returned to
the position it espoused almost seventy years earlier.
Nicholson arose when plaintiffs husband was injured as the result of al-
leged negligent treatment by defendant physician and hospital. The trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and the court of appeals
affimed.26
The supreme court reversed, concluding that policy considerations now
compelled a revision of the law.27 The effect of Hinnant and Helmstetler, the
court noted, was to "strip both spouses of a right to recover for what can be a
very real injury to the marital partnership." 28 These prior cases thus contra-
18. The smaller units may be more comprehensible to the jury than an abstract idea of pain
for a great number of years.
19. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
20. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 infra. As recently as 1978, the supreme court had
refused to consider the issue. See Cozart v. Chapin, 35 N.C. App. 254, 241 S.E.2d 144, cert.
denied, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).
21. Thirty-five other states allow recovery for loss of consortium. See Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d
900 (1971 & Supp. 1980), and cases cited therein.
22. The husband's common law cause of action against a negligent third party for loss of
consortium of the wife was based on the services that the wife owed to him. The wife, however,
was viewed as his social and legal inferior, "she could not require him to work for her, and she
had at least no common law remedy for deprivation of his society, intercourse and affections." W.
PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 894 (4th ed. 1971).
23. 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
24. 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
25. 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
26. Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 615, 259 S.E.2d 586
(1979).
27. 300 N.C. at 296-97, 266 S.E.2d at 819.
28. Id at 300, 266 S.E.2d at 821.
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dict the modem policy of extending liability to allow compensation to those
injured by the wrongful acts of others. The Nicholson court further criticized
the assumption in Helmstetler that recovery by the injured spouse for his or
her personal injuries was sufficient compensation for the spouse suffering loss
of consortium. That assumption ignored the deprivation of sexual gratifica-
tion to the "uninjured" spouse and the loss of the possibility of children, the
court observed. 29 Also, the court noted that Hinnant and Helmsteller were
inconsistent with cases recognizing a cause of action for loss of a husband's or
wife's consortium due to the intentional acts of third parties?30
The court further reexamined and rejected the reasoning in Hinnant.3 1 It
concluded that the double recovery feared by the Hinnant court could be pre-
vented by compelling joinder of one spouse's claim for loss of consortium with
any suit the other spouse may have instituted to recover for personal injuries.
Joinder is required in several jurisdictions, the court noted, and this require-
ment appropriately recognizes that the injury is to the marriage itself.32
Finally, in response to defendants' objection that the matter should be
left to the legislature, the court observed that the cause of action for loss of
consortium had been judicially created and then removed. By reversing Hin-
nant and Helmstetler, the court simply restored the cause of action it had abol-
ished decades earlier.33
29. Id at 301, 266 S.E.2d at 821.
30. Id See Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 96 S.E.2d 870 (1957) and Knighten v. Mc-
Clain, 227 N.C. 682,44 S.E.2d 79 (1947) (recognizing recovery for loss of spouse's consortium due
to intentional acts of third parties).
31. The Nicholson court identified four major considerations underlying the decision in Hin-
nant to remove the wife's cause of action: (1) The Hinnant court implied that the married wo-
men's legislation of the nineteenth century had not changed the historic inability of married
women to sue; (2) The court in Hinnant assumed that consortium included a services factor, and
that any attempt to separate that factor from society, companionship, and affection was impossi-
ble; the court implied that society and companionship were impossible to measure; (3) The court
held that the wife's damage was too remote a consequence of defendant's negligence to have been
proximately caused by that injury; if permitted, the court feared that the cause of action also might
be extended to parents, employers, and other third parties; and (4) The court feared double recov-
ery. 300 N.C. at 299-300, 266 S.E.2d at 820-21.
Unlike the implication in Hinnant, the Nicholson court found that the married women's legis-
lation was intended "to remove common law disabilities against women and to equalize the rights
of husbands and wives." Id at 301, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
Second, the court observed that the presumption in HIinnant that service covered loss of con-
sortium ignored the definition given to consortium in intentional torts cases at the time. More-
over, the court continued, such a presumption was inaccurate, since at common law, service was
only one severable aspect of consortium. Id at 302, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
Third, the idea that damages to the wife were too remote to measure was "no longer sound
legal principle," the court asserted. Id Experience with the state's wrongful death statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1976), had demonstrated that courts and juries were able to measure
damages for loss of consortium. Id
Finally, the Hinnant court's fear of proximate cause and double recovery could have been
resolved by means less drastic than barring the action altogether, the Nicholson court concluded.
By expanding the definition of consortium to include sexual intercourse, the Nicholson court effec-
tively limited recovery to one's spouse. Id at 303, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
32. Id at 304-05, 266 S.E.2d at 823.
33. Id at 304, 266 S.E.2d at 823.
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C Lessor's Liabili y
In North Carolina, if a third party is injured while in non-public areas of
leased premises as the result of any defective condition in the premises, the
injured party generally may seek redress from the lessee but not from the les-
sor.34 A long accepted exception to this general rule is that liability may be
extended to the lessor if he knowingly demises the premises in a ruinous con-
dition.35
In Boyer v. Agapion36 the court addressed the question whether the begin-
ning of each new term in a month-to-month tenancy should be treated as a
new lease, for the purpose of determining whether lessor had knowingly de-
mised premises in a ruinous condition. In Boyer, plaintiff was injured on Au-
gust 22 while falling on a defective step at a private residence. The residence
was leased under a month-to-month tenancy, the period beginning on the first
day of each month. Plaintiff sued lessor for damages alleging that lessor was
liable since the defective condition was present on the first day of the rental
period and was known, or should have been known, to lessor.
In examining the question of whether continuation of a month-to-month
tenancy imposes the same liability on lessors as does an actual reletting, the
court noted that there is a split of authority among the jurisdictions that have
considered the issue. Missouri and Illinois courts answer the question affirma-
tively,37 while Washington courts refuse to impose liability.38 The North Car-
olina court concluded that the Restatement (Second) of Property § 17.139
adequately deals with this split of authority and adopted the Restatement ap-
proach. Accordingly, a lessor is subject to liability for injuries to third parties
when the lessor allows a periodic tenancy to continue into the next period, and
at the beginning of the next period the leased premises are in a ruinous condi-
tion. However, the lessor of premises for private use is subject to liability to
third parties only if the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the
defect and the lessor both knows or has reason to know of the defect and is
34. See Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454, 460-61, 181 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1971).
35. Wilson v. Dowtin, 215 N.C. 547, 550, 2 S.E.2d 576, 577 (1939); see Floyd v. Jarrell, 18
N.C. App. 418, 197 S.E.2d 229 (1973).
36. 46 N.C. App. 45, 264 S.E.2d 364 (1980).
37. See Borman v. Sandgren, 37 M11 App. 160, 161 (1890); Griffith v. Lewis, 17 Mo. App. 605,
613 (1885).
38. See Ward v. Hinkleman, 37 Wash. 375, 381, 79 P. 956, 959 (1905).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.1 (1977). This section provides in pertinent
part:
(1) A landlord who conceals or fails to disclose to his tenant any condition, whether
natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons
on the leased property and which exists when tenant takes possession, is subject to
liability to the tenant and others upon the leased property with the consent of the
tenant or his subtenant for physical harm caused by the condition after the tenant
has taken possession, if-
(a) the tenant does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk
involved; and
(b) the landlord knows or has reason to know of the condition, realizes or should
realize the risk involved, and has reason to expect that the tenant will not
discover the condition or realize the risk.
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cognizant that the lessee will not discover the defect. Thus, the lessor is liable
to third parties only to the same extent he is liable to the lessee.
The court in Boyer concluded that defendant lessor was not liable since 1)
plaintiff was a third party injured on leased premises not held open for public
use, 2) the lessee had the opportunity to be cognizant of the defect, and 3)
lessor had reason to expect that lessee would be cognizant of the defect.40
Boyer places a new burden on the lessor of month-to-month tenancies.
For the lessor of premises for private use, however, that burden is arguably of
more theoretical significance than of practical importance since the lessor can
reasonably expect the lessee residing on the premises to be cognizant of any
defects which develop during the preceding period.
D. Liability Without Privity
In 1980 North Carolina continued to expand the scope of liability of ar-
chitects and structural engineers for the negligent performance of their profes-
sional duties. The North Carolina Court of Appeals considered three cases
presenting variations of the basic issue of whether a party without privity may
recover damages for economic loss and/or injury to property resulting from
the negligent performance of contractual obligations.4 ' In Browning v. Mau-
rice B. Levien & Co. 42 the court held that when an architect agreed with a
lending agency to certify stages in the construction of an apartment complex,
the architect could reasonably foresee that the borrower-owner of the complex
might rely on the architect's certification. 43 In Stanford v. Owens44 the court
ruled that, even in the absence of privity of contract, a cause of action in negli-
gence could be brought against a structural engineer who conducted soil tests,
the results of which were relied on in the subsequent construction of a building
on the property.45 In Quail Hollow East Condominium Association v. Donald J.
Scholz Co. 46 the court held that it is reasonably foreseeable that an architect's
faulty design or supervision of construction of a condominium may bring
harm to the homeowner.47 These three cases augment the court's 1979 deci-
sion in Davidson and Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover48 which abolished the privity
40. 46 N.C. App. at 50-51, 264 S.E.2d at 367-68.
41. Quail Hollow East Condominium Assoc. v. Donald J. Scholz Co., 47 N.C. App. 518, 268
S.E.2d 12, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 527, 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388,
265 S.E.2d 617, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 95, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980); Browning v. Maurice B. Levien &
Co., 44 N.C. App. 701, 262 S.E.2d 355, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 371, 267 S.E.2d 673 (1980).
42. 44 N.C. App. 701, 262 S.E.2d 355 (1980).
43. Id at 705, 262 S.E.2d at 358.
44. 46 N.C. App. 388, 265 S.E.2d 617 (1980).
45. Id at 401, 265 S.E.2d at 625.
46. 47 N.C. App. 518, 268 S.E.2d 12 (1980).
47. Id at 525, 268 S.E.2d at 17.
48. 41 N.C. App. 661, 255 S.E.2d 580 (1979). Architect, pursuant to a contract with the prop-
erty owner, designed the building that plaintiff, general contractor, was constructing. During con-
struction there was damage to an adjacent building that was also owned by property owner.
Property owner refused to make payments for plaintifi's work, and plaintiff sued. Property owner
counterclaimed against plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a third party complaint against the architect, with
whom he had no contract, seeking indemnity for any liability he might incur under the counter-
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requirement in architect liability.
In Browning49 plaintiffs, members of a limited partnership, obtained a
loan for the construction of an apartment complex. The lending agency con-
tracted with defendant, an architect, to inspect the construction at the time of
each progress payment request and to certify that progress was in accordance
with the construction plans and specifications. The building contractor de-
faulted on the loan agreement. Plaintiffs sued defendant asserting that de-
fendant had been negligent in certifying that $900,000 worth of work had been
performed by the contractor when, in fact, it had not been performed. The
jury found the defendant had been negligent and plaintiffs contributorily neg-
ligent, and awarded plaintiffs only a nominal sum. Plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss
the action because defendant's contract for overseeing the construction was
with the lending agency, not with the plaintiff, and therefore there was no
privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant. In remanding for a new
trial because of an improper charge to the jury relative to contributory negli-
gence, the court stated it believed that "it is the law that an architect who
contracts to perform services is liable for damages proximately caused by his
negligence to anyone who can be reasonably foreseen as relying on that archi-
tect's performing his services in a reasonable manner."50 The court empha-
sized that the services performed were required by the contract, and
distinguished the case at hand from the 1979 case of McKinney Drilling Co. v.
Nello L. Teer Co.51 in which the alleged negligently performed services were
in excess of the contractual commitment. The court's holding continued the
theme set forth in Davidson,52 that is, that the only apparent limit on an archi-
tect's liability for breach of the duty of due care is foreseeability.
In Stanford53 plaintiff purchased land from seller. At the time of
purchase plaintiff knew that portions of the land had been filled to raise it to
an acceptable grade; seller knew plaintiff intended to build a specific type of
restaurant. Seller contracted with defendant engineering corporation to con-
duct a subsurface examination of the tract. Defendant reported that the tract
was of sufficient quality to support a building of the type that plaintiff pro-
posed to construct. Subsequent to receiving the report plaintiff constructed the
building, which cracked within a short time because of the subsidence of the
land. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs claim against defendant because of
lack of privity of contract. The court of appeals held that plaintiff did have a
valid claim for negligence against defendant and concluded that such a hold-
claim. The court held that an architect may be liable to a general contractor not in privity for
"economic loss foresecably resulting from breach of an architect's common-law duty of care in the
performance of his contract with the owner." Id at 667, 255 S.E.2d at 584.
For further discussion of Davidson, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1979-
Torts, 58 N.C.L. REv. 1181, 1564 (1980).
49. 44 N.C. App. 701, 262 S.E.2d 355 (1980).
50. Id at 704-05, 262 S.E.2d at 358.
51. 38 N.C. App. 472, 248 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
52. See note 48 supra.
53. 46 N.C. App. 388, 265 S.E.2d 617 (1980).
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ing was "consistent with the trend of abolishing the privity requirement in
cases with factual situations similar to that in Davidson."54
In Condominium Association55 defendant architect, pursuant to a contract
with a general contractor, was allegedly responsible for preparing plans and
specifications as well as for supervising and administering the construction of
a condominium complex. The underground water pipe system serving the
complex was faulty. Plaintiff, a homeowner's association, sought damages for
economic injury resulting from the substandard condition of the water system.
The court of appeals overturned the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of defendant, who sought dismissal because of the absence of privity.
In so doing the court stated that "[i]t is obvious that any architect's involve-
ment in residential construction is intended to affect the ultimate consumer-
purchaser in that the buyer anticipates and expects sound construction and
solid workmanship. '56 Because of the foreseeability that a defect in design or
negligence in supervision may result in harm to the homeowner the court held
that plaintiff had a valid claim of breach of the duty of due care despite the
lack of privity. Furthermore, the court refused to distinguish between injury
in the form of economic loss and injury in the form of property damage, and
concluded that the form of the loss did not affect the applicability of the gen-
eral rule that, in factual situations such as these, the plaintiff lacking privity
can seek redress.57
E Negligence of Common Carriers
By denying discretionary review in Wesley v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. ,5 the
North Carolina Supreme Court declined to resolve a decades-old conflict over
the proper duty of care owed by common carriers to their passengers. The
court of appeals had ruled that the trial judge did not err in instructing the
jury that a bus company owed a passenger "the highest degree of care" in
foreseeing the imminence of a criminal assault by an intruder.5 9 The lower
court implicitly had called on the supreme court to clarify North Carolina law
in this area.60
Plaintiff in Wesley was sexually assaulted by an intruder in the restroom
of defendant's bus station. Defendant argued that the proper standard of care
in this circumstance was ordinary or due care. The court of appeals noted that
at least three standards of care had been recognized previously by the supreme
court: (1) In Britton v. Atlanta & Charlotte Airline Railway,61 the supreme
court imposed a duty on the carrier to protect passengers from violence by
fellow passengers or intruders, when by the exercise of proper care, the carrier
54. Id at 401, 265 S.E.2d at 625.
55. 47 N.C. App. 518, 268 S.E.2d 12 (1980).
56. Id at 525, 268 S.E.2d at 17.
57. Id at 526; 268 S.E.2d at 17.
58. 301 N.C. 239, - S.E.2d - (1980), denying cert. to 47 N.C. App. 680 S.E.2d 855.
59. 47 N.C. App. at 694-95, 268 S.E.2d at 864-65.
60. Id at 695, 268 S.E.2d at 865.
61. 88 N.C. 536 (1882).
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could have foreseen and prevented the violent acts. (2) In Daniel v. Petersburg
Railroad62 the supreme court used the "highest degree of care" verbalization,
(3) Purportedly overruling Daniel, the supreme court in Hollingworth v. Skeld-
ing63 stated that the carrier's duty was to provide for the passengers' safe con-
veyance. Since these standards were first expressed, the supreme court
apparently has cited-without explaining its inconsistency--different combi-
nations of the three in carrier negligence cases.64
The court of appeals pointed out that the conflicting standards of care
used by the supreme court had been identified as early as 1939, when a com-
mentator called for corrective action to make the standard consistent.65 Con-
cluding that it was "for the Supreme Court to determine which rule will
govern," 66 the court of appeals in Wesley affirmed the trial court's decision,
stating that the trial judge had utilized instructions in accord with at least two
of the existing standards. 67
The majority of American jurisdictions hold that a common carrier owes
the highest degree of care to its passengers consistent with the practical opera-
tion of its business. Notwithstanding this general rule, the majority of courts
also hold (1) that passengers are to be protected from only those dangers that
are reasonably foreseeable; and (2) that the carrier owes passengers only an
ordinary duty of care to protect them from harmful acts of third persons not
under the carrier's control.68 Many North Carolina decisions appear to agree
with the majority positions. 69 Yet, as the court of appeals recognized, the
supreme court's conflicting verbalizations of the duty of care create doubt;70
and, as one author noted, "it seems that we would secure more uniform ver-
dicts, and have fewer appeals, if the supreme court would definitely and finally
put its stamp of approval on one consistent group of words which could be
confidently used by trial courts in cases involving this question." 71
F Workers" Compensation72
The court of appeals ruled for the first time in North Carolina that the
62. 117 N.C. 408, 23 S.E. 327 (1895).
63. 142 N.C. 246, 55 S.E. 212 (1906). In 1939 the supreme court relied on Hollingsworth,
ordering a new trial when the trial court instructed the jury as in Daniel. Perry v. Sykes, 215 N.C.
39, 200 S.E. 923 (1939).
64. See, eg., cases cited in 47 N.C. App. at 693-94, 268 S.E.2d at 864.
65. Id at 694-95, 268 S.E.2d at 864-65, citing Note, Torts-Negligence-Common Carriers-De-
gree ofCare Owed Passengers, 17 N.C.L. REv. 453, 457-58 (1939).
66. 47 N.C. App. at 695, 268 S.E.2d at 865.
67. Id
68. See 14 AM. JuR. 2d Carriers §§ 916, 921, 1071, 1072 (1964 & Supp. 1980), and cases cited
therein. See also Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 504 (1961).
69. See, ag., Leake v. Queen City Coach Co., 270 N.C. 669, 155 S.E.2d 161 (1967); Harris v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 243 N.C. 346, 90 S.E.2d 710 (1956); Smith v. Camel City Cab Co., 227
N.C. 572, 42 S.E.2d 657 (1947); White v. Chappell, 219 N.C. 652, 14 S.E.2d 843 (1941); Pruett v.
Southern Ry., 164 N.C. 3, 80 S.E. 65 (1913).
70. 47 N.C. App. at 692, 268 S.E.2d at 864.
71. Note, Torts-Negligence-Common Carriers-Degree of Care Owed Passengers, 17 N.C.L.
REv. 453, 458 (1939).
72. In another case construing the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, the North
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dependent of a deceased worker is entitled to the worker's benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act,73 even though the worker died from an unre-
lated cause before filing a claim for compensation.
Wilhite v. Liberty Veneer Co. 74 dealt with a serious disfigurement claim
filed pursuant to G.S. 97-31(22). 75 The court noted that G.S. 97-31(22) does
not require that a disfigurement claim be filed before the death of the covered
worker to constitute compensation to which the worker was "entitled," within
the meaning of G.S. 97-37.76 The court held that this interpretation would
allow the dependent of the deceased worker to collect compensation for the
worker's disfigurement. 77 Since the worker died before the healing period was
completed, the court ruled that compensation would have to be based on a
medical estimate of the extent of permanent disfigurement the decedent would
have suffered if he had lived until the end of the healing process.78 The court
also ruled that the compensation should be deemed "unaccrued" since no
lump sum award had been made prior to the worker's death. Therefore, under
G.S. ch. 97 the compensation would pass to decedent's dependents rather than
his estate.79
In determining whether the deceased worker's dependent should be al-
lowed to recover when a claim had not been filed before the worker's death,
the court noted the split in decisions in the jurisdictions that have been con-
fronted with this problem.80 The Wilhite court recognized that under North
Carolina Supreme Court held that recovery for death claims under workers' compensation are no
longer limited to a maximum of $80.00 per week. Andrews v. Nu-Woods, Inc., 299 N.C. 723, 264
S.E.2d 99 (1980). In 1977 plaintiff's spouse suffered a fatal injury by accident arising out of his
course of employment. Decedent was earning a weekly wage of $420.28. Relying on G.S. 97-38,
defendant employer argued that plaintiffs recovery was limited to a maximum of 66 2/3% of the
average weekly wages but not more than $80.00. The court ruled that G.S. 97-29, as amended by
Law of April, 1974, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 234, supersedes G.S. 97-38 and clearly
establishes maximum weekly benefits for all sections of the Workers' Compensation Act including
benefits for total incapacity and death. Thus, maximum weekly benefits are no longer limited to
$80.00 per week as specified in G.S. 97-38.
73. N.C. GEM. STAT. ch. 97 (1979).
74. 47 N.C. App. 434, 267 S.E.2d 566 (1980). The North Carolina Supreme Court granted
discretionary review. 301 N.C. 106,273 S.E.2d 312 (1980). The Supreme Court's decision will not
only decide this particular case, it will also have a major impact on Bridges v. McCrary Stone
Services, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 185, 268 S.E.2d 559 (1980). Bridges dealt with facts similar to those in
WVlhite, and the court relied on Wilhite in its decision.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(22) (1979) sets a ten thousand dollar limit for compensation for
serious bodily disfigurement that is not compensable under any other subdivision of ch. 97, ex-
cluding "disfigurement resulting from permanent loss or permanent partial loss of use of any
member of the body for which compensation is fixed in the schedule contained in this section.'
Decedent suffered second- and third-degree burns in an accident during the course of his employ-
ment. He later died of a heart attack that was unrelated to his injuries.
76. Where injured employee dies before total compensation is paid.-When an em-
ployee receives or is entitled to compensation under this Article for an injury covered by
G.S. 97-31 and dies from any other cause.., payment of the unpaid balance of com-
pensation shall be made: First, to the surviving whole dependents. . . in lieu of the
compensation the employee would have been entitled to had he lived.
N.C. GE . STAT. § 97-37 (1979).
77. 47 N.C. App. at 439, 267 S.E.2d at 569.
78. Id at 437, 267 S.E.2d at 568.
79. Id at 438, 267 S.E.2d at 569.
80. Id at 438-39, 267 S.E.2d at 569. It should be noted that both of the cases that the court
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Carolina law, when a covered worker dies of an unrelated cause, recovery by
his dependents would be allowed if the claim had been filed prior to the
worker's death, even though no award had yet been made.8' The court ruled
that the extension of this principle to the present case in which no claim had
been filed prior to the worker's death would be consistent with G.S. 97-37.82
The court did not clearly address defendant's argument that the worker
was no longer "entitled" under G.S. 97-37 to a recovery for disfigurement after
his death. Defendant argued that recovery for disfigurement is compensation
for diminution of future earning capacity and that after the worker is deceased
his earning capacity cannot be diminished further.83 Therefore, the worker
should only collect compensation for loss of earning capacity from the date of
the disfigurement until his death. There is some merit to this argument, espe-
cially in light of the court's emphasis on the loss of earning capacity as the
basis for disfigurement damages. 84 The issue is whether disfigurement com-
pensation is compensation for disability or for a permanent injury. "Disabil-
ity", as defined by G.S. 97-2(9), means the "incapacity because of injury to
earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the
same or any other employment."85 If the compensation for disfigurement is
determined by the loss of earning capacity and is viewed as a disability pay-
ment, it would seem as though the worker's dependent is not entitled to pay-
ment after the worker's death unless the payment is vested. 6
The problem with defendant's interpretation is definitional. While the
court often refers to the loss of earning capacity as a basis for calculating com-
pensation for disfigurement, the statute does not use this criterion.87 Loss of
cited as opposed to extending the benefits can be distinguished from Wilhite. Flynn v. Asten Hill
Mfg. Co., 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 218, 383 A.2d 255 (1978) dealt with a statute that directed that
disability was deemed to begin on the date the claim was filed. Since the worker died before the
claim was filed, there was no disability on that date and therefore no cause of action. Frederico
Granero Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 48 Pa. Commw. Ct. 252, 409 A.2d 1187 (1980)
allowed the widow to recover because the worker died within two weeks of his injury without
being released from the hospital. The court refused to extend the right of recovery to all cases in
which the claim had not been filed before the worker's death. This refusal, however, was dictum.
81. See Inman v. Meares, 247 N.C. 661, 101 S.E.2d 692 (1958). Also, in Butts v. Montague
Bros., 204 N.C. 389, 168 S.E. 215 (1933), the court allowed the dependent to recover even though
the initial claim was denied and the covered worker died before the appeal was final
82. See note 76 supra.
83. 47 N.C. App. at 437, 267 S.E.2d at 568.
84. See id at 436, 267 S.E.2d at 567. North Carolina courts have often focused on the loss of
earning capacity as the major determination of serious disfigurement. See Ashley v. Rent-A-Car
Co., 271 N.C. 76, 84, 155 S.E.2d 755, 761 (1967); Davis v. Sanford Constr. Co., 247 N.C. 332, 336,
101 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1957); Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 236, 25 S.E.2d 865,
868 (1943); Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, 266, 22 S.E.2d 570, 576 (1942).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1979). While the deceased was recovering from his injuries
and until his death he apparently was receiving temporary disability payments. 47 N.C. App. at
435, 267 S.E.2d at 567.
86. See Inman v. Meares, 247 N.C. 661, 101 S.E.2d 692 (1958). Moreover, if the compensa-
tion is for total incapacity, the payments continue only during the worker's lifetime. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-29 (1979).
87. The court has held that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979) provides compensation regard-
less of loss of earning capacity. See Perry v. Hibriten Furn. Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397
(1978); Crawley v. Southern Devices, 31 N.C. App. 284,229 S.E.2d 325 (1976); Loflin v. Loftin, 13
N.C. App. 574, 186 S.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 154, 187 S.E.2d 585 (1972).
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earning capacity may be used by the courts and the Commission in determin-
ing the amount of the compensation for disfigurement, but it should not be
controlling.88 Moreover, the confusion surrounding the term "disability" may
be clarified by G.S. 97-37. The fact that G.S. 97-37 allows compensation to
continue past the worker's death from unrelated causes supports the inference
that the compensation for injuries included in G.S. 97-31 are not disability
payments that should continue only during the worker's lifetime.89 This inter-
pretation would indicate that the compensation for disfigurement would more
properly be labelled an award for a permanent injury rather than an award
for a permanent disability. In other words, even if loss of earning capacity is
being used to determine the amount of the compensation, the award is for the
serious disfigurement and not for the diminution of earning capacity that
would accompany a disability
Applying this analysis, the worker was "entitled" to compensation as soon
as he was injured, and therefore his dependent should receive his compensa-
tion under G.S. 97-37. If the court did not allow the dependent to file the
claim, it would be imposing an arbitrary cut-off for the benefits allowed under
G.S. 97-37. 90 The problem in this case is compounded because the worker did
not complete the healing period that is used to ascertain the extent of his dis-
figurement. The court properly recognized that this factor should not bar the
dependent's receipt of the deceased worker's compensation.9' To hold other-
wise would defeat the purpose of G.S. 97-37.
Once the court determined that the worker was entitled to compensation,
it had to decide if the worker's dependent or his estate would receive the pay-
ment. The court held that since the amount of the lump sum payment had not
been determined prior to the worker's death, the compensation was not ac-
crued, and therefore the worker's dependents were entitled to the payment
pursuant to G.S. 97-37.92
G. Other Cases
In Pierce v. Piver,93 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a
cause of action exists against a doctor who, attempting to sterilize a woman,
improperly performs a bilateral tubal ligation allowing a subsequent preg-
88. In Watts v. Brewer, 243 N.C. 422, 424, 90 S.E.2d 764, 767 (1956), the court held that the
fact that the worker was earning the same salary after he lost his eye could not be grounds to deny
compensation.
89. The court has allowed compensation for both partial incapacity and disfigurement at the
same time. Hall v. Thomason Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 139 S.E.2d 857 (1965). Also, in
Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951), the court held that the
worker must prove the disability in order to receive compensation unless the injury is within G.S.
97-31.
90. A contrary ruling would allow the dependent to recover if the worker filed the claim and
was killed as he was leaving the office, but would deny the dependent recovery if the worker was
killed on his way to file the claim.
91. 47 N.C. App. at 437, 267 S.E.2d at 568.
92. Id at 438, 267 S.E.2d at 568-69.
93. 45 N.C. App. 111, 262 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 300 N.C. 375, - SE.2d -
(1980)(mem.).
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nancy. Significantly, plaintiff had included in her damages claim the cost of
raising the child until emancipation. The concurring judge expressed concern
that the majority opinion would permit recovery for that element of dam-
ages.94
The majority identified plaintiffs claim as one for remedial medical mal-
practice, based on negligence and breach of contract; the court noted that a
similar cause of action had been recognized in Florida,95 Minnesota,96 and
Tennessee.97 In these cases, however, recovery was not allowed for the cost of
raising the child. Moreover, since the supreme court dismissed the appeal in
Pierce because of a settlement by the parties, 98 resolution of the issue of recov-
ery for costs of raising the child must await future developments.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged, in dictum, that
since a hospital owes many duties directly to patients, it may be sued on a
theory of corporate negligence for breach of those duties. 99 The court deter-
mined' ° that among those duties, were: inspection of credentials of hospital
physicians,101 provision of suitable equipment,102 promulgation of rules for
safe storage and use of medications, 0 3 inspection of equipment, 10 4 and refusal
to obey a doctor's obviously negligent or dangerous instructions.105 The the-
ory of corporate negligence for breach of these duties provides a basis for lia-
bility separate from the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court
concluded. 1o6
94. 45 N.C. App. at 113, 262 S.E.2d at 322 (Wells, J., concurring).
95. See Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970).
96. See Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976).
97. See Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. App. 1974).
98. See 300 N.C. 375, - S.E.2d - (1980) (mem.) (dismissing defendant's appeal).
99. Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d
621 (1980).
100. 44 N.C. App. at 647, 262 S.E.2d at 396.
101. See Robinson v. Duszynski, 36 N.C. App. 103, 243 S.E.2d 148 (1978).
102. See Starnes v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d 733
(1976).
103. See Habuda v. Rex Hosp., Inc., 3 N.C. App. 11, 164 S.E.2d 17 (1968).
104. See Payne v. Garvey, 264 N.C. 593, 142 S.E.2d 159 (1965).
105. See Byrd v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 202 N.C. 337, 162 S.E. 738 (1932).
106. 44 N.C. App. at 647, 262 S.E.2d at 396. Examining the facts in Bost, the court noted that
plaintiff's decedent, who had been injured in a bike accident, was admitted to defendant hospital
and diagnosed and treated by defendant doctor. The patient recovered partially but suffered a
relapse. Defendant partners of the doctor then cared for the patient and performed additional
surgery. The patient responded poorly and was transferred to another hospital, where he eventu-
ally died. Plaintiffsued the first hospital and three doctors for negligence. The trial court directed
a verdict for the hospital; the jury returned verdicts for the doctors. Id at 63941, 262 S.E.2d at
392-93.
The court noted that plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the hospital's rule about keeping
patient progress notes had been violated by the doctors, and that the doctors were not disciplined
by the hospital. This evidence could show a violation of a duty owed to the patient, the court
observed, but plaintiff had offered no evidence to show that the hospital's breach of duty contrib-
uted to the patient's injuries or death. Plaintiff did not allege that the hospital had hired the
doctors, so the doctrine of respondeat superior was inapplicable. Finally, since no evidence had
been introduced to show that the hospital had failed to use reasonable care in the employment of
defendant doctors, the court concluded that the directed verdict in favor of the hospital was cor-
rect. Id at 648, 262 S.E.2d at 397.
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In a case of first impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected
an employee's cause of action against her supervisor for negligently maldng
job performance reports to her employer.10 7 The court noted that if this cause
of action were allowed, it would burden supervisors and reduce business effi-
ciency by discouraging frankness in work reports. 108
In another case of first impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
ruled that an individual partner has privity to sue a seller for personal injuries
that result from a breach of warranty on goods purchased by the partnership
with partnership funds.10 9 Since a partner can be sued personally for nonpay-
ment or other breach of contract for purchase of the goods, he is thus privy to
the contract, the court reasoned. 10
The court of appeals also ruled that the county health department can use
the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a defense to an action for negligence.' I I
Although the court indicated a distaste for the doctrine, it stated that the appli-
cation of sovereign immunity to public health care is not a new extention of
the doctrine. Moreover, the court expressed its belief that any modification of
the doctrine must come from the General Assembly." 12
In Koury v. John Meyer ofNorwich 1 3 the court of appeals questioned the
107. Osborne v. Walker, 48 N.C. App. 627, 269 S.E.2d 281 (1980).
108. Id at 629, 269 S.E.2d at 282. It is possible that the court treated this case too lightly. The
court ruled that since plaintiff was an employee at will and could be discharged from her employ-
ment regardless of whether her work was satisfactory, she suffered no harm. While this may be
true, plaintiff may have suffered an injury if she was discharged solely because of the negligently-
made job performance reports. Moreover, the court ignores any possible future injury that plain-
tiff may suffer if she is subsequently refused employment because of the job performance reports
and related discharge from the position.
109. Barnes v. Campbell Chain Co., 47 N.C. App. 488, 267 S.E.2d 388 (1980). Plaintiff's eye
had been injured by a defective cable sold to plaintiff's partnership by defendant. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals noted that a
partner cannot sue in his own name alone and for his own benefit on a cause of action accruing to
the partnership, citing Threadgill v. Faust, 213 N.C. 226, 230, 195 S.E. 798, 800 (1938). But here,
the court concluded, the claim was not one accruing to the partnership. 47 N.C. App. at 489, 267
S.E.2d at 389. The court stated that, except possibly for intentional torts, it would be against
public policy to allow all partners to recover for the personal injuries to one partner. The right to
recover should belong to the partner personally injured, the court reasoned. Id
110. 47 N.C. App. at 490, 267 S.E.2d at 390. Defendant further argued that the partner should
be considered an employee of the partnership. Thus, plaintiff would be unable to sue the seller for
breach of warranty because of lack of horizontal privity required by N.C. GaN. STAT. § 25-2-318
(1965 and Cum. Supp. 1979). See also id., N.C. Comment (1965). The court dismissed this argu-
ment, pointing out that a partner is not an employee of the partnership. Therefore, plaintiff was in
effect a purchaser and, consequently, he had direct contractual privity. 47 N.C. App. at 490, 267
S.E.2d at 390.
111. Casey v. Wake County, 45 N.C. App. 522,263 S.E.2d 360, cer. denied, 300 N.C. 371,267
S.E.2d 673 (1980). Plaintiff went to the family planning clinic of the Wake County Health Depart-
ment seeking contraceptive aid. She was fitted with an intrauterine device that she claims led to
severe injuries, due to the negligence of the clinic. The court held that the act of prescribing and
dispensing contraceptives without charge is not proprietary in nature and therefore the health
department could assert the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a defense.
112. Id at 523, 263 S.E.2d at 361, citing Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
113. 44 N.C. App. 392, 261 S.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 299 N.C. 736, 267 S.E.2d 662 (1980).
Koury's company had been sued by John Meyer of Norwich for failure to pay debts. During the
trial against the company, which ended in a mistrial, Koury gave false testimony under oath
thereby attempting to perpetrate a fraud. Upon discovering the perjured testimony Meyer
amended its complaint, joined Koury as an additional party, and moved for an order that Koury
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fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
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be arrested. After a hearing Koury was arrested. Koury's subsequent motion to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action was granted. He then sued Meyer for false imprison-
ment, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. According to the court the latter two charges
were properly dismissed on summary judgment. The pivotal issue in the false imprisonment
charge was whether, at the time of the pre-judgment arrest, there was probable cause for the
arrest.
Causes for which a defendant in a civil action may be subjected to prejudgment arrest are
specified in G.S. 1-410. This statute, which has been operational for over a hundred years, autho-
rizes civil arrests when an action is brought to recover damages for fraud. Acknowledging that
Koury's activities in the first trial constituted fraud within the intent of G.S. 1-410(4) the court
held that there was probable cause for Koury's arrest. In dictum, however, the court stated that
there is a serious question whether G.S. 1-410 violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution despite the fact that the statute is
within the ambit of the North Carolina constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt
"except in case of fraud." See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 28.
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